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FAILING TO KEEP THE CAT IN THE BAG:  
A DECENNIAL ASSESSMENT OF FEDERAL RULE 
OF EVIDENCE 502’S IMPACT ON FORFEITURE OF 
LEGAL PRIVILEGE UNDER CUSTOMARY 
WAIVER DOCTRINE 
 
JARED S. SUNSHINE* 
 
ABSTRACT 
Federal Rule of Evidence 502—providing certain exemptions from the surrender 
of attorney-client and work product privilege because a confidential item was 
disclosed—had great expectations to live up to after its enactment in 2008, as Congress 
and others heralded it as a panacea to litigation’s woes in the face of bourgeoning 
discovery. The enacted rule was the subject of much skepticism by the academic 
punditocracy, however. Ten years later, this Article surveys the actual results and finds 
that, regrettably, pessimism has proven the better prediction. Percolation of debate 
over the rule’s many ambiguities and courts’ disparate approaches have not resolved 
initial critiques, but only diversified their targets and fostered new bubbles of 
confusion, conflict, and consternation. That said, FRE 502 has indeed improved some 
aspects of the state of the law of privilege—and may do more as consensus matures—
but has still left jurisprudence well short of the ideals dreamt of under its framers’ 
vision. Nonetheless, the game is worth the candle: The pursuit of a more perfect 
privilege vindicates the essential individual rights of Lockean society, and the ongoing 
quest thus reflects that of civilization itself. 
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* * * 
It bears remembering that the attorney-client privilege belongs to the 
client. That the client’s representative has let the cat out of the bag, 
inadvertently and without authorization, should not entitle the adverse party 
to take the horse, the dog, the hamsters, and the goldfish too.1 
As other courts have noted, “any order issued now by the court to attempt 
to redress these disclosures would be the equivalent of closing the barn door 
after the animals have already run away.” Thus, while Rule 502(b) would in 
essence allow me to round up the animals and put them back in the barn, 
defendants have not provided any evidence that they took reasonable efforts 
to keep the barn door closed.2 
The abiding principle should be the narrowest scope of waiver, which 
conforms to fairness to both parties and which, now that a portion of the cat 
 
1 Greenleaf Arms Realty Trust I, LLC v. New Bos. Fund, Inc., 30 Mass. L. Rptr. 477, at *4–
5 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2012). 
2 Amobi v. D.C. Dep’t of Corr., 262 F.R.D. 45, 55 (D.D.C. 2009) (quoting Victor Stanley, 
Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 251, 259 (D. Md. 2008)). 
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is out of the bag, is most likely to arrive at a clear notion of just what the 
contours of the cat are.3 
INTRODUCTION 
Federal Rule of Evidence 502 celebrated its tenth birthday on September 19, 
2018.4 One does not ordinarily commemorate the anniversary of federal rules, but so 
many had attended to its passage that the wishing of many happy returns seems apt.5 
Congressmen had verily proclaimed it the savior of modern litigation in approving the 
law!6 Yet unlike its senior antecedent codified at 501, FRE 502 addresses itself to a 
highly particularized aspect of privilege: certain exceptions to the waiving the 
attorney-client or work product privilege by virtue of disclosing the information so 
protected.7 One might not think so narrow a subject to merit such august attention,8 
but questions of waiver are amongst the most thorny and debated areas of the law of 
evidence—and that jurisprudence is hardly one that suffers from simplicity generally.9 
One early celebrant of FRE 502 noted that “[m]uch of the dissatisfaction with the 
previous state of affairs focused on the question of waiver—when the protection would 
be waived and the scope of such a finding.”10 The most recent edition of Edna Selan 
Epstein’s classic hornbook on privilege, now incorporating law under FRE 502, 
devotes no less than four hundred and forty-two pages—one quarter of the entire 
treatise—to the subject.11 “No area of the law of privilege is more fraught with 
 
3 EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK PRODUCT 
DOCTRINE 834 (6th ed. 2017). 
4 Act of Sept. 19, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-322, § 1(c), 122 Stat. 3538. Coincidentally, 2018 
was also the seventy-fifth anniversary of the death of Dean John Henry Wigmore, a towering 
figure in the world of privilege who will figure prominently in this Article. 
5 See infra note 16; see also infra Part III (describing how FRE 502 was formulated). 
6 See Michael Correll, The Troubling Ambition of Federal Rule of Evidence 502(d), 77 MO. 
L. REV. 1031, 1031–32 (2012). 
7 FED. R. EVID. 502. 
8 Cf., e.g., Correll, supra note 6, at 1032 (“These claims may, at first blush, seem alarmist. 
After all, Rule 502(d)—a very brief, forty-six-word ‘enabling’ provision—sits at the end of a 
fairly narrow rule clearly targeted at issues regarding inadvertent disclosures and productions 
in government investigations.”). 
9 See Kenneth S. Broun & Daniel J. Capra, Getting Control of Waiver of Privilege in the 
Federal Courts: A Proposal for a Federal Rule of Evidence 502, 58 S.C. L. REV. 211, 213–17 
(2006); Roger P. Meyers, An Analysis of Federal Rule of Evidence 502 and its Early 
Application, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1441, 1446–47 (2009). 
10 Meyers, supra note 9, at 1446. 
11 See EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 508–835 (attorney-client); id. at 1279–1394 (work product). 
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complexity than the area of waivers,” concludes Epstein, offering proof: “Witness the 
length of this chapter.”12 
This Article thus appropriates the decennial of FRE 502 as an opportunity to assess 
its real-world efficacy on the jurisprudence of waiver, both simpliciter and subject-
matter, and, more broadly, how its treatment of waiver has affected the use of 
privilege, both attorney-client and work product. Part I describes the harsh standards 
imposed by earlier courts hewing to the progenitor of modern privilege law, Dean John 
Henry Wigmore. Those standards demanded near-perfection in protecting secrets 
against any conceivable threat in the first place, and demanded an almost reflexive 
finding of waiver, or even of a “subject matter waiver” over a broad swath of attorney 
communications or work product. The Article then, in Part II, explores mounting—if 
conflicting—countercurrents questioning traditional Wigmorean precedent around the 
turn of the millennium, and how bourgeoning discovery and concomitant costs 
accelerated change, segueing in the pivotal Part III to the briefest of discussions of the 
development and adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence 502 itself in 2008. 
The Article thereupon leaps forward ten years to Part IV, scrutinizing, in depth, 
decisions under the new jurisprudential schema: in Section A, to detect any intimations 
of adherence to the ancien régime or revanchism and to explore the newly competing 
rules of decision that FRE 502(b) has engendered; in Section B, to consider how and 
whether modifications to subject-matter waiver continue to serve the tried and true 
doctrine that privilege may not be used as both sword and shield; in Section C, to 
compare the responsibilities of the producing and receiving parties in remediating 
inadvertent errors; and in Section D, to alight on the increasing use of bespoke 
interparty covenants regulating waiver. Part V then briefly reviews zones in which the 
rules of privilege and waiver by disclosure remain ostensibly unchanged, and yet seem 
to have been influenced by FRE 502 all the same. The Article describes throughout 
Part VI some structural and philosophical challenges to privilege in the era of FRE 
502, narrating progress made thus far and some avenues for improvement, culminating 
in Part VII with proposed rules of interpretation for the various subparts of the Rule. 
A brief conclusion steps further from the fray of privilege to ask whence privilege has 
come, whither precedent on waiver may yet lead, and whether all of the opinions, 
litigation, scholarship, and general hand-wringing are effectual: is the game worth the 
candle—and does FRE 502 make it more or less so?13 
No small number of assessments of FRE 502 were undertaken shortly after its 
enactment with varying emphases but oddly similar conclusions.14 All noted as 
 
12 Id. at 834. So too, alas, of this Article. 
13 Cf. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 684 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Rather, the 
question here is whether the Act, given its restrictions on adult access, significantly advances 
that interest. In other words, is the game worth the candle?”). 
14 See, e.g., David D. Cross & Nathiya Nagendra, The Demise of Subject Matter Waiver: 
Federal Rule of Evidence 502(a) Five Years Later, BLOOMBERG BNA (2013); John M. Barkett, 
Evidence Rule 502: The Solution to the Privilege-Protection Puzzle in the Digital Era, 81 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1589 (2013); Jeffrey G. Close, FRE 502, Inadvertence in Privilege Waiver, 
and Avoiding Malpractice, 21 PRETRIAL PRAC. & DISCOVERY 22 (2013); James P. McLoughlin 
Jr. et al., Navigating Implied Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege After Adoption of Federal 
Rule 502 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 693 (2012); Correll, 
supra note 6; Paul W. Grimm et al., Federal Rule of Evidence 502: Has It Lived Up to Its 
Potential?, XVII RICH. J.L. & TECH. 8 (2011); Ann M. Murphy, Federal Rule of Evidence 502: 
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premise that the revisions were timely (and indeed designed) to combat the ballooning 
scope of litigation discovery and costs in light of email and other sources of 
electronically stored information.15 Yet even a year or two after FRE 502’s 
promulgation, many were pessimistic about the rule’s chances to achieve those 
goals,16 or at best agnostic,17 with few exceptions.18 Critics dissected every aspect of 
the rule: its treatment of intentional19 and inadvertent disclosures,20 its interplay with 
 
The Get Out of Jail Free Provision—Or Is It?, 41 N.M. L. REV. 193 (2011); John W. Gergacz, 
Attorney-Client Privilege: Inadvertent Disclosure and a Proposed Construction of Federal Rule 
of Evidence 502, 5 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1 (2011); Paula Schaefer, The Future of Inadvertent 
Disclosure: The Lingering Need to Revise Professional Conduct Rules, 69 MD. L. REV. 195 
(2010); Wayne Morse Jr., Oops, It Happened Again: Inadvertent Disclosure Under New 
Federal Rules of Evidence 502, 71 ALA. LAW. 65 (2010); Henry S. Noyes, Federal Rule of 
Evidence 502: Stirring the State Law of Privilege and Professional Responsibility with a 
Federal Stick, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 673 (2009); Patrick M. Emery, The Death of Selective 
Waiver: How New Federal Rule of Evidence 502 Ends the Nationalization Debate, 27 J.L. & 
COMM. 231 (2009); Jonathan M. Redgrave & Jennifer J. Kehoe, New Federal Rule of Evidence 
502: Privileges, Obligations, and Opportunities, 56 FED. LAW. 34 (2009); Meyers, supra note 
9; Jerry Cavaneau, New Fed. R. Evid. 502—How Well Will It Work?, 44 ARK. LAW. 10 (2009); 
Lucius T. Outlaw III, The Reasonable Problem with FRE 502(b), Mealey’s Litigation Report: 
Discovery, May 2009, at 1; see also, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried, Protecting the Attorney-
Client Privilege in Business Negotiations: Would the Application of the Subject-Matter Waiver 
Doctrine Really Drive Attorneys from the Bargaining Table, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 167 (2013) 
(touching on FRE 502 meaningfully but tangentially). 
15 See, e.g., Cross & Nagendra, supra note 14, at 1; Barkett, supra note 14, at 1589–90; 
Imwinkelried, supra note 14, at 169–170; Correll, supra note 6, at 1031–32, 1068–71; Grimm 
et al., supra note 14, at 4–6; Murphy, supra note 14, at 195–96; Gergacz, supra note 14, at 6–
9, 17; Schaefer, supra note 14, at 199–200; Morse, supra note 14, at 66; Noyes, supra note 14, 
at 675, 684–87; Emery, supra note 14, at 242–43; Redgrave & Kehoe, supra note 14, at 34; 
Meyers, supra note 9, at 1449; Cavaneau, supra note 14, at 10; Outlaw III, supra note 14, at 1, 
7. 
16 See, e.g., McLoughlin et al., supra note 14, at 751–52; Correll, supra note 6, at 1070–71; 
Grimm et al., supra note 14, at 19, 79; Gergacz, supra note 14, at 7; Schaefer, supra note 14, at 
201–02; Noyes, supra note 14, at 759–61; Outlaw III, supra note 14. 
17 See, e.g., Cross & Nagendra, supra note 14, at 1–2; Barkett, supra note 14, at 1619–20; 
Murphy, supra note 14, at 231; Gergacz, supra note 14, at 17; Emery, supra note 14, at 297–
98; Meyers, supra note 9, at 1485; Cavaneau, supra note 14, at 10. 
18 See, e.g., Morse, supra note 14, at 67 (“However, thoughtful, well-informed practice under 
Rule 502 should help control costly electronic discovery and privilege reviews meant to protect 
against inadvertent disclosure.”). 
19 See, e.g., Cross & Nagendra, supra note 14, at 3–4; McLoughlin et al., supra note 14; 
Grimm et al., supra note 14, at 19–27. 
20 See, e.g., Barkett, supra note 14, at 1595; Gergacz, supra note 14; Grimm et al., supra note 
14, at 27–55; Schaefer, supra note 14; Meyers, supra note 9, at 1457–58; Outlaw III, supra note 
14. 
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state privilege law,21 and its provisions for interparty agreements and court orders.22 
Some, indeed, thought the rule overall would be downright counterproductive:23 one 
author, only eight months after the rule was enacted, predicted that its unintended 
consequences “will not only undermine the very purpose of the rule, but will 
drastically increase the costs and burdens of discovery.”24 
The last of this initial spate of articles undertook a brief review at the law’s 
quinquennial in late 2013.25 As is often the case, scholarly interest waned after the 
new rule’s birthing pangs, and the passage of over a decade has now multiplied 
decisions applying the new rule many times over and allowed ambit for divisions and 
distinctions to percolate and meander towards resolution.26 A renewed examination 
of whether the pessimism has been borne out is timely.27 Regrettably, percolation has 
not resolved many initial critiques, but only diversified their targets and fostered new 
bubbles of confusion, conflict, and consternation. Some problems of privilege are 
closer to resolution, but those very solutions have engendered yet more ramifications 
in the law of waiver, insinuating a distressingly nihilist conclusion that the nuances of 
privilege are too delicate to address in gross. Measured thus far,28 FRE 502 may well 
have improved some aspects of the law of privilege, but has still left jurisprudence 
well short of the ideals envisioned by its framers.29 Indeed, a decade into the latest 
phase of the perennial project to improve privilege, one wonders if that glorious vision 
of a fair, efficient, and predictable privilege may ever be realized.30 
 
21 See, e.g., Noyes, supra note 14, at 679–83; Emery, supra note 14, at 294; Meyers, supra 
note 9, at 1465–67; Cavaneau, supra note 14, at 11. 
22 See, e.g., Barkett, supra note 14; Correll, supra note 6; Grimm et al., supra note 14; 
Murphy, supra note 14; Schaefer, supra note 14, Noyes, supra note 14; Emery, supra note 14, 
at 295–96. 
23 See, e.g., Correll, supra note 6, at 1070–71; Noyes, supra note 14, at 760–61; Outlaw III, 
supra note 14, at 8. 
24 Outlaw III, supra note 14, at 8 (emphasis added). 
25 Cross & Nagendra, supra note 14, at 1. 
26 See Correll, supra note 6, at 1054 (“Those controversies, while too new and undeveloped 
to offer reliable instruction, illustrate a number of potential roadblocks, judicial preferences, and 
unanticipated issues that may guide the future development of other aspects of the rule.”); 
Redgrave & Kehoe, supra note 14, at 37 (“Counsel can expect courts to begin issuing opinions 
that address some of the questions about the effects of Rule 502 and how it is applied in the real 
world.”); cf. Meyers, supra note 9, at 1468 (noting the paucity of cases in 2009 and noting 
certain provisions had occasioned no decisions yet). 
27 Cf. Cross & Nagendra, supra note 14, at 1 (noting the need for reassessment after five 
years). 
28 As its title suggests, this Article largely restricts itself to cases from the ten years following 
the passage of FRE 502.  
29 See Grimm et al., supra note 14, at 79; Murphy, supra note 14, at 238; Schaefer, supra 
note 14, at 233–34; Meyers, supra note 9, at 1485–86; Cavaneau, supra note 14, at 12. 
30 See Broun & Capra, supra note 9, at 271–73 (explaining the rulemakers’ vision). 
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The World of Waiver That Was 
I. THE PERILOUS SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS OF CUSTOMARY WAIVER 
DOCTRINE 
“Earlier cases,” observes Epstein, “seemingly enlarged on the scope of the waiver 
more than would be likely today.”31 This observation might seem odd, given that 
whatever was waived would assumptively be defined by what was divulged—but for 
the judicial invention of the “subject-matter waiver doctrine,” under which 
compromise of one secret might jeopardize them all.32 Thus, the Second Circuit could 
find in the 1923 case, Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen v. Dexter & Carpenter, that all 
privilege in communications with counsel was waived after a single specimen had 
been introduced to prove a point,33 just as the Supreme Court had held in 1888 that 
where the “client has voluntarily waived the privilege, it cannot be insisted on to close 
the mouth of the attorney.”34 Prior to further disturbing this bizarre and ornery creature 
of jurisprudence, however, perhaps it is best to begin at the beginning. 
  
 
31 EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 787. 
32 See generally Meyers, supra note 9; see cases cited infra note 99. 
33 See Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen v. Dexter & Carpenter, 32 F.2d 195, 201 (2d Cir. 1929). 
34 See Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888). 
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A. Wigmore on Waiver, or, “Letting the Cat Out of the Bag”35 
Before there can be subject-matter waiver of privilege, there must be waiver 
simpliciter. Attorney-client and work-product privilege are so familiar to practitioners 
that little further elaboration is needed here where so much has gone before.36 As for 
waiver, similarly to many more-or-less counterintuitive features of the privilege, the 
concept arises from the nominal requirement of strict confidentiality for privilege to 
be preserved.37 To again recite the oft-recited formulation of 1904 by the legendary 
Dean John Henry Wigmore, attorney-client privilege applied when eight elements are 
satisfied: 
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal 
adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that 
purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance 
 
35 Needless to say, the idiom of “letting the cat out of the bag” is profoundly odd; were cats 
so frequently secreted in sacks that an aphorism might emerge to record their release? 
Academia, of course, has an answer: “letting the cat out of the bag originally referred to a way 
of avoiding the common fraud in 16th century markets of selling a cheap substitute—a cat 
hidden in a bag, instead of a pricier piglet. Similar expressions exist in Spanish ‘to sell cat for 
rabbit’ and German ‘to buy a cat in a bag.’” JAG BHALLA, I’M NOT HANGING NOODLES ON YOUR 
EARS AND OTHER INTRIGUING IDIOMS FROM AROUND THE WORLD 15–16 (Nat’l Geo. Books 
2009). When one recognizes “poke” to be dialectical term for a bag, the reference in English to 
“buying a pig in a poke,” e.g., Indiana Protection & Advocacy Servs., v. Indiana Family & Soc. 
Servs. Admin., 603 F.3d 365, 389 (7th Cir. 2010), reinforces that the Renaissance society 
whence these idioms derive suffered from a disturbing preoccupation with containerized 
farmyard animals in commerce. Were fraud so prevalent, one wonders why anyone bothered to 
offer or considered purchasing a pig in a poke, a cat in a sack, or any other bagged livestock. 
What kind of merchant tenders payment for a (hopefully) living, breathing creature allegedly 
ensconced in a sack, sight unseen? Academia again has a response at the ready. “Back in the 
Middle Ages, when the Muslims invaded Southern Europe, suddenly pork was declared 
unclean, and thus became a premium on the open market. Because of strict laws forbidding 
such, pigs were sold undercover, stashed in bags.” KARLEN EVINS, I DIDN’T KNOW THAT: FROM 
“ANTS IN THE PANTS” TO “WET BEHIND THE EARS”–THE UNUSUAL ORIGINS OF THE THINGS WE 
SAY 70 (Simon & Schuster 2007). Although one must accept this implausible etymology as the 
only explanation on offer for these idioms, the entire business registers as rather ridiculous and 
more suited to an antique world of fairy tales featuring magical beans proffered to artless 
bumpkins. See JOSEPH JACOBS, Jack and the Beanstalk, in ENGLISH FAIRY TALES 59 (David Nutt 
publ. 1890). 
36 See Jared S. Sunshine, Clients, Counsel, and Spouses: Case Studies at the Uncertain 
Junction of the Attorney-Client and Marital Privileges, 81 ALB. L. REV. 489, 493 (2018) 
[hereinafter Sunshine, Uncertain Junction] (citing Teri J. Dobbins, Great (and Reasonable) 
Expectations: Fourth Amendment Protection for Attorney-Client Communications, 32 SEATTLE 
U. L. REV. 35, 41 (2008)); see also, e.g., McLoughlin et al., supra note 14, at 711–24 (discussing 
privilege); Grimm et al., supra note 14, at 13–19 (same); Murphy, supra note 14, at 205–07 
(same); Gergacz, supra note 14, at 2–5 (same). 
37 See generally Correll, supra note 6, at 1033–38; Jared S. Sunshine, Seeking Common Sense 
for the Common Law of Common Interest in the D.C. Circuit, 65 CATH. U. L. REV. 833, 834–
36 (2016) [hereinafter Sunshine, Common Interest]. 
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permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, 
(8) except the protection be waived.38   
Yet the provenance of that most thorny condition for privilege—confidentiality—
is decidedly obscure prior to Wigmore.39 What historical evidence exists anent 
confidentiality in attorney-client communications suggests it was a weapon in the 
hands of clients, intended to allow them to compel counsel to protect their secrets, 
rather than a latent landmine waiting to obliterate their privilege at the casual slip of 
the tongue.40 No less an authority than Paul R. Rice has observed that it seems to have 
sprung Athena-like, fully formed41 from the head of Dean Wigmore himself, 
establishing itself by virtue of the Dean’s preeminence rather than doctrinal 
underpinnings or legal precedent.42 This is consistent with the 1924 observation that 
“[w]hen the first edition was published, it was only possible to judge of Mr. 
Wigmore’s book as a statement of the law. During the intervening years it has become 
something greater. It has created law.”43 Indeed, “once he had perpetrated a doctrine 
on the basis of little or no authority, precedents would soon follow to fill the gap.”44 
Thus by the latter half of the twentieth century, the requirement of confidentiality was 
 
38 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN 
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2292, at 554 (McNaughton rev. 1961); see United States v. Kovel, 
296 F.2d 918, 921 (2d Cir. 1961) (quoting id.); accord, e.g., Cavallaro v. United States, 284 
F.3d 236, 245 (1st Cir. 2002); United States v. Rockwell Int’l, 897 F. 2d 1255, 1264 (3d Cir. 
1990); NLRB v. Harvey, 349 F. 2d 900, 904 (4th Cir. 1965); United States v. El Paso Co., 682 
F. 2d 530, 538 n.9 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Goldfarb, 328 F.2d 280, 281 (6th Cir. 1964); 
United States v. Lawless, 709 F. 2d 485, 487 (7th Cir. 1977); Simon v. GD Searle & Co., 816 
F. 2d 397, 403 n.7 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v. Martin, 278 F. 3d 988, 999 (9th Cir. 2002). 
39 See Correll, supra note 6, at 1034–35; Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege: Continuing 
Confusion about Attorney Communications, Drafts, Pre-Existing Documents, and the Source of 
the Facts Communicated, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 967, 968 nn.2–5 (1999) [hereinafter Rice, 
Continuing Confusion]; PAUL R. RICE, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES § 
6:3 (Thomson Reuters ed., 2018) [hereinafter RICE, ACPITUS]. 
40 Paul R. Rice, Attorney Client Privilege: The Eroding Concept of Confidentiality Should 
Be Abolished, 47 DUKE L.J. 853, 868–72 (1998) [hereinafter Rice, Eroding Concept]; see 
Sunshine, Uncertain Junction, supra note 36, at 547–48 (first citing Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr., An 
Historical Perspective on the Lawyer-Client Privilege, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1061, 1071–72 (1978); 
and then citing Max Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communication Between Lawyer and 
Client, 16 CAL. L. REV. 487, 487 (1928)); Sunshine, Common Interest, supra note 37, at 834–
35 (discussing Hazard and Radin articles at length); Correll, supra note 6, at 1035–37; Rice, 
Continuing Confusion, supra note 39, at 968. 
41 See THOMAS BULFINCH, BULFINCH’S MYTHOLOGY 7, 107 (1913). 
42 See Rice, Continuing Confusion, supra note 39, at 968 n.5 (“The concept of confidentiality 
and secrecy was literally made up by Wigmore in the first edition of his treatise.”); Rice, 
Eroding Concept, supra note 40, at 859–61; RICE, ACPITUS, supra note 39; see also Sunshine, 
Uncertain Junction, supra note 36, at 547; Correll, supra note 6, at 1035–36. 
43 Zechariah Chafee Jr., Book Review, 37 HARV. L. REV. 513, 521 (1924). 
44 WILLIAM TWINING, THEORIES OF EVIDENCE: BENTHAM AND WIGMORE 111 (1985). 
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well established as a prerequisite for privilege.45 And under the sternest definitions of 
waiver, any compromise of confidentiality ended privilege in the communications.46 
Where a communication involving client and counsel was not confidential ab 
initio—for example, a colloquy on the record between a client, his counsel, their 
opponents, and the court—it would be strange to suggest privilege could (or should) 
later sequester what had been offered to opponents and ombudsman in its utterance.47 
The more fiddly question arose when a communication was manifestly confidential in 
the making but was later disclosed outside the attorney-client relationship—whether 
by express design, inadvertence, or utter misadventure.48 Three instances may 
illustrate these situations. The first might occur should a client wish to argue as a 
defense that she relied on advice of counsel in acting; once evidence of that advice is 
offered in that character, it would no longer be held privileged.49 The last imagines 
unforeseeable circumstances: a burglar, perhaps, breaking and entering counsel’s 
offices and publishing their client files.50 The intermediate situation then falls 
somewhere between: imagine a client tasked with preparing documents for transfer to 
court inadvertently included amongst them a privileged matter,51 or, for that matter, 
counsel doing so in the midst of a production to regulators.52 Or a cooperative client 
 
45 Correll, supra note 6, at 1037–38; RICE, ACPITUS, supra note 39 (“By 1950 Wigmore’s 
rule on confidentiality appears to have taken hold.”). 
46 RICE, ACPITUS, supra note 39; Jenkins v. Bartlett, 487 F.3d 482, 490 (7th Cir. 2007); 
Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1424 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(citing United States v. AT&T, 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980)); James Julian, Inc. v. 
Raytheon Co., 93 F.R.D. 138, 141 (D. Del. 1982) (“The presence of nonessential third parties 
not needed for the transmittal of the information will negate the privilege.”); EPSTEIN, supra 
note 3, at 335–44; WIGMORE, supra note 38, § 2311 (“One of the circumstances by which it is 
commonly apparent that the communication is not confidential is the presence of a third person 
. . . .”); Sunshine, Uncertain Junction, supra note 36, at 493–94, 497, 546–47; Sunshine, 
Common Interest, supra note 37, at 834–36; Jared S. Sunshine, The Part & Parcel Principle: 
Applying the Attorney-Client Privilege to Email Attachments, 8 J. MARSHALL L.J. 47, 74–75 
(2014) [hereinafter Sunshine, Part & Parcel]. 
47 See United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 359–61 (D. Mass. 
1950); Correll, supra note 6, at 1036–37; EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 508–09. 
48 See generally EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 508–835 (exploring such situations for over three 
hundred pages); cf., e.g., Sunshine, Uncertain Junction, supra note 36, at 524–38 (discussing 
varying results in cases in which attorney-client confidences were later transmitted to a spouse). 
49 E.g., Technitrol, Inc. v. Digital Equipment Corp., 18 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 561, 561 (N.D. Ill. 
1974). 
50 See Smith v. Armour Pharm. Co., 838 F. Supp. 1573, 1577 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (discussing 
such a scenario) (quoting infra note 275). 
51 E.g., Underwater Storage, Inc. v. U.S. Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546, 549 (D.D.C. 1970) 
(“The plaintiff turned over to his attorney the documents to be produced. This letter was among 
them. The Court will not look behind this objective fact to determine whether the plaintiff really 
intended to have the letter examined.”). 
52 E.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean Transp., 604 F.2d 672, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1979) 
(per curiam). 
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might allow the government free access to a voluminous set of internal files without 
realizing privileged material lay within.53 Unlike intentional disclosure, whether an 
incident of the latter varieties constitutes misadventure, negligence, or recklessness 
may be difficult to discern. 
To most early and even pre-modern courts, however, such distinctions were beside 
the point.54 They would see all three as circumstances covered under Wigmore’s terse 
final caveat, “unless the privilege be waived.”55 Wigmore himself expounded further: 
All involuntary disclosures, in particular, through the loss or theft of 
documents from the attorney’s possession, are not protected by the privilege, 
on the principle that, since the law has granted secrecy so far as its own 
process goes, it leaves to the client and attorney to take the measures of 
caution sufficient to prevent being overheard by third parties. The risk of 
insufficient precautions is upon the client. This principle applies equally to 
documents.56 
Whether disclosure was intentional or not, all that mattered was that the proverbial 
“cat is out of the bag.”57 This principle could prove quite punitive for well-intentioned 
parties, as in the 1950s case United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co.,58 where the 
target of a governmental antitrust investigation agreed to provide access to its general 
files, which invitation investigators eagerly accepted, ultimately photocopying a 
thousand germane to the case.59 The company later discovered that, unbeknownst to 
it at the time, some twenty-nine privileged documents had been inadvertently stored 
 
53 E.g., United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461, 464–65 (E.D. Mich. 1954). 
54 See, e.g., Texaco Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Dep’t of Consumer Affairs, 60 F.3d 867, 883–84 (1st 
Cir. 1995); In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Weil v. Inv./Indicators, 
Research and Mgmt., Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 24 (9th Cir. 1981) (“‘[I]nadvertence’ of disclosure does 
not as a matter of law prevent the occurrence of waiver.”); Ocean Transp., 604 F.2d at 675 (“An 
intent to waive one’s privilege is not necessary for such a waiver to occur.”); Kunglig 
Jarnvagsstyrelsen v. Dexter & Carpenter, 32 F.2d 195, 201–02 (2d Cir. 1929); Data Gen. Corp. 
v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 139 F.R.D. 556, 558–561 (D. Mass. 1991); Prudential Ins. Co. 
v. Turner & Newall, P.L.C., 137 F.R.D. 178, 182 (D. Mass. 1991); Suburban Sew ‘N Sweep, 
Inc. v. Swiss-Bernia, Inc. 91 F.R.D. 254, 260 (N.D. Ill. 1981); In re Grand Jury Proceedings 
Involving Berkley & Co., 466 F. Supp. 863, 869 (D. Minn. 1979), aff’d, 629 F.2d 548 (8th Cir. 
1980); Underwater Storage, 314 F.Supp. at 549; Kelsey-Hayes, 15 F.R.D. at 465.  
55 Compare supra note 38 with supra note 54. 
56 WIGMORE, supra note 39, § 2325, at 631. 
57 Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377 F. 3d 133, 144 n.11 (2nd Cir. 2004) (“‘Once the cat 
is out of the bag, the ball game is over.’ Calabrian Co. v. Bangkok Bank Ltd., 55 F.R.D. 82 
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) (addressing the use at trial of privileged documents when the privileged nature 
of the documents, which had not been maintained in confidence, was first asserted during the 
relevant witness’s cross-examination in open court)”); see cases cited supra note 54. 
58 15 F.R.D. at 461. 
59 Id. at 464. 
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amongst those the government accessed, and sought them excluded.60 In demurring, 
the court made much of the cat’s baglessness: “Plaintiff now knows the contents of 
the documents and has photostatic copies of each of them,” and as such applying the 
rule of privilege would be mere “mechanical obedience to a formula.”61 Citing 
Wigmore, the court continued in condemning the company’s practices: 
Nor is this result affected by [defendant]’s assertion that the privileged 
documents were inadvertently handed over to the Government’s 
representatives; that the mass of documents in its files were so voluminous 
that it did not know nor did it have time to discover that privileged ones were 
among them. It is difficult to be persuaded that these documents were 
intended to remain confidential in the light of the fact that they were 
indiscriminately mingled with the other routine documents of the corporation 
and that no special effort to preserve them in segregated files with special 
protections was made. One measure of their continuing confidentiality is the 
degree of care exhibited in their keeping, and the risk of insufficient 
precautions must rest with the party claiming the privilege.62 
Engendering rather less sympathy are those proponing privilege where they knew 
full well they were exposing specifically privileged records to view outside of 
discovery, even if they did not really wish to waive their privilege.63 Such was the 
case when documents intended for counsel were abandoned in a hallway outside his 
office: “If the cleaning woman, the watchman or any casual visitor might have 
rummaged through these documents, apparently with the consent of those being 
investigated, I assume that the Grand Jury is also entitled to rummage through the 
documents.”64 Likewise waiver ensued as to documents that a defendant had lodged 
with his accountant in an effort to conceal them from investigators;65 because the 
accountant had evidently been granted plenary access in service of the deceit, any 
privilege to the items within was waived.66 
More surprising, the result does not differ even if the once-bagged cat were 
kidnapped rather than set free: in Suburban Sew ‘N Sweep, Inc. v. Swiss-Bernia, Inc., 
plaintiffs alleging antitrust violations “developed a practice of searching the trash 
dumpster located in the parking lot of the office building where [one defendant] rented 
 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 464–65. 
62 Id. at 465. 
63 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 74–75 (2d Cir. 
1973); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Victor, 422 F. Supp. 475, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
64 Victor, 422 F. Supp. at 476. 
65 Horowitz, 482 F.2d at 74–75. 
66 Id. at 82 (“If Kasser had not wished to keep the communications between himself and his 
lawyers with him, he could have returned them to the lawyers. At the very least he could have 
directed Horowitz not to look at them. In contrast he treated the communications between 
himself and counsel on the same basis as all other records, with Horowitz, who was an 
independent contractor and not a servant, having a free run to look at what he pleased.”).  
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offices. This search for and retrieval of documents began in August of 1977 and 
continued for over two years. Hundreds of relevant documents were obtained.”67 The 
court found privilege forfeited even as to letters from the defendant’s president to its 
corporate counsel, despite the concededly slight “likelihood that third parties will have 
the interest, ingenuity, perseverance and stamina, as well as risk possible criminal and 
civil sanctions, to search through mounds of garbage in hopes of finding privileged 
communications.”68 Faulting the defendants’ diligence instead, the court held that “if 
the client or attorney fear such disclosure, it may be prevented by destroying the 
documents or rendering them unintelligible before placing them in a trash dumpster,” 
even whilst acknowledging such a course “may seem extreme.”69 
The court also noted that a “purloined letter [or] a stolen document . . . are not 
privileged”70—the subject of another case, in Minnesota.71 There, the court 
distinguished between documents lawfully seized by the government pursuant to a 
warrant, and those that had apparently been stolen by a disgruntled former employee 
and provided to the government.72 Counterintuitively, however, the court found 
privilege available to shield those qualifying from the lawfully acquired set, but 
categorically denied privilege to any documents that had been unlawfully taken, citing 
Wigmore’s insistence that the proponent of privilege do whatever is necessary to 
prevent even criminal malefactors from getting their documents.73 Yet this was as the 
Second Circuit had written half a century before in Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen (also 
citing Wigmore).74 It must be noted that not every early decision was prepared to 
credit Wigmore’s reflexive denunciation of the victims of malfeasance.75 An Ohio 
district court in 1984, for example, found that a closely-protected diary of 
communications pertaining to active litigation had been somehow obtained and 
 
67 Suburban Sew ‘N Sweep, Inc. v. Swiss-Bernia, Inc. 91 F.R.D. 254, 255–56 (N.D. Ill. 
1981). 
68 Id. at 260. 
69 Id. at 260–61. 
70 Id. at 259. 
71 In re Grand Jury Proceedings Involving Berkley & Co., 466 F. Supp. 863, 865 (D. Minn. 
1979), aff'd, 629 F.2d 548 (8th Cir. 1980). 
72 Id. at 868. 
73 Id. 
74 See Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen v. Dexter & Carpenter, 32 F.2d 195, 202 (2d Cir. 1929) 
(“Even evidence obtained by theft or other illegal means is admissible. While the federal courts 
hold that the use of evidence illegally obtained by federal officers violates the constitutional 
rights of a defendant in a criminal proceeding, the rule is not extended to illegal seizures by 
private persons, nor to civil suits.”) (citations omitted). 
75 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Mayman v. Martin Marietta Corp., 886 F. Supp. 1243, 1246 
(D. Md. 1995) (“outright theft”); Dyer v. William S. Bergman & Assocs., 657 A.2d 1132, 1138 
(D.C. 1995); In re Dayco Corp. Sec. Litig., 102 F.R.D. 468, 470 (S.D. Ohio 1984). 
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published by a local newspaper.76 Suggesting the company’s protections were 
reasonable, the court rejected the Wigmore approach and found the diary privileged, 
given it had been misappropriated without authorization.77 
Desultory mercies aside, the prevalent doctrinal approach in these stricter, early 
courts worked considerable violence to the ordinary meaning of waiver, which 
involves a reasonable degree of volition in effecting a waiver.78 Many other areas of 
the law, indeed, mandate that waivers be knowing, intentional, and voluntary, which 
is quite the antithesis of misadventure, and well beyond mere negligence as well.79 
That a company’s susceptibility to “dumpster diving,”80 or its offices’ 
burglarization,81 could constitute such an intentional act defies logic, equity, and 
decency; yet so it was with attorney-client privilege82 and work product.83 The proper 
term for such situations is forfeiture, not waiver.84 (Despite some authorities insisting 
 
76 Dayco Corp., 102 F.R.D. at 469. 
77 Id. at 470 (citing JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL 
EVIDENCE, § 503(a)(4)[01] (1982)). 
78 EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 508 (“The term ‘waiver’ used to describe by what means the 
privilege has been lost is singularly infelicitous.”); see, e.g., Sunshine, Common Interest, supra 
note 37, at 834. 
79 See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 483–84 (1981) (“The Court specifically noted that 
the right to counsel was a prime example of those rights requiring the special protection of the 
knowing and intelligent waiver standard….”); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) 
(“Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent 
acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.”); 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 384 (1966); see 
also EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 508 (“In other domains of the law waiver entails a knowing, 
voluntary, conscious and intentional relinquishment of that right by the holder thereof.”). 
80 See Suburban Sew ‘N Sweep, Inc. v. Swiss-Bernia, Inc., 91 F.R.D. 254, 260–61 (N.D. Ill. 
1981). 
81 Id. at 259; see In re Grand Jury Proceedings Involving Berkley & Co., 466 F. Supp. 863 
(D. Minn. 1979), aff’d, 629 F.2d 548 (8th Cir. 1980). 
82 EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 508 (observing that in the attorney-client context, “[w]aiver can 
and does occur by operation of law, despite the fact that the waiver may have been unknowing, 
involuntary, and unintentional.”). 
83 See Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 139 F.R.D. 556, 558–61 (D. Mass. 
1991); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Turner & Newall, P.L.C., 137 F.R.D. 178 (D. Mass. 1991). 
84 See EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 508–09; McLoughlin et al., supra note 14, at 725 n.128; Trs. 
of Elec. Workers Local No. 26 Pension Tr. Fund v. Tr. Fund Advs., Inc., 266 F.R.D. 1, 11 
(D.D.C. 2010); e.g., Hamer v. Neighborhood Housing Servs. of Chi., 138 S. Ct. 13, 17 n.1 
(2017) (first quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993); and then quoting 
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) ( “Waiver is different from forfeiture. Whereas 
forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is the ‘intentional 
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.”’)); United States v. Wesley, 422 F.3d 509, 
520 (7th Cir. 2005) (“A forfeiture is basically an oversight; a waiver is a deliberate decision”); 
see also Sunshine, Common Interest, supra note 37, at 834–35 n.11 (discussing same). 
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on a shift in nomenclature,85 this Article adheres to traditional terminology.) Such 
compelled waiver bears with it the unseemly intimation of the state forcibly extracting 
confessions86—à la the abuses of the infamous Star Chamber that gave rise to such 
protections as are found in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, guarding against 
compelled self-incrimination,87 and guaranteeing the right to public trial and 
counsel,88 respectively. These norms are fundamental to the very system of Anglo-
American criminal law.89 
Courts understandably retreated from the disturbing notion of returning to the 
Stuarts’ abuse of sequestered and coercive justice.90 Instead, they strove energetically 
to explain how forfeiture is really a voluntary waiver remaining within the control of 
the holder of the privilege, generally via the conceit that those who act negligently 
have constructively assented to waiver in deciding against affording privileged 
documents the necessary security to avoid disclosure.91 Absent a requirement of the 
most punctilious care, they reasoned, the temptation to shepherd documents under the 
 
85 E.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 508–09; In re Grand Jury John Doe Co., 350 F.3d 299, 302 
(2d Cir. 2003). 
86 See Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 212 (1988) (“Historically, the privilege was 
intended to prevent the use of legal compulsion to extract from the accused a sworn 
communication of facts which would incriminate him. Such was the process of the ecclesiastical 
courts and the Star Chamber—the inquisitorial method of putting the accused upon his oath and 
compelling him to answer questions designed to uncover uncharged offenses, without evidence 
from another source.”); accord Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 595–96 (1990). 
87 See Muniz, 496 U.S. at 595–96; Doe, 487 U.S. at 212; Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 
463, 470–71 (1976); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 439–40 (1974); Ullmann v. United 
States, 350 U.S. 422, 428 (1956); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 287 (1936). 
88 See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 538–39 (1965); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54 (1949); 
In re Oliver, 33 U.S. 257, 268–70 (1948). 
89 See Watts, 338 U.S. at 54 (“Such has been the characteristic of Anglo-American criminal 
justice since it freed itself from practices borrowed by the Star Chamber from the Continent 
whereby an accused was interrogated in secret for hours on end.”). 
90 See Kitchen v. Corizon Health Inc., No. 1:16-cv-1068, 2017 WL 5099892, at *3 (W.D. 
Mich. Nov. 5, 2017); Martis v. Dish Network, No. 1:13-cv-1106, 2013 WL 6002208, at *2–3 
(W.D. Mich. Nov. 12, 2013) (citing Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 
1165, 1177–79 (6th Cir. 1983)); State v. Deatore, 358 A.2d 163, 170 n.8 (N.J. 1975). 
91 See, e.g., F.C. Cycles Int’l, Inc. v. Fila Sport, S.p.A., 184 F.R.D. 64, 79 (D. Md. 1998) 
(“Moreover, this follows logically from a finding of unexcused inadvertence under the 
customary five factor test. As courts have suggested, the five factor test determines the 
‘constructive’ voluntariness or intentionality of the production from all the circumstances of its 
production.”); W. Trails, Inc. v. Camp Coast to Coast, Inc., 139 F.R.D. 4, 8–9 (D.D.C. 1991); 
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Marine Midland Realty Credit Corp., 138 F.R.D. 479, 482 (E.D. Va. 
1991) (“Inadvertent disclosures are, by definition, unintentional acts, but disclosures may occur 
under circumstances of such extreme or gross negligence as to warrant deeming the act of 
disclosure intentional.”); Suburban Sew ‘N Sweep, Inc. v. Swiss-Bernia, Inc. 91 F.R.D. 254, 
260–61 (N.D. Ill. 1981); United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461, 465 (E.D. 
Mich. 1954); see also In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
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moniker of privilege would face little restraint.92 By this logic, anything short of court-
compelled disgorgement of information thus entailed waiver.93 Tautologically, if due 
diligence had been taken, the documents would not have been divulged; the proof is 
in the pudding.94 The D.C. Circuit summarized this primordial view in its hugely 
influential decision in In re Sealed Case in 1989:95 
Even assuming Company’s disclosure was due to “bureaucratic error,” 
which we take to be a euphemism that necessarily implies human error, that 
unfortunate lapse simply reveals that someone in the company and thereby 
Company itself (since it can only act through its employees) was careless 
with the confidentiality of its privileged communications. Normally the 
amount of care taken to ensure confidentiality reflects the importance of that 
confidentiality to the holder of the privilege. To hold, as we do, that an 
inadvertent disclosure will waive the privilege imposes a self-governing 
restraint on the freedom with which organizations such as corporations, 
unions, and the like label documents related to communications with counsel 
as privileged. To readily do so creates a greater risk of “inadvertent” 
disclosure by someone and thereby the danger that the “waiver” will extend 
to all related matters, perhaps causing grave injury to the organization. But 
that is as it should be. Otherwise, there is a temptation to seek artificially to 
expand the content of privileged matter. In other words, if a client wishes to 
preserve the privilege, it must treat the confidentiality of attorney-client 
communications like jewels—if not crown jewels. Short of court-compelled 
disclosure, or other equally extraordinary circumstances, we will not 
distinguish between various degrees of “voluntariness” in waivers of the 
attorney-client privilege.96 
B. The Traditional Subject Matter Waiver Doctrine 
Nor did such harsh constructions of forfeiture under the misnomer of waiver 
exhaust the stringencies imposed on those seeking to preserve their privilege, as 
adumbrated by the D.C. Circuit’s reference to waiver extending to “all related 
matters.”97 The Ninth Circuit explained concisely in Weil v. Investment/Indicators, 
Research & Management, Inc. that “[b]ecause it impedes full and free discovery of 
 
92 W. Trails, 139 F.R.D. at 8–9; Sealed Case, 877 F.2d at 980. 
93 E.g., W. Trails, 139 F.R.D. at 8–9; Sealed Case, 877 F.2d at 980. 
94 See Int’l Dig. Sys. v. Dig. Equip. Corp., 120 F.R.D. 445, 448 (D. Mass. 1988); see cases 
cited supra note 91; see also EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 553–54; WIGMORE, supra note 38, § 
2325, at 631. 
95 Given the profusion of cases on privilege captioned as In re Sealed Case, this Article will 
limit references to the moniker in the main text to this epochal decision to avoid confusion. See 
Sunshine, Common Interest, supra note 37, at 860 n.189 (collecting such cases from the D.C. 
Circuit and opting for similar choice to avoid confusion). 
96 Sealed Case, 877 F.2d at 980. 
97 Id. 
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the truth, the attorney-client privilege is strictly construed,” and therefore “it has been 
widely held that voluntary disclosure of the content of a privileged attorney 
communication constitutes waiver of the privilege as to all other such communications 
on the same subject.”98 Other circuits agreed in the era of Wigmore99—indeed, nigh 
unto the eve of FRE 502.100 Nor was this subject matter waiver strictly limited to 
intentional disclosures: “Even an inadvertent waiver may extend to documents not 
produced which relate to the same subject matter as the documents for which the 
privilege was waived.”101 A number of other courts have agreed that whilst the 
circumstances of a disclosure bear upon the scope of the waiver, there was no 
categorical exemption to subject-matter waiver for unintentionality,102 often looking 
to the omnipresent Wigmore as justification:103 “A privileged person would seldom 
be found to waive, if his intention not to abandon could alone control the situation.”104 
  
 
98 Weil v. Inv./Indicators, Research & Mgt., Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 24 (9th Cir. 1981). 
99 See WIGMORE, supra note 38, § 2327, at 638 (“The client’s offer of his own or the 
attorney’s testimony as to a specific communication to the attorney is a waiver as to all other 
communications to the attorney on the same matter.”); e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 219 
F.3d 175, 183 n.4 (2d Cir. 2000); Genentech, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 122 F.3d 1409, 
1416 (Fed. Cir.1997); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 78 F.3d 251, 255 (6th Cir. 1996); In re 
Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 623 (4th Cir. 1988); In re Cont’l Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 
1302, 1314 n. 18 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Jones, 696 F.2d 1069, 1073 (4th Cir. 1982) 
(per curiam); United States v. Cote, 456 F.2d 142, 144–45 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v. 
Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 239–40 (1975). 
100 See Fort James Corp. v. Solo Cup Co., 412 F.3d 1340, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“The widely 
applied standard for determining the scope of a waiver of attorney-client privilege is that the 
waiver applies to all other communications relating to the same subject matter.”). 
101 First Wisc. Mortg. Trust v. First Wisc. Corp., 86 F.R.D. 160, 173 (1980) (nonetheless 
finding against subject matter waiver whilst quoting Wigmore). 
102 E.g., In re Grand Jury, 475 F.3d 1299, 1305 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Texaco Puerto Rico, Inc. 
v. Dep’t of Consumer Affairs, 60 F.3d 867, 883–84 (1st Cir. 1995); Sealed Case, 877 F.2d at 
980; Elkins v. D.C., 250 F.R.D. 20, 25–26 (D.D.C. 2008); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Johnson, No. 
Civ.A.00-2855, 2006 WL 2616187, at *18–20 (D.D.C. Sept. 12, 2006); Minebea Co. v. Papst, 
228 F.R.D. 34, 35 (D.D.C. 2005); In re United Mine Workers of Am. Emp. Benefit Plans Litig., 
159 F.R.D. 307, 309 (D.D.C. 1994); Mergentime Corp. v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 
761 F. Supp. 1, 1–2, 2 n.2 (D.D.C. 1991); W. Trails, Inc. v. Camp Coast to Coast, Inc., 139 
F.R.D. 4, 7–8 (D.D.C. 1991); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1161–
62 (D.S.C. 1974); see also F.C. Cycles Int’l, Inc. v. Fila Sport, S.p.A., 184 F.R.D. 64, 75–80 
(D. Md. 1998) (ordering subject matter waiver); Santrade, Ltd. v. Gen. Electric Co., 150 F.R.D. 
539, 543 (E.D.N.C. 1993) (“To the extent that [the plaintiff] has inadvertently or deliberately 
disclosed attorney client communications, it has waived attorney client privilege as to all 
communications on all subjects covered by these communications”). 
103 E.g., W. Trails, 139 F.R.D. at 8; Sealed Case, 877 F.2d at 979–80; Duplan, 397 F. Supp. 
at 1162. 
104 WIGMORE, supra note 38, § 2327, at 636. 
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1. Related Documents Ordered Produced 
The rationale for the subject matter waiver doctrine has thus always turned on 
notions of equity and fair play.105 When disclosure is tactical and intentional, courts 
quite sensibly admit the entirety of the subject matter to place the parties on a level 
playing field and to prevent one from trying to “hoodwink the other side.”106 Or as 
the Fifth Circuit said more formally, with a dutiful nod to Wigmore: 
[A] client’s offer of his own or his attorney’s testimony as to a specific 
communication constitutes a waiver as to all other communications on the 
same matter [because] “the privilege of secret communication is intended 
only as an incidental means of defense, and not as an independent means of 
attack, and to use it in the latter character is to abandon it in the former.”107 
So too for the production of documents.108 In Technitrol, Inc. v. Digital Equipment 
Corp., the Northern District of Illinois found subject matter waiver where the 
privilege’s proponent had released a legal opinion favorable to its position whilst 
seeking to withhold the remainder of counsel’s work on the subject.109 
Acknowledging the “attorney-client privilege is an important element of our system 
and should not be easily cast aside,” nonetheless “parties should not be able to 
manipulate the privilege so as to release only favorable information and withhold 
anything else.”110 To do so would “kidnap the truth-seeking process” wholesale.111 
This principle is intuitively correct, has been adopted by innumerable courts,112 and 
 
105 See In re Keeper of Records, 348 F.3d 16, 24–26 (1st Cir. 2003); Genentech, Inc. v. U.S. 
Int’l Trade Comm’n, 122 F.3d 1409, 1416 (Fed. Cir.1997); In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 
F.2d 619, 623 (4th Cir. 1988); see Imwinkelried, supra note 14, at 172–74 (exploring rationale 
for subject matter waiver); Gergacz, supra note 14, at 5–6; cf. WIGMORE, supra note 38, § 2327, 
at 638. 
106 EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 533 (“A privilege holder may not pick and choose which 
privileged matters on a given subject matter it will voluntarily disclose without thereby waiving 
the privilege as to similar communications. If you are going to show your privilege cards, you 
will have to show them all, not just those that allow you to hoodwink the other side most 
credibly.”). 
107 United States v. Woodall, 438 F.2d 1317, 1324 (5th Cir. 1970) (en banc) (quoting 
WIGMORE, supra note 38, § 2327, at 638); accord Nguyen v. Excel Corp., 197 F.3d 200, 207–
08, 208 n.19 (5th Cir. 1999). 
108 Cf. WIGMORE, supra note 38, § 2325, at 633 (“This principle applies equally to 
documents.”). 
109 Technitrol, Inc. v. Dig. Equip. Corp., Nos. 70 C 2916, 71 C 1082, 1974 WL 20497, at *1 
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 22, 1974). 
110 Id. 
111 In re Keeper of Records, 348 F.3d 16, 24 (1st Cir. 2003) (“Were the law otherwise, the 
client could selectively disclose fragments helpful to its cause, entomb other (unhelpful) 
fragments, and in that way kidnap the truth-seeking process.”). 
112 See, e.g., Eco Mfg. LLC v. Honeywell Int’l., Inc., No. 1:03-CV-0170-DFH, 2003 WL 
1888988, at *3–4 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 11, 2003); Brock Equities Ltd. v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, 
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was enunciated crisply as far back as the nineteenth century to support subject matter 
waiver consequent to intentional disclosure: “It would hardly be contended that the 
complainant could introduce extracts from these communications as evidence in its 
own behalf for the purposes of a final hearing, and yet withhold the other parts if their 
production were required by the defendant. A party cannot waive such a privilege 
partially.”113   
Subject matter waiver’s fairness was more attenuated when the predicate 
disclosure was not tactical but inadvertent, yet courts unpredictably ordered it all the 
same.114 The notion was that if the privilege’s proponent did not care enough to 
safeguard its privilege on the matter, it was only proper that the privilege be lost 
wholesale rather than piecemeal, inadvertence notwithstanding, as a Maryland court 
explained in great detail in F.C. Cycles International v. Fila Sport.115 After losing its 
argument that a key memorandum was not privileged at all,116 Fila conceded the 
document had been divulged, but contended the disclosure was inadvertent, and thus 
there should be no waiver, or at least no subject matter waiver.117 But given no 
showing of securing the document and unexplained delay in making the claim, Fila’s 
“‘Johnny come lately’ assertion of inadvertence [was] simply not enough to convince 
this Court.”118 Nonetheless, assuming arguendo disclosure had been inadvertent,119 
 
Inc., No. 92 Civ.8588, 1993 WL 350026, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 1993); Chinnici v. Cent. 
Dupage Ass’n, 136 F.R.D. 464, 465 (N.D. Ill. 1991); Abbott Labs. v. Baxter Travenol Labs., 
Inc., 676 F. Supp. 831, 832 (N.D. Ill. 1987); In re Int’l Harvester's Disposition of Wisconsin 
Steel, 666 F.Supp. 1148, 1153 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Nye v. Sage Prod., 98 F.R.D. 452, 453 (N.D. 
Ill. 1982); Cent. Soya Co. v. George A. Hormel & Co., 581 F. Supp. 51, 53 (W.D. Okla. 1982); 
Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n of Am. v. Shamrock Broad. Co., 521 F. Supp. 638, 641 
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); First Wis. Mortg. Tr. v. First Wis. Corp., 86 F.R.D. 160, 174 (E.D. Wis. 1980); 
Ranney-Brown Distribs., Inc. v. E.T. Barwick Indus., Inc., 75 F.R.D. 3, 6 (S.D. Ohio 1977); 
Smith v. FTC, 403 F.Supp. 1000, 1018–1019 (D. Del. 1975); Technitrol, 1974 WL 20497, at 
*1. 
113 W. Union Tel. Co. v. Balt. & Ohio Tel. Co., 26 F. 55, 56-57 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1885). The 
court continued: “He cannot remove the seal of secrecy from so much of the privileged 
communication as makes for his advantage, and insist that it shall not be removed as to so much 
as makes to the advantage of his adversary, or may neutralize the effect of such as has been 
introduced.” Id. 
114 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Pogue v. Diabetes Treatment Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 444 F.3d 
462, 478 (6th Cir. 2006) (Griffin, J., concurring); Texaco Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Dep’t of Consumer 
Affairs, 60 F.3d 867, 883–84 (1st Cir. 1995); Bellsouth Advert. & Pub. Corp. v. Bus. Lists, Inc., 
No. 1:90-CV-149-JEC, 1992 WL 338392, at *8 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 8, 1992). 
115 F.C. Cycles Int’l, Inc. v. Fila Sport, S.p.A., 184 F.R.D. 64, 75–80 (D. Md. 1998). 
116 Id. at 71. 
117 Id. at 72. 
118 Id. at 73–74 (“In sum, there were never any efforts to retrieve the document and privilege 
was not asserted as to the document until the defendant filed a memorandum in opposition to 
the instant motion in September 1998.”). 
119 Id. at 75. 
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the court proceeded to consider the fairness of subject matter waiver.120 The court 
reasoned that just as the memorandum’s waiver was at least constructively intentional 
because it was occasioned by gross negligence, so too was subject-matter waiver 
appropriate: “it is highly apparent that there was little or no effort made by the 
defendant to maintain the confidentiality of this document,” even if the actual 
divulgence was not intended.121   
Somewhat more sympathy may be due the defendant in Western Trails v. Camp 
Coast to Coast, where Western Trails sought to extract further documents associated 
with a privileged report produced by Coast to Coast, reasoning the privilege had been 
waived by its disclosure.122 Coast to Coast resisted on the basis that the production 
was inadvertent and represented merely one document out of many thousands, 
emphasizing the mistaken divulgence had been innocent and understandable given 
such volume.123 The D.C. district court was unmoved, citing the strict rule that 
inadvertence is no defense to waiver, which thereupon “extends ‘to all other 
communications relating to the same subject matter.’”124 Although the court allowed 
it had “discretion to impose less than the full scope of waiver,” it nonetheless ruled 
that the sought-for associated charts and reports ought to be disclosed notwithstanding 
the inadvertence.125 Exercising this discretion, however, less directly related 
documents were found to be beyond the legitimate reach of the subject matter 
waiver.126 
The district court for the District of Columbia would go on to embrace subject 
matter waiver warmly and recurrently, albeit with the same allowance in tailoring its 
 
120 Id. at 79–80. 
121 Id. at 80 (quoting Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Marine Midland Realty Credit Corp., 138 
F.R.D. 479, 482 (E.D. Va. 1991)). 
122 W. Trails, Inc. v. Camp Coast to Coast, Inc., 139 F.R.D. 4, 7 (D.D.C. 1991). 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 8–9 (quoting In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1982)); id. at 11–12. 
125 Id. at 11–12. 
126 Id. at 12–14. 
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extent.127 The results may still seem harsh; as with waiver simpliciter,128 the principle 
extends beyond recklessness and negligence even unto the victims of theft: in Elkins 
v. District of Columbia,129 the District had argued in its defense that “it is possible 
that the documents were impermissibly provided to [Plaintiffs] by disgruntled former 
District employees.”130 The court found their provenance irrelevant, even if illegal, 
and imposed subject matter waiver: “The law in this Circuit is clear—even the 
inadvertent disclosure of privileged information results in the waiver of the privilege 
for that information and all documents and communications relating to the same 
subject matter.”131 The reference to the D.C. Circuit is telling; as will be discussed 
later, that circuit has always been amongst the most miserly with privilege and 
expansive with waiver.132 
Is waiver fair if the lapse is not logistical but legal? This was the question answered 
in a federal case that eventuated after an earlier state proceeding had settled, in Sinclair 
Oil Corp. v. Texaco Inc.133 The plaintiff’s new attorneys proceeded to produce certain 
documents in discovery from the state counsel’s litigation files, and upon receiving 
these, the defendants moved to compel disclosure of all attorney-client 
communications between the plaintiffs and his lawyers on the basis of subject matter 
waiver.134 The new counsel argued that he had only disclosed the documents because 
they were not privileged at all, being only recitations of fact between attorney and 
client.135 But such communications are the very epitome of privilege, notwithstanding 
 
127 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury, 475 F.3d 1299, 1305 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Elkins v. D.C., 250 
F.R.D. 20, 25–26 (D.D.C. 2008); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Johnson, No. Civ.A.00-2855, 2006 WL 
2616187, at *18–20 (D.D.C. Sept. 12, 2006) (“‘[T]he confidentiality of communications 
covered by the [attorney-client] privilege must be jealously guarded by the holder of the 
privilege lest it be waived. The courts will grant no greater protection to those who assert the 
privilege than their own precautions warrant.’ Hence, a privilege holder's inadvertent disclosure 
of privileged materials will effect a waiver that “‘extends to all other communications relating 
to the same subject matter.’” (quoting In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1989)); 
In re United Mine Workers of Am. Emp. Benefit Plans Litig., 159 F.R.D. 307, 309 (D.D.C. 
1994); see also Elliott v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 521 F. Supp. 2d 41, 57–58 (D.D.C. 2007) 
(reciting principle in apparent intentional disclosure case); Minebea Co. v. Papst, 228 F.R.D. 
34, 35 (D.D.C. 2005) (same). 
128 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings Involving Berkley & Co., 466 F. Supp. 863 (D. 
Minn. 1979), aff'd, 629 F.2d 548 (8th Cir. 1980); see also Suburban Sew ‘N Sweep, Inc. v. 
Swiss-Bernia, Inc. 91 F.R.D. 254, 259 (N.D. Ill. 1981). 
129 Elkins, 250 F.R.D. at 25–26.  
130 Id. at 26. 
131 Id. 
132 See infra Section II.A.1. 
133 Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Texaco Inc., 208 F.R.D. 329, 331 (N.D. Okla. 2002). 
134 Id. at 331. 
135 Id. at 332. 
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counsel’s misapprehension.136 Despite the inadvertence involved in the mistake of 
law, the district court not only found privilege waived, but invoked subject matter 
waiver to order disclosure of “all attorney client communications in the prior state 
court lawsuit.”137 At least (for fairness’s sake?) this was less than defendant’s desired 
“blanket or complete waiver” of privilege in the instant federal suit.138 Other helpful 
but mistaken disclosures of privileged material have yielded similar results.139 
Of course, the produced items must actually be privileged to implicate waiver.140 
In a droll inversion of Sinclair Oil, the defendant in Intervet, Inc. v. Merial Ltd. 
claimed that the patent analyses it had received were privileged, and demanded all 
related subject matter be revealed.141 Intervet objected that the analyses were not 
privileged, but its position was complicated by its inconsistent defensive tactic of 
clawing back the production and replacing the analyses with redacted versions.142 The 
court found this mattered not a whit, for Intervet was correct that “the invocation of 
[subject matter waiver] requires that the document on which the waiver was based was 
privileged in the first place; it is non sequitur to deduce a waiver from the production 
of a document that is not privileged.”143 With evident irritation, the court denounced 
Merial’s attempt to propone privilege over the holder’s correct objections as “pure 
 
136 Id. (“Plaintiff maintains that some of the documents which were sent by Plaintiff's prior 
attorney to Plaintiff but which communicated purely ‘factual information’ are not attorney client 
communications. The Court disagrees. The Court understands, in principle, the distinction 
which Plaintiff's counsel is attempting to draw. And, in some respects, the Court applauds 
Plaintiff's counsel's efforts at attempting to provide as much factual information to Defendant 
in discovery as possible. However, factual information which is communicated by an attorney 
to a client within the context of the attorney client relationship is protected by the attorney client 
privilege.”).   
137 Id. at 333. 
138 Id. at 332–33. 
139 See, e.g., United States v. Cote, 456 F.2d 142, 144–45 (8th Cir. 1972) (when accountant 
transcribed the results of workpapers prepared under attorney supervision and thus privileged, 
the resultant submission of those results waived privilege as to the underlying workpapers); In 
re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., No. 94-C-897, 1995 WL 683777, at *3 
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 1995) (erroneous discrepancy in redactions yielded waiver). 
140 See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Johnson, No. Civ.A.00-2855, 2006 WL 2616187, at *19–20 (D.D.C. 
Sept. 12, 2006) (“In the end, very little subject-matter waiver has occurred. This is a direct result 
of the fact that most of the waiver documents are not, as the Court has concluded, covered by 
the attorney-client privilege in the first instance.”). 
141 Intervet, Inc. v. Merial Ltd., 252 F.R.D. 47, 52 (D.D.C. 2008). 
142 Id. (“Thus, in the perfect converse of the ordinary situation, the titular holder of the 
privilege, Intervet, is insisting that the documents are not privileged while Merial is insisting 
they are. . . . Intervet, claiming that Exhibits 64 and 67 are not privileged, nevertheless ‘clawed 
them back’ under a provision of a Protective Order, pertaining to the production of privileged 
material. It then produced them in a redacted form, even though Merial had already seen them 
in an unredacted form, and used them during the deposition.”). 
143 Id. 
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gamesmanship” and “pure gotcha,” and its sought-after waiver utterly out of 
proportion to Intervet’s arguably inconsistent assertions.144 
2. Privilege in Related Documents Upheld 
Fairness did not always mean more disclosure—even after the intentional variety. 
Deploying one of the most oft-conjured metaphors in jurisprudence,145 the Second 
Circuit in In re Von Bulow reviewed a district court’s finding that it was “unfair to 
permit a party to make use of privileged information as a sword with the public, and 
then as a shield in the courtroom. Thus, the trial judge found what is generally called 
a ‘waiver by implication,’ based on fairness considerations.”146 The case itself was of 
great notoriety: Claus Von Bulow had been convicted for the attempted murder of his 
wife, but the conviction was overturned and he was acquitted upon retrial.147 His 
lawyer, Alan Dershowitz, then published a book detailing the trial, including 
communications between Dershowitz and Von Bulow; in the ensuing civil case 
against Von Bulow, plaintiffs accordingly sought to abrogate attorney-client privilege 
from the criminal trial.148 The court of appeals, however, following its view of fairness 
(and invoking the by-now-familiar metaphorical cat), thought otherwise, having 
distinguished the Ninth Circuit’s broader formulation: 
[W]here, as here, disclosures of privileged information are made 
extrajudicially and without prejudice to the opposing party, there exists no 
reason in logic or equity to broaden the waiver beyond those matters actually 
revealed. Matters actually disclosed in public lose their privileged status 
because they obviously are no longer confidential. The cat is let out of the 
bag, so to speak. But related matters not so disclosed remain confidential. 
Although it is true that disclosures in the public arena may be “one-sided” or 
“misleading”, so long as such disclosures are and remain extrajudicial, there 
is no legal prejudice that warrants a broad court-imposed subject matter 
waiver. The reason is that disclosures made in public rather than in court—
even if selective—create no risk of legal prejudice until put at issue in the 
litigation by the privilege-holder.149 
This represented a widely-held recognition that non-tactical disclosures long 
before litigation (or perhaps in attempt to avoid litigation entirely) were less 
blameworthy than those used during litigation to gain advantage.150 Disclosures in a 
 
144 Id. at 52–53. 
145 See Rice, Continuing Confusion, supra note 39, at 998. 
146 In re von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94, 101 (2d Cir. 1987). 
147 Id. at 96. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 103. 
150 In re Keeper of Records, 348 F.3d 16, 24–26 (1st Cir. 2003); accord Electro Scientific 
Indus. v. Gen. Scanning, Inc., 175 F.R.D. 539, 543–44 (N.D. Cal. 1997). 
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lawsuit are different;151 fifteen years after Von Bulow, the Second Circuit returned to 
the subject to reaffirm that “the attorney-client privilege cannot at once be used as a 
shield and a sword” and found that the defendant’s aim to represent that he believed 
his actions to be legal would waive privilege as to any conversations with counsel 
bearing on that belief.152 This made sense: to allow the defendant to testify in court as 
to what counsel had informed him whilst denying his adversary discovery into what 
counsel had in fact said would be the essence of unfair play.153 Ultimately, however, 
the definition of subject matter remained circumscribed by such fairness, as in United 
States v. Skeddle, where the court declined to order plenary waiver of privilege as to 
an entire investigation on the basis of brief testimony by a company’s general 
counsel.154 Contrary to the Sinclair Oil court’s reasoning, “[t]o use these limited, 
factual disclosures as a bootstrap to discover Miller’s entire investigative file would 
run counter to the principles underlying the narrow waiver of the attorney-client 
privilege.”155 
Quite naturally, moreover, the majority of courts found fairness militates against 
subject matter waiver in cases of inadvertent disclosure. Though there may be no 
categorical exception,156 the rule that “a disclosure waives not only the specific 
communication but also the subject matter of it in other communications is not 
appropriate in the case of inadvertent disclosure, unless it is obvious that a party is 
attempting to gain an advantage or make offensive or unfair use of the disclosure.”157 
Numerous judges over the decades adopted this principle together with its slender 
exception.158 Such was the result in Hercules, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., where any overlap 
 
151 See Keeper of Records, 348 F.3d at 24–26. 
152 United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1292 (2d Cir. 1991). 
153 See id. at 1293; see also Keeper of Records, 348 F.3d at 24–25 (“In the former setting [of 
offering testimony at trial], the likelihood of prejudice looms: once a litigant chooses to put 
privileged communications at issue, only the revelation of all related exchanges will allow the 
truth-seeking process to function unimpeded.”). 
154 United States v. Skeddle, 989 F. Supp. 917, 919–20 (N.D. Ohio 1997). 
155 Id. at 920; see also Keeper of Records, 348 F.3d at 25 (“Where a party has not thrust a 
partial disclosure into ongoing litigation, fairness concerns neither require nor permit massive 
breaching of the attorney-client privilege.”). 
156 See First Wis. Mortg. Tr. v. First Wis. Corp., 86 F.R.D. 160, 174 (1980); see also cases 
cited supra note 102. 
157 Parkway Gallery Furniture, Inc. v. Kittinger/Pa. House Grp. Inc., 116 F.R.D. 46, 52 
(M.D.N.C. 1987) (citing cases). 
158 E.g., Blue Lake Forest Prods., Inc. v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 779, 798 (2007); Koch 
Materials Co. v. Schore Slurry Seal, Inc., 208 F.R.D. 109, 120 (D.N.J. 2002); Metzger v. City 
of Leawood, No. 00–2015–KHV, 2000 WL 1909637, at *3–4 (D. Kan. Dec. 20, 2000); Draus 
v. Healthtrust, Inc., 172 F.R.D. 384, 390 (S.D. Ind. 1997); Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland 
v. McCulloch, 168 F.R.D. 516, 521 n. 7 ( E.D. Pa. 1996); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Marine 
Midland Realty Credit Corp., 138 F.R.D. 479, 484 (E.D. Va. 1991); In re Sause Bros. Ocean 
Towing, 144 F.R.D. 111, 115–16 (D. Ore. 1991); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Turner & Newall, 137 
F.R.D. 178, 182–83 (D. Mass. 1991); Bud Antle, Inc. v. Grow-Tech, Inc., 131 F.R.D. 179, 183–
84 (N.D. Cal. 1990); Golden Valley Microwave Foods, Inc. v. Weaver Popcorn Co., 132 F.R.D. 
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in subject matter with the inadvertently produced documents was general at best, and 
none would “unfairly deprive defendant of access to facts relevant to particular subject 
matter disclosed in already produced documents.”159 So too where a client had 
misunderstood his counsel’s advice and made privileged documents available to his 
adversaries, a layperson’s error “does not warrant a finding that [the party] has waived 
what would essentially be its entire world of privileged documents.”160 Another court 
explained colorfully that even if one party “opened the gate by inadvertently 
producing” a privileged document, “defendants are not entitled to drive a bulldozer 
through it.”161 And yet another announced emphatically in 1990 that it “could find no 
cases where unintentional or inadvertent disclosure of a privileged document resulted 
in the wholesale waiver of the attorney-client privilege as to undisclosed documents 
concerning the same subject matter.”162 
As illustrated by the preceding Section, subsequent cases undid that last assertion. 
It is perhaps technically true that courts did not exercise the full ambit of their authority 
to impose waiver wholesale, whatever that means.163 Citations to discretion and 
professions of judicial restraint abounded in subject matter waiver orders where 
inadvertence was alleged: “The Court finds the emails were more narrow” in topic 
than the challengers sought;164 “the Court concludes that the scope of waiver urged . 
. . is unduly broad in the context of this case”;165 “limiting the scope of the alleged 
waiver to all other communications relating to the ‘same specific subject matter,’ as 
opposed to ‘the same subject matter’;166 “the factual context of the disclosure supports 
 
204, 208 (N.D. Ind. 1990); Colt Indus., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., Civ. A. No. 87-4107, 
1989 WL 46189, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 28, 1989); ICI Americas, Inc. v. John Wanamaker of 
Phila., No. 88–1346, 1989 WL 38647, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 18, 1989); Int’l Dig. Sys. v. Dig. 
Equip. Corp., 120 F.R.D. 445, 446–447 n.1 (D. Mass. 1988); Standard Chartered Bank, PLC v. 
Ayala Int’l. Holdings (U.S.), Inc., 111 F.R.D. 76, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
159 Hercules, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 156–57 (D. Del. 1977). 
160 Wunderlich-Malec Sys., Inc. v. Eisenmann Corp., No. 05-C-04343, 2006 WL 3370700, 
at *10 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 7, 2006) (agreeing the “Wigmore doctrine of strict waiver is atavistic and 
generates harsh results”) (quoting Graco Children’s Prods., Inc. v. Dressler, Goldsmith, Shore 
& Milnamow, Ltd., No. 95-C-1303, 1995 WL 360590, at *7 (N.D. Ill. June 14, 1995)). 
161 In re Herschinger Inv. Co. of Del., 303 B.R. 18, 26 (D. Del. 2003). In fairness, the context 
was the work production privilege, which implicates slightly different concerns as to subject 
matter waiver. 
162 Golden Valley Microwave Foods, 132 F.R.D. at 207. 
163 See Elkins v. D.C., 250 F.R.D. 20, 25–26 (D.D.C. 2008); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Johnson, No. 
Civ.A. 00-2855 (JDB), 2006 WL 2616187, at *19 (D.D.C. Sept. 12, 2006); Minebea Co. v. 
Papst, 228 F.R.D. 34, 35 (D.D.C. 2005); In re United Mine Workers of Am. Emp. Benefit Plans 
Litig., 159 F.R.D. 307, 309 (D.D.C. 1994); Mergentime Corp. v. Washington Metro. Area 
Transit Auth., 761 F. Supp. 1, 2 n.2 (D.D.C. 1991); W. Trails, Inc. v. Camp Coast to Coast, Inc., 
139 F.R.D. 4, 12–14 (D.D.C. 1991). 
164 Elkins, 250 F.R.D. at 25–26. 
165 Gen. Elec., 2006 WL 2616187, at *19. 
166 United Mine Workers, 159 F.R.D. at 309. 
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only a narrow waiver of the privilege.”167 Even the expansive Sinclair Oil court was 
careful to note it rejected the proposal of a “blanket or complete waiver.”168 When 
subject matter waiver was found, therefore, courts sought to protect the privilege 
remaining where they thought possible.169 That a court could have been harsher but 
forbore, however, rarely gave great comfort to the party compelled to produce 
privileged documents against its own interests in a supposed spirit of fairness. 
C. Scylla and Charybdis in the Narrow Straits of Privilege 
Yet even this sort of Solomonic balancing of the equities in waiver may have been 
more a curse than a blessing, all things considered. Setting down the sword and shield, 
the Second Circuit invoked another popular metaphor for the all-or-nothing nature of 
privilege, compelling a decision whether to withhold useful information potentially 
subject to privilege, or to disclose it and jeopardize all related conversations with 
counsel: navigating “between a Scylla and Charybdis.”170 On one side lies the 
prospect of fighting a case with one arm tied behind one’s back; on the other, that of 
doing so with one’s own weapons in an adversary’s hands—as another court observed 
unsympathetically in the context of Fifth Amendment privilege, employing the same 
metaphor.171 Nor was the Tenth Circuit sensitive to the quandary: 
Whether characterized as forcing a party in between a Scylla and 
Charybdis, a rock and a hard place, or some other tired but equally evocative 
metaphoric cliché, the “Hobson’s choice” argument is unpersuasive given the 
facts of this case. An allegation that a party facing a federal investigation and 
the prospect of a civil fraud suit must make difficult choices is insufficient 
justification for carving a substantial exception to the waiver doctrine.172 
As has been seen, fairness swayed courts in every direction as to the scope of 
subject matter waiver: “subject matter can be defined narrowly or broadly” or 
 
167 Mergentime, 761 F. Supp. at 2. 
168 Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Texaco, Inc., 208 F.R.D. 329, 323–33 (N.D. Okla. 2002). 
169 See cases cited supra note 163. 
170 In re Steinhardt Partners, LP, 9 F.3d 230, 236 (2d Cir. 1993); accord In re Qwest 
Commc’ns Int’l Inc., 450 F.3d 1179, 1200 (10th Cir. 2006); cf. THOMAS BULFINCH, BULFINCH’S 
MYTHOLOGY 243–44 (1913). 
171 See Blackburn v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 204, 209 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) 
(describing defendant’s complaint of being forced “between the Scylla of providing testimony 
in his own defense that may be incriminatory and the Charybdis of losing the case by asserting 
his Constitutional rights and remaining silent”); cf. State v. Kaquatosh, 600 N.W.2d 153, 158 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (reversing in a Fifth Amendment context and using the same metaphor). 
172 Qwest, 450 F.3d at 1200 (quoting Steinhart, 9 F.3d at 236) (rejecting the “culture of 
waiver” that “appears to be of relatively recent vintage” in corporate selective waiver cases). 
This Article does not grapple with the selective waiver doctrine at any length, as it represents a 
discrete jurisdprudence that FRE 502 quite consciously opted to leave unaddressed. See 
generally Emery, supra note 14 (also employing the metaphor of Scylla and Charybdis). 
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anywhere in-between.173 Intentional disclosures, whether extrajudicial or in the midst 
of a trial, have been forgiven with no further waiver ordered.174 Other premeditated 
divulgences have led to further compelled waiver of anything from the remainder of 
partially-produced documents175 to closely related materials176 to an entire course of 
negotiations,177 or to any other legal correspondence relating to the litigation at bar.178 
Espousing a constancy (albeit a harsh one) that does not appear in the cases, the 
Federal Circuit opined that the default scope extended to “all documents which formed 
the basis for the advice, all documents considered by counsel in rendering that advice, 
and all reasonably contemporaneous documents reflecting discussions by counsel or 
others concerning that advice.”179   
Courts regularly ordered a broader waiver absent any clear tactical intent or 
assessment of “sword and shield” concerns.180 But other courts denied waiver based 
on the same “sword and shield” analysis,181 even where the challenger complained 
that the privileged documents may well contradict those produced.182 One court rather 
puzzlingly commented that a court need not ask or decide whether tactical advantage 
was at play in ordering subject matter waiver, but that such a question was nonetheless 
an important consideration.183 Another remarked, more understandably, in 1992 that 
“[t]he way in which courts have dealt with this type of waiver has become inconsistent 
 
173 In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 219 F.3d 175, 190 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting In re Grand Jury 
Proceedings Oct. 12, 1995, 78 F.3d 251, 255 (6th Cir. 1996)). 
174 See, e.g., In re von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94, 103 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. Skeddle, 
989 F. Supp. 917, 919–20 (N.D. Ohio 1997). 
175 E.g., Chinnici v. Cent. Dupage Ass’n, 136 F.R.D. 464, 465 (N.D. Ill. 1991); W. Union 
Tel. Co. v. Balt. & Ohio Tel. Co., 26 F. 55, 56–57 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1885).  
176 E.g., W. Trails, Inc. v. Camp Coast to Coast, Inc., 139 F.R.D. 4, 11–14 (D.D.C. 1991); 
Technitrol, Inc. v. Dig. Equip. Corp., Nos. 70 C 2916, 71 C 1082, 1974 WL 20497, at *1 (N.D. 
Ill. Feb. 22, 1974). 
177 E.g., Murray v. Gemplus Int’l., S.A., 217 F.R.D. 362, 367 (E.D. Pa. 2003). 
178 E.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Texaco, Inc., 208 F.R.D. 329, 333 (N.D. Okla. 2002). 
179 In re Pioneer Hi–Bred Int’l, Inc., 238 F.3d 1370, 1374–75 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
180 See, e.g., Elliott v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 521 F. Supp. 2d 41, 57–58 (D.D.C. 2007); 
Minebea Co. v. Papst, 228 F.R.D. 34, 35 (D.D.C. 2005); Chinnici, 136 F.R.D. at 465; W. Trails, 
139 F.R.D. at 7. 
181 See, e.g., Yankee Atomic Elec. Co. v. United States, 54 Fed. Cl. 306, 315–16 (2002); 
Graco Children's Prods., Inc. v. Dressler, Goldsmith, Shore & Milnamow, Ltd., No. 95-C-1303, 
1995 WL 360590, at *8–9 (N.D. Ill. June 14, 1995). 
182 See, e.g., N. River Ins. Co. v. Phila. Reinsurance Corp., 797 F. Supp. 363, 370–71 (D.N.J. 
1992); Remington Arms Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 142 F.R.D. 408, 415–16 (D. Del. 1992). 
183 Graco, 1995 WL 360590, at *8 (“When defining waiver, a court is not required to 
determine whether the party has gained a tactical advantage. However, determining whether a 
party has gained a tactical advantage is an important consideration.”) (citing Nye v. Sage Prods., 
Inc., 98 F.R.D. 452, 453 (N.D. Ill.1982)). 
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and unnecessarily complicated.”184 The only real constant was courts’ recurring 
mantra of judicial discretion in the service of just results, particularly when ordering 
subject matter waiver.185 And yet the stakes of those results were high: “Obviously, 
the consequences of subject-matter waiver could be disastrous to a party.”186 
With due respect to judicial notions of fairness, such a system was profoundly 
indeterminate a priori, leaving parties without guidance on what effect disclosure will 
have.187 This was perhaps by design: courts are supposed to evaluate privilege on a 
case-by-case basis.188 Clients weighing the viability of asserting their privilege thus 
did so not against a reliable standard, but against the normative views of a future judge 
trying to plumb their motives from afar.189 It is almost trite by now to invoke the many 
courts who have extolled the importance of privilege being applied in a consistent and 
predictable fashion.190 The Supreme Court has certainly done so repeatedly, with vim: 
“Making the promise of confidentiality contingent upon a trial judge’s later evaluation 
. . . would eviscerate the effectiveness of the privilege.”191 Perhaps the best thing that 
could be said for the case-by-case regime (besides the fact that Congress had ordained 
 
184 Remington, 142 F.R.D. at 415. 
185 See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 163–167. 
186 Meyers, supra note 9, at 1447. 
187 See Berg Elecs., Inc. v. Molex, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 261, 263 (D. Del. 1995); see also Rice, 
Continuing Confusion, supra note 39, at 998–99; Graco, 1995 WL 360590, at *8. 
188 See Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 396–97 (1981) (citing Notes of Committee 
on the Judiciary to Fed. R. Evid. 501, Senate Report No. 93–1277 (describing its adoption of 
FRE 501 should be “understood as reflecting the view that the recognition of a privilege based 
on a confidential relationship and other privileges should be determined on a case-by-case 
basis.”); and then citing Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980); and then citing 
United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 367 (1980)); Graco, 1995 WL 360590, at *8 (“Courts 
should, consistent with principles of fundamental fairness, fashion their orders compelling 
document production on a case by case basis.”). 
189 See Berg Elec., 875 F. Supp. at 261; see also Rice, Continuing Confusion, supra note 39, 
at 998–99. 
190 E.g., In re Lott, 139 F. App’x. 658, 662 (6th Cir. 2005) (first quoting Rhone-Poulenc 
Rorer Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851, 862–63 (3d Cir. 1994; and then quoting In re Von 
Bulow, 828 F.2d 94, 100 (2d Cir. 1987)). Trite because it is so frequently done, not least by this 
author. See, e.g., Sunshine, Uncertain Junction, supra note 36, at 563 nn.587–589, 564 n.594; 
Jared S. Sunshine, The Secrets of Corporate Courtship and Marriage: Evaluating Common 
Interest Privilege When Companies Combine in Mergers, 69 S.C. L. REV. 301, at 375 n.479 
(2017); Sunshine, Common Interest, supra note 37, at 868 n.255.  
191 Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11 (1996); accord Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 
U.S. 399, 409 (1998); Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 392 (1981); Hunt v. 
Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888). But see Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 396–97 (“While such a ‘case-
by-case’ basis may to some slight extent undermine desirable certainty in the boundaries of the 
attorney-client privilege, it obeys the spirit of the Rules.”). 
29Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2020
666 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [68:637 
 
it)192 was then that those who deliberately chose to weaponize privileged materials 
also chose to put themselves at the mercy of that later evaluation.193 If they sought an 
absolute privilege, they might ensure the inviolability of their confidences by 
declining to disclose anything and asserting their privilege when solicited—at the cost 
of not being able to deploy such evidence.194 That was all Wigmore asked, after all.195 
But that was not actually true either: companies perforce confronted another Scylla 
and Charybdis in whether to incur the cost in coin and convenience of vaultlike 
security and punctilious supervision of discovery anent privileged materials, or to 
hazard them should lesser measures prove inadequate.196 And once a waiver occurs 
(even athwart precautions, lesser or greater), a severer judge could expand the breach 
to related subject matter197—even if others might not.198 As the First Circuit 
cautioned in ordering such an expansion, “it also must be recognized that inadvertent 
disclosures can have a significance that transcends the documents actually 
disclosed.”199 There, a broader swathe of critical materials was forfeited merely 
because counsel had overlooked a handful of privileged documents included in a 
teeming data room.200 The trial court had described the situation unceremoniously: 
 
192 See Notes of Committee on the Judiciary to Fed. R. Evid. 501, Senate Report No. 93–
1277; see also Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 396–97; FED R. EVID. 501. 
193 Compare, e.g., Murray v. Gemplus Int’l., S.A., 217 F.R.D. 362, 367 (E.D. Pa. 2003) 
(rejecting a more constrained scope, concluding that “Gemplus disclosed its documents in order 
to put in a positive light the motivation that went into the Gemplus–Hesta negotiations, namely 
Gemplus’s desire to be ‘squeaky clean.’ By doing so, Gemplus waived its privilege with regard 
to these negotiations.”) with Graco Children’s Prods., Inc. v. Dressler, Goldsmith, Shore & 
Milnamow, Ltd., No. 95-C-1303, 1995 WL 360590, at *8–9 (N.D. Ill. June 14, 1995) (noting 
court had broad discretion to fashion subject matter waiver to the case at hand and thereby 
declining to order broader waiver). 
194 See, e.g., United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 244–45 (2d Cir. 1989) (remanding 
for determination of whether government had violated privilege by obtaining documents from 
a third party despite the defendants’ repeated assertions of privilege); United States v. 
Castellano, 610 F.Supp. 1137 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); see also Arista Records, LLC v. Lime Gp., 
LLC, No. 06 CV 5936, 2011 WL 1642434, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2011); AG Equip. Co. 
v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 636 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1227 (N.D. Okla. 2009). 
195 See WIGMORE, supra note 38, § 2325, at 631, 638. 
196 See In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1989); F.C. Cycles Int’l, Inc. v. Fila 
Sport, S.p.A., 184 F.R.D. 64, 75–80 (D. Md. 1998); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Johnson, No. 00-2855, 
2006 WL 2616187, at *18–20 (D.D.C. Sept. 12, 2006); Emery, supra note 14, at 242 (“This 
leads to a thorny choice for corporations: expend energy and finances to scour all documents 
for privileged information or risk losing protection.”). 
197 See, e.g., cases discussed supra notes 115–139; see also Schaefer, supra note 14, at 215 
(“These concerns [about subject matter waiver] have led to costly preproduction privilege 
review that still may not detect every privileged document.”). 
198 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 158. 
199 Texaco P.R., Inc. v. Dep’t of Consumer Affairs, 60 F.3d 867, 883–84 (1st Cir. 1995). 
200 Id. 
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“You people told them, here is a room full of papers, you can take a look at them. 
They looked at them, they found them and then when you discovered that they had 
seen them and that they wanted copies of those, then you came running here seeking 
an order.”201 
Clarifying what standard it demanded, the D.C. Circuit had qualified in Sealed 
Case that it did “not face here any claim that the information was acquired by a third 
party despite all possible precautions, in which case there might be no waiver at 
all.”202 Its didactic simile that privileged materials must be treated like unto “crown 
jewels” to be preserved thus had teeth.203 Individuals and small firms had not the 
wherewithal to devise schemes to protect their privilege against all possible 
contingencies;204 conglomerates numbering in the myriads upon myriads faced an 
Augean task in corralling every piece of legal work their many subdivisions generated 
and ensuring access protections across their multitudes.205 Companies subject to 
discovery could face tens of millions of pages, each of which could be a silver bullet 
to privilege.206 One would have needed the clout of a kingdom to protect crown jewels 
such as these; those of the British crown may at least be locked away under guard in 
the Tower of London when not in use at the coronation of a new monarch.207 Legal 
communications and analyses, however, would be of scant use if they could similarly 
be accessed only once in a lifetime.208  
 
201 Id. at 883 n.7. 
202 In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (emphasis added). 
203 Id. at 980; accord Gen. Elec. Co. v. Johnson, No. 00-2855, 2006 WL 2616187, at *58–
59 (D.D.C. Sept. 12, 2006); Minebea Co. v. Papst, 228 F.R.D. 34, 35 (D.D.C. 2005); accord 
also Navajo Nation v. Peabody Holding Co., 255 F.R.D. 37, 45 (D.D.C. 2009) (not in subject 
matter waiver context). 
204 See, e.g., Johnson v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., No. 99-CIV-9161, 2001 WL 897185, at *6–7 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2001) (discussed infra notes 355-357); see also Schaefer, supra note 14, at 
200 (“By one estimate, today’s ‘small’ business likely has the equivalent of two thousand four-
drawer file cabinets of records-all in the form of electronically stored information . . . . In only 
the past twenty years, inadvertent disclosure has evolved from the slim possibility of 
misaddressing an envelope, which seemed preventable, to a substantial risk faced by every 
practicing attorney regardless of the care taken to prevent it.”). 
205 See, e.g., Transamerica Compt. Co. v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 573 F.2d 646, 650–51 (9th 
Cir. 1978) (discussed infra notes 345–352). 
206 Id.; see Schaefer, supra note 14, at 200. 
207 See generally SIR GEORGE YOUNGHUSBAND & CYRIL DAVENPORT, THE CROWN JEWELS 
OF ENGLAND (1919) (providing extensive discussion of the crown jewels and their use in 
coronations by Sir George, then Keeper of the Jewel House, Tower of London). 
208 See Gray v. Bicknell, 86 F.3d 1472, 1483 (8th Cir. 1996) (“The strict test sacrifices the 
value of protecting client confidences for the sake of certainty of results. Hydraflow, Inc. v. 
Enidine Inc., 145 F.R.D. 626, 637 (W.D.N.Y. 1993). There is an important societal need for 
people to be able to employ and fully consult with those trained in the law for advice and 
guidance. State ex rel. Great Am. Ins. Co., 574 S.W.2d at 383. The strict test would likely 
impede the ability of attorneys to fill this need by chilling communications between attorneys 
and clients. If, when a document stamped ‘attorney-client privileged’ is inadvertently released, 
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II. EVOLUTION IN THE LAW OF WAIVER AT THE TURN OF THE MILLENNIUM 
Indeed, the whole Wigmorean concept of waiver sat rather uneasily with the 
philosophy underpinning privilege, which stressed its vitality to the law, and the 
importance of its certainty.209 The Sixth Circuit panel considering the case leading to 
the epochal Upjohn decision rejected the premise of subject matter waiver entirely: 
even “voluntary disclosures . . . amount to a waiver of the privilege only with respect 
to the facts actually disclosed.”210 More fundamentally, the underlying presumption 
of waiver as to the document divulged raised judicial hackles in inadvertent cases, 
with an oft-quoted court211 in Mendenhall v. Barber-Green Co. having sounded the 
charge in 1982 with the pronouncement that “if we are serious about the attorney client 
privilege and its relation to the client’s welfare, we should require more than such 
negligence by counsel before the client can be deemed to have given up the 
privilege.”212 The Supreme Court itself had passed within spitting distance of the issue 
in United States v. Zolin in 1989 when it left undisturbed the Ninth Circuit’s finding 
against waiver from a secretary’s inadvertently divulging privileged tapes under the 
misimpression they were blank.213 In the face of sundry and mounting concerns, 
waiver law evolved swiftly from primæval deference to the strictures of Wigmore into 
an increasing divergence (“trivergence” would be better, were it a word) of opinion.214 
  
 
it and all related documents lose their privileged status, then clients will have much greater 
hesitancy to fully inform their attorney.”); see also Schaefer, supra note 14, at 236 (“While 
many would argue that too many confidential thoughts are put in writing today (particularly in 
e-mail), something is lost when attorneys and clients purposely avoid the written word.”); 
Emery, supra note 14, at 274 (“[W]aivers will continue to undermine client confidentiality and 
candor. Lawyers will be excluded from operating in a preventative, rather than reactive manner. 
Worse, lawyers will take fewer notes in meetings for fear of privilege waiver and risk being 
called as a witness against their own corporation.”). 
209 See, e.g., Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 409 (1998); Jaffee v. Redmond, 
518 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1996); Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888). 
210 United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1227–28 n.12 (6th Cir. 1979), rev’d on other 
grounds, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). 
211 See EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 573; Broun & Capra, supra note 9, at 220 (calling it a 
“leading case”); e.g., Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais (Suisse) S.A., 160 F.R.D. 437, 
442 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Georgetown Manor, Inc. v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 936, 938 (S.D. 
Fla. 1991).  
212 Mendenhall v. Barber-Green Co., 531 F. Supp. 951, 955 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (emphasis 
added). 
213 See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 563 (1989), aff’g in relevant part, 809 F.2d 
1411, 1417 (9th Cir. 1987); cf. Georgetown Manor, 753 F. Supp. at 939 (finding the Zolin 
decisions instructive as to waiver when read together). 
214 See Murphy, supra note 14, at 207–08; Schaefer, supra note 14, at 213–14; Gergacz, 
supra note 14, at 7–8; Broun & Capra, supra note 9, at 220–24. 
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A. A Sharp Trifurcation in Approaches to Inadvertent Waiver 
This trifurcation as to the result of inadvertent disclosure was well-recognized by 
the end of the twentieth century.215 Consistent nomenclature for the split was more 
elusive. One of the earlier cases labelled these three jurisprudential lines as the 
objective analysis, subjective analysis, and the balancing test.216 Another identified 
the same three more anecdotally as the Wigmore rule, the “no waiver” rule, and a “rule 
closer to some Aristotelian mean.”217 In 1996, the Eighth Circuit employed more 
philosophical terminology: the strict approach, the lenient approach, and the “middle 
of the road” approach, respectively.218 Yet another borrowed from multiple systems 
with its strict liability approach, subjective intent approach, and skeptical balancing 
approach.219 Law practicing no Linnaean adherence to the first published 
nomenclature,220 this Article calls upon whichever of the labels is most apt. 
1. An Objective Analysis: The Strict Approach of the Wigmore Rule 
As Wigmore’s view has already been much discussed, this Section is brief. The 
D.C. Circuit has long been recognized as a great champion of the strict approach to 
waiver, together with its sequelæ for related documents.221 The infamous In re Sealed 
 
215 See EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 565; Close, supra note 14, at 22; Murphy, supra note 14, at 
207–08; Schaefer, supra note 14, at 213–14; Gergacz, supra note 14, at 7–8; Noyes, supra note 
14, at 684–85; Meyers, supra note 9, at 1447; Broun & Capra, supra note 9, at 220–24; Shawn 
T. Gaither, The Attorney-Client Privilege: An Analysis of Involuntary Waiver, 48 CLEV. ST. L. 
REV. 311, 314–18 (2000); JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL 
EVIDENCE § 503.42[1]-[4] (2d ed. 1997); e.g., Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 190 
F.R.D. 287, 290–92 (D. Mass. 2000); Draus v. Healthtrust, Inc., 172 F.R.D. 384, 386–87 (S.D. 
Ind. 1997); Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Concrete Sales & Servs., Inc., 176 F.R.D. 695, 699 (M.D. 
Ga. 1997); Berg Elecs., Inc. v. Molex, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 261, 261–63 (D. Del. 1995). 
216 Golden Valley Microwave Foods, Inc. v. Weaver Popcorn Co., 132 F.R.D. 204, 208 (N.D. 
Ind. 1990). 
217 Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Marine Midland Realty Credit Corp., 138 F.R.D. 479, 481–82 
(E.D. Va. 1991). 
218 Gray v. Bicknell, 8 F.3d 1472, 1483 (8th Cir. 1996). 
219 Simon Prop. Grp. L.P. v. mySimon, Inc., 194 F.R.D. 644, 648 (S.D. Ind. 2000); accord 
Jones v. Eagle-North Hills Shopping Ctr, L.P., 239 F.R.D. 684, 685 (E.D. Okla. 2007). 
220 Cf. INT’L ASSOC. FOR PLANT TAXONOMY, INTERNATIONAL CODE OF NOMENCLATURE FOR 
ALGAE, FUNGI, AND PLANTS art. 11.3–11.5 (2018). 
221 See Amobi v. D.C. Dep’t of Corrs., 262 F.R.D. 45, 51 (D.D.C. 2009); e.g., In re 
Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d 1367, 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (quoting Permian Corp. v. 
United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 1981)); United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 
642 F.2d 1285, 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see also Sunshine, Common Interest, supra note 37, at 
865 (“The D.C. Circuit has often treated claims of privilege parsimoniously as compared to 
other jurisdictions.”); Alec Koch, Internal Corporate Investigations: The Waiver of Attorney-
Client Privilege and Work-Product Protection through Voluntary Disclosures to the 
Government, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 347, 359 (1997); Raymond E. Watts Jr., Reconciling 
Voluntary Disclosure with the Attorney-Corporate Client Privilege: A Move Toward a 
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Case quoted at length above staked a powerful claim for severity, but it was not 
alone.222 Its district courts loyally fell into line as they must,223 reciting the canon of 
the crown jewels and applying an unforgiving standard of privilege under which “the 
party claiming privilege must prevent the introduction of privileged material into the 
public record” at all costs, whatever the provenance.224 Beyond the victim of theft in 
Elkins,225 the plaintiff in The Navajo Nation v. Peabody Holding Co. was seeking to 
recoup privileged documents divulged by the Hopi Nation to whom they had been 
produced under court order.226 But even the court order could not save them.227 Citing 
Sealed Case, the court found the Navajo did not “jealously guard” the documents by 
tarrying to demand their return, and faulted the Nation’s “knowing, self-inflicted 
blindness [as] further evidence that the Navajo failed to treat its privileged materials 
like ‘crown jewels.’”228 Acting as a sort of neutral ombudsman in applying the law of 
her sister circuit, the Sixth Circuit elsewhere agreed privilege was waived even after 
a mistake was quickly detected, corrected, and the offending documents “secreted . . . 
from the production box” (a rather evocative turn of phrase).229 
Only the court of appeals for the Federal Circuit aligned itself wholly, writing that 
excusing inadvertence would “do no more than seal the bag from which the cat has 
already escaped.”230 (The cat again!) The First Circuit was sympathetic as well, 
finding it “apodictic that inadvertent disclosure may work a waiver of the attorney-
 
Comprehensive Limited Waiver Doctrine, 39 MERCER L. REV. 1341, 1344 (1988) (“The District 
of Columbia (D.C.) Circuit is the leader in finding a full and complete waiver of the attorney-
client privilege following disclosure of confidential information to the government.”). But see 
EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 568 (“The Federal and First Circuits were the strongest proponents of 
the strict approach.”). 
222 In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
223 See cases cited supra note 203. 
224 Navajo Nation v. Peabody Holding Co., 255 F.R.D. 37, 45 (D.D.C. 2009). 
225 Elkins v. D.C., 250 F.R.D. 20, 25–26 (D.D.C. 2008). 
226 Navajo Nation, 255 F.R.D. at 42–43. 
227 But see Sealed Case, 877 F.2d at 980 (allowing that production under court order would 
not constitute waiver). 
228 Id. The decision issued shortly after the passage of FRE 502, but notably seemed 
oblivious to it. See infra notes 453–54. 
229 United States ex rel. Pogue v. Diabetes Treatment Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 444 F.3d 462, 478 
(6th Cir. 2006) (Griffin, J., concurring). 
230 See Carter v. Gibbs, 909 F.2d 1450, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“It is irrelevant whether the 
attachment was inadvertent . . . . Voluntary disclosure of attorney work product to an adversary 
in the litigation for which the attorney produced that information defeats the policy underlying 
the privilege.”); Sealed Case, 877 F.2d at 980; see also EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 568. 
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client privilege”231; its district courts have indeed often imposed strict waiver.232 For 
some courts, the strict rule’s justification was to impose a “self-governing restraint” 
that corporations be parsimonious in their assertions of privilege.233 Other courts 
hewed closer to the view of inadvertent waiver as constructively advertent by the very 
fact they were disclosed.234 One explained: “Waiver does not require that the privilege 
holder ‘intentionally relinquish a known right.’ If he voluntarily undertakes actions 
that will predictably lead to the disclosure of the document, then waiver will 
follow.”235 Another detailed with more granularity how privileged documents were 
intermingled haphazardly with the mundane, how other documents were facsimiled 
without security to remote locations, and how yet others were given over in dusty 
boxes hinting at a lack of review.236 The inferential step was straightforward: because 
defendants “failed to take reasonable steps to insure and maintain the confidentiality 
of privileged documents,” they “did not intend them to remain confidential.”237 
As the Federal Circuit intimated, such accounts are beside the point under a truly 
objective test. The Massachusetts district court, in International Digital Systems v. 
Digital Equipment Corp., criticized other opinions bandying justifications under the 
strict analysis, which “after a substantial amount of verbiage, can be reduced to a 
bottom line to the effect that the precautions were inadequate because they were not 
effective in preventing the disclosure of privileged documents. If the precautions had 
been adequate, the disclosure would not have occurred.”238 Kindlier attempts to judge 
the reasonableness of precautions would ignore the fact that the cat was already out of 
the bag and no judicial order could change that.239 Parties that make mistakes or are 
negligent in their handling of documents must expect to bear the consequences, 
 
231 Texaco P.R., Inc. v. Dep’t of Consumer Affairs, 60 F.3d 867, 883 (1st Cir. 1995); see 
EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 568. 
232 E.g., Ares–Serono, Inc. v. Organon Int’l B.V., 160 F.R.D. 1, 4 (D. Mass. 1994); Fed. 
Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Singh, 140 F.R.D. 252 (D. Me. 1992); Int’l Dig. Sys. v. Dig. Equip. Corp., 
120 F.R.D. 445, 449 (D. Mass. 1988). 
233 E.g., Bellsouth Advert. & Publ’g Corp. v. Am. Bus. Lists, Inc., No. 1:90-CV-149, 1992 
WL 338392, at *8 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 8, 1992); W. Trails, Inc. v. Camp Coast to Coast, Inc., 139 
F.R.D. 4, 8–9 (D.D.C. 1991). 
234 See cases cited supra note 91. 
235 Bowne of N.Y.C., Inc. v. AmBase Corp., 150 F.R.D. 465, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (internal 
citations omitted); accord In re Kidder Peabody Sec. Litig., 168 F.R.D. 459, 468 (S.D.N.Y. 
1996) (quoting Bowne, 150 F.R.D. at 479). 
236 Ray Larsen Assocs., Inc. v. Nikko Am., Inc., No. 89 CIV. 2809, 1993 WL 307905, at *7–
9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug 11, 1993). 
237 Id. at *9; see also Williams v. D. Richey Mgmt. Co., No. 87-C-6398, 1988 WL 79655, at 
*1 (N.D. Ill. July 22, 1988) (refusing to credit claim of inadvertence where deliberate actions 
belied mistake). 
238 Int’l Dig. Sys. v. Dig. Equip. Corp., 120 F.R.D. 445, 449 (D. Mass. 1988). 
239 Id. at 449. 
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rebutting the idea that an inadvertent discloser is blameless.240 (The court did not 
address innocent victims of theft, but the same logic implies they ought to have 
safeguarded their valuables better.)241 This left only the objective rule of Wigmore: 
neither the intention of the disclosing party nor the adequacy or inadequacy of any 
precautions mattered a whit, only the fact of disclosure.242 Courts ought not squander 
their resources on nugatory analyses of the severity of a party’s lapse or its 
motivation,243 for “[i]t seems somehow fictional to confirm the adequacy of the 
discovery precautions taken when obviously (as manifested by the disclosure) the 
precautions, almost by definition, were inadequate.”244 
2. A Subjective Analysis: The Lenient Approach of a “No Waiver” Rule 
The diametrically opposite view decried the Wigmore rule as “atavistic,”245 taking 
up the cause of those who protested that a waiver could never be unintentional: 
subjective motivation controlled.246 “We are taught from first year law school that 
waiver imports the ‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right,’” 
lectured Mendenhall, continuing the lesson above as to the privilege belonging to the 
 
240 Id. at 450 (“I also agree with the Bankruptcy Court in the case of In Re Standard Financial 
Management Corp. Despite theoretical arguments to the contrary, ‘. . . in the real world, 
unforced disclosure is disclosure and should support the waiver argument.” 77 B.R. [324] at 
330 [Bktcy. D. Mass 1987]. ‘[M]istake or inadvertence is, after all, merely a euphemism for 
negligence, and, certainly . . . one is expected to pay a price for one's negligence.’ Id.”). 
241 See Suburban Sew ‘N Sweep, Inc. v. Swiss-Bernina, Inc. 91 F.R.D. 254, 260–61 (N.D. 
Ill. 1981). 
242 Int’l Dig. Sys., 120 F.R.D. at 449–50 (“When confidentiality is lost through ‘inadvertent’ 
disclosure, the Court should not look at the intention of the disclosing party. It follows that the 
Court should not examine the adequacy of the precautions taken to avoid ‘inadvertent’ 
disclosure either.”) (citations omitted); see Harmony Gold U.S.A., Inc. v. FASA Corp., 169 
F.R.D. 113, 117 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Singh, 140 F.R.D. 252, 253 (D. Me. 
1992) (rejecting other approaches for the strict because when “persons not within the ambit of 
the confidential relationship have knowledge of the communication, that knowledge cannot be 
undone. One cannot ‘unring’ a bell.”). 
243 See Draus v. Healthtrust, Inc., 172 F.R.D. 384, 386–87 (S.D. Ind. 1997) (“Courts taking 
this approach have noted that courts should not be consumed with searching for the true 
intention of the disclosing party nor in exercising 20–20 hindsight concerning the adequacy of 
the precautions taken.”); id. at 388 (“The courts should not need to devote such efforts to protect 
clients from their own errors or those of their counsel.”); Int’l Dig. Sys., 120 F.R.D. at 449–50; 
Harmony Gold, 169 F.R.D. at 117; Golden Valley Microwave Foods, Inc. v. Weaver Popcorn 
Co., 132 F.R.D. 204, 209 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (“When ‘inadvertent’ disclosure occurs the court 
should not be consumed in searching for the true intention of the disclosing party nor should it 
utilize its crystal clear hindsight to determine the adequacy of the precautions taken.”); see also 
Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 190 F.R.D. 287, 290–91 (D. Mass. 2000) 
(discussing Int’l Dig. Sys.). 
244 Golden Valley, 132 F.R.D. at 207. 
245 Mendenhall v. Barber-Green Co., 531 F. Supp. 951, 955 n.8 (N.D. Ill. 1982). 
246 See supra notes 78–87 and accompanying text. 
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client.247 “Inadvertent production is the antithesis of that concept.”248 The case is 
particularly instructive because the privileged documents were interspersed amongst 
only twenty-eight total: counsel’s failure to remove them, although inadvertent, 
“might well have been negligent.”249 Mendenhall provided a rule as simple and 
executory as Wigmore’s, a perennial concern of courts looking for rules rather than 
philosophies: “mere inadvertent production by the attorney does not waive the client’s 
privilege.”250 Two interwoven rationales have persuaded courts following the rule.251 
The first was that only clients have the power over their own privilege; attorneys’ 
lapses accordingly could not rightly be imputed to those that retained them.252 The 
second was that inadvertence by anyone (even if negligent) could not suffice for 
waiver, which requires intentional relinquishment.253 
When these two underlying principles were in syzygy, of course, no waiver would 
be found by a “no waiver” jurisdiction, the foremost of which was Mendenhall’s own, 
the Northern District of Illinois.254 Moreover, it seemed that the lenient rule would 
 
247 Mendenhall, 531 F. Supp. at 955 (quoting United States ex rel. Ross v. Franzen, 668 F.2d 
933, 941 (1982) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938))). 
248 Id. 
249 Id. 
250 Georgetown Manor, Inc. v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 936, 938 (S.D. Fla. 1991). 
251 Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais (Suisse) S.A., 160 F.R.D. 437, 442 (S.D.N.Y. 
1995) (“The rationale behind this view is twofold. First, these courts reason that the privilege 
belongs to the client, so an act of the attorney cannot effect a waiver. Second, a ‘waiver’ is by 
definition the intentional relinquishment of a known right, and the concept of an ‘inadvertent 
waiver’ is therefore inherently contradictory.”) (citations omitted). 
252 See Corey v. Norman, Hanson & DeTroy, 742 A.2d 933, 941 (Me. 1999) (“We agree 
with the Superior Court and its adoption of the common sense rule set out in Mendenhall. 
Underlying this rule is the notion that the client holds the privilege, and that only the client, or 
the client’s attorney acting with the client’s express authority, can waive the privilege.”) 
(citations omitted); Bank Brussels, 160 F.R.D. at 442; Helman v. Murry’s Steaks, Inc., 728 F. 
Supp. 1099, 1104 (D. Del. 1990) (“The holder of the privilege is the client. It would fly in the 
face of the essential purpose of the attorney/client privilege to allow a truly inadvertent 
disclosure of a privileged communication by counsel to waive the client’s privilege.”) (citations 
omitted); Fidelity Bank, N.A. v. Bass, No. 88-5257, 1989 WL 9354, at *1 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (“The 
attorney-client privilege belongs to the client, not to the attorney, and the mere inadvertent 
production of documents by counsel does not waive an assertion of the privilege.”). 
253 See Bank Brussels, 160 F.R.D. at 442; Phillips Petroleum Co. v. N. Petrochem. Co., No. 
84-C-2028, 1987 WL 10300, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 30, 1987); Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Levi Strauss & Co., 104 F.R.D. 103, 105–06 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (identifying intent as the crucial 
factor in determining waiver); Kansas-Nebraska Nat. Gas Co. v. Marathon Oil Co., 109 F.R.D. 
12, 21 (D. Neb. 1983); Manfrs & Traders Tr. Co. v. Servotronics, Inc., 132 A.D.2d 392, 399 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (“Intent must be the primary component of any waiver test. The Supreme 
Court has defined waiver as an ‘intentional relinquishment . . . of a known right’”) (quoting 
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). 
254 E.g., In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., No. 94-C-897, 1995 WL 
683777, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 1995); Phillips Petroleum, 1987 WL 10300, at *2; Ziemack 
v. Centel Corp., No. 92-C-3551, 1995 WL 314526, at *2 n.8 (N.D. Ill. May 19, 1995); Wiebolt 
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generally excuse an inadvertent waiver by the client no less than counsel—its 
traditional formulation is best construed to mean that allowing counsel’s inadvertence 
to waive would add insult to injury.255 To this point spoke any number of cases that 
regurgitate the rule without reference to counsel: “The court in Mendenhall stated that 
a waiver constituted the intentional abandonment of a known right and that inadvertent 
disclosure, therefore, could not amount to a waiver of privilege.”256 Courts have 
accordingly excused acts of inadvertence by clients under such a rule.257 Perhaps most 
emphatically, Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co. found lack of intent 
wholly dispositive, dismissing the role of counsel in the waiver as unnecessary to 
review.258 To be sure, one could find an occasional court imposing waiver upon a 
finding of client negligence, despite professing adherence to Mendenhall, but such 
eccentrics were a decided minority within the subjective school.259 
It was less clear whether counsel’s deliberate rather than accidental disclosure—
without client approval—could waive the client’s privilege, for it is difficult to conjure 
a scenario in which counsel could or would do so absent direction.260 It seems obvious 
 
Stores, Inc. ex rel. Raleigh v. Schottenstein, No. 87-C-8111, 1991 WL 105633, at *4 (N.D. Ill. 
June 7, 1991); In re Sealed Case, 120 F.R.D. 66, 72 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Barr v. Safeco Ins. Co. of 
Am., No. 83-C-2711, 1987 WL 7466, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 1987). 
255 See Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Shields, 18 F.R.D. 448, 451 (D. Conn. 1955) (“Here there 
is no evidence that defendants intended to waive any privilege and no evidence even that their 
counsel so intended.”). 
256 Phillips Petroleum, 1987 WL 10300, at *2; accord Ziemack, 1995 WL 314526, at *2 n.81 
(“Under Mendenhall’s subjective approach, inadvertent disclosure never results in a waiver; 
waiver is an intentional relinquishment, and, thus, an inadvertent act lacks the requisite intent.”); 
Wiebolt Stores, 1991 WL 105633, at *4 (“[M]ere inadvertent production does not waive the 
privilege.”); Sealed Case, 120 F.R.D. at 72. 
257 E.g., Barr, 1987 WL 7466, at *1; Dunn Chem. Co. v. Sybron Corp., No. 8-85, 1975 WL 
970, at *4–6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 1975); see also Oppliger v. United States, No. 8:06CV750, 2010 
WL 503042, at *5–6 (D. Neb. Feb. 8, 2010) (common interest document produced by 
unrepresented third party did not cause waiver); State v. J.G., 619 A.2d 232, 235–38 (N.J. App. 
Div. 1993) (documents subject to victim-counselor privilege mistakenly produced by 
government clerk). 
258 Lois Sportwear, 104 F.R.D. at 106 (“The authority dispute, that is, whether the Deputy 
General Counsel had the authority to waive the privilege, need not be resolved in view of the 
conclusion reached that the disclosure was inadvertent. However, since she was the individual 
designated to exercise the privilege, a logical corollary would be that she also was thereby 
authorized to waive such exercise.”). 
259 E.g., Omega Elecs., S.A. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 1988 WL 132133, at *4–5 (N.D. Ill. 
Dec. 2, 1988) (“A certain degree of negligence on the part of counsel is allowable in 
circumstances of the nature cited by Omega, because the client’s welfare should be considered 
before counsel can be deemed to have effect a waiver of the privilege. In this case, however, the 
client’s treatment of the document was also negligent insofar as the document was placed in a 
marketing file, rather than a confidential file.”) (citing Mendenhall v. Barber-Green Co., 531 F. 
Supp. 951 (N.D. Ill. 1982)). 
260 See Cities Serv. Helex, Inc. v. United States, 214 Ct. Cl. 765, 768 (1977) (“We know of 
no case in which an attorney was held to have been able to waive the privilege of a client who 
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an attorney’s flouting a client’s direction to assert privilege could not work waiver for 
lack of authority,261 but the law specializes in outré scenarios. By way of introduction, 
the court, in Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co. v. Marathon Oil Co.,262 faced the 
question of privilege in a document marked as an exhibit for trial; the defendant 
protested it was privileged and had been produced in error.263 Rejecting the strict 
approach, the court was persuaded by Mendenhall’s rule, emphasizing the volume of 
documents produced (over 75,000) and the procedures employed by the defendant 
bolstered a claim of inadvertence, and no waiver had occurred.264 This was perfectly 
in line with the typical analysis under the subjective view.265 Only, explained the 
court, had the critical exhibit been intentionally included in the production might 
privilege be waived.266 A number of other courts in due course looked to Kansas-
Nebraska for this last proposition that inadvertence does not comprehend a 
“deliberate” act or, critically, “the result of a conscious but erroneous decision.”267 
But this latter category comfortably encompassed attorney mistakes of law as in 
Sinclair Oil, meaning such oversights would still result in waiver—and perhaps 
subject matter waiver—under even subjective analysis. This extrapolation was 
supported by the post-FRE-502 case, Seger v. Ernest-Spencer Metals, Inc.,268 which 
cited Kansas-Nebraska in determining that “[r]eliance on a law firm to advise a client 
about privilege is an insufficient basis to find inadvertent disclosure,” notwithstanding 
the volume of documents under consideration and numerous errors made.269 
Accordingly, the Seger court found the waiver was not properly viewed as inadvertent 
but knowing and intentional.270 Likewise, in In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs 
Antitrust Litigation, different lawyers had reached different and erroneous conclusions 
on privilege redactions, with the result that production was found “conscious” enough 
 
had previously indicated that he wanted to assert the privilege.”); cf. Corey v. Norman, Hanson 
& DeTroy, 742 A.2d 933, 941 (Me. 1999). 
261 Cities Service, 214 Ct. Cl. at 768 (collecting cases). 
262 Kansas-Nebraska Nat. Gas Co. v. Marathon Oil Co., 109 F.R.D. 12, 20–21 (D. Neb. 
1983). 
263 Id. 
264 Id. at 21. 
265 Id. 
266 Id. 
267 Id.; see, e.g., In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., No. 94-C-897, 1995 
WL 683777, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 1995) (quoting Golden Valley Microwave Foods, Inc. v. 
Weaver Popcorn Co., 132 F.R.D. 204, 208 (N.D. Ind. 1990)) (citing Kansas-Nebraska, 109 
F.R.D. at 21); Int’l Dig. Sys. v. Dig. Equip. Corp., 120 F.R.D. 445, 448 (D. Mass. 1988) (quoting 
Kansas-Nebraska, 109 F.R.D. at 21). 
268 No. 8:08CV75, 2010 WL 378113 (D. Neb. Jan. 26, 2010). 
269 Id. at *6. 
270 Id. 
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for waiver.271 Even a “no waiver” court may thus distinguish between mistakes of fact 
and law, invoking waiver for the latter.272 Yet such a rule allows counsel’s error to 
contravene the client’s direction to assert privilege where possible.273 
Mistakes of law aside, however, the “no waiver” approach avoided some of the 
most objectionable results of Wigmore’s,274 as for example in the event of theft: 
After all, what if a confidential memorandum is stolen from an attorney’s 
office and subsequently published in newspapers across the country? Clearly, 
the client should not be held to have waived the attorney-client privilege. The 
fact that the contents of a privileged document have become widely known 
is insufficient by itself to eliminate the privilege that covers the document. 
Although in practical terms the document has lost any semblance of 
confidentiality, the Court in legal terms must recognize that the client has not 
intentionally waived the privilege. The law is clear; it is only the client who 
has the power to waive the attorney-client privilege. To hold that public 
circulation eliminates the privilege would, in effect, give any individual who 
secured a privileged document the power to waive the attorney-client 
privilege by simply having the contents widely recounted in newspaper 
reports.275 
There was much to recommend a rule both predictable in application and forgiving 
of blameless clients who stood to lose the most important of evidentiary privileges, 
likely accounting for what popularity the anti-Wigmore approach enjoyed.276 
 
271 Brand Name Prescription Drugs, 1995 WL 683777, at *3 (“Apparently, the right hand 
was not aware of what the left hand was doing. Though some of the disclosures were made in 
error, there was a ‘conscious’ decision behind each.”). 
272 Id. (citations omitted) (first quoting Baxter Travenol Labs., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 117 
F.R.D. 119, 121 (N.D. Ill. 1987); and then quoting Golden Valley Microwave Foods, Inc. v. 
Weaver Popcorn Co., 132 F.R.D. 204, 208 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (citing Kansas-Nebraska, 109 
F.R.D. at 21)) (“A truly inadvertent disclosure is ‘accidental,’ and is ‘not the product of some 
conscious but erroneous decision.’”); see Lifewise Master Funding v. Telebank, 206 F.R.D. 
298, 303 (D. Utah 1990) (citations omitted) (“This court has also drawn a distinction between 
inadvertent disclosure and disclosure which was advertent and intended where the person 
making discovery was merely unaware of the legal consequences or nature of the document 
produced.”). 
273 See cases cited supra notes 267–72. 
274 See Berg Elec., Inc. v. Molex, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 261, 262 (D. Del. 1995) (“A 
disadvantage of this traditional approach is that it divests the client of the opportunity to protect 
communications he or she intended to maintain confidential. The privilege for confidential 
communications can be lost if papers are in a car that is stolen, a briefcase that is lost, a letter 
that is misdelivered, or in a facsimile that is missent. This approach takes from the client the 
ability to control when his or her privilege is waived, and is inconsistent with the Supreme 
Court's admonition that courts should apply the privilege to ensure a client remains free from 
apprehension that consultations with a legal advisor will be disclosed.”). 
275 Smith v. Armour Pharm. Co., 838 F. Supp. 1573, 1577 (S.D. Fla. 1993). 
276 See Jones v. Eagle-North Hills Shopping Ctr., L.P., 239 F.R.D. 684, 685 (E.D. Okla. 
2007) (“This Court would gravitate more to the side of the ‘no waiver’ approach, based on the 
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3. A Balancing Test: An Aristotelian “Middle of the Road” Approach 
Nonetheless, courts by nature relish a good compromise,277 and so it is 
unsurprising that the third approach alternately denominated as an Aristotelian mean, 
middle of the road, or balancing test accrued the majority’s support in the grand 
trifurcation.278 The essence of this approach was that waiver would turn on objectively 
discernable factors, not by subjective avowals of intent.279 (There was an implicit nod 
to Wigmore in this emphasis, given his dictum that if waiver turned on intent, no self-
interested party would profess to it.)280 As early as 1988, just prior to the shot across 
the bow fired in Sealed Case by the D.C. Circuit, Stewart v. General Motors Corp. 
recognized that the “modern trend, which is apparently now followed by a majority of 
courts, is that inadvertent disclosure may result in waiver, but the inadvertence of the 
disclosure is just one of a number of factors to consider in determining if waiver 
occurred.”281 Six years later, another Illinois district court confirmed that the “trend 
 
idea that a waiver when the client is not aware of an inadvertent disclosure serves only to punish 
the innocent.”); Berg Elec., 875 F. Supp. at 263. 
277 Gray v. Bicknell, 86 F.3d 1472, 1482–84 (8th Cir. 1996); see, e.g., In re Nexium 
(Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig., 968 F. Supp. 2d 367, 386 (D. Mass. 2013) (“The Supreme 
Court did not go so far as to endorse K–Dur’s strict, presumptively-unlawful test, however. 
Instead, it adopted a rule-of-reason standard as a middle-of-the-road compromise, the contours 
of which have been left to the lower courts to etch.” (citations omitted)); Milk Train, Inc. v. 
Veneman, 167 F. Supp. 2d 20, 31 (D.D.C. 2001), rev’d, 310 F.3d 747 (D.C. Cir. 2002) 
(upholding under the APA the government’s having “considered three options, and once again, 
selected the middle-of-the-road choice.”); see also Jared S. Sunshine, The Putative Problem of 
Pestersome Paupers: A Critique of the Supreme Court's Increasing Exercise of Its Power to 
Bar the Courthouse Doors against in Forma Pauperis Petitioners, 46 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
57, 81 (2018) (“As is often the case, a middle-of-the-road approach is likely the best.” (citing 
Gray, 86 F.3d at 1482)); cf. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s v. S. Pride Trucking, Inc., No. 8:16-
CV-116, 2018 WL 1392910, at *1 (D. Neb. Mar. 20, 2018) (“A good compromise leaves 
everybody mad.” (quoting Bill Watterson, Calvin and Hobbes, GOCOMICS (May 1, 1993), 
http://www.gocomics.com/calvinandhobbes/1993/05/01)). 
278 See cases cited supra notes 216–19. 
279 Simon Prop. Grp. L.P. v. mySimon, Inc., 194 F.R.D. 644, 648 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (rejecting 
subjective assessment in favor of the balancing test); Draus v. Healthtrust, Inc., 172 F.R.D. 384, 
388 (S.D. Ind. 1997) (“This court will not follow the approach requiring an examination of the 
subjective intentions of the disclosing party.”); Golden Valley Microwave Foods, Inc. v. 
Weaver Popcorn Co., 132 F.R.D. 204, 208–09 (N.D. Ind. 1990); see also In re Sause Bros. 
Ocean Towing, 144 F.R.D. 111, 114–15 (D. Or. 1991) (discussing holdings from the Ninth 
Circuit held the “the subjective intent of the privilege holder is merely one factor in determining 
whether waiver should be implied from disclosure”). 
280 See WIGMORE, supra note 38, § 2327, at 638. 
281 Stewart v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 86-C-4741, 1988 WL 6927, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 27, 
1988); see also Allen-Bradley Co. v. Autotech Corp., No. 86-C-8514, 1989 WL 134500, at *3 
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 11, 1989) (“Although there are numerous decisions adhering to a strict waiver 
rule, the trend of recent cases is in the other direction.” (citations omitted)). 
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under federal common law appears to be towards an evaluation of circumstances.”282 
And looking back in 2006—even as FRE 502 was being deliberated—a third 
concluded that a factor-based balancing test weighing actions, procedures, and context 
rather than a Platonic ideal of intent was entrenched as the majority view.283 
The preponderance of circuits eventually embraced the multi-factor balancing test 
as the appropriate standard. In many cases, this was after grappling with the twin 
antipodes of the Sealed Case and Mendenhall rules and finding both extremities 
unpalatable: “Many courts faced with this issue have adopted a middle approach 
between these two polar opposites by examining several factors to determine if the 
privilege should be deemed waived under the particular circumstances presented. It is 
such a rule to which the Fourth Circuit subscribes.”284 So too was it in the Second,285 
Fifth,286 and Ninth,287 whilst the Eighth left no doubt it approved if not quite holding 
 
282 Cunningham v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins., 845 F. Supp. 1403, 1412 (S.D. Cal. 1994). 
283 Tracey P. v. Sarasota Cty., No. 8:05-CV-927-T-27, 2006 WL 8440293, at *4 (S.D. Fla. 
Dec. 20, 2006). 
284 Scott v. Glickman, 199 F.R.D. 174, 177 (E.D.N.C. 2001). But see F.C. Cycles Int’l, Inc. 
v. Fila Sport, S.p.A., 184 F.R.D. 64, 76 (D. Md. 1998) (“[I]t is not at all clear that the Fourth 
Circuit has adopted the balancing test. Under Hawkins, Sheet Metal Workers, Duplan, and 
Harvey it appears that there is more support for the theory that the Fourth Circuit favors the 
‘strict’ or ‘Wigmore’ approach of full waiver upon disclosure—whether inadvertent, voluntary, 
or implied.”). 
285 Bus. Integration Servs., Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Corp., 251 F.R.D. 121, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008) (“In the Second Circuit, it appears that the ‘middle-of-the-road approach’ has been 
adopted.”). 
286 Alldread v. City of Grenada, 988 F.2d 1425, 1433 (5th Cir. 1993). 
287 United States ex rel. Bagley v. TRW, Inc., 204 F.R.D. 170, 177 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (“Like 
most courts elsewhere, courts within the Ninth Circuit have embraced the totality of the 
circumstances approach. In the Ninth Circuit, the inadvertent production of privileged 
documents is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for finding that the privilege was 
waived.”). 
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so.288 The Third, 289 Sixth,290 and Eleventh291 Circuits did not squarely endorse a 
standard, but most of their district courts fell in line with the balancing test, as did 
those of the Tenth Circuit on the rare occasions they confronted the issue.292 There 
were even some devotees of the Aristotelian mean within the Chicagoan stronghold 
of Mendenhall in the Seventh Circuit.293 On the other side of the debate, the First 
 
288 Gray v. Bicknell, 86 F.3d 1472, 1482–84 (8th Cir. 1996); see also, e.g., Pucket v. Hot 
Springs School Dist. No. 23-2, 239 F.R.D. 572, 586 (D.S.D. 2006) (“Although the Eighth 
Circuit has not decided which approach applies to inadvertent disclosure of privileged 
documents in federal question cases, the court follows Judge Bennett’s opinion in Engineered 
Prods. Co. v. Donaldson Co., 313 F. Supp. 2d 951 (N.D. Iowa 2004), and applies the Hydraflow 
test here.”). 
289 See Jame Fine Chems., Inc. v. Hi-Tech Pharm. Co., No. 00-3545-AET, 2006 WL 
2403941, at *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 18, 2006) (“Although the Third Circuit has not definitively 
addressed the issue of waiver by inadvertent disclosure, courts within this Circuit have generally 
utilized the” Hydraflow factors); Maldonado v. New Jersey ex rel. Admin. Office of Courts, 
225 F.R.D. 120, 128 (D.N.J. 2004) (noting the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has implied it 
would use the balancing test); Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Sandoz Ltd., 916 F. Supp. 404, 411 n.13 
(D.N.J. 1995) (same). 
290 See Evenflo Co. v. Hantec Agents Ltd., No. 3:05-CV-346, 2006 WL 2945440, at *5 (S.D. 
Ohio Oct. 13, 2006) (“The Sixth Circuit has not set forth an approach to inadvertent disclosure. 
However, district courts within the Sixth Circuit and Ohio courts have found that the ‘middle 
ground’ approach is the most fair and appropriate.”); see also Dyson v. Amway Corp., No. G88-
CV-60, 1990 WL 290683, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 15, 1990) (“guessing” the Sixth Circuit 
would approve of the balancing test). 
291 See Georgetown Manor, Inc. v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 936, 937 (S.D. Fla. 1991) 
(“The Eleventh Circuit and the district courts within the Eleventh Circuit have not, as of yet, 
addressed this issue.”); In re Polypropylene Carpet Antitrust Litig., 181 F.R.D. 680, 689 (N.D. 
Ga. 1998) (“Under such circumstances, the prevailing view in courts of this circuit—and other 
circuits as well—is that a waiver can be found only after performing a balancing test”); e.g., 
Tracey P. v. Sarasota Cty., No. 8:05-CV-927-T-27,  2006 WL 8440293, at *3–6 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 
20, 2006). But see Georgetown Manor, 753 F. Supp. at 937 (adopting the Mendenhall rule). 
292 Jones v. Eagle–North Hills Shopping Ctr., 239 F.R.D. 684, 685 (E.D. Okla. 2007) (noting 
that “little relevant precedent exists in this circuit on the subject”); accord Palgut v. City of 
Colorado Springs, No. 06–cv–01142–WDM–MJW, 2007 WL 1238730, at *2 n.1 (D. Colo. Apr. 
27, 2007); see also Lifewise Master Funding v. Telebank, 206 F.R.D. 298, 303 n.4 (D. Utah 
2002) (“It has been suggested that in the Tenth Circuit inadvertent disclosure is an absolute 
waiver based on United States v. Ryans, 903 F.2d 731, 741 n. 13 (10th Cir. 1990). However, the 
case did not treat the issue and the footnote cited does not address inadvertent disclosure except 
to say it may constitute a waiver. Id. The Ryans footnote is too slim a statement on which to 
find an absolute waiver from inadvertent disclosure.”). 
293 E.g., Graco Children’s Prods., Inc. v. Dressler, Goldsmith, Shore & Milnamow, Ltd., No. 
95-C-1303, 1995 WL 360590, at *7 (N.D. Ill. June 14, 1995) (“Although Dressler cites 
Mendenhall v. Barber–Greene Co., 531 F.Supp. 951, 954–55 (N.D. Ill.1982) for the proposition 
that inadvertent production does not waive the privilege because waiver requires ‘the 
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right,’ this court prefers the balancing approach.”); 
Stewart v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 86-C-4741, 1988 WL 6927, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 27, 1988); 
see also, e.g., Simon Prop. Grp. L.P. v. mySimon, Inc., 194 F.R.D. 644, 648 (S.D. Ind. 2000) 
(“In Draus this court rejected the subjective approach but did not need to make a choice between 
the strict liability and balancing approaches because both produced the same result. In this case, 
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Circuit was partial to the strict accountability approach,294 though closer examination 
indicates it did not hold as much.295 And the D.C. Circuit persisted in its austere 
adherence to Wigmore until the bitter end with FRE 502,296 as did the Federal 
Circuit.297 
There remains, of course, the conspicuous and momentous question of what the 
objective factors to be considered were. Many judges looked to 1993’s Hydraflow, 
Inc. v. Enidine Inc. in the Western District of New York,298 to the point that the 
middle-of-the-road approach itself is “sometimes called the Hydraflow test.”299 The 
factors there identified were: 
(1) the reasonableness of the precautions taken to prevent inadvertent 
disclosure in view of the extent of the document production, (2) the number 
of inadvertent disclosures, (3) the extent of the disclosure, (4) the promptness 
 
however, there is a difference, and this court adopts the balancing approach.”). The Seventh 
Circuit provides a mixed bag indeed, as one can even find its courts rejecting the balancing text 
in favor of strict liability. See, e.g., Harmony Gold U.S.A., Inc. v. FASA Corp., 169 F.R.D. 113, 
117 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Golden Valley Microwave Foods, Inc. v. Weaver Popcorn Co., 132 F.R.D. 
204, 207 (N.D. Ind. 1990). 
294 See supra notes 231–32; see also Indus. Commc’ns & Wireless, Inc. v. Town of Alton, 
N.H., No. 07-82-JL, 2008 WL 3498652, at *2 (D.N.H. Aug. 7, 2008) (“Arguably, the First 
Circuit adopted the strict accountability approach in Texaco P.R. v. Dep’t of Consumer Affairs. 
But while a number of district courts in this circuit have utilized this approach, the more recent 
trend has been to utilize the middle test.” (citations omitted)). 
295 See Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., Nos. 610, 611, 2000 WL 290346, at 
*3 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“The First Circuit has not clearly stated that it is following either line of 
cases.”); Figueras v. P.R. Elec. Power Auth., 250 F.R.D. 94, 96–97 (D.P.R. 2008) (“Although 
some courts have interpreted the First Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Texaco Puerto Rico, 
Inc. v. Dep’t of Consumer Affairs, 60 F.3d 867, 883 (1st Cir. 1995) as adopting the ‘strict 
accountability’ approach, this Court disagrees. In Texaco Puerto Rico, the court of appeals 
stated that “[i]t is apodictic that inadvertent disclosures may work a waiver of the attorney-client 
privilege.” As Chief Judge Young from the District of Massachusetts stated, the word ‘may’ 
indicates that the district court has discretion, which is unavailable under the strict 
accountability approach. Therefore, district courts within the first circuit are not bound to follow 
the ‘strict accountability’ approach. This Court shall follow the majority approach, and apply 
the ‘middle test.’” (citations omitted)). 
296 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury, 475 F.3d 1299, 1305 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Elkins v. D.C., 250 
F.R.D. 20, 25–26 (D.D.C. 2008); General Elec. Co. v. Johnson, No. Civ.A 00-2855 (JDB), 2006 
WL 2616187, at *18–20 (D.D.C. Sept. 12, 2006). 
297 See supra note 230. But see Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 106 Fed. Cl. 571, 
586 (2012) (describing how inferior courts within the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction sought to 
evade its authoritative precedent in favor of their preferred balancing test). 
298 145 F.R.D. 626 (W.D.N.Y. 1993). 
299 Gray v. Bicknell, 86 F.3d 1472, 1483–84 (8th Cir. 1996); accord, e.g., Pinnacle Pizza Co. 
v. Little Caesar Enter., Inc., 627 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1074 (D.S.D. 2007); Pucket v. Hot Springs 
School Dist. No. 23-2, 239 F.R.D. 572, 586 (D.S.D. 2006); Starway v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 
625, 187 F.R.D. 595, 597 (D. Minn. 1999); see also EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 574 (same); Close, 
supra note 14, at 22 (same). 
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of measures taken to rectify the disclosure, and (5) whether the overriding 
interests of justice would or would not be served by relieving the party of its 
error.300 
The Hydraflow court itself was more modest,301 crediting its innovations to a 1987 
case in the Middle District of North Carolina,302 which in turn credited Hartford Fire 
Insurance Co. v. Garvey out of California,303 and the previously discussed Lois 
Sportswear court back in New York.304 Myriad courts have cited to these foundational 
cases305—one rightly praised the last as offering “the seminal discussion of the totality 
of the circumstances approach to the problem of inadvertent production.”306 If nothing 
else, such authorities spanning the nation demonstrate a true consensus gravitating 
towards the so-called Aristotelian mean.307 With minor variations of phrasing and 
itemization,308 the factors identified in Hydraflow and its philosophical forebears were 
accepted as enunciating the proper balancing of the equities for and against waiver. 
 
300 Hydraflow, 145 F.R.D. at 637. 
301 Id. 
302 Parkway Gallery Furniture, Inc. v. Kittinger/Pa. House Grp., Inc., 116 F.R.D. 46, 50 
(M.D.N.C. 1987). 
303 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Garvey, 109 F.R.D. 323 (N.D. Cal. 1985). 
304 Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 104 F.R.D. 103, 106 (S.D.N.Y. 
1985). 
305 E.g., Alldread v. City of Grenada, 988 F.2d 1425, 1435 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Hartford, 
109 F.R.D. at 323); United States v. Gangi, 1 F. Supp. 2d 256, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (first citing 
Hydraflow, 145 F.R.D. 637; and then citing Lois Sportswear, 104 F.R.D. at 106); United States 
v. United Techs. Corp., 979 F. Supp. 108, 116 (D. Conn. 1997) (same); Bank Brussels Lambert 
v. Credit Lyonnais (Suisse) S.A., 160 F.R.D. 437, 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (same); Baxter Travenol 
Labs., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 117 F.R.D. 119, 121 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (first citing Hartford, 109 
F.R.D. at 323; and then citing Lois Sportswear, 104 F.R.D. at 106); United States ex rel. Bagley 
//v. TRW, Inc., 204 F.R.D. 170, 177 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (same); Monarch Cement Co. v. Lone 
Star Indus., Inc., 132 F.R.D. 558, 560 (D. Kan. 1990) (citing Hartford, 109 F.R.D. at 323); In 
re Wyoming Tight Sands Antitrust Cases, No. 85-2349-S, 1987 WL 93812, at *4 (D. Kan. Sept. 
11, 1987) (citing Hartford, 109 F.R.D. at 323). 
306 Bagley, 204 F.R.D. at 178. 
307 See cases cited supra notes 281–83; cf. Irth Sol., LLC v. Windstream Commc’ns., LLC, 
No. 2:16-cv-219, 2017 WL 3276021, at *7–8 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 2, 2017) (surveying privilege 
precedent from courts “across the country”). 
308 See, e.g., United States v. United Techs. Corp., 979 F. Supp. 108, 116 (D. Conn. 1997) 
(“a) whether the disclosing party took reasonable precautions to prevent disclosure; b) the speed 
at which the disclosing party acted to rectify its mistake; c) the overall volume of documents 
produced in discovery; d) the number of inadvertent disclosures included among those 
documents; and e) fairness”); Hartford, 109 F.R.D. at 323 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (“(1) the 
reasonableness of the precautions to prevent inadvertent disclosure; (2) the time taken to rectify 
the error; (3) the scope of the discovery; (4) the extent of the disclosure; and (5) the ‘overriding 
issue of fairness’”); Lois Sportswear, 104 F.R.D. at 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (“The elements which 
go into that determination include the reasonableness of the precautions to prevent inadvertent 
disclosure, the time taken to rectify the error, the scope of the discovery and the extent of the 
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Before venturing too much further, it must be admitted the last of the progenitors 
of Hydraflow is rather perplexing, for one may recall from the preceding section that 
the case was decided under the “no waiver” rule.309 Nevertheless, Lois Sportswear 
recited very similar factors in its analysis: 
These factors are generally traced to Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi 
Strauss & Co., although the court there appears to have applied the subjective 
test of the disclosing party’s intention, and used the listed factors as evidence 
as to whether the disclosure was “a knowing waiver or simply a mistake, 
immediately recognized and rectified.” Id. After finding the disclosure was 
inadvertent, the Lois Sportswear court found no waiver because there was no 
intent to waive the privilege. Nevertheless, courts that have rejected the 
subjective approach and followed the balancing approach have used those 
same factors to determine whether waiver should be found.310 
This observation that “no waiver” courts determining inadvertence (which would 
foreclose waiver) often found themselves employing the same factors as did a 
balancing test court to assess waiver directly does not stand alone. “In some 
instances,” concluded a puzzled 1994 court after trying to tease the two apart, “the 
intent-based approach and the totality-of-the-circumstances approach appear to 
merge.”311 Laying bare the conflation, a Chicago court (helpfully?) explained that 
“mere inadvertent production of documents does not waive the privilege,” quoting 
Mendenhall.312 It then added: “Inadvertence is determined by weighing a number of 
factors such as the scope and volume of the discovery, the time available for the 
review, the adequacy of review procedures employed, the extent of the disclosure, the 
time taken to rectify the error and the fairness of the disclosure,” paraphrasing quite 
explicitly the factors from Hydraflow and its ilk.313 Such explicit conflation of the two 
putatively discrete approaches was not unusual.314 
 
disclosure. There is, of course, an overreaching issue of fairness and the protection of an 
appropriate privilege which, of course, must be judged against the care or negligence with which 
the privilege is guarded with care and diligence or negligence and indifference.”). 
309 See Lois Sportswear, 104 F.R.D. at 106; see supra note 258. 
310 Draus v. Healthtrust, Inc., 172 F.R.D. 384, 387 n.1 (S.D. Ind. 1997) (citations omitted). 
311 Koch Foods of Ala., LLC v. Gen. Elec. Capital. Corp., 531 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1321 (M.D. 
Ala. 2008) (citing Stratagem Dev. Corp. v. Heron Int’l N.V., 153 F.R.D. 535, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 
1994) (stating that a waiver “must be intentional . . . to be effective,” then considering 
precautions taken to avoid disclosure)). 
312 In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., No. 94-C-897, 1995 WL 683777, 
at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 1995) (quoting Mendenhall v. Barber-Green Co., 531 F. Supp. 951, 
955 (N.D. Ill. 1982)). 
313 Id. 
314 E.g., Int’l Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers, Local 7-517 v. Uno-Ven Co., No. 97-C-2663, 
1998 WL 100264, at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 23, 1998) (“Plaintiff suggests the magistrate judge’s 
ruling is best understood as an application of the subjective approach. The court does not see it 
that way . . . . If the magistrate judge were applying the subjective approach, he could have 
noted that the documents were disclosed inadvertently and left his reasoning at that. He did not 
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If the subjective and balancing texts often reduced to a similar assessment of 
circumstances, then why were they so consistently viewed as discrete approaches? The 
difference was in presumption: “no waiver” courts cited circumstances to corroborate 
the privilege proponent’s averment that no divulgence was intended,315 whilst 
balancing courts entered into the analysis without predisposition, discounting as they 
did the subjective intent of the discloser.316 It was thus only in the most extreme cases, 
beyond the arguable negligence of Mendenhall, wherein circumstances negated the 
discloser’s inadvertence in a subjective court: those cases “look to the factual basis for 
the claim the disclosure was inadvertent to determine whether the client intended to 
disclose the document or communication, whether the disclosure was inadvertent, or 
whether the disclosure was unintentional but was so negligent or reckless that the court 
should deem it intentional.”317 In jurisdictions tracking the middle of the road, 
however, circumstances far short of gross negligence or recklessness could readily 
yield waiver.318 
 
do so, instead noting the precautions taken to prevent disclosure, the disclosure having occurred 
when defendants were trying to expedite discovery, and the question of fairness, all of which 
go to factors used in the balancing approach. Therefore, the court is of the opinion the magistrate 
judge’s decision is best viewed as an application of the balancing approach.”); Berg Elecs., Inc. 
v. Molex, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 261, 262–63 (D. Del. 1995). 
315 See, e.g., Flores v. Albertson’s, Inc., No. CV-01-0515 PA(SHX), 2004 WL 3639290, at 
*5 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2004) (“As stated, plaintiffs argue that the disclosure of the documents 
was inadvertent. There was no subjective intent on the part of plaintiffs to disclose the 
information. Plaintiffs’ counsel’s actions support this conclusion.”); Baker’s Aid, a Div. of M. 
Raubvogel Co. v. Hussmann Foodservice Co., No. CV-87-09371988 WL 138254, at *5–6 
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 1988) (“I must accord great weight to defendants subjective intent in 
producing the April 11, 1986 document. Upon examination of the factors listed above, I find 
that in this instance, disclosure was the result of an inadvertent error rather than a knowing 
waiver of the attorney-client privilege.”). 
316 See cases cited supra note 279. 
317 Berg Elecs., 875 F. Supp. at 263 (first citing Helman v. Murry’s Steaks, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 
1099, 1104 (D. Del. 1990); and then citing Mendenhall v. Barber-Green Co., 531 F. Supp. 951, 
955 (N.D. Ill. 1982); and then citing Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Marine Midland Realty Credit 
Corp., 138 F.R.D. 479, 482 (E.D. Va. 1991) (“Inadvertent disclosures are, by definition, 
unintentional acts, but disclosures may occur under circumstances of such extreme or gross 
negligence as to warrant deeming the act of disclosure to be intentional.”)); accord Bank 
Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais (Suisse) S.A., 160 F.R.D. 437, 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) 
(quoting Marine Midland, 138 F.R.D. at 482); Fry v. McCall, No. 95 Civ. 1915, 1998 WL 
273035, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 28, 1998) (quoting Marine Midland, 138 F.R.D. at 482); see 
Bensel v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, 248 F.R.D. 177, 179–80 (D.N.J. 2008) (quoting Ciba–Geigy 
Corp. v. Sandoz Ltd., 916 F. Supp. 404, 411 (D.N.J.1995) (“gross negligence” standard)); In re 
Copper Market Antitrust Litigation, 200 F.R.D. 213, 221–22 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“[I]nadvertent 
production will not waive the privilege unless the conduct of the producing party or its counsel 
evinced such extreme carelessness as to suggest that it was not concerned with the protection of 
the asserted privilege.”). 
318 E.g., Atronic Int’l, GMBH v. SAI Semispecialists of Am., Inc., 232 F.R.D. 160, 164–65 
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) (ordering waiver because reviewing attorney was unaware of the name of one 
attorney involved in the matter and accordingly did not annotate them as privileged, after 
considering unfairness to the defendant); United States v. Gangi, 1 F. Supp. 2d 256, 265–66 
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (“Standing alone, each of the individual ‘events’ in this ‘unfortunate chain’ is 
47Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2020
684 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [68:637 
 
In the majority view, the balancing test eliminated the worst foibles of both 
extremes, as compromises are wont to do.319 To the D.C. Circuit, this majority 
rejoined that despite its professed reverence of the confidentiality of attorney and 
client, Wigmore’s rule perversely “diminishes the attorney-client relationship 
because, in rendering all inadvertent disclosures—no matter how slight or 
justifiable—waivers of the privileges, the rule further undermines the confidentiality 
of communications.”320 Revisiting the dumpster-divers for privilege in antediluvian 
Wigmorean courts,321 a balancing rule court could deny waiver to those who would 
purloin others’ secrets.322 To supporters of leniency, another court remonstrated that 
Mendenhall’s blanket rule “encourages sloppy practice; encourages counsel to not 
take precautions, and creates all the wrong incentives.”323 And both absolutist rules 
largely ignored the obvious reality that litigation at the turn of the millennium involved 
large if not colossal demands by way of document production, and although some 
mistakes are literally “inevitable,”324 they need not be abetted by preemptive plenary 
absolution.325 It is therefore worth examining exactly how these demands were being 
assessed when brought before courts administering discovery. 
 
arguably understandable and perhaps excusable. In combination, however, they demonstrate 
that the Government failed to take reasonable precautions to avoid inadvertent disclosures of 
the type that occurred here”). 
319 See Gray v. Bicknell, 86 F.3d 1472, 1482–84 (8th Cir. 1996); Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst 
Marion Roussel, Inc., 190 F.R.D. 287, 290-92 (D. Mass. 2000); Gangi, 1 F. Supp. 2d at 264; 
Marine Midland, 138 F.R.D. at 482; Dyson v. Amway Corp., No. G88-CV-60, 1990 WL 
290683, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 15, 1990); Broun & Capra, supra note 9, at 224 (“The middle 
ground or balanced approach would seem to eliminate the disadvantages of both the no waiver 
and absolute waiver rules.”). 
320 Amgen, 190 F.R.D. at 292. 
321 Suburban Sew ‘N Sweep, Inc. v. Swiss-Bernia, Inc. 91 F.R.D. 254, 255–61 (N.D. Ill. 
1981) (discussed supra notes 67–70). 
322 McCafferty’s, Inc. v. Bank of Glen Burnie, 179 F.R.D. 163, 167–70 (D. Md. 1998) 
(discussing and rejecting the result in Suburban Sew ‘N Sweep). 
323 Dyson, 1990 WL 290683, at *2; see Emery, supra note 14, at 280 (“Waiver of privilege 
sometimes acts as a disincentive for lazy production in that a party is punished for failing to 
perform due diligence and protect its own privileges.”); Broun & Capra, supra note 9, at 224. 
324 See Judson Atkinson Candies, Inc. v. Latini–Hohberger Dhimantec, 529 F.3d 371, 388–
89 (7th Cir. 2008); Transamerica Comp. Co. v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 573 F.2d 646, 651–52 
(9th Cir. 1978); cf. ALEXANDER POPE, AN ESSAY ON CRITICISM 31 (W. Lewis 1711) (Floating 
Press 2010) (“To err is human . . .”); Gergacz, supra note 14, at 1 (quoting Pope in the context 
of FRE 502). 
325 See Amgen, 190 F.R.D. at 290 (“Providing a measure of flexibility, the ‘middle test’ best 
incorporates each of these concerns and accounts for the errors that inevitably occur in modern, 
document-intensive litigation.”); United States v. Gangi, 1 F. Supp. 2d 256, 264 (“Although this 
rule recognizes that mistakes will be made given ‘the realities of the discovery process in 
complex litigation,’ it also creates an incentive for counsel to guard the privilege closely, as the 
failure to take reasonable precautions will result in a waiver.” (quoting Asian Vegetable 
Research v. Inst. of Int’l Educ., No. 94 CIV. 6551, 1995 WL 491491, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 
1995))); see also Dyson, 1990 WL 290683, at *2 (Federal courts are “cognizant of the 
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B. Waiver, Simpliciter, and Subject-Matter Amidst Ballooning Discovery 
“Two twentieth-century phenomena have increased the likelihood of such 
mishaps,” began a 1995 article on inadvertent waiver: “the low-cost photocopy 
machine, which has resulted in more copies, and liberal discovery rules, which have 
given adversaries access to files to which they would not have had access 
previously.”326 The latter phenomenon was the culmination of a seismic shift in 
litigation itself, expanding discovery rules to allow parties to demand virtually 
anything that could have relevance be produced.327 By the turn of the millennium, the 
proliferation of email and electronic records had transcended the reach of the 
photocopier into new multitudes.328 Where these trends converged, “the Wigmore 
rule, born in an earlier era, seems too harsh in light of the vast volume of documents 
disclosed in modern litigation.”329 Such lessons were somewhat slow to sink in 
amongst a judiciary long steeped in the traditional approach to privilege.330 In 
retrospect, however, the unprecedentedly sprawling extent of antitrust litigation 
against IBM in the 1970s served as a philosophical catalyst to the modern revolution 
in the privilege law of discovery, as narrated in a trilogy of watershed cases.331 
Controversies began early in discovery in Control Data Corp. v. IBM Corp. (IBM 
I).332 The first stage involved interrogatories and document inspection only, but its 
scope was still jaw-dropping: CDC averred that IBM had copied some 80 million 
 
tremendous difficulty that lawyers and litigants face in making these massive document 
productions. And it’s quite foreseeable that there will be some slip-ups, some human error, some 
mistakes made in the system. It seems to me to be Draconian to apply a strict waiver rule no 
matter what precautions have been taken; no matter what the difficulties were, and that this 
Draconian rule does not take into consideration the problems that lawyers and litigants face. It 
seems to me to be sort of a hardball rule that really doesn’t take into account understandable 
human error and it certainly isn’t in line with the way that we urge lawyers to conduct 
themselves nowadays.”). 
326 John T. Hundley, “Inadvertent Waiver” of Evidentiary Privileges: Can Reformulating 
the Issue Lead to More Sensible Decisions?, 19 S. ILL. U. L.J. 263, 264 (1995). 
327 See Baez-Eliza v. Instituto Psicoterapeutica de P.R., 275 F.R.D. 65, 69–70 (D.P.R. 2011) 
(“Our current rules of civil procedure were introduced many decades ago to effectuate a 
dramatic change in the way litigation was conducted. The rules in place at the time afforded 
litigants limited means to discover information necessary to prepare for trial. In fact, the prior 
rules were premised on the idea that ‘a judicial proceeding was a battle of wits rather than a 
search for the truth[;] [thus] each side was protected to a large extent against disclosure of its 
case.’” citations omitted)). 
328 See Noyer, supra note 14, at 67576; Sunshine, Part & Parcel, supra note 46, at 48. 
329 Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Marine Midland Realty Credit Corp., 138 F.R.D. 479, 481 
(E.D. Va. 1991). 
330 See Outlaw III, supra note 14, at 3–4. 
331 See EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 571–72. 
332 No. 3-68 CIV 312, 1972 WL 123079 (D. Minn. Apr. 18, 1972) (Neville, J.). 
49Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2020
686 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [68:637 
 
documents from its files.333 Given this almost incomprehensible scope—even by 
twenty-first century standards—IBM had instituted a novel manner of protecting 
privilege, stationing an “interceptor” at its data rooms who would screen any 
documents marked for photocopying for privilege before permitting it.334 As might 
be imagined, under this process CDC’s inspection ground to a halt, and after 
application to the court, removal of the interceptor had been ordered—with the 
understanding that no waiver claims would be entertained going forward, though 
previous disclosures remained waived.335 Now reversing himself, Judge Phillip 
Neville ruled that both parties had “no intent to waive any privilege and both, despite 
their protective measures, through inadvertence permitted privileged documents to fall 
into the other’s hands.”336 Noting the “paucity of precedent” on inadvertent disclosure 
whilst citing a few harsher results, the court ruled disclosures in such overwhelming 
circumstances would not yield waiver, so long as “reasonable precautions” had been 
taken.337 
The following year, the Ninth Circuit entertained an extraordinary petition under 
the All Writs Act in the government’s antitrust case in IBM Corp. v. United States 
(IBM II).338 In an effort to expedite its case,339 the government agreed to accept the 
production made in IBM I, as redacted to remove any documents that had been 
inadvertently included there, with appropriate privilege log.340 Upon delivery, 
however, the government (apparently dismayed at the bargain it had struck) contended 
privilege in all redacted documents had been waived by disclosure to CDC, and the 
district court granted its motion.341 The appellate panel was not amused, observing 
that the parties in IBM I had labored under impossible conditions after the court there 
demanded the acceleration of an already expedited discovery program involving 
 
333 Id. at *1. 
334 Id. 
335 Id. at *1–2. 
336 Id. Notably, the court disdained IBM’s contention that CDC had been more cavalier with 
its documents, lacking dedicated interceptors, and thus should be thought to have waived them: 
“fairness and evenhanded justice should make any ruling of this import reciprocal and equally 
applicable to all parties. IBM’s contention that the documents should be suppressed but those it 
obtained from CDC should not does not sit well with the court.” Id. at *4. 
337 Id. at *4–5. 
338471 F.2d 507, 510 (2d Cir. 1972), rev’d en banc for lack of jurisdiction, 480 F.2d 293 (2d 
Cir. 1973). 
339 Id. (“As already noted, the Government saw many advantages to abandoning its own 
documentary discovery and to binding itself to the IBM-CDC discovery program, not the least 
of which was the accelerated schedule imposed by Judge Neville, a schedule which would both 
facilitate the progress of the New York action as well as avoid duplicative effort and expense.”). 
340 Id. at 508–09. 
341 Id. at 509. 
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hundreds of millions of documents;342 it was in this context that Judge Neville had 
granted the plenary indulgence from waiver to both sides reciprocally.343 The court 
concluded: “It is clear to us beyond peradventure that the delivery of the documents 
pursuant to the Minnesota court order did not constitute a waiver by IBM of its 
attorney-client or work-product privileges. Of the vast amount of material made 
available . . . at issue here are only 1,200 documents.”344   
The final case in the trilogy is Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp. (IBM 
III),345 where the district court rejected the same argument made in IBM II that the 
CDC production had caused waiver, but certified its decision for review.346 The Ninth 
Circuit again relied on the severity of the Minnesota order: “The effect of the order 
was to require IBM to produce within a three-month period for inspection and for 
adversary copying approximately 17 million pages of documents. To say the least, the 
logistical problems confronting IBM were monumental and were exacerbated by a 
number of factors.”347 Counsel unfamiliar with the case were perforce used for 
review; the redaction process of the time was “cumbersome,” IBM was defending 
multiple massive discovery requests simultaneously, and documents were “randomly 
strewn throughout various IBM branch offices and divisional headquarters.”348 Even 
so, IBM made a “herculean effort” to comply whilst preserving its privilege.349 The 
court did not rest on that diligence, however; instead, “under the rather extraordinary 
circumstances of the accelerated discovery proceedings in that case IBM’s inadvertent 
production there of a limited number of privileged documents was, in effect, 
‘compelled,’ and therefore no waiver of the privilege could be predicated upon such 
involuntary production.”350 
The IBM III court’s rationale for inferring compulsion resonates powerfully to this 
day in an era of electronic discovery that similarly confronts millions of documents in 
discovery: 
We have already described at length the extraordinary logistical 
difficulties with which IBM was confronted in its efforts to comply, as it 
eventually did, with the demanding timetable Judge Neville had established 
for the document inspection program. We believe that there is merit in IBM’s 
argument that that timetable deprived IBM of the opportunity to claim the 
privilege inasmuch as it was statistically inevitable that, despite the 
extraordinary precautions undertaken by IBM, some privileged documents 
 
342 Id. at 510. 
343 Id. at 511. 
344 Id. 
345 573 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1978). 
346 Id. at 647–48. 
347 Id. at 648. 
348 Id. 
349 Id. 
350 Id. at 651. 
51Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2020
688 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [68:637 
 
would escape detection by the IBM reviewers. There were literally millions 
of ways for mistakes to be made in the screening process. For example, 
mistakes could easily occur during any of the millions of purely mechanical 
steps necessary for successful screening. In particular, inasmuch as 17 
million individual pages had to be read, the physical failure to turn and 
examine a single one of those 17 million pages could result in the inadvertent 
production of privileged material. Moreover, as explained above, once 
privileged documents were located they had to be placed in green folders. 
The failure to perform so simple a mechanical act as the insertion of a 
document into a folder would also result in the production of privileged 
material.[351] In addition to the plethora of opportunities for mechanical 
blunders, there were inherent in the process numerous opportunities to 
overlook privileged material resulting from what might be characterized as 
visual or judgmental mistakes. For instance, in order to identify privileged 
material it was necessary for IBM examiners inspecting each of the 17 
million pages to recognize a particular name out of myriad names as that of 
an attorney who had rendered advice to IBM, or to uncover in long textual 
passages a legal opinion which perhaps encompassed only a very few lines. 
Moreover, it is obvious that the chance of mistakes being made in the visual 
and judgmental steps of the screening process was considerably enhanced by 
the long hours that many of those most intimately involved in the screening 
were working, and by the necessary extensive utilization of outside 
personnel.352 
Future courts following the majority view took the point, concluding that “in 
extraordinary situations such as expedited discovery or massive document exchanges, 
a limited inadvertent disclosure will not necessarily result in a waiver.”353 Even in 
productions numbered in multiples of thousands rather than millions, courts 
recognized that “mistakes of this type are likely to occur in cases with voluminous 
discovery” in forgiving inadvertent production of a handful of pages after diligent 
screening.354 For firms or individuals with modest resources, commensurately minor 
burdens garnered sympathy that the discloser had acted appropriately—few parties, 
after all, could marshal the resources of IBM: “This is not a case where the Court is 
called upon to assess the adequacy of document screening and review procedures in 
 
351 Modern practitioners might simply replace “insertion of a document into a folder” with 
“clicking of a button marked privileged” to appreciate that the logistical nightmares of 
yesteryear remain with them today despite ever more sophisticated technology. 
352 Id. at 651–52. 
353 Parkway Gallery Furniture, Inc. v. Kittinger/Pa. House Grp., Inc., 11 F.R.D. 46, 50 
(M.D.N.C. 1987) (first citing IBM III, 573 F.2d at 646; and then citing Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., 
Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 104 F.R.D. 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)); and Kansas-Nebraska Natural 
Gas v. Marathon Oil Co., 109 F.R.D. 12 (D. Neb. 1985)); see also Outlaw III, supra note 14, at 
3–4 (discussing pre-FRE-502 measures of production volume). 
354 United States v. Pepper’s Steel & Alloys, Inc., 742 F. Supp. 641, 645 (S.D. Fla. 1990); 
accord, e.g., Judson Atkinson Candies, Inc. v. Latini–Hohberger Dhimantec, 529 F.3d 371, 
388–89 (7th Cir. 2008); In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust Litig., 235 F.R.D. 407, 417 (N.D. Ill. 
2006). 
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the context of complex corporate litigation, where a hierarchy of attorneys has been 
involved,” explained the court in Johnson v. Sea-Land Service, Inc.355 “Rather, 
plaintiff, an individual, is represented by a relatively small law firm.”356 Finding 
plausible his attorney’s overlooking a smattering of privilege in the three-hundred-odd 
documents the client had supplied at the eleventh hour for his deposition, the court 
excused the error.357   
A “no waiver” court, of course, needed no such analysis to forgive mistakes.358 A 
Wigmorean court, however, viewed an IBM-like situation differently from the “mere 
inadvertence” of Mendenhall, as illustrated in Chubb Integrated Systems Ltd. v. 
National Bank of Washington.359 Five months after their initial requests, plaintiffs 
were given access to over 50,000 pages of documents, of which they requested copies 
of roughly a quarter, but defendants later determined some of those involved privilege 
and withheld them.360 The court rejected the invocation of IBM III in support, 
observing that the dispositive factor there was not inadvertence but outright judicial 
compulsion, which all agreed—even the D.C. Circuit361—renders a production 
involuntary and causes no waiver.362 Had the Chubb discovery proceeded under 
similarly breakneck conditions, the court might well have followed IBM III in 
forgiving truly “extraordinary circumstances.”363 Given the smaller volume and 
extended time for compliance, however, the court saw no Hobson’s choice of either 
producing without adequate screening or violating a court order, only run-of-the-mill 
inadvertence, which IBM III did not excuse per se.364 
Nor even in balancing test courts would the IBM III rule have permitted a company 
to sidestep the burdens of discovery with a “document dump” whilst expecting 
 
355 See, e.g., Johnson v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., No. 99-CIV-9161, 2001 WL 897185, at *6 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug 9, 2001). 
356 Id. 
357 Id. at *6–7 (“While, of course, plaintiff could have sent the documents to his attorney 
before he came to New York, in a relatively modest, individual case such as this one, it is not 
surprising or particularly troubling that plaintiff brought his documents with him. There would 
have been no reason to expect that the documents would be so copious or complex as to require 
significant, advance time to review them for privilege.”). 
358 See supra Part II.A.2. 
359 103 F.R.D. 52 (D.D.C. 1984). 
360 Id. at 62. 
361 See In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (exempting court-compelled 
disclosure from waiver). 
362 See Chubb, 103 F.R.D. at 63 n.2 (“The attorney-client privilege is waived by any 
voluntary disclosure . . . . Voluntary disclosure means the documents were not judicially 
compelled.”). 
363 Cf. Sealed Case, 877 F.2d at 980 (equating “extraordinary circumstances” with court-
compelled waiver). 
364 Chubb, 103 F.R.D. at 67 (“We believe that plaintiff misinterprets the decision.”). 
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privilege to be preserved by virtue of the unwieldy size of its production, even if some 
modicum of precaution had been taken.365 Parties proceeding under ordinary 
conditions of discovery in terms of time vis-à-vis volume ordinarily stood to lose their 
privilege had they divulged documents absent some particularized excuse beyond the 
rigors of federal litigation.366 In Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Sandoz Ltd.,367 for example, 
defendants pointed to the 44,000 pages of documents produced, their supposedly 
punctilious protocols for detecting privilege, and a misplaced reliance on counsel.368 
The court was not impressed, discounting overall numbers and holding that “counsel 
has failed to establish that it undertook reasonable precautions to prevent the 
inadvertent disclosure of the Oppikofer document, given the small size of the 
production at issue, the lack of time constraints, and counsel’s inexcusable neglect, on 
two occasions, to conduct a privilege review prior to production” at all.369 
Nevertheless, even though the documents produced were surrendered, waiver 
might have been limited thereto and not extend to those concerning the same subject 
matter370—even where a party deliberately forgoes review.371 Subject matter waiver 
is a doctrine of equity imposed to ensure selectively chosen items do not garble the 
 
365 Parkway Gallery Furniture, Inc. v. Kittinger/Pa. House Grp., Inc., 11 F.R.D. 46, 50 
(M.D.N.C. 1987); see In re Recombinant DNA Tech. Patent & Contractual Litig., MDL No. 
912, 1994 WL 270712, at *41 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 22, 1993) (emphasizing in rejecting the paltry 
precautions taken that “21,000 pages of documents thought to be privileged ‘slipped through’”); 
see also Outlaw III, supra note 14, at 3 (“As one can imagine, courts did not hesitate to find 
waiver where the disclosing party took little to no precautions to protect privileged materials.”). 
366 Recombinant DNA, 1994 WL 270712, at *38–40 (“Furthermore, while the scope of 
discovery here involved was not insignificant, it was not unmanageable. Although 
approximately 50,000 pages of documents were reviewed and about 12,000 pages produced, 
UC does not suggest that it was under any pressure in responding to the production request. 
This case is not comparable to [IBM III].”); see, e.g., Scott v. Glickman, 199 F.R.D. 174, 178–
79 (E.D.N.C. 2001); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Marine Midland Realty Credit Corp., 138 F.R.D. 
479 (E.D. Va. 1991); Liggett Grp., Inc. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 116 F.R.D. 
205, 207 (M.D.N.C. 1986). 
367 916 F. Supp. 404 (D.N.J. 1995). 
368 Id. at 408. 
369 Id. at 413 (carefully tracking time permitted and volume of documents in making 
judgment). 
370 See, e.g., Recombinant DNA, 1994 WL 270712, at *42; Prudential Ins. Co. v. Turner & 
Newall, PLC, 137 F.R.D. 178, 182–83 (D. Mass. 1991); In re Sause Bros. Ocean Towing, 144 
F.R.D. 111, 116 (D. Ore. 1991); Bud Antle, Inc. v. Grow-Tech, Inc., 131 F.R.D. 179, 184 (N.D. 
Cal. 1990); ICI Americas, Inc. v. John Wanamaker of Phila., No. 88–1346, 1989 WL 38647, at 
*4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 18, 1989). 
371 See Recombinant DNA, 1994 WL 270712, at *42 (“In summation, when such inadequate 
screening procedures are coupled with an informed determination to forego a thorough review 
of the documents, the Court cannot be used as a safety net. Certainly, the parties are acutely 
aware of the significance of this litigation and must conduct themselves accordingly. In fairness 
to other parties, failure to do so can result only in living with the consequences . . . . However . 
. . we do not find a subject matter waiver; the waiver applies only to the documents actually 
produced.”). 
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truth;372 such concerns are not at play with documents randomly included in an 
unmitigated mass.373 “A ruling of no waiver will maintain confidentiality which is the 
main purpose of the privilege,” one court concluded: “This ruling limits the risk to 
parties in major discovery cases and still makes them, and not the Court, accountable 
for maintaining confidentiality” in the documents already disclosed.374 Subject matter 
waiver of privileged communications during litigation predictably implicated the very 
core of the case, and thus “the ultimate sweep of this argument would effectively mean 
there was no remaining privilege,” a result that would compromise any adversarial 
proceeding.375 Absent indicia of misfeasance, such a sanction would be 
disproportionate,376 and thus “federal courts generally frown on applying a broad-
subject-matter waiver to claims of privilege in the context of discovery.”377 
But forbearance was still not dependable. Courts espying deliberate attempts to 
sidestep discovery burdens did not hesitate to impose subject matter waiver as 
punishment for bad faith or exploitation of process.378 Others went further with a sort 
of objective test: in Hartman v. El Paso Natural Gas Company,379 the Supreme Court 
of New Mexico affirmed a trial court’s order of subject matter waiver that required 
“El Paso to produce confidential, in-house information written by key El Paso 
personnel during the period July 1, 1982 to June 18, 1986, a period when the events 
complained of in Hartman’s amended complaint were taking place.”380 Finding El 
Paso’s precautions in discovery lacking when measured against the Hydraflow factors, 
 
372 See Sause Bros., 144 F.R.D. at 116; Golden Valley Microwave Foods, Inc. v. Weaver 
Popcorn Co., 132 F.R.D. 204, 207 n.8 (N.D. Ind. 1990); see supra note 105. 
373 See Parkway Gallery Furniture, Inc. v. Kittinger/Pa. House Grp., Inc., 11 F.R.D. 46, 52 
(M.D.N.C. 1987). 
374 Id.; accord Golden Valley, 132 F.R.D. at 208. 
375 Golden Valley, 132 F.R.D. at 206 (“Golden Valley insists that as a result of this 
production any attorney-client privilege Hunt–Wesson had, has now been waived; not only as 
to this document, but ‘any communications referring or relating to attorney opinions addressing 
these issues.’”). 
376 Id. at 208 (“It is not apparent that Hunt–Wesson is attempting to gain any advantage from 
the disclosure and Golden Valley does not argue the point. Accordingly, a ruling that no waiver 
has occurred as to the non-disclosed documents will maintain the confidentiality which is the 
main purpose of the attorney-client privilege.”). 
377 Gerber Prods. Co. v. CECO Concrete Constr., LLC, 533 S.W.3d 139, 143 (Ct. App. Ark. 
2017). 
378 See, e.g., Texaco P.R., Inc. v. Dep’t of Consumer Affairs, 60 F.3d 867, 883–84 (1st Cir. 
1995); In re Sause Bros. Ocean Towing, 144 F.R.D. 111, 116 (D. Ore. 1991) (noting the 
“contention that Canada’s counsel has manipulated the discovery process with regard to the 
damage reports is nonetheless serious” and ordering theretofore withheld drafts of final reports 
produced). 
379 763 P.2d 1144 (N.M. 1988). 
380 Id. at 1146. 
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waiver simpliciter followed for those actually disclosed.381 Indulging then in a bit of 
bootstrapping, the court found that “since the cat was already out of the bag, as far as 
the jury’s knowledge of El Paso’s conduct is concerned, it was not prejudicial to El 
Paso’s case for the trial court to order production of the additional documents.”382 
That old cat had struck again—to the tune of $2.1 million in compensatory damages 
and just over $1 million in punitive.383 
III. CONSIDERATION AND ADOPTION OF FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 502 
So matters anent waiver stood in the first decade of the twenty-first century: a 
simmering olio of competing approaches and unpredictable results.384 In 2005, Judge 
Paul W. Grimm of the District of Maryland rendered a well-received decision in 
Hopson v. Mayor of Baltimore that provided a thorough airing of the contemporary 
problems with privilege,385 and proposed what he himself admitted was a Rube-
Goldberg device of using judicial orders to effect modifications to a broken regime.386 
But that regime was in its final days.387 Incomparably able authors have written of 
how FRE 502 came to be with great skill, most conspicuously the principal drafters of 
the then-proposed rule in 2006,388 and Judge Grimm’s own magisterial assessment of 
the state of play under FRE 502 in 2011.389 There would be little point in attempting 
to fawningly reduplicate such first-person accounts, and so the following is offered as 
the briefest summary; the intrepid scholar is urged to peruse these invaluable records 
in their entirety.390 
Rulemakers were not writing on a blank slate with FRE 502; the possibility of a 
federal rule of evidence codifying questions of privilege had been debated for decades 
but repeatedly come to naught.391 Famously, the adoption of the Federal Rules of 
 
381 Id. at 1152. 
382 Id. at 1152–53. 
383 Id. at 1146. 
384 See Hopson v. Mayor of Balt., 232 F.R.D. 228, 232–243 (D. Md. 2005). 
385 Id.; see also Grimm et al., supra note 14, at 2 (summarizing his own ruling in Hopson in 
the context of analyzing newly enacted FRE 502); Redgrave & Kehoe, supra note 14, at 34–35 
(discussing Hopson at length). 
386 Hopson, 232 F.R.D. at 240–43; Grimm et al., supra note 14, at 4–5. 
387 See Grimm et al., supra note 14, at 2. 
388 Broun & Capra, supra note 9. This author had the privilege to meet the latter whilst 
studying at Fordham University School of Law, a distinct pleasure undoubtedly shared by many 
grateful classes. 
389 Grimm et al., supra note 14. 
390 Another fine source, albeit not first person, is Michael Correll’s thoughtful narration with 
the benefit of hindsight in 2012. See Correll, supra note 6, at 1040–49. 
391 See McLoughlin et al., supra note 14, at 707; Noyes, supra note 14, at 679–80. 
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Evidence as a whole in 1973 was nearly derailed by a rebellion in Congress against its 
proposed treatment of evidentiary privileges.392 Unable to substitute its own solution, 
however, Congress simply struck the entire corpus of the proposed privileges, and 
instead inserted the indeterminate FRE 501, which prescribes tersely that the 
“common law—as interpreted by United States courts in the light of reason and 
experience—governs a claim of privilege” unless otherwise specified.393 The Senate 
Judiciary Committee was clear about its purpose: the wholesale deletion should be 
“understood as reflecting the view that the recognition of a privilege based on a 
confidential relationship and other privileges should be determined on a case-by-case 
basis.”394 Faced with such a mandate, the Evidence Rules Advisory Committee, in 
returning to the subject in 1998, fared no better in refining such guidance,395 especially 
given Congress’s reservation of power to enact such rules.396 
By 2006, however, Congress had reconsidered its traditional policy of 
nonintervention, with the chairman of the House Judiciary Committee formally 
requesting in January that the Judicial Conference undertake a rulemaking to address 
forfeiture of privileges specifically.397 Representative Sensenbrenner sought to 
“protect against the forfeiture of privilege where a disclosure in discovery is the result 
of an innocent mistake,” and “permit parties, and courts, to protect against the 
consequences of waiver by permitting disclosures of privileged information between 
the parties to a litigation.”398 The Evidence Rules Advisory Committee in turn 
deputed Professors Kenneth Broun and Daniel Capra to propose a draft, which they 
circulated later that year.399 The Committee’s ensuing edits generally served to 
broaden protections to align with concerns by Representative Sensenbrenner and 
courts that prohibitive precautions anent privilege were driving litigation costs to 
unprecedented heights.400 Central to achieving greater economy was a “predictable, 
uniform set of standards under which parties can determine the consequences of a 
disclosure of communications or information covered by the attorney-client privilege 
or work product protection.”401 
In particular, the Committee declined to adopt the proposed baseline that voluntary 
disclosures presumptively waived privilege, being unconvinced that rule was even 
 
392 Noyes, supra note 14, at 681–82; Meyers, supra note 9, at 1444–45. 
393 FED. R. EVID. 501; see Noyes, supra note 14, at 682–83; Meyers, supra note 9, at 1445. 
394 Notes of Senate Committee on the Judiciary to Fed. R. Evid. 501, Senate Report No. 93–
1277. 
395 See Noyes, supra note 14, at 683, 690–91. 
396 28 U.S.C. § 2074(b) (2018); see Correll, supra note 6, at 1040; Meyers, supra note 9, at 
1446. 
397 Broun & Capra, supra note 9, at 246; see Murphy, supra note 14, at 200. 
398 Broun & Capra, supra note 9, at 246. 
399 Id. at 247–48; see McLoughlin et al., supra note 14, at 707. 
400 Broun & Capra, supra note 9, at 247–52. 
401 Id. at 252. 
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right, and more critically, unassuming of its ability to foresee the proper carve-outs to 
that severe rule.402 Accordingly, sections (a) and (b) of the proposal concerned 
protective limitations upon waiver under the common law foundation installed as 
authority by FRE 501.403 Mindful of the trifurcated approach in the courts, the rule 
adopted the middle-of-the-road view and conditioned waiver simpliciter after 
inadvertent disclosure upon an assessment of whether reasonable diligence had been 
demonstrated before and after the error.404 Perhaps inviting some of the judicial 
tempests to come, the Committee opted to keep the traditional terminology of 
inadvertence precisely to encompass all the varied court-beleaguering species of 
“mistaken or unintentional” divulgences.405 Subject matter waiver, meanwhile, could 
attach only after voluntary disclosures and would be delimited by fairness to the 
opponent.406 
After opportunity for public comment and further edits, the Judicial Conference 
recommended the proposed rule’s adoption to Congress.407 Importantly, the version 
submitted narrowed one item such that subject matter waiver would apply only to 
“intentional” rather than merely voluntary disclosures—the latter term having been 
ascribed to highly unintentional acts by stricter courts.408 This was meant to confirm 
that the waiver itself must be intentional for subject matter waiver to come into 
play.409 The Senate and then House approved the text without amendment, and 
President George W. Bush’s signature on September 19, 2008 made it into law.410 
Signaling the law’s import, Congress took the unusual step of promulgating a 
“Statement of Congressional Intent Regarding Rule 502 of the Federal Rules of 
 
402 Id. at 258–60. 
403 Id. 
404 Id. at 254–55. 
405 Id. 
406 Id. at 253. 
407 See Correll, supra note 6, at 1042–43; Grimm et al., supra note 14, at 11. 
408 See Bear Republic Brewing Co. v. Cent. City Brewing Co., 275 F.R.D. 43 (D. Mass. 
2011) (discussing choice of where to place the adjective “intentional”); McLoughlin et al., supra 
note 14, at 707–08; compare FED. R. EVID. 502(a) advisory committee’s note to 2008 
amendment (“Thus, subject matter waiver is limited to situations in which a party intentionally 
puts protected information into the litigation in a selective, misleading and unfair manner. It 
follows that an inadvertent disclosure of protected information can never result in a subject 
matter waiver. See Rule 502(b). The rule rejects the result in In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976 
(D.C. Cir. 1989), which held that inadvertent disclosure of documents during discovery 
automatically constituted a subject matter waiver.”), with Sealed Case, 877 F.2d at 980 (“Short 
of court-compelled disclosure, or other equally extraordinary circumstances, we will not 
distinguish between various degrees of ‘voluntariness’ in waivers of the attorney-client 
privilege”). 
409 See Cross & Nagendra, supra note 14, at 2. 
410 Correll, supra note 6, at 1043–44; Grimm et al., supra note 14, at 5; see Act of Sept. 19, 
2008, Pub. L. 110–322, §1(c), 122 Stat. 3538. 
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Evidence,” which seems to be something more than legislative history but less than 
law411—and which understandably has been much noticed by courts.412 As enacted, 
the first two subparts of Federal Rule of Evidence 502 provide as follows: 
(a) Disclosure Made in a Federal Proceeding or to a Federal Office or 
Agency; Scope of a Waiver. When the disclosure is made in a federal 
proceeding or to a federal office or agency and waives the attorney-client 
privilege or work-product protection, the waiver extends to an undisclosed 
communication or information in a federal or state proceeding only if: (1) the 
waiver is intentional; (2) the disclosed and undisclosed communications or 
information concern the same subject matter; and (3) they ought in fairness 
to be considered together. 
(b) Inadvertent Disclosure. When made in a federal proceeding or to a 
federal office or agency, the disclosure does not operate as a waiver in a 
federal or state proceeding if: (1) the disclosure is inadvertent; (2) the holder 
of the privilege or protection took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure; and 
(3) the holder promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the error, including 
(if applicable) following Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(B).413 
The rule also includes provisions for agreements between parties, with or without 
approval of the court,414 ordains its supremacy over state court determinations,415 and 
clarifies that the privileges to which it applies are the attorney-client and work 
product.416 Evidently eager to put its various accomplishments into action, Congress 
provided in the enabling act that its amendments “shall apply in all proceedings 
commenced after the date of enactment of this Act and, insofar as is just and 
practicable, in all proceedings pending on such date of enactment.”417 
  
 
411 Statement of Congressional Intent Regarding Rule 502 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
154 CONG. REC. H7818-H7819 (Sept. 8, 2008); see Correll, supra note 6, at 1044–45. But see 
Bear Republic, 275 F.R.D. at 43 (D. Mass. 2011) (relegating the Statement to mere legislative 
history). 
412 See Correll, supra note 6, at 1044–45 n.75 (collecting cases). 
413 FED. R. EVID. 502(a)–(b). For easy reference, this Article refers to 502(b)(2) as the 
precaution prong, and (b)(3) as the remediation prong, with associated adjectives following suit. 
414 Id. at (d)–(e); see infra Section IV.D. 
415 Id. at (c), (f). 
416 Id. at (g). The Rule consciously omitted any changes to the doctrine of selective waiver 
as such. This Article does not touch on that doctrine, which already has received much 
scholarship. See generally Emery, supra note 14. 
417 Act of Sept. 19, 2008, Pub. L. 110–322, §1(c), 122 Stat. 3538. 
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The World of Waiver That Is 
IV. REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL LANDSCAPE FOR WAIVER BY 
DISCLOSURE 
Wasting little time, the first decision to apply the new FRE 502 appears to be 
Stamps.com, Inc. v. Endicia, Inc. a fortnight later.418 The court first focused on the 
reason for the overhaul in waiver law, quoting the Senate Judiciary Committee’s 
recommendation: 
[T]hough most documents produced during discovery have little value, 
lawyers must nevertheless conduct exhaustive reviews to prevent the 
inadvertent disclosure of material. In addition to the amount of resources 
litigants must dedicate to preserving privileged material, the fear of waiver 
also leads to extravagant claims of privilege, further undermining the purpose 
of the discovery process. Consequently, the costs of privilege review are 
often wholly disproportionate to the overall cost of the case.419 
Applying this overarching purpose, the court found the disclosures in question 
inadvertent, the precautions reasonable, and thus no waiver of any sort under FRE 
502(b).420 This result ensued despite a daunting parade of errors: lengthy delays owing 
to “mistakes and miscommunications” after defense counsel identified the privileged 
material; the delegation of the review to a “new associate and paralegals” unfamiliar 
with the case;421 senior counsel’s voluntary absence on travel and another trial; and 
the ubiquitous bogeyman of botched coding in the electronic review database.422 On 
the other hand, senior counsel acted swiftly to recoup the documents once the mistakes 
were understood, and only three documents—out of millions of pages produced—
slipped through in the first place.423 The defendants’ lurid assertion that “production 
of the documents and later assertion of privilege was part of an intentional plot to 
frustrate discovery” was unsupportable.424 
  
 
418 Stamps.com, Inc. v. Endicia, Inc., No. CV 06–7499–ODW, 2008 WL 11338241 (C.D. 
Cal. Oct. 6, 2008). It was, however, not the first reported decision—that honor goes to the later 
Rhoads Indus. v. Bldg. Materials Corp. of Am., 254 F.R.D. 216 (E.D. Pa. 2008). See Murphy, 
supra note 14, at 212–14 (discussing the case). 
419 Stamps.com, 2008 WL 11338241, at *2 (quoting S. Rep. 110–264, at 2 (2008)). 
420 Id. 
421 One can only feel sympathy for the thankfully anonymous associate whose inexperience 
managed to find its way into a federal holding. 
422 Id. 
423 Id. 
424 Id. 
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A. The Three Schools of Waiver in the Era of FRE 502 
Other courts swiftly began filling the case reporters with analogous decisions 
relying on the new federal rule.425 It will be useful to peruse these according to the 
general trifurcation of approach preexisting FRE 502 as to inadvertent disclosures (and 
concomitant readiness to impose subject-matter waiver), for the new rule would at 
least theoretically have dramatically different impacts on each. 
1. Revisiting the Protégés of Wigmore in the D.C., First, and Federal 
Circuits 
Although a few cases predated it, Amobi v. District of Columbia Dep’t of 
Corrections serves as the most thoughtful initial response to the new world order for 
waiver in the D.C. Circuit.426 “Just over a year ago, parties in defendants’ position in 
this Circuit would have no argument to protect against waiver; they would simply be 
dead in the water with an inadverten [sic] disclosure,” began the court.427 Dutifully, 
however, it recognized the new FRE 502 “overrides the long-standing strict 
construction of waiver in this Circuit,” protecting such disclosures if the middle-of-
the-road test was met.428 Construing inadvertence by dictionary standards to mean 
“‘inattentive, negligent; heedless, . . . . [or] unintentional,’” the court readily found the 
single document’s production in the course of discovery to meet that subjective 
standard.429 Playing the tempter, plaintiffs had entreated the court to reinstate the D.C. 
Circuit’s traditional approach by the same tautology it had always applied: “According 
to plaintiffs, if the disclosure was by a lawyer, then it clearly was not mistaken and not 
inadvertent; if it was by a non-lawyer, then defendants did not take reasonable steps 
to protect privilege.”430 The court did not bite: “The premise of that statement is 
wrong. Lawyers make inadvertent mistakes; it is judges who never make mistakes.”431 
 
425 By way of scale, a search on Westlaw in late 2018 revealed well over a thousand decisions 
referring to FRE 502. Undoubtedly far more lurk in the orders of the magistrate judges, special 
masters, and other adjuncts to Article III jurists who so often decide matters of privilege that do 
not make their way into centralized electronic databases. 
426 Amobi v. D.C. Dep’t of Corr., 262 F.R.D. 45 (D.D.C. 2009). The privilege primarily 
under discussion was work product, but as the exceptions to waiver under FRE 502 apply to 
both that and attorney-client privilege, analysis of the new rule’s effect remains instructive. 
427 Id. at 52. 
428 Id. 
429 Id. at 53. 
430 Id. at 54. 
431 Id. (“More to the point, to find that a document disclosed by a lawyer is never inadvertent 
would vitiate the entire point of Rule 502(b). Concluding that a lawyer's mistake never qualifies 
as inadvertent disclosure under Rule 502(b) would gut that rule like a fish. It would essentially 
reinstate the strict waiver rule in cases where lawyers reviewed documents, and it would create 
a perverse incentive not to have attorneys review documents for privilege.”). 
61Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2020
698 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [68:637 
 
Nonetheless, the court found the defendants had failed to carry their burden to 
demonstrate reasonable precautions and imposed waiver.432 
Such a result has been distressingly uniform in the D.C. Circuit since 2008; 
although reciting the new standard, its district court has remained severe.433 Some 
have used the very size and speed of discovery against the producer: “While the Court 
is particularly mindful of the ‘magnitude of OFHEO’s productions,’ and the time 
pressures OFHEO faced, those circumstances should have evoked a heightened 
concern about inadvertent disclosures,” wrote one in ordering waiver.434 So too this 
inverted logic condemned an email with counsel that proved an exception to a course 
of diligent precautions in guarding email, arising from the technical misuse of a BCC 
field: “A party cannot prevent the waiver of attorney-client privilege under 502(b) for 
reasonable precautions that were not undertaken.”435 Again, the very thoroughness of 
diligence elsewhere was held against the proponent for failing to do so on one 
occasion.436 Still others simply looked to Amobi’s reasoning that the privilege’s 
proponent provided insufficient detail to show reasonable precautions and prompt 
remediation—even where a demand for a document’s return was issued but 
refused.437 Such courts could be found resuscitating fond memories of Sealed Case’s 
requirement that privilege “be jealously guarded”438 as though “crown jewels.”439   
The D.C. Circuit’s traditional emphasis on the burden of proof lying with the 
privilege’s proponent made such decisions easier, as FRE 502 did not displace such 
 
432 Id. at 54–55 (“Hence, the efforts taken are not even described, and there is no indication 
of what specific efforts were taken to prevent disclosure, let alone any explanation of why these 
efforts were, all things considered, reasonable in the context of the demands made upon the 
defendants. Instead, ‘the court is left to speculate what specific precautions were taken by 
counsel to prevent this disclosure.’ There can be no reasonable efforts, unless there are efforts 
in the first place.”) (quoting Golden Valley Microwave Foods, Inc. v. Weaver Popcorn Co., 132 
F.R.D. 204, 209 (N.D. Ind. 1990)). 
433 See, e.g., Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham, 253 F. Supp. 3d 64, 74 (D.D.C. 2017); 
Educ. Assist. Found. v. United States, 32 F. Supp. 3d 35, 44–46 (D.D.C. 2014); Feld v. Feld, 
No. 08-1557, 2011 WL 13193354 (D.D.C. Mar. 9, 2011); Williams v. D.C., 806 F. Supp. 2d 
44, 48–53 (D.D.C. 2011); In re Fannie Mae Sec. Litig., MDL No. 1668, 2009 WL 10708594, 
at *1 (D.D.C. June 9, 2009); case cited infra notes 446–52 (subject matter waiver). But see 
Convertino v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 674 F. Supp. 2d 97, 108–10 (D.D.C. 2009) (forgiving an 
inadvertent disclosure occasioned by correspondence between a client and attorney that had 
been unknowingly surveilled by the Department of Justice because he used his government 
computer for email). 
434 Fannie Mae, 2009 WL 10708594, at *1 (criticizing use of contract attorneys with only 
limited quality control for review). 
435 Feld, 2011 WL 13193354, at *3–4. 
436 Id. at *4. 
437 E.g., Raynor v. D.C., No. 14-0750, 2018 WL 852366, at *2 (D.D.C. Feb. 12, 2018); 
Williams v. D.C., 806 F. Supp. 2d 44, 48–53 (D.D.C. 2011). 
438 Williams, 806 F. Supp. 2d at 52. 
439 Educ. Assist. Found. v. United States, 32 F. Supp. 3d 35, 45 (D.D.C. 2014). 
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precedent.440 That allocation of burden had been true since Wigmore, to whom the 
absence of waiver was an element of privilege.441 And the D.C. Circuit, uniquely, 
applied the same logic to work product privilege as well.442 Cases could thus recite 
the burden of proof before discrediting a proponent’s protestations of diligence as 
insufficient to meet an apparently insuperable obstacle.443 Courts remonstrated they 
were being forced to speculate as to finer points of a screening protocol.444 One sought 
to evince a sense of fairness, allowing it did “not intend to suggest a party seeking to 
invoke the protections of Rule 502(b) must always address all, or even necessarily 
most, of the considerations described above in order to secure relief,” but opining all 
the same that “not one” was addressed with enough detail to meet the burden.445 All 
told, the D.C. Circuit’s reliance on onerous interpretations of burden and the resulting 
homogeneity of result do not comport well with the rationales underlying FRE 502(b). 
Amobi and a few other cases at least seemed to think that the “new rule abolishes 
the dreaded subject-matter waiver” in inadvertent cases.446 But that did not stop D.C. 
district courts from ordering it where some degree of intentionality could be found—
and in creative fashion.447 In SEC v. Brown,448 the district court reviewed earlier D.C. 
 
440 See Amobi v. D.C. Dep’t of Corr., 262 F.R.D. 45, 53 (D.D.C. 2009) (“Rule 502 itself 
does not provide any guidance on who has the burden of proving waiver. In this district, prior 
to the enactment of the rule, ‘the proponent of the privilege . . . [had] the burden of showing that 
it [had] not waived attorney-client privilege.’ I see no reason why Rule 502 can be interpreted 
to modify that rule and I will apply it.”); see also Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham, 253 F. 
Supp. 3d 64, 74 (D.D.C. 2017) (“The D.C. Circuit's strict definition of privilege carries over to 
the waiver of privilege, placing the burden of protecting privileged communications squarely 
on the proponent of the privilege.”). 
441 See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
442 See Amobi, 262 F.R.D. at 53 (“determin[ing] that the document is privileged as work 
product and that defendants have the burden to prove that the privilege has not been waived”). 
443 See, e.g., Educ. Assist. Found, 32 F. Supp. 3d at 44–45; Williams, 806 F. Supp. 2d at 48–
51 (noting the “holder of the privilege bears the burden” and that its “showing is woefully 
deficient,” whilst also faulting a failure to submit affidavits rather than unsworn statements); 
Amobi, 262 F.R.D. at 53–55; see also U.S. Airline Pilots Ass’n v. Pension Ben. Guar. Corp., 
274 F.R.D. 28, 30–33 (D.D.C. 2011). 
444 See, e.g., Williams, 806 F. Supp. 2d at 50–51; Amobi, 262 F.R.D. at 54–55.  
445 Williams, 806 F. Supp. 2d at 51. 
446 Trs. of Elec. Workers Local No. 26 Pension Tr. Fund v. Tr. Fund Advs., Inc., 266 F.R.D. 
1, 10–16 (D.D.C. 2010); accord Amobi, 262 F.R.D. at 52. 
447 Consider, for example, the court facing a redacted application for attorneys’ fees, which 
provided the profferer with the choice to either withdraw the redacted entries from 
reimbursement or permit a motion for subject-matter waiver should it wish to press for payment 
on them. See Animal Welfare Inst. v. Feld Enter., Inc., No. 03-2006, 2014 WL 12775090, at *2 
(D.D.C. Jan. 23, 2014); cf. Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham, 253 F. Supp. 3d 64, 74 (D.D.C. 
2017) (ordering subject matter waiver of attorney interview memos underlying intentionally 
disclosed report). 
448 No. 09-1423, 2010 WL 11602724 (D.D.C. Sept. 29, 2010). 
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Circuit case law in Sealed Case, Minebea, Elkins, and Intervet without so much as a 
whisper of FRE 502 before following their lead in ordering a subject matter waiver as 
to the same topics voluntarily discussed with the SEC.449 So too where the attorneys 
argued the report produced was not privileged, despite being manifestly so: the 
disclosure was found intentional contra the avowed mistake of law, subject matter 
waiver imposed, and questioning permitted as to a broad range of topics included in 
the report.450 And Hughes v. Abell contrived with no mean talent to find that a client’s 
disclosure that he had not discussed a topic with counsel constituted a subject matter 
waiver of the topics he had discussed with his counsel, a feat of bootstrapping that 
beggars the imagination.451 It is incredible to think the client could have intended his 
denial to implicate privilege at all, let alone to yield a subject matter waiver of his 
conversations with counsel wholesale.452 
Surely most troubling are holdings that wholly pretermit the revisions of FRE 502 
without mention. Such an omission might have been understandable shortly after its 
passage, as with The Navajo Nation v. Peabody Holding Co.,453 decided on January 
9, 2009, which directly contravened the newfangled law in pronouncing that “any 
disclosure of attorney-client material will be considered” a subject matter waiver, 
which “will occur regardless of the party’s intent when making the disclosure.”454 No 
such excuse can accrue to the 2015 district court that relied solely on Sealed Case to 
conclude that privilege had been waived by inadvertent disclosure without a hint of 
 
449 Id. at *2–3. The court added in a footnote: “Because the Court concludes that the scope 
of Integral’s subject matter waiver is far narrower than Defendants seek, it need not reach the 
other arguments advanced by the parties under Federal Rule of Evidence 502(a).” Id. at n.6. 
450 U.S. Airline Pilots Ass’n v. Pension Ben. Guar. Corp., 274 F.R.D. 28, 30–33 (D.D.C. 
2011) (“A review of the Report shows that the ‘same subject matter’ includes: the scope and 
methods of the investigation; the documents reviewed; the efforts made to obtain more 
documents; the Plan’s investment policy; the U.S. Airways Master Trust’s policies and 
procedures; and Hagan’s findings. Thus, questions in the Association’s topics three and five, 
which cover the scope, conduct, participants, and conclusions of the investigations in which 
Hagan participated, are permissible.”). 
451 Hughes v. Abell, No. 09-0220, 2012 WL 13054819, at *3–5 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2012) (“[A]s 
indicated above, Rule 502 does not change the important premise that the disclosure of one 
communication waives the privilege with respect to other communications concerning the same 
subject matter when ‘they ought in fairness be considered together,’ Fed. R. Evid. 502(a)(3), ‘in 
order to prevent a selective and misleading presentation of evidence to the disadvantage of the 
adversary,’ Fed. R. Evid. 502 explanatory note. Here, the Court finds that it would be unfair to 
disclose only what Mr. Hughes did or did not tell Weinstock regarding Modern Management, 
and not the rest of his communications with the firm around the time he entered the agreement 
with Wells Fargo in late September 2006.”). 
452 But see id. at *5 (“Furthermore, the danger of prejudice to Wells Fargo from selective 
disclosure is ample because the disclosure was made in a declaration intended to convince this 
Court to deny Wells Fargo’s motion for summary judgment.”). 
453 255 F.R.D. 37 (D.D.C. 2009). 
454 Id. at 48. 
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the required analysis of circumstances under FRE 502.455 Adding insult to injury, it 
imposed subject matter waiver without even resolving the open question of whether 
the disclosure was accidental,456 still relying upon Sealed Case alone, and expressly 
rejecting the government’s submission that such a waiver must be predicated on 
correcting an unfairly intentional disclosure, as FRE 502(a) would inquire.457 
If the D.C. Circuit remains imbrued with the teachings of its earlier precedent, the 
First Circuit has fared only somewhat better. At times, its district courts have looked 
to the separate provision in FRE 502(d) permitting for a court order to preemptively 
define the scope of waiver in holding inadvertence excused.458 Yet waiver was also 
found under a 502(d) order when one party delayed for months in invoking clawback 
provisions after an allegedly mistaken production, under an amorphous standard 
asking whether maintenance of privilege would be contrary to its philosophical 
purposes.459 Some decisions appear as harsh as those of the D.C. Circuit. The court in 
SurfCast, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.460 accepted that the disclosure was likely 
inadvertent, but faulted counsel for delaying its objection until the end of the day when 
the privileged document appeared in a deposition,461 as well as for the oversight 
having originated in separating hard copy and email documents for review, a 
supposedly “self-imposed” wound.462 (Once again pointing up the devil in the details, 
the mistake may well have actually arisen because the pivotal language—“I’d 
appreciate your views and lagal [sic] advice”—might not register to automated or even 
human detection of legal rather than “lagal” vocabulary.)463 
District courts in the First Circuit have also not infrequently ordered subject matter 
waiver, but with somewhat more searching standards of intentionality and tactical 
advantage and fairness.464 The analysis in Bear Republic Brewing Co. v. Central City 
 
455 Agility Pub. Warehousing Co. K.S.C. v. Dep’t of Def., 110 F. Supp. 3d 215, 224–26 
(D.D.C. 2015). 
456 Id. (“As all parties now agree, some disclosures—perhaps accidental, perhaps not—have 
occurred here.”). 
457 Id. at n.7. 
458 See, e.g., E. Coast Sheet Metal Fabricating Corp. v. Autodesk, Inc., No. 12-cv-517-LM, 
2014 WL 4627262, at *2 (D.N.H. Sept. 16, 2014). 
459 See Thomas & Betts Corp. v. New Albertson’s, Inc., No. 10-11947-DPW, 2014 WL 
11462825, at *4 (D. Mass. July 21, 2014). 
460 Surfcast, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 2:12-cv-333-JAW, 2013 WL 4039413, at *4–5 (D. 
Me. Aug. 7, 2013). 
461 Id. at *4 (finding that the failure to object to the obviously privileged document prior to 
the end of the deposition rather than the end of the day was dispositive). 
462 Id. at *4–5. 
463 See id. at *1. 
464 See, e.g., Ortiz v. City of Worcester, No. 4:15-cv-40037-TSH, 2017 WL 1948523, at *4–
5 (D. Mass. May 10, 2017); Columbia Data Prods., Inc. v. Autonomy Corp., No. 11-12077, 
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Brewing Co. is incisive and quite evenhanded.465 There the court parsed at length 
whether the waiver itself—as opposed to the disclosure—needs to be intentional under 
FRE 502, holding that it did (and was).466 It discarded, on the other hand, a discrete 
predicate requirement that waiver be made specifically “in a selective, misleading and 
unfair manner,” as that clarifying language appeared only the note to the rule rather 
than the rule itself.467 Thus satisfied subject matter waiver was available, the court 
imposed it sparingly under the fairness prong of the test, extending only to the 
circumstances under which the disclosed material was obtained: “the waiver goes just 
this far and no further.”468 Other First Circuit district courts, practicing even greater 
parsimony under FRE 502, have found subject matter waiver unnecessary where 
fairness did not demand it.469 
Still, like the D.C. Circuit, however, there remain courts seemingly overlooking 
the new rule. The First Circuit itself pronounced in 2011 that waiver occurs “when 
otherwise privileged communications are disclosed to a third party” because “such 
disclosure ‘destroys the confidentiality upon which the privilege is premised,’” citing 
its own pre-2008 precedent without mention of FRE 502.470 Loose language makes 
mischief: Riveiro-Caldera v. Cooperativa de Ahorro y Credito de Aguadilla involved 
the district court’s review of a magistrate judge’s order denying waiver.471 The district 
court looked to its court of appeals,472 and overruled the magistrate.473 Although 
counsel had been instructed not to (and usually did not) use a fax machine in the 
general office space for privileged communications, in this instance they had, and a 
 
2012 WL 6212898, at *17–18 n.9 (D. Mass. Dec. 12, 2012); Massachusetts v. Mylan, Inc., No. 
2003-11865-PBS, 2010 WL 2545607, at *1–2 (D. Mass. June 21, 2010). 
465 Bear Republic Brewing Co. v. Cent. City Brewing Co., 275 F.R.D. 43 (D. Mass. 2011). 
466 Id. at 47. 
467 Id. 
468 Id. at 49–50. 
469 See Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 293 F.R.D. 
244, 253 (D. Mass. 2013); see also Thomas & Betts Corp. v. New Albertson’s, Inc., No. 10-
11947-DPW, 2014 WL 11462825, at *5 n.7 (D. Mass. July 21, 2014) (“To be clear, the 
Supermarket Defendants have not argued for, and this Court has not found, a subject matter 
waiver. Rather, the Court finds that T&B waived any work production protection as to the 
spreadsheets only.”). 
470 Lluberes v. Uncommon Prods., LLC, 663 F.3d 6, 24 (1st Cir. 2011) (first citing United 
States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681, 684 (1st Cir. 1997); and then citing In re Keeper 
of Records, 348 F.3d 16, 22 (1st Cir. 2003)). 
471 Riveiro-Caldera v. Cooperativa de Ahorro y Credito de Aguadilla, No. 11-1702-CCC, 
2013 WL 503965 (D.P.R. Feb. 8, 2013). 
472 See id. at *3 (first citing Lluberes, 663 F.3d at 23–24; and then citing Texaco Puerto Rico 
v. Department of Consumer Aff., 60 F.3d 867, 883 (1st Cir. 1993)). 
473 Id. at *5. 
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letter regarding termination of an employee was intercepted by that very employee.474 
The magistrate had found the precautions reasonable given the lapse was an exception 
rather than the rule, but the district court faulted the defendant for counsel’s failure to 
follow instructions, as “the carelessness or negligence of an attorney is imputable to 
the client under the agency theory.”475 Notwithstanding harshness of result, the elision 
of FRE 502 is explicable given uncertainty as to whether a relevant federal proceeding 
was ongoing at the time.476 No such allowance, however, applied to another court 
summarily ordering subject matter waiver and citing only pre-FRE-502 precedent.477 
The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, on the other hand, has acknowledged in 
passing that FRE 502 now sharply distinguishes inadvertent from intentional 
disclosures,478 and tightened the requirements for subject matter waiver.479 It is a 
unique court of appeals, however, as its privilege law is generally taken from the 
circuit whose district court it is reviewing on appeal.480 And its own subordinate 
tribunal, the Court of Federal Claims, had been brazenly unabashed in flouting the 
Federal Circuit’s instruction on strict waiver for nearly two decades: 
A decision of the Court of Claims, National Helium, was widely recognized 
for the proposition that an inadvertent disclosure of privileged material 
despite “a good faith, sufficiently careful, effort to winnow a relatively small 
number of privileged materials from a very large volume of documents” does 
not result in waiver of the attorney-client privilege. The salient question was 
deemed to be whether the producing party had employed a “lax, careless, or 
inadequate” screening procedure. However, in Carter v. Gibbs, a decision 
issued ten years after National Helium, the Federal Circuit held that the 
accidental appending of an internal Department of Justice memorandum to a 
motion for extension of time would waive work-product protection as to that 
memorandum. Without citing National Helium, the court stated that “[i]t is 
irrelevant whether the attachment was inadvertent. . . .” Opinions from this 
court previously employed a variety of devices to limit Carter and to follow 
National Helium. The enactment of Fed. R. Evid. 502 would seem to have 
put this controversy to rest. The court sees no reason to refrain from 
 
474 Id. at *4. 
475 Id. at *3. 
476 Id. at *1 (noting the advice was sought in connection with the employee’s protection 
sought under the Federal Bankruptcy Act). See infra Section V.B for discussion of the peculiar 
position of extrajudicial disclosures. 
477 See BTU Ventures, Inc. v. Betancourt, No. 09-10058-JLT, 2011 WL 3421520, at *1 (D. 
Mass. Aug. 3, 2011). 
478 See In re OptumInsight, Inc., No. 2017-116, 2017 WL 3096300, at *3 (Fed. Cir. July 20, 
2017). 
479 See Wi-LAN, Inc. v. Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP, 684 F.3d 1364, 1369–70 
(Fed. Cir. 2012). 
480 See id. at 1368; In re Pioneer Hi-Bred Intern., Inc., 238 F.3d 1370, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
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embracing the subsection of that Rule pertaining to inadvertent disclosures, 
which accords with the principles applied in National Helium.481 
That trial courts operating under the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence have 
apparently adjusted faithfully to FRE 502 thus signifies only that they were roughly 
following that rule already.482 For what is worth, however, the Court of Federal 
Claims does appear to hew to an objectivist stance in assessing inadvertence based on 
context rather than subjective intent,483 disregarding the example set by Amobi. 
2. Minor Adjustments in “No Waiver” Courts to the New Standard 
Speaking of intent: the acolytes of Mendenhall and its ilk faced the opposite 
challenge in the wake of FRE 502, being called on to now override subjective intent 
when objective circumstances evinced a lack of diligence. As discussed earlier, 
however, lenient courts were already considering many of the same factors in 
evaluating inadvertence, and thus the “no waiver” courts arguably faced an easier 
transition that the “always waiver” courts—some might call it only a change in 
emphasis or perspective.484 
The Southern District of Florida, site of probably the second most influential 
decision of the “no waiver” school,485 offers a vivid illustration of the lenient approach 
in the FRE 502 era in Diamond Car Care, LLC v. Scottsdale Insurance Co.486 
Plaintiffs claimed waiver had occurred because the privileged documents were used 
in depositions some five months after being produced (twice), and defendants 
allegedly made no timely objection.487 Defendants countered they did not even know 
of the mistake until the deposition, and did object, adding that plaintiffs were the 
wrongdoers for concealing the inadvertent production despite numerous notices that 
privilege had been intended in letters, motion practice, and logs.488 The court was 
unpersuaded of waiver, finding defendants’ attempts to assert privilege on the 
document demonstrated lack of intentional waiver, which lack was not compromised 
 
481 Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 106 Fed. Cl. 571, 584 (Fed. Cl. 2012) (lineation 
and citations omitted) (citing numerous Federal Court of Claims cases applying the balancing 
test). 
482 Id.; accord, e.g., Oasis Int’l Waters, Inc. v. United States, 110 Fed. Cl. 87 (2013); Eden 
Isle Marina, Inc. v. United States, 89 Fed. Cl. 480, 503 (2009) (“By requiring the waiver to be 
intentional, Congress made it clear that a subject-matter waiver cannot result from an 
inadvertent disclosure.”). 
483 See, e.g., Cormack v. United States, 117 Fed. Cl. 392, 399 (2014). 
484 See supra notes 309–18 and accompanying text. 
485 Georgetown Manor, Inc. v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 936, 938 (S.D. Fla. 1991). 
486 No. 16-Civ-20813, 2017 WL 1293249 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 10, 2017). 
487 Id. at *2–3. 
488 Id. 
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by the five-month delay.489 And intention controlled in light of their clear expressions 
thereof; quoting Mendenhall at length, the court concluded squarely that “even if 
Defendant negligently produced the privilege documents at issue, Plaintiff’s argument 
fails because there is no waiver without an intentional relinquishment.”490 
That bald statement seemingly set the court athwart FRE 502’s middle-of-the-road 
approach to inadvertent waiver, but the court pivoted to take the rule on its own terms, 
and found it supported the same conclusion.491 On the first prong, there was little 
argument the production was inadvertent other than the long delay in assertion, which 
defendants had justified satisfactorily.492 Defendants’ repeated notices that the 
documents of the type in question were privileged during discovery—including 
seeking a protective order—apparently sufficed for precautionary measures.493 And 
whilst the parties debated whether objection was made at the deposition, evidence 
showed defendants had at least demanded the documents destroyed shortly after its 
conclusion.494 Yet it is notable the court found the precautionary prong in 502(b)(2) 
satisfied absent any evidence of defendant’s screening protocol for privilege, so often 
the sensible focus of courts finding waiver.495 As for the 502(b)(3) prong, recall that 
a First Circuit district court had found the same few hours’ delay in objecting after a 
deposition yielded waiver, contra the result in Diamond Car.496 Some measure of 
goal-oriented application of FRE 502’s test is as surely on display in formerly “no 
waiver” courts as “always waiver” courts. 
 
489 Id. at *5. 
490 Id. 
491 Id. (“The application of Federal Rule of Evidence 502 supports the same conclusion. The 
disclosure of communications covered under the work product privilege does not waive 
protection when ‘(1) the disclosure is inadvertent; (2) the holder of the privilege or protection 
took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure; and (3) the holder promptly took reasonable steps 
to rectify the error.’ The purpose of this rule is to resolve ‘longstanding disputes in the courts 
about inadvertent disclosure issues” and “provide a predictable, uniform set of standards under 
which parties can determine the consequences of a disclosure of a communication or 
information covered by the attorney-client privilege or work-product protection.’ As set forth 
below, Defendant meets all of the aforementioned requirements.” (citations omitted)). 
492 Id. at *6. 
493 Id. 
494 Id.  
495 Compare id. with, e.g., Desouza v. Park West Apartments, Inc., No. 3:15-CV-01668, 
2018 WL 625010, at *2–3 (D. Conn. Jan. 30, 2018); Felman Prods., Inc. v. Indus. Risk Ins., 
C.A., No. 3:09-0481, 2010 WL 2944777, at *1–2 (S.D. W. Va. July 23, 2010). Courts have 
specifically noted the absence of details on screening as compelling a finding of waiver. See 
cases cited supra note 444. However, however, the absence is explicable by the distinction 
between attorney-client and work product privileges on the burden of proof. See infra text 
accompanying notes 522–27. 
496 See Surfcast, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 2:12-cv-333-JAW, 2013 WL 4039413, at *4–
5 (D. Me. Aug. 7, 2013) (discussed supra text accompanying notes 460–61). 
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Diamond Car also shows that there remains room under FRE 502 for the subjective 
test of inadvertence itself, as proposed in Amobi,497 and explained more profusely by 
another decision of the Southern District of Florida, Liles v. Stuart Weitzman, LLC: 
The first element of Rule 502(b) requires that the disclosure of privileged 
documents be “inadvertent”; the rule, however, does not define that term. 
Courts considering whether a disclosure of privileged documents is 
inadvertent have taken two different approaches. Some courts considering 
the question have ruled that a party’s subjective intent is not sufficient to 
establish that a disclosure is inadvertent; rather, these courts look at several 
factors to determine whether the “inadvertent” element has been satisfied, 
including the total number of documents reviewed, the procedures used to 
review the documents before production, and the actions of the producing 
party after discovering that the documents had been produced. Other courts 
have taken a simpler approach, “essentially asking whether the party intended 
a privileged or work-product protected document to be produced or whether 
the production was a mistake.”498 
Unsurprisingly, the court opted for the familiar subjective approach.499 More 
surprisingly, perhaps, it did not rubber-stamp the intention against waiver with the 
surrounding circumstances, but faithfully assessed it under the latter prongs of FRE 
502(b).500 Criticizing the same lack of detail as Amobi, the court cited the miniscule 
size of the production and lack of time constraints in finding a lack of diligence, 
despite plaintiffs’ characterization of the mistaken production as “barely 1%” of those 
produced.501 (Indeed, the court often cited Amobi favorably in its analysis.)502 As for 
remediation, the facts and result were congruent with Diamond Bar: the document was 
introduced at a deposition, objection lodged, an email sent later that day asserting 
privilege, and a motion filed the following day.503 But that was not enough, for all 
prongs must be met, and accordingly, the inadvertent production yielded waiver.504 
Preference for the subjective approach comported with an influential structural 
analysis from the Northern District of Illinois in Coburn Group, LLC v. Whitecap 
Advisors LLC shortly after the new rule’s promulgation.505 There the court 
distinguished the two methodologies of analyzing inadvertence based on intention 
 
497 See Amobi v. D.C. Dep’t of Corr., 262 F.R.D. 45, 52–53 (D.D.C. 2009). 
498 Liles v. Stuart Weitzman, LLC, No. 09-61448, 2010 WL 11505149, at *2 n.9 (S.D. Fla. 
June 15, 2010). 
499 Id. at *4. 
500 Id. at *4–6. 
501 Id. at *4–5. 
502 Id. at *4–6. 
503 Id. at *5–6. 
504 Id. at *6. 
505 Coburn Grp., LLC v. Whitecap Advisors LLC, 640 F. Supp. 2d 1032 (N.D. Ill. 2009). 
70https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol68/iss4/5
2020] FAILING TO KEEP THE CAT IN THE BAG 707 
versus circumstance, and came down strongly in favor of the former.506 First, the 
structure of FRE 502 strongly implied the threshold analysis was a binary assessment 
of subjective motivation: if intentional, then subpart (a) applied; if not intentional and 
therefore inadvertent, then subpart (b) applied.507 Second, the latter two prongs of 
502(b) looked expressly to objective factors surrounding the disclosure; it would be 
redundant to import those selfsame factors sub silentio into the first prong.508 There 
being “no real dispute” as to subjective intent, Coburn Group proceeded to analyze 
the latter two prongs, and this time denied waiver, finding the steps taken to screen for 
privilege commendable in their detail and depth, and the demand for the privilege 
documents’ return suitably prompt.509   
Many courts from the Chicago and South Florida district courts historically 
practicing leniency have thus maintained their subjectivist bent in reliance on 
Coburn’s compelling logic;510 such courts could accept a proponent’s representation 
of their (lack of) intention as satisfying the first element without much further 
inquiry.511 But after applying the latter elements of FRE 502(b), subjective courts 
have scrupulously ruled in favor of waiver512 as well as against,513 as the surrounding 
circumstances of precautions and remediation taken dictate. The objectivist strain, 
however, depending upon circumstance to assess the gateway question of 
 
506 Id. at 1037–38. 
507 Id. at 1038. 
508 Id. 
509 Id. at 1039–41. 
510 Walker v. White, No. 16-C-7024, 2018 WL 2193255, at*3 (N.D. Ill. May 14, 2018) 
(“Although Rule 502 does not define ‘inadvertent,’ the majority of courts in this district ask 
‘merely whether the production was unintentional.’”); accord Excel Golf Prods., Inc. v. 
MacNeil Eng’g Co., No. 11-C-1928, 2012 WL 1570772, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 3, 2012); see, e.g., 
Siegmund v. Xuelian Bian, No. 16-CV-62506, 2018 WL 3725775, at *10 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 
2018); Viamedia, Inc. v. Comcast Corp., No. 16-CV-5486, 2017 WL 2834535, at *5–6 (N.D. 
Ill. June 30, 2017); Thermoset Corp. v. Bldg. Mats. Corp. of Am., No. 14-60268-CIV, 2015 WL 
1565310, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 8, 2015); Thorncreek Apts. III, LLC v. Vill. of Park Forest, No. 
08-C-1225, 2011 WL 3489828, at *5–6 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 9, 2011); Sidney I v. Focused Retail 
Prop. I, LLC, 274 F.R.D. 212, 215 (N.D. Ill. 2011); Kmart Corp. v. Footstar, Inc., No-09-C-
3607, 2010 WL 4512337, at *3 nn.32–36 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 2, 2010); see also Walker v. GEICO 
Indem. Co., No. 6:15-cv-1002, 2017 WL 1174234, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2017); In re 
Yasmin & Yaz Mktg. Litig., MDL No. 2100, 2014 WL 4961490, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2014). 
511 E.g., Thermoset Corp., 2015 WL 1565310, at *8 (“This Court concurs with the rationale 
of Amobi and, therefore, accepts GAF’s representation that the production of the two emails at 
issue was inadvertent, that is, a mistake and unintentional.”). 
512 E.g., Walker, 2018 WL 2193255, at *4; Thorncreek Apts., 2011 WL 3489828, at *8; 
Sidney, 274 F.R.D. at 217–18; Kmart, 2010 WL 4512337, at *5. 
513 E.g., Siegmund, 2018 WL 3725775, at *10; Viamedia, 2017 WL 2834535, at *7; Walker, 
2017 WL 1174234, at *8; Thermoset Corp., 2015 WL 1565310, at *8–9; Yasmin & Yaz, 2014 
WL 4961490, at *2–3; Excel Golf, 2012 WL 1570772, at *4. 
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inadvertence, rapidly became a diminutive minority view in these jurisdictions,514 
represented most frequently by the early case Heriot v. Byrne,515 whose many later 
citations honor it more in the breach than the observance.516   
The key distinction amongst outcomes in Diamond Bar, Liles, and Coburn then 
lies with the second prong of FRE 502(b). In all three cases, a handful of pages were 
inadvertently produced, unbeknownst to their owners, until they were unveiled by 
their opponents at a deposition.517 Objections were duly lodged and demands 
straightaway sent that the offending documents were privileged and must be returned 
or destroyed, followed by motion practice to enforce the same.518 What differed was 
the showing made as to precautions against disclosure: the Coburn court credited the 
detail-filled descriptions of the equally detailed review protocol undertaken, whilst the 
Liles court could conclude only that screening was insufficient because the motion 
papers were.519 The lesson is that motion practice matters, and when it comes to 
preservation of privilege, more is more—perhaps even Amobi might have come out 
differently had the privilege’s proponent there framed its arguments more fully!520 
Ultimately, courts remain mindful of the lessons of IBM I, II, and III that would point 
eventually to FRE 502: “The scope of discovery is a logical starting point in many 
cases because ‘[w]here discovery is extensive, mistakes are inevitable and claims of 
inadvertence are properly honored so long as appropriate precautions are taken’”—
and demonstrated.521 
Yet in an inversion of responsibilities, the Diamond Car court rested not as did 
Liles on the failure of the privilege’s proponent to show adequate precautions, but on 
 
514 See White, 2018 WL 2193255, at *4; Viamedia, 2017 WL 2834535, at *6; Excel Golf, 
2012 WL 1570772, at *2. 
515 Heriot v. Byrne, 257 F.R.D. 645, 659-60 (N.D. Ill. 2009); see also Comrie v. Ipsco, Inc., 
No. 08-C-3060, 2009 WL 4403364, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 30, 2009) (following Heriot rather 
than Coburn); Yasmin & Yaz, 2014 WL 4961490, at *2 (noting both strains of precedent exist). 
516 See, e.g., Viamedia, 2017 WL 2834535, at *5–6; Thermoset Corp., 2015 WL 1565310, 
at *8; Thorncreek Apts., 2011 WL 3489828, at *5–6; cf. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY 
OF HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK act 1, sc. 4. 
517 See Diamond Car Care, LLC v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., No. 16-Civ-20813, 2017 WL 
1293249, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 10, 2017); Liles v. Stuart Weitzman, LLC, No. 09-61448, 2010 
WL 11505149, at *1 (S.D. Fla. June 15, 2010); Coburn Grp., LLC v. Whitecap Advisors LLC, 
640 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1035–36 (N.D. Ill. 2009). 
518 Diamond Car, 2017 WL 1293249, at *1; Liles, 2010 WL 11505149, at *5–6; Coburn, 
640 F. Supp. 2d at 1036. 
519 Liles, 2010 WL 11505149, at *5–6; Coburn, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 1039–40. 
520 Compare Liles, 2010 WL 11505149, at *5–6 (likening lack of detail to Amobi) with 
Amobi v. D.C. Dep’t of Corr., 262 F.R.D. 45, 54–55 (D.D.C. 2009) (finding lack of detail 
dispositive). 
521 Coburn, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 1039 (quoting Judson Atkinson Candies, Inc. v. Latini–
Hohberger Dhimantec, 529 F.3d 371, 388–89 (7th Cir. 2008)). 
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the failure of the party challenging privilege to show inadequate precautions.522 This 
inversion follows from a distinction between attorney-client and work product 
privileges, for in almost all courts the burden is on the proponent of privilege for the 
former, but on the challenger for the latter.523 (Not so in the D.C. Circuit,524 and a 
few other outliers,525 where the burden remains on the proponent for both.) In most 
courts, therefore, those seeking to protect work product against waiver under FRE 502 
may find considerable lenience indeed; Diamond Car explained its own result mirrors 
that of the Fifth Circuit in upholding work product privilege simply after finding that 
the challenger had failed to offer any “clear evidence” supporting a waiver.526 That 
said, the court of appeals permitted further discovery via deposition to develop such 
evidence, so those trusting in a barren record should be wary.527 
Finally, lest it be forgotten, the other half of Mendenhall’s holding concerned the 
role of counsel vis-à-vis client, and may be treated more briefly, for the new rule does 
not speak to whether attorneys’ negligence may substitute for the client’s in waiver. 
One may thus still find lenient-leaning courts applying the Mendenhall principle that 
it could not: YS Garments v. Continental Casualty Co. concerned a law firm, 
Buchalter, that had missed a deadline for objections to a subpoena, purportedly 
waiving privilege as to the unchallenged documents.528 Finding the client had worked 
vigorously with counsel to assert its privilege, the court rejected the idea that the client 
had somehow “contributed to the waiver.”529 The client “had no reason to suspect that 
Buchalter would miss the deadline to object or fail to assert the relevant privilege,” 
and in any event “cannot ‘contribute’ to a waiver by Buchalter because Buchalter does 
 
522 Diamond Car, 2017 WL 1293249, at *5 (“[T]he record here is lacking on whether a 
waiver actually occurred. Plaintiff argues that the privileged documents were presented to 
several deponents without any objections from Defendant. To the contrary, Defendant alleges 
that Plaintiff blindsided Defendant with the use of privileged documents at a deposition and that 
Defendant properly objected to its use. Therefore, the problem here is that there are no citations 
to any deposition testimony—let alone any deposition transcript included as an exhibit. Because 
Plaintiff has the burden to demonstrate that a waiver has occurred and it has failed to do so, 
there is no basis to conclude, on this issue, that the documents have lost their privileged status.”). 
523 See Ecuadorian Plaintiffs v. Chevron Corp., 619 F.3d 373, 379 n.10 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing 
Johnson v. Gmeinder, 191 F.R.D. 638, 643 (D. Kan. 2000)); Diamond Car, 2017 WL 1293249, 
at *4 (noting “courts across the country” agree and collecting numerous cases); B.H. ex rel. 
Holder v. Gold Fields Mining Corp., 239 F.R.D. 652, 655–56 (N.D. Okla. 2005) (collecting 
cases and identifying as majority view). 
524 See Amobi, 262 F.R.D. at 53; supra notes 440–45. 
525 E.g., Resolution Tr. Corp. v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 200 F.R.D. 183, 190–91 
(W.D.N.Y. 2001); Granite Partners, L.P. v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 184 F.R.D. 49, 52 (S.D.N.Y. 
1999). 
526 Ecuadorian Plaintiffs, 619 F.3d at 379. 
527 Id. at 379–80. 
528 See YS Garments v. Cont. Cas. Co., No. CV-17-03345-SJO, 2018 WL 3829764 (C.D. 
Cal. Jan. 29, 2018). 
529 Id. at *4. 
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not have the authority or ability to waive the attorney-client privilege unless given 
actual consent by” its client, which it clearly lacked.530 By and large, however, stricter 
and mainstream courts alike continued to simply impute the error from counsel to 
client under agency theory.531 
3. For the Majority, “Plus Ça Change, Plus C’est La Même Chose”532 
By design, for the majority of courts who had gravitated to the middle-of-the-road 
rule, the new FRE 502 did little more than ratify established practice.533 Indeed, the 
note from the Advisory Committee went so far as to endorse the ubiquitous factors 
enunciated in Lois Sportswear and Hartford Fire, and later regularized in 
Hydraflow,534 as setting forth the relevant if not dispositive considerations, especially 
with regard to the size, extent, and time constraints on the production relative to the 
mistakes535—although some later commentators have expressed doubts.536 Academic 
 
530 Id.; see also Terrell v. Cent. Wash. Asphalt, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-142, 2015 WL 461823, at 
*9 (D. Nev. Feb. 4, 2015) (rejecting argument that counsel’s inadvertence could not be imputed 
to client because the client had personally endorsed the divulgence). 
531 See Irth Sols., LLC v. Windstream Commc’ns LLC, No. 2:16-cv-219, 2017 WL 3276021, 
at *11 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 2, 2017); First Tech. Capital, Inc. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 
5:12-CV-289, 2013 WL 7800409, at *3 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 10, 2013) (“The Rule 502(b) cases, 
which typically involve assessing lawyer acts, uniformly seem, without discussion, to treat 
conduct regarding disclosure and preventive steps as within the attorney-client agency. This is 
a model supported traditionally in the cases as a function of implied authority.”); EPSTEIN, supra 
note 3, at 11; e.g., Riveiro-Caldera v. Cooperativa de Ahorro y Credito de Aguadilla, No. 11-
1702-CCC, 2013 WL 503965, at *3 (D.P.R. Feb. 8, 2013); Hilton-Rorar v. State & Fed. 
Commc’ns Inc., No. 5:09-CV-01004, 2010 WL 1486916, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 13, 2010). 
532 JEAN-BAPTISE ALPHONSE KARR, LES GUÊPES (6th series 1859) (generally rendered in 
English as “the more things change, the more they are the same,” although the original is 
singular). 
533 See FED. R. EVID. 502(b) advisory committee’s note to 2008 amendment (expressly 
noting it adopted the “middle ground” approach “in accord with the majority view”); accord 
Multiquip, Inc. v. Water Mgmt. Sys. LLC, No. CV-08-403-S, 2009 WL 4261214, at *2–3. (D. 
Ida. Nov. 23, 2009). 
534 FED. R. EVID. 502(b) advisory committee’s note to 2008 amendment; see supra text 
accompanying notes 298–306. 
535 Id.; see Schaefer, supra note 14, at 219 (“That rule essentially adopts the ‘balancing’ 
approach to determine waiver.”); Cavaneau, supra note 14, at 11; see also Grimm et al., supra 
note 14, at 35 n.159 (noting endorsement but that the rule is intended to allow for other factors 
to be considered as well); Murphy, supra note 14, at 211–12 (citing advisory committee intent 
to use the factors as guidelines); Broun & Capra, supra note 9, at 224 (noting Committee intent 
to adopt majority rule); see also Close, supra note 14, at 22 (“In 2008, FRE 502(b) codified 
what appears to be a ‘modified’ version of Hydraflow.”). 
536 See N. Am. Rescue Prods., Inc. v. Bound Tree Med., LLC, No. 4:08CV1474, 2010 WL 
199948, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 14, 2010) (“Rule 502 does not set forth a five-factor test for 
determining waiver.”); Murphy, supra note 14, at 223–24 (seemingly endorsing Bound Tree); 
Meyers, supra note 9, at 1484 (“[T]he analysis should still focus on the 502(b) framework and 
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qualms aside, circuits that previously employed the median approach have broadly 
acknowledged that the standards for reasonable diligence under FRE 502(b)(2)-(3) 
mirror their previous precedent.537 Such recognition derives largely from the district 
 
not simply walk through the individual factors of tests used in cases applying the old 
‘inadvertent waiver’ standard”); Outlaw III, supra note 14, at 7 (“There is nothing in the rule or 
its history that suggests that FRE 502(b) is meant to be a preliminary analysis to be followed by 
the five-factor test. To the contrary, it is clear that FRE 502 was designed to replace the five-
factor test by incorporating its elements.”). Murphy notes both approaches. See Murphy, supra 
note 14, at 230 nn.280–81. 
537 Second: Desouza v. Park W. Apts., Inc., No. 3:15-CV-01668, 2018 WL 625010, at *2 
n.4 (“Courts in the Second Circuit have used both the factors from Fed. R. Evid. 502(b) and 
Lois Sportswear to determine whether a party has waived the attorney-client privilege through 
inadvertent disclosure.”) (collecting cases); Third: J.N. v. S.W. Sch. Dist., 55 F. Supp. 3d 689, 
599 n.11 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (“Federal Rule of Evidence 502(b) provides that, in a federal 
proceeding, unintentional disclosure of privileged materials does not result in waiver of that 
privilege if “(1) the disclosure is inadvertent; (2) the holder of the privilege or protection took 
reasonable steps to prevent disclosure; and (3) the holder promptly took reasonable steps to 
rectify the error.” Fed. R. Evid. 502(b). Adopting a case-by-case approach, courts within the 
Third Circuit consider the [Hydraflow] factors in determining whether an inadvertent disclosure 
constitutes waiver.”); accord Gilson v. Penn. State Police, No. 1:12-cv-0002, 2015 WL 403181, 
at *2 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 2015); Fourth: Harleysville Ins. Co. v. Holding Funeral Home, Inc., 
No. 1:15CV00057, 2017 WL 4368617, at *10 (W.D. Va. Oct. 2, 2017) (“Observing that the 
five-factor test completely encompasses the three factors described in Rule 502, at least one 
court in this circuit has applied the five-factor test when determining whether a waiver has 
occurred under Rule 502(b).”) (citing Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. Felman Prod., Inc., 271 F.R.D. 
125, 133–36 (S.D. W. Va. 2010)); Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., No. 3:13-cv-06529, 2015 WL 
1650428, at *7 (S.D. W. Va. Apr. 14, 2015) (“A five-factor test is often used in this circuit, a 
similar test has been adopted in the Sixth Circuit.” (citations omitted)); Fifth: Adaptix, Inc. v. 
Alcatel-Lucent USA, Inc., No. 6:12-cv-22, 2015 WL 12781215, at *2–3 (E.D. Tex. June 1, 
2015) (rejecting contention that FRE 502 diverges from the five-factor test and applying it); 
Alpert v. Riley, 267 F.R.D. 202, 209 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (“Rule 502(b) retains—without 
codifying—the multifactor test set out in the case law.”); Sixth: Kumar v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 
No. 08–2689, 2009 WL 1683479, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. June 16, 2009) (recognizing that FRE 502 
“addresses inadvertent disclosures by adopting the general principles of the ‘middle ground’ 
approach”); see also Johnson, 2015 WL 1650428, at *7; Seventh: Carmody v. Bd. of Trs., 893 
F.3d 397, 405–06 n.2 (7th Cir. 2018); Eighth: Baranski v. United States, No. 4:11-CV-123, 
2015 WL 3505517, at *4 (D. Mo. June 3, 2015) (“Rule 502(b) adopts the middle ground on 
whether inadvertent disclosure constitutes a waiver of the attorney-client and work product 
privileges. Although Rule 502(b) does not explicitly codify the Hydraflow test, it is flexible 
enough to accommodate all of its factors.” (citation omitted)); Ewald v. Royal Norwegian 
Embassy, No 11-CV-2116, 2014 WL 1309095, at *7 (D. Minn. Apr. 1, 2014) (noting courts in 
its district use Hydraflow factors); Ninth: Am. Cap. Homes, Inc. v. Greenwich Ins. Co., No. 
C09-0622, 2010 WL 11561400, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 3, 2010) (noting in applying FRE 502 
that “courts in the Ninth Circuit and elsewhere have employed a set of five factors,” citing Lois 
Sportswear and Hartford Fire); accord Blueearth Biofuels, LLC v. Hawaiian Elec. Co., No. 
09–00181, 2010 WL 11425708, at *7 (D. Haw. May 11, 2010) (applying Lois Sportswear to 
FRE 502); Mauna Kea Resort, LLC v. Affil. FM Ins. Co., No. 07-00605, 2009 WL 10677201, 
at *4–5 (D. Haw. June 24, 2009) (same); Tenth: Silverstein v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 07-
cv-02471, 2009 WL 4949959, at *11 (D. Colo. Dec. 14, 2009) (citing Lois Sportswear factors 
from the advisory note); Eleventh: Butterworth v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, No. 3:08–cv–
411, 2010 WL 11470895, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 2, 2010) (applying the Hartford Fire factors 
under FRE 502(b)). 
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courts, as the courts of appeals have rarely had cause to examine the minutiæ of 
privilege.538 But as for what constitutes the requisite intent under FRE 502(a)(1) and 
(b)(1)—that is, whether and by which provision a waiver is governed by FRE 502 at 
all—federal law remains rather unsettled to this day,539 grappling with three 
interwoven nuances of definition and methodology.540 
a. Subjective Versus Objective Assessment of Intent 
First, courts across the country have pondered whether inadvertence is to be 
assessed based on circumstances or purpose: the issue discussed above within the 
subjective courts.541 Unlike their lenient peers, middle-of-the-road courts prior to FRE 
502 had often amalgamated what were now three distinct prongs, so the question of 
whether a change in course was due was more pointed.542 One court summed up the 
philosophies that had emerged by 2013: 
The Rule does not define “inadvertent” and the Tenth Circuit has not 
addressed the issue. Of the courts that have considered it, some have 
continued to use the common law balancing test described above to 
determine if a disclosure is inadvertent. Others have conflated inadvertency 
with the second and third requirements of the rule—the duty to take 
reasonable steps to prevent and rectify the disclosure. Still others have given 
inadvertent its dictionary definition of unintentional or mistaken.543 
 
538 See, e.g., Bd. of Trs., Sheet Metal Workers’ Nat’l Pension Fund v. Palladium Equity 
Partners, LLC, 722 F. Supp. 2d 845, 850 (E. D. Mich. 2010) (“Neither the Sixth Circuit nor any 
other court of appeals has addressed a list of factors under Rule 502 yet.”). Even in passing, the 
first and only to date would appear to be the Seventh Circuit—a decade later, in 2018. Carmody, 
893 F.3d at 405–06 n.2. 
539 See Harleysville Ins. Co. v. Holding Funeral Home, Inc., No. 1:15CV00057, 2017 WL 
4368617, at *9 (W.D. Va. Oct. 2, 2017) (“There is a dearth of authority in the Fourth Circuit, 
and in federal law generally, as to the definition of an ‘inadvertent disclosure’ under the meaning 
of Rule 502.”); see also Meyers, supra note 9, at 1457–58, 1482–83. 
540 Of course, there are also the courts that decline to grapple with FRE 502 entirely, in 
troubling disregard of federal law. See, e.g., Relion, Inc. v. Hydra Fuel Cell Corp., No. CV06-
607-HU, 2008 WL 5122828, at *3 (D. Or. Dec. 4, 2008) (“I conclude that Relion did not pursue 
all reasonable means of preserving the confidentiality of the documents produced to Hydra, and 
therefore that the privilege was waived. The fact that Wells St. John did not intend to produce 
any privileged documents is not dispositive.”). Other articles have noted that Relion seemingly 
failed to engage with FRE 502 meaningfully at all. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 14, at 214. 
541 See supra notes 505–16. 
542 See, e.g., Meyers, supra note 9, at 1457–58 (“Compounding the problem is that 
‘inadvertent’ was the conclusion of the prior common-law approach, yet it is now an element 
under the rule.”); id. at 1476; Grimm et al., supra note 14, at 29 (noting reliance on pre-FRE-
502 case law). 
543 De Los Santos v. City of Roswell, No. 12-375, 2013 WL 12330144, at *9 (D.N.M. May 
21, 2013) (citations omitted); see also, e.g., Shields v. Boys Town La., Inc., No. 15-3243, 2016 
WL 9414346, at *2 (E.D. La. May 24, 2016) (distinguishing two approaches); Thermoset Corp. 
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A minority of courts have indeed persisted in their previous methodology, judging 
inadvertence by objective indicia of proponents’ precautions and remediation, not by 
their avowed intent, whether using some version of the Hydraflow factors or the latter 
prongs of FRE 502(b) to which those factors are largely tantamount.544 As one 
explained, “the question whether the mistake was inadvertent is wrapped up with 
whether [the producer] took reasonable steps to prevent its disclosure.”545 At least one 
commentator has endorsed this approach as providing for a more predictable and 
normative regime.546 
But to most, this approach “does not make sense,” being inherently redundant in 
either applying the latter factors twice or reading the first factor out of existence.547 
The better argument thus lies with those who have adopted the cogent logic embodied 
in Coburn, and Amobi before it, finding the dictionary meaning, structure, and purpose 
of FRE 502 coincide to clearly commend a subjective approach, disentangled from the 
latter prongs.548 Or as one court said, almost as if in rebuttal: “In ordinary usage 
 
v. Bldg. Materials Corp. of Am., No. 14-60268-CIV, 2015 WL 1565310, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 
8, 2015) (same).  
544 Williams v. Merle Pharmacy, Inc., No. 15-cv-1262, 2017 WL 3705802, at *14 (C.D. Ill. 
Aug. 28, 2017) (“In determining whether a disclosure was inadvertent, courts look at such 
factors as ‘the total number of documents reviewed, the procedures used to review the 
documents before they were produced, and the actions of producing party after discovering that 
the documents had been produced.’ These common law factors overlap with the requirements 
of Rule 502(b).”) (quoting Heriot v. Byrne, 257 F.R.D. 645, 658–59 (N.D. Ill. 2009)); e.g., 
Cormack v. United States, 117 Fed. Cl. 392, 399 (2014); D’Onofrio v. Borough of Seaside Park, 
No. 09-6220, 2012 WL 1949854, at *10 (D.N.J. May 30, 2012); Silverstein v. Fed. Bureau of 
Prisons, No. 07–cv–02471, 2009 WL 4949959, at *11–13 (D. Colo. Dec. 14, 2009); Heriot, 257 
F.R.D. at 658–59 (“This Court can find no reason to discard these factors, which aptly address 
the issue of whether a party inadvertently disclosed confidential information.” (citation 
omitted)); Rhoades v. Young Women’s Christian Ass’n of Greater Pittsburgh, No. 09-261, 2009 
WL 3319820, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 14, 2009); United States v. Sensient Colors, Inc., No. 07-
1275, 2009 WL 2905474, at *4 (D.N.J. Sept. 9, 2009) (“However, plaintiff’s subjective intent 
is not controlling. All inadvertent disclosures are by definition unintentional. To determine if 
plaintiff's production was inadvertent the Court must look at a multitude of factors, including 
whether plaintiff took reasonable precautions to prevent errors.”); see also Smith v. Auto-
Owners Ins. Co., No. 15-cv-1153, 2016 WL 11117291, at *5–6 (D.N.M. Oct. 5, 2016) 
(discussing precautions taken and promptness of response in assessing inadvertence); see 
Grimm et al., supra note 14, at 29–30; Gergacz, supra note 14, at 10–11. 
545 Cormack, 117 Fed. Cl. at 399. 
546 See, e.g., Gergacz, supra note 14, at 14–15. 
547 Grimm et al., supra note 14, at 29. 
548 E.g., cases cited supra note 510 (collecting examples within N.D. Ill. And S.D. Fla.); Irth 
Sols., LLC v. Windstream Commc’ns, LLC, No. 2:16-cv-219, 2017 WL 3276021, at *8 (S.D. 
Ohio Aug. 2, 2017); Shields v. Boys Town La., Inc., No. 15-3243, 2016 WL 9414346, at *2 
(E.D. La. May 24, 2016); First Tech. Capital, Inc. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 5:12-
CV-289, 2013 WL 7800409, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 10, 2013); In re Tier 1 JEG Telecomm. Cases, 
No. 4:07-CV-00043, 2013 WL 12158598, at *7 (S.D. Iowa Nov. 25, 2013); BNP Paribas Mortg. 
Corp. v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 09 CIV. 9783, 2013 WL 2322678, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 
2013) (The three “requirements are separate and should not be conflated in the analysis; in 
particular, inadvertence under the first prong does not turn on the reasonable steps taken to 
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something is ‘inadvertent’ if it is not intended or planned. To show inadvertence the 
producing party is not required to demonstrate the production occurred despite 
reasonable precautions to prevent disclosure.”549 This does not mean that context 
plays no part, but rather that its part is to corroborate an avowal of unintentionality, 
not hold the avower to an objective standard of reasonableness.550 Indeed, this is just 
as it was in the pre-FRE-502 subjective courts.551 FRE 502 has thus yielded the 
perhaps unexpected result of promoting broader adoption to the test of subjective 
intent practiced by the lenient school as the gatekeeper to its protections. Nonetheless, 
uncertainty has consequences, as some courts, apparently stymied by the uncertainty, 
have pretermitted the question and found waiver under the latter two prongs of FRE 
502(b) whilst assuming inadvertence.552 
b. A Binary Versus Multifarious Spectrum of Intent 
Second, regardless of the subjective versus objective analysis, there is the question 
of whether inadvertence and intentionality occupy the entire spectrum of intent, or 
whether there might be unenumerated intermediates like negligence or recklessness 
that are neither inadvertent nor intentional and thus fall outside FRE 502 entirely.553 
For courts that follow a dictionary approach equating inadvertent with unintentional, 
the answer would be clear (literally by definition).554 As for the rest, the court in Irth 
 
prevent mistaken disclosure addressed in the second prong.”); Datel Holdings Ltd. v. Microsoft 
Corp., No. C–09–05535, 2011 WL 866993, at *3 (N.D. Cal. March 11, 2011) (distinguishing 
Silverstein); see also Deere & Co. v. Bush Hog, LLC, No. 3:09-CV-00095, 2011 WL 13097463, 
at *5 (S.D. Iowa June 16, 2011); Kelly v. CSE Safeguard Ins. Co., No. 2:08-cv-88, 2011 WL 
3494235, at *2 (D. Nev. Aug. 10, 2011) (“A disclosure is inadvertent when it is a mistaken, 
unintended disclosure.”); Amobi v. D.C. Dep’t of Corr., 262 F.R.D. 45, 53–54 (D.D.C. 2009); 
Meyers, supra note 9, at 1482–84 (arguing for subjective standard). 
549 Tier 1, 2013 WL 12158598, at *7. 
550 E.g., Deere & Co., 2011 WL 13097463, at *5 (“Having viewed the document in camera, 
and considering the circumstances of this case, the Court finds that Dellett’s and Delsman’s 
declarations . . . are credible.”); see also Cross & Nagendra, supra note 14, at 3 (“Thus, courts 
may look to the circumstances of disclosure and infer intent even where the disclosing party 
disavows any intent to waive privilege.”). 
551 See supra text accompanying notes 311–18. 
552 E.g., De Los Santos v. City of Roswell, No. 12-375, 2013 WL 12330144, at *9 (D.N.M. 
May 21, 2013). 
553 See Gergacz, supra note 14, at 11–12; Meyers, supra note 9, at 1455. 
554 See United States v. Sensient Colors, Inc., No. 07-1275, 2009 WL 2905474. at *4 (D.N.J. 
Sept. 9, 2009) (“All inadvertent disclosures are by definition unintentional.”); e.g., Thermoset 
Corp. v. Bldg. Materials Corp. of Am., No. 14-60268-CIV, 2015 WL 1565310, at *8 (S.D. Fla. 
Apr. 8, 2015); First Tech. Capital, Inc. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 5:12-CV-289, 2013 
WL 7800409, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 10, 2013) (“[A]ny mistaken, or unintentional, production of 
privileged material is ‘inadvertent.’”); Tier 1, 2013 WL 12158598, at *7; Kelly v. CSE 
Safeguard Ins. Co., No. 2:08-cv-88, 2011 WL 3494235, at *2; Coburn Grp., LLC v. Whitecap 
Advisors LLC, 640 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1038 (N.D. Ill. 2009); Amobi v. D.C. Dep’t of Corr., 262 
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Solutions, LLC v. Windstream Communications LLC had occasion to conduct a 
searching and thoughtful analysis, which is to be commended given such a question is 
seldom squarely presented:555 
This is a rare case where inadvertence is challenged because inadvertence 
is a given in most cases. Plaintiff argues that what Defendant characterizes 
as “inadvertent” is “in fact nothing short of a negligent, if not reckless, 
production of allegedly privileged communications.” Plaintiff’s position 
presumes, without support, that there are three distinct types of disclosures: 
(1) intentional, (2) inadvertent, and (3) negligent.556 
Invoking the structure of FRE 502, the court thought it clear that the rule 
contemplated only two possibilities, with no daylight betwixt and between.557 A 
survey of “[c]ourts across the country” revealed that inadvertence was indeed being 
equated with unintentionality, with no mention of negligence in evidence.558 And such 
an interpretation comported with the language of the rule, which cleanly separates 
issues of negligence that might be at play in evaluating the reasonableness of 
precautions or remediation from the gateway issue of motivation.559 The conclusion 
was clear: “classifying a disclosure is a binary choice: it is either intentional or 
inadvertent,” with negligence (being unintentional) subsumed within the latter.560 
Contrarily, in the courts conflating the latter two prongs of FRE 502(b) with the 
question of inadvertence, negligence perforce crept in to the analysis.561 Although 
judges studiously avoided reference to negligence in hæc verba, their assessments 
under 502(b)(1) are replete with normative judgments: one noted that the party’s 
“actions can be described only as responsible,” that “the procedures used to review the 
documents were reasonable,” and that the party “should be able to rely” on its vendor 
 
F.R.D. 45, 53 (D.D.C. 2009); see also Meyers, supra note 9,, at 1455 (“Thus ‘intentional’ may 
mean ‘not inadvertent.’”); Grimm et al., supra note 14 , at 31–33. 
555 Irth Sols., LLC v. Windstream Commc’ns, LLC, No. 2:16-cv-219, 2017 WL 3276021, at 
*7–8 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 2, 2017). 
556 Id. at *7 (citations omitted). 
557 Id. at *8 (“Rule 502, however, does not distinguish between “negligent disclosure” and 
“inadvertent disclosure.” Instead, the language of Rule 502 allows for only two options: there 
is either (1) intentional disclosure of privileged material, in which case Rule 502(a) defines the 
scope of the waiver or (2) an unintentional, inadvertent disclosure, in which Rule 502(b) guides 
whether waiver occurred.” (citations omitted)). 
558 Id. (“That a negligent disclosure is subsumed within the category of an inadvertent 
disclosure finds support in the relevant case law. Courts across the country have held that any 
action that was not intended, not planned, or a mistake, qualifies as “inadvertent”—regardless 
of how negligent a party’s actions were.” (citations omitted)). 
559 Id. (“Intuitively, this makes sense based upon the remaining language of Rule 502(b). 
The reasonableness of counsel’s actions are considered expressly in 502(b)(2) and (b)(3), with 
no evidence that reasonableness should also be part of the (b)(1) analysis.”). 
560 Id. 
561 See cases cited supra note 544. 
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and “had no reason to suspect” a mistake was made.562 Such tests are precisely an 
inquiry into negligence, which, to return to the dictionary, is the “failure to exercise 
the standard of care that a reasonably prudent person would have exercised in a similar 
situation.”563 Some courts have even used the taboo word itself.564 Such furtive (or 
less than furtive) consideration of an intent standard conspicuously absent from the 
gateway prongs of FRE 502(a)(1) and (b)(1), muddying the question of which applies, 
provides further reason to reject the objective approach.565   
The subjective approach properly regards negligence as a species of inadvertence, 
clearly governed by FRE 502(b).566 There remains perhaps a bit more uncertainty 
about what to do with grossly negligent or reckless disclosures,567 but the best rule is 
simply to state that such disclosures are not intentional and therefore inadvertent.568 
Epstein, indeed, points up the need for such Manichaeism to obtain some measure of 
 
562 Heriot v. Byrne, 257 F.R.D. 645, 659–60 (N.D. Ill. 2009). 
563 Negligence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
564 E.g., Diamond Car Care, LLC v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., No. 16-Civ-20813, 2017 WL 
1293249, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 10, 2017). 
565 Cf. supra note 557 (adverting to the textual absence of a negligence standard). 
566 See Shields v. Boys Town La., Inc., No. 15-3243, 2016 WL 9414346, at *2 (E.D. La. 
May 24, 2016) (following Amobi and explaining the dichotomy as between “inadvertent in the 
sense of negligent mistake” and “deliberate and voluntary”); e.g., Amobi v. D.C. Dep’t of Corr., 
262 F.R.D. 45, 53 (D.D.C. 2009) (including negligence in the definition of inadvertence); 
Thermoset Corp. v. Bldg. Mats. Corp. of Am., 2015 WL 1565310, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 8, 2015) 
(following Amobi); Liles v. Stuart Weitzman, LLC, No. No. 09-61448, 2010 WL 11505149, at 
*4 (S.D. Fla. June 15, 2010) (same). 
567 See, e.g., Eden Isle Marina, Inc. v. United States, 89 Fed. Cl. 480, 503 (2009) (finding a 
disclosure “sufficiently careless and reckless to be intentional”); cases cited infra note 808 
(applying a recklessness standard in evaluating inadvertence under agreements pursuant to FRE 
502(d)); see also BNP Paribas Mortg. Corp. v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 09 CIV. 9783, 2013 WL 
2322678, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013) (rejecting a parsing between recklessness and 
inadvertence); Meyers, supra note 9, at 1476 (“As I argue below, inadvertence as a factor, rather 
than a conclusion, is best measured by the privilege holder’s mental state—was the disclosure 
truly accidental, or was it the result of sheer recklessness or bad faith?”); cf. Schaefer, supra 
note 14, at 198 (surveying pre-FER-502 courts’ distinctions—if any—between intentionality, 
recklessness, negligence, and inadvertence). 
568 See BNP Paribas, 2013 WL 2322678, at *9; Schaefer, supra note 14, at 197 (proposing 
a definition of “inadvertent disclosure” that would “encompass the full range of mistaken, 
negligent, grossly negligent, and reckless disclosures”); e.g., Irth Sols., LLC v. Windstream 
Commc’ns, LLC, No. 2:16-cv-219, 2017 WL 3276021, at *8 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 2, 2017); First 
Tech. Capital, Inc. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 5:12-CV-289, 2013 WL 7800409, at *2 
(E.D. Ky. Dec. 10, 2013) (holding “any mistaken, or unintentional, production of privileged 
material is ‘inadvertent’”); In re Tier 1 JEG Telecomm. Case, No. 4:07-CV-00043, 2013 WL 
12158598 (S.D. Iowa Nov. 25, 2013) (“In ordinary usage something is ‘inadvertent’ if it is not 
intended or planned.”); Coburn Grp., LLC v. Whitecap Advisors, LLC, 640 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 
1038 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (“the analysis under subpart (b)(1) is intended to be much simpler, 
essentially asking whether the party intended a privileged or work-product protected document 
to be produced or whether the production was a mistake.”). 
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consistency: “What one court would deem excusable mistake, another will call ‘gross 
negligence.’”569 
c. Intent to Disclose Versus Intent to Waive 
Third, there is the question of what exactly needs to be intentional or inadvertent: 
the disclosure itself or the resultant waiver.570 Such a distinction may seem to be 
“slicing the baloney mighty thin,”571 but it has practical consequences, most markedly 
in mistake-of-law cases in which the act of disclosure was intended but waiver was 
not, based on an error in assessing the privileged status of the document.572 Some 
post-FRE-502 courts continue to view such situations as intentional disclosures under 
FRE 502(a)(1);573 indeed, some sliced yet finer, holding for example that a disclosure 
was not “inadvertent” where the document was produced intentionally, and the only 
mistake was producing it in unredacted form.574 The latter reasoning comes close to 
a tautology that would collapse FRE 502’s dichotomy between intentionality and 
inadvertence: every mistakenly produced privileged document is by definition 
mistaken in that the necessary redactions were not applied.575 Strict courts of the D.C. 
Circuit, pace the liberal-minded Amobi, unapologetically deem mistakes as to 
 
569 EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 574. 
570 See, e.g., Leftwich v. City of Pittsburgh, No. 16-2112, 2017 WL 2774774, at *2 n.2 (D. 
Kan. June 27, 2017) (“Rule 502(a) applies to an ‘intentional waiver.’ It is unclear whether that 
requirement means that the privilege-holder must not only intend to disclose the communication 
but also intend that the disclosure operate as a waiver.”). 
571 Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1215 (2018) (“As THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s valiant 
attempt to do so shows, that would be slicing the baloney mighty thin.”). 
572 See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Texaco Inc., 208 F.R.D. 329, 331 (N.D. Okla. 2002); In re 
Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., No. 94-C-897, 1995 WL 683777, at *3 (N.D. 
Ill. Nov. 16, 1995); Lifewise Master Funding v. Telebank, 206 F.R.D. 298, 303 (D. Utah 1990). 
573 E.g., ePlus Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 280 F.R.D. 247, 255 (E.D. Va. 2012); Deere & 
Co. v. Bush Hog, LLC, No. 3:09-CV-00095, 2011 WL 13097463, at *5 (S.D. Iowa June 16, 
2011) (exemplifying intentionality as “when disclosure is based on a mistaken understanding 
that the document was not privileged”); U.S. Airline Pilots Ass’n v. Pension Benefit Guar. 
Corp., 274 F.R.D. 28, 30–33 (D.D.C. 2011); Seger v. Ernest-Spencer Metals, Inc., No. 
8:08CV75, 2010 WL 378113 (D. Neb. Jan. 26, 2010); Silverstein v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 
No. 07-cv-02471, 2009 WL 4949959, at *11 (D. Colo. Dec. 14, 2009); see Grimm et al., supra 
note 14, at 20–22 (“Thus, Rule 502(a) does not require a demonstration that the party that 
disclosed the privileged or protected information subjectively intended to waive the protection, 
but rather a showing that the production was ‘voluntary’ and not ‘inadvertent.’”). 
574 ePlus, 280 F.R.D. at 255. But see Harleysville Ins. Co. v. Holding Funeral Home, Inc., 
No. 1:15CV00057, 2017 WL 4368617, at *9 (W.D. Va. Oct. 2, 2017) (distinguishing ePlus 
sharply). 
575 Cf. Mays v. Bd. of Comm’rs Port of N.O., No. 14-1014, 2015 WL 13531796, at *2 (E.D. 
La. Nov. 15, 2015) (“Here, Plaintiff cites no case law whatsoever to support her claim, which 
appears to amount to equating Federal Rule of Evidence 502(b)’s protections for ‘inadvertent 
disclosure[s],’ or disclosures that are accidental and unintentional, with protections for 
disclosures made without the advice of counsel and without knowledge of the law.”). 
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privileged status categorically intentional under FRE 502(a), susceptible to subject 
matter waiver.576  
The better view, and the greater majority, holds that it is the waiver of a known 
privilege that must be intentional to qualify under FRE 502(a).577 Foundationally, the 
Advisory Committee had discussed the very issue and sought to cabin subject matter 
waiver to knowing and intentional cases.578 Thus “the scope of any potential waiver 
under Rule 502 depends on whether the waiver of the privilege—rather than the act of 
disclosing the information—is deemed intentional or inadvertent.”579 Courts have 
conceded that discerning the desire to waive may prove more difficult than the desire 
to physically release a document.580 But in keeping with the purpose of the rule, they 
have accepted the challenge nevertheless, regularly saving counsel that mistakenly 
produce documents under the misimpression they are not privileged from the dread 
specter of subject matter waiver.581 This approach does offer economies of its own, 
saving courts themselves from parsing between lawyers who failed to recognize 
privilege in the first place and those who failed to keep privileged documents from 
being produced; the result was error either way:582 
 
576 See, e.g., U.S. Airline Pilots, 274 F.R.D. at 30–33. 
577 See, e.g., First Tech. Capital, Inc. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 5:12-CV-289, 
2013 WL 7800409, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 10, 2013); SEC v. Welliver, No. 11–cv–3076, 2012 
WL 8015672, at *5 (D. Minn. Oct. 26, 2012); Barnett v. Hospital, No. 5:11-CV-399, 2012 WL 
12886505, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 17, 2012); Valentin v. Bank of New York Mellon Corp., No. 
09 Civ. 9448, 2011 WL 1466122, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2011) (“Disclosure is unintentional 
even if a document is deliberately produced, where the producing party fails to recognize its 
privileged nature at the time of production.”); Datel Holdings Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp., No. C-
09-05535, 2011 WL 866993, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2011); Seyler v. T-Sys. N. Am., Inc., 
No. 10 Misc. 7 (JGK), 2011 WL 196920, at *288 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2011); Bear Republic 
Brewing Co. v. Cen. City Brewing Co., 275 F.R.D. 43, 47 (D. Mass. 2011); Silverstein v. Fed. 
Bureau of Prisons, No. 07-cv-02471, 2009 WL 4949959, at *12–13 (D. Colo. Dec. 14, 2009); 
Coburn Grp., LLC v. Whitecap Advisors, LLC, 640 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1038 (N.D. Ill. 2009); 
see also Gergacz, supra note 14, at 16 (“It is not a question of whether the disclosure itself was 
intended . . . . Instead, what is intended is the relinquishment of the privilege. This is assessed 
by evaluating whether the loss of confidentiality has compromised the goals of the privilege.”). 
578 See Welliver, 2012 WL 8015672, at *5 (quoting minutes of the Advisory Committee and 
discussing); Cross & Nagendra, supra note 14, at 2 (same). 
579 Welliver, 2012 WL 8015672, at *5; accord Bear Republic, 275 F.R.D. at 47; Silverstein, 
2009 WL 4949959, at *12–13 (“There is a clear distinction between intentional disclosure and 
intentional waiver.”). 
580 See Astrazeneca LP v. Breath Ltd., No. 08-1512, 2010 WL 11428457, at *4 (D.N.J. Aug. 
26, 2010) (“First, while the Court has concluded that Apotex intentionally disclosed an attorney-
client communication, it is not clear that Apotex intended to waive the attorney-client 
privilege.”). 
581 See cases cited supra note 577. 
582 First Tech, 2013 WL 7800409, at *2; Barnett, 2012 WL 12886505, at *3 (“It is unclear 
to the Court after considering the testimony of defendant’s attorneys Hearey and Billington, 
whether the unredacted content of the documents at issue were not recognized by defendant as 
privileged before the documents were disclosed, or whether the documents were recognized as 
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Here, the only evidence (and reasonable conclusion) is that either FTC 
identified the pages at issue as privileged and then mistakenly produced them 
anyway, or FTC did not adequately screen the documents for and thus did 
not appreciate application of privilege as to those items. Nothing suggests 
that FTC wittingly included in a production papers it knew were privileged. 
The Court finds that the production, as to the 45 pages, was not an intentional 
act of disclosing protected information and thus was inadvertent. FTC meets 
the 502(b)(1) standard.583 
Judge Grimm formulated the rule slightly differently, although the result remains 
the same: he would look not to intent to waive, but rather to intent to disclose a 
document known to be privileged.584 Such a reformulation may be worthwhile to 
curtail baseless argument suggesting one could deliberately publish an avowedly 
privileged document without waiving its privilege.585 In any event, penalizing counsel 
and clients for mistakes of logistics but not of the law of privilege always made for 
arbitrary results, even in subjective courts.586 Moreover, such a principle invites 
gamesmanship and artful pleading,587 an outcome hardly attributable to the Congress 
that passed the FRE 502.588 To wit: counsel who botch a privilege call under a mistake 
of law might yet salvage their blunder by reframing their argument to claim that 
privilege “would have” been recognized but for some logistical error.589 Properly 
 
privileged and disclosed by mistake. However, either way under Rule 502(b), the disclosure 
was inadvertent.”); Datel, 2011 WL 866993, at *3. 
583 First Tech, 2013 WL 7800409, at *2 
584 See Grimm et al., supra note 14, at 20 n.108 (opining that intentional waiver requires 
wittingly producing something known to be privileged, as opposed to wittingly producing 
something thought not privileged). 
585 Id. at 20–22.  
586 See supra notes 268–73. 
587 See Cross & Nagendra, supra note 14, at 4 (“Waiver also can occur where the disclosing 
party claims that the disclosed information was not privileged to begin with, if the court finds 
the claim to be a meritless effort to avoid subject matter waiver as to undisclosed information 
and the disclosing party relies on the disclosed information in the litigation.”). 
588 Cf. Brown v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 833 (1976) (“It would require the 
suspension of disbelief to ascribe to Congress the design to allow its careful and thorough 
remedial scheme to be circumvented by artful pleading.”). 
589 See, e.g., Deere & Co. v. Bush Hog, LLC, No. 3:09-CV-00095, 2011 WL 13097463, at 
*5 (S.D. Iowa June 16, 2011) (accepting, in a court viewing mistakes of law as an intentional 
waiver, counsel’s declarations that “they did not recall reviewing the document at issue and its 
duplicates, but had they seen the documents, they would have designated them as privileged”). 
To be clear, this author does not intimate that the affiants or other participants therein botched 
the assessment of privilege, misrepresented any material fact, or otherwise misbehaved, but 
rather cites the opinion to illustrate the potential procedural foibles occasioned should such a 
principle be applied elsewhere. 
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understood and applied—whether under the rubric of intent to waive or Judge 
Grimm’s alternative—the rule finally closes that bizarre historical discrepancy.590 
d. A Case Study in Confusion Under FRE 502 
A more detailed review of an ornery case illustrates how these three questions 
interlock and overlap yet more confusingly in the real world.591 In Silverstein v. 
Federal Bureau of Prisons,592 the court recognized at the outset that “Rule 502 clearly 
abrogates previous Tenth Circuit law concerning subject matter waivers on disclosed 
documents otherwise protected by attorney-client privilege and work-product 
protection.”593 At issue was a three-page memorandum going to the heart of the case 
that had been prepared by the BOP’s counsel but, through a convoluted series of 
misunderstandings, had been turned over during discovery based on lead counsel’s 
misreading of its status at a critical juncture and despite several attorneys’ having 
previously designated it as privileged.594 Once its nature was ascertained far later in 
preparation for a deposition of the BOP’s counsel, its return was demanded, and 
judicial process invoked to rule on its status.595 By that time, however, the 
memorandum had been discussed between counsel at length and provided to experts 
on both sides.596 
Despite recognizing the dictionary definition of inadvertent as unintentional, the 
court recited the minority view that the factors surrounding precautions and 
 
590 See cases cited supra note 581; see also Gergacz, supra note 14, at 16 (“Parties, hereafter, 
will know that the key for protecting privilege during document discovery is not the 
unfathomable ‘how’ a disclosure may occur (e.g., by mistake, poor judgment, or unintended 
disclosure). Instead, the key is predictable planning: put reasonable safeguards in place and 
create a procedure for prompt action if a disclosure occurs.”). 
591 See Gergacz, supra note 14, at 11–14 (highlighting Silverstein as a model of confusion). 
592 Silverstein v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 07-cv-02471, 2009 WL 4949959 (D. Colo. 
Dec. 14, 2009). 
593 Id. at *9. 
594 Id. at *1–4. As another court summarized: “In Silverstein, a party intentionally disclosed 
a privileged document based on a mistaken understanding that the document was not privileged 
even though the document had been previously and correctly determined by other lawyers to be 
privileged. Upon learning that the document had been misidentified and was actually privileged, 
counsel did not take reasonable steps to rectify the error.” Datel Holdings Ltd. v. Microsoft 
Corp., No. C–09–05535, 2011 WL 866993, at *3 (N.D. Cal. March 11, 2011). 
595 Silverstein, 2009 WL 4949959, at *4. 
596 Id. at *8 (“There is no question that the October 2004 document was disclosed to opposing 
counsel, discussed between and among counsel, and a conscious decision made not to recall the 
document in spite of its previous characterization as privileged. Mr. Synsvoll continued, as 
noted, to gather more information about the document indicating that the document was not 
simply forgotten after its initial disclosure. Further, the October 2004 Document was also 
disclosed to all of the defendants' testifying experts in this case. Plaintiff also sent the document 
to his experts, Drs. Haney and Friedman, as well as correctional expert Steve Martin.” citations 
omitted)). 
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remediation informed the assessment of inadvertence under FRE 502(b)(1).597 But it 
then skipped to the latter prongs of 502(b), under which the BOP “utterly failed to 
continue to reasonably protect the document and failed again to take reasonable steps 
to rectify the erroneous disclosure which had taken place only four days 
previously.”598 And that entire analysis was seemingly superfluous, for the court 
adopted the additional minority view as to the mistake-of-law issue distinguishing 
intent to disclose from intent to waive, declaring itself  
not convinced that this type of mistake was Congress’ concern when creating 
Rule 502. Based on all the commentary, the word “inadvertent” from Rule 
502 mandates a remedy for an unintended, rather than mistaken, disclosure. 
The October 2004 Document was specifically examined and willfully 
withheld from production by two attorneys representing the BOP. This is not 
a case where the questioned document was part of a larger production which 
went unnoticed by the producer to the opposition party. The October 2004 
Document was specifically addressed by the holder of the privilege.599 
It is perhaps suspicious that despite other courts’ citation of the Oxford English 
Dictionary in synonymizing inadvertence with mistake,600 the Silverstein court opted 
instead for an abridged college dictionary published two decades earlier that happened 
to elide that particular synonym.601 In any event, the disclosure was disqualified from 
inadvertence based on the lead attorney’s decision to divulge the document, even 
though it was avowedly premised on a misreading of its content.602 
Further proving a maverick, the court also discarded the rule of bifurcation 
dictating that any disclosure not qualifying as inadvertent was definitionally 
intentional; instead, “having found that the waiver cannot be considered ‘inadvertent’ 
under Rule 502(b), the court must determine whether the disclosure was 
intentional.”603 The question was not already answered because the court found that 
502(a)(1) required not just that the privilege holder intend to waive its privilege, but 
 
597 Id. at *10 (“Courts have considered a number of factors to determine inadvertency, 
including the number of documents produced in discovery, the level of care with which the 
review for privilege was conducted, and the actions of the producing party after discovering that 
the document had been produced.”). 
598 Id. at *11–12. 
599 Id. at *11. 
600 See Amobi v. D.C. Dep’t of Corrs., 262 F.R.D. 45, 53 (D.D.C. 2009) (finding that 
“defining inadvertent as mistaken comports with the dictionary definition of the word”) (citing 
THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989), as updated in its online edition of even date); 
accord Irth Sols., LLC v. Windstream Commc’ns, LLC, No. 2:16-cv-219, 2017 WL 3276021, 
at *8 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 2, 2017); Shields v. Boys Town La., Inc., No. 15-3243, 2016 WL 
9414346, at *2 (E.D. La. May 24, 2016). 
601 See Silverstein, 2009 WL 4949959, at *10 (citing WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 
(3d College ed. 1988)). 
602 Id. at *12. 
603 Id. 
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that it do so “to gain advantage in the litigation,” looking to FRE 106 for guidance 
because it employed a standard of “in fairness ought to be considered.”604 Applying 
that extratextual rule seemingly more suited to the parallel language in 502(a)(3), 
Silverstein reviewed the circumstances, finding that the long period during which the 
lead counsel maintained the document was not privileged militated strongly for 
intentionality, as the opinion defined it, notwithstanding other attorneys who had 
disagreed and avowals of accident.605 Given privilege was only reasserted on the eve 
of a pivotal deposition, the court concluded the BOP had “intentionally and willfully 
intended to mislead the plaintiff and gain an advantage in the litigation, six days before 
the close of discovery,” obviously prejudicing its opponent and accordingly meriting 
subject-matter waiver under 502(a)(3).606 
The Silverstein analysis demonstrates that the third question—what exactly is 
being tested in evaluating intentionality—can bleed into an evaluation of overall 
fairness within the context of the proceeding, the subject of FRE 502(a)(3). And that, 
in turn, reinvokes the venerable sword-and-shield doctrine. 
B. A Resurgent Sword & Shield Doctrine 
Over the decade after the passage of FRE 502, it has sometimes seemed the old 
saw about the sword and shield were on the lips of every district court607—and even 
 
604 Id. (“There is a clear distinction between intentional disclosure and intentional waiver, 
for instance. ‘The idea is to limit subject matter waiver to situations in which the privilege holder 
seeks to use the disclosed material for advantage in the litigation but to invoke the privilege to 
deny its adversary access to additional materials that could provide an important context for 
proper understanding of the privileged materials . . . .’”) (quoting 8 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2016.2 (3rd ed. 2009 Supp.)). 
605 Id. at *12–13. 
606 Id. at *13–14. 
607 In re Symbol Techs., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. CV 05-3923, 2016 WL 8377036, at *5 
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2016) (“In applying subject matter waiver, ‘courts have invoked the 
metaphors of “sword” and “shield” to describe the type of strategic assertion of privilege that 
would implicate fairness considerations.’”). Many dozens of courts have done so just in the last 
few years. E.g., NexPay, Inc. v. Comdata Network, Inc., No. 3:14-cv-01749, 2018 WL 4181619, 
at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 30, 2018); Audubon Soc. of Portland v. Zinke, No. 1:17-cv-00069, 2018 
WL 1522691, at *8 (D. Or. Mar. 27, 2018); Doe 1 v. Baylor Univ., 320 F.R.D. 430, 439–40 
(W.D. Tex. 2017); Princeton Dig. Image Corp. v. Office Depot, Inc., C.A. No. 13-239, 2017 
WL 3264068, at *2 (D. Del. Aug. 1, 2017); In re Symbol Techs., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. CV 05-
3923, 2017 WL 1233842, at *15–16 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2017); BridgeBuilder Tax + Legal 
Servs., P.A. v. Torus Spec. Ins. Co., No. 16-2236, 2017 WL 914809, at *7 (D. Kan. Mar. 8, 
2017); Cave Consulting Grp., Inc. v. OptumInsight, Inc., No. 15-cv-03424, 2016 WL 7475820, 
at *8 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2016); Noval Williams Films, LLC v. Branca, No. 14 Civ. 4711, 2016 
WL 7238960, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2016); Bona Fide Conglom., Inc. v. SourceAmerica, 
No. 3:14-cv-00751, 2016 WL 4361808, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2016); Gateway Deliveries, 
LLC v. Mattress Liquidators, Inc., No. 2:14-cv-02033, 2016 WL 232427, at *2–3 (D. Ariz. Jan. 
20, 2016); Chisholm Trail Dev., LLC v. Arvest Bank, No. CIV-15-0633, 2015 WL 13567098, 
at *1 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 30, 2015); Madrigal v. Allstate Indem. Co., No. CV 14-4242, 2015 WL 
12748277, at *7–8 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2015); Patrick v. City of Chi., 154 F. Supp. 3d 705, 715–
16 (N.D. Ill. 2015); Luminara Worldwide, LLC v. Liown Elecs. Co., No. 14-3103, 2015 WL 
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the occasional court of appeals.608 This is hardly surprising given that FRE 502(a) 
veritably “embodies the principle that ‘privileges cannot be used as both a sword and 
a shield. A party cannot choose to disclose only so much of allegedly privileged matter 
as is helpful to his case.’”609 
1. Discerning the Proper Test for Intentional Waiver 
More specifically, FRE 502(a)(3) makes the question of fairness dispositive to 
subject matter waiver if intentionality is established.610 A few courts, to be sure, have 
followed Silverstein in garbling the threshold question of intent with that fairness 
test.611 The magistrate judge in De Los Santos v. City of Roswell, for example, took 
the view that advisory note regarding selective and misleading disclosures informed 
the question of both intent and unfairness.612 But the district court, ruling on 
 
9861106, at *5 (D. Minn. Oct. 5, 2015); Hairston v. ED Nelson Transport, No. 3:13-cv-1457, 
2015 WL 12843869, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 25, 2015); Adinolfe v. United Tech Corp., 2015 WL 
11254706, at *4 n.4 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 17, 2015); Obeid v. La Mack, No. 14 cv 6498, 2015 WL 
5581577, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2015); Fagen, Inc. v. Exergy Devel. Grp. of Idaho, L.L.C., 
No. 12-2703, 2015 WL 12977507, at *4 (D. Minn. June 1, 2015); Mitre Sports Int’l, Ltd. v. 
Home Box Office, Inc., 304 F.R.D. 369, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); see also Ewald v. Royal 
Norwegian Embassy, 2014 WL 1309095, at *7 (D. Minn. Apr. 1, 2014); Century Aluminum 
Co. v. AGCS Marine Ins. Co., 285 F.R.D. 468, 472 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Favors v. Cuomo, 285 
F.R.D. 187, 198–99 (E.D.N.Y. 2012); Shukh v. Seagate Tech., LLC, 848 F. Supp. 2d 987, 990 
(D. Minn. 2011); SEC v. McNaul, 277 F.R.D. 439, 444 (D. Kan. 2011); Shinnecock Indian 
Nation v. Kempthorne, 652 F. Supp. 2d 345, 365–66 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). 
608 E.g., In re OptumInsight, Inc., No. 2017-116, 2017 WL 3096300, at *3 (Fed. Cir. July 
20, 2017). 
609 PETA, Inc. v. Tri-State Zoological Park of W. Md., Inc., No. PX-17-2148, 2018 WL 
3546725, at *3 (D. Md. July 24, 2018); see also Correll, supra note 6, at 1055–56; Grimm, 
Bergstrom & Kraueter, supra note 14, ¶¶ 27, 30. 
610 FED. R. EVID. 502(a)(3); see Columbia Data Prods. v. Autonomy Corp. Ltd., No. 11–
12077, 2012 WL 6212898, at *17 n.9 (D. Mass. Dec. 12, 2012) (holding that “fairness controls 
the question of waiver under Rule 502(a)”); Silverstein v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, No. 07–
cv–02471, 2009 WL 4949959, at *12 (D. Colo. Dec. 14, 2009) (“If the waiver is intentional, 
meaning that the disclosed privileged material is used to gain advantage in the litigation, the 
court must then determine the scope of the waiver—that is, whether it extends to undisclosed 
communications covering the same subject matter.”). 
611 E.g., Coyne v. Los Alamos Nat’l Security, LLC, No. 15-0054, 2016 WL 10587986, at *6 
(D.N.M. Mar. 10, 2016) (“Defendant LANS makes no showing that Ms. Coyne’s disclosure of 
certain emails in this case was made with the intent to put protected information at issue in a 
selective, misleading or unfair manner.”); De Los Santos v. City of Roswell, No. 12-375, 2013 
WL 12330144, at *10 (D.N.M. May 21, 2013), objs. overruled, 2013 WL 12330083, at *5 
(D.N.M. June 26, 2013); see also Bear Republic Brewing Co. v. Cen. City Brewing Co., 275 
F.R.D. 43, 48 (D. Mass. 2011) (“These Notes seem to provide that for there to be a waiver of 
more than what was disclosed, the disclosure and waiver must be not only ‘intentional’ but also 
be made ‘. . . in a selective, misleading and unfair manner.’”). 
612 De Los Santos, 2013 WL 12330144, at *10 n.15 (“Some courts have read ‘intentional’ 
broadly, ignoring the Advisory Committee’s ‘additional requirement’ that the disclosure be 
‘selective, misleading and unfair’ since it is not part of the rule itself. I find that the Advisory 
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objections, elucidated that it saw the Advisory Committee’s note as “advising district 
courts on how to evaluate fairness,” not intentionality, otherwise affirming the 
magistrate’s conclusions.613 De Los Santos, Silverstein, and their ilk are thus best 
understood as inartfully observing that all three prongs must be satisfied, and thus no 
subject matter waiver follows from an intentional disclosure unless it also meets the 
fairness prong of FRE 502(a)(3), rather than a philosophy that subjectively intentional 
waiver is not actually intentional under FRE 502(a)(1) absent tactical motivations. 
These things matter: without intention, there can be no subject matter waiver, no 
matter how heinous any other sins.614 
More significantly, courts disagree on the default principle and application under 
502(a)(3): is waiver generally limited to what was actually disclosed, with subject 
matter waiver only available in exceptional situations where fairness demands it, or 
does an intentional waiver generally extend to documents concerning the same subject 
matter, absent a reason to constrain it on grounds of fairness?615 One article has 
helpfully linked the two approaches to what it denominates the Modern and Classic 
Views of privilege and waiver.616 The former “emphasizes the attorney-client 
privilege as a useful and beneficial component of the judicial system and broader 
society, and so takes a more generous view of the privilege and a much more limited 
view of the circumstances under which the privilege is lost and the scope of that 
loss.”617 The latter, meanwhile, believes privilege to be “a necessary evil, and courts 
holding to the Classic View are rigorous in the application of the requirements of the 
privilege. The failure of a client to comply with the strictures of the classic 
requirements of the privilege results in a complete or broad loss of the privilege.”618 
Courts from the first school have followed the Advisory Committee’s note 
religiously in finding that “Rule 502(a) establishes the new general rule that an 
intentional disclosure ‘results in a waiver only of the communication or information 
disclosed.’”619 These courts thus read FRE 502(a)(3) as enunciating an exception to 
 
Committee note, while not dispositive, helps clarify both the intentionality and fairness prongs 
of the Rule and will consider it.”). 
613 Id. at *5. 
614 See, e.g., Foti v. City of Jamestown Bd. of Pub. Utils., 2014 WL 3842376, at *4–7 
(W.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2014) (affirming no subject-matter waiver available despite a production 
made without any semblance of precaution to protect privilege at all); Amobi v. D.C. Dep’t of 
Corr., 262 F.R.D. 45, 53 (D.D.C. 2009); see also Cross & Nagendra, supra note 14, at 6 
(observing that “a finding of intentional waiver is a necessary condition for subject matter 
waiver under Rule 502(a)”). 
615 See McLoughlin, Bloomfield, Miller & Mercer, supra note 14, at 695–96; Meyers, supra 
note 9, at 1455. 
616 See McLoughlin, Bloomfield, Miller & Mercer, supra note 14, at 698–702. 
617 Id. at 695. 
618 Id. 
619 Bona Fide Conglom., Inc. v. SourceAmerica, No. 3:14-cv-00751, 2016 WL 4361808, at 
*9 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2016); accord Gateway Deliveries, LLC v. Mattress Liquidators, Inc., 
No. 2:14-cv-02033, 2016 WL 232427, at *2–3 (D. Ariz. Jan. 20, 2016). 
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that general rule, with subject matter waiver only applicable if some particularized 
unfairness is affirmatively demonstrated.620 This structure followed from the 
Advisory Committee’s direction that subject matter waiver should be “reserved” for 
“unusual situations,”621 involving disclosures made in a “selective, misleading, and 
unfair manner.”622 More courts than not have come to align themselves with this view, 
whether in hæc verba or using various synonyms such as “tactical advantage” or 
“adversarial gain.”623 
The stricter school taking the Classic View derives authority from the traditional 
penalty of subject matter waiver for intentional disclosure under the Wigmore 
regime.624 By its own terms, FRE 502(a) itself did not plainly displace that customary 
baseline.625 Bear Republic Brewing Co. v. Central City Brewing Co.626 examined the 
 
620 See Bona Fide, 2016 WL 4361808, at *9 (“An exception to this general rule exists, and 
a subject matter waiver will be found, where the disclosed and undisclosed communications 
‘ought in fairness to be considered together.’”) (citations omitted); accord Gateway, 2016 WL 
232427, at *2–3; Adinolfe v. United Tech Corp., 2015 WL 11254706, at *4 n.4 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 
17, 2015). 
621 Bona Fide, 2016 WL 4361808, at *9 (“A subject matter waiver is therefore ‘reserved for 
those unusual situations in which fairness requires a further disclosure of related, protected 
information, in order to prevent a selective and misleading presentation of evidence to the 
disadvantage of the adversary.’ To determine whether a given case presents such an unusual 
situation, courts must engage in ‘a case-specific analysis of the subject matter and 
adversaries.’”) (citations omitted); accord Adinolfe, 2015 WL 11254706, at *4 n.4. 
622 See, e.g., Bona Fide, 2016 WL 4361808, at *9; Adinolfe, 2015 WL 11254706, at *4 n.4; 
Madrigal v. Allstate Indem. Co., No. CV 14-4242, 2015 WL 12748277, at *7–8 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 
5, 2015); Obeid v. La Mack, No. 14 cv 6498, 2015 WL 5581577, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 
2015); Neogenix Oncol., Inc. v. Gordon, No. CV 14-4427, 2015 WL 13735953, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. 
July 31, 2015); Fagen, Inc. v. Exergy Devel. Grp. of Idaho, LLC, No. 12-2703, 2015 WL 
12977507, at *4 (D. Minn. June 1, 2015); Mitre Sports Int’l Ltd. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 304 
F.R.D. 369, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); RLIS, Inc. v. Cerner Corp., No. 3:12-CV-209, 2014 WL 
12599509, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 24, 2014); Blankenship v. Super. Controls, Inc., No. 13-12386, 
2014 WL 12659921, at *3–4 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 25, 2014); De Los Santos v. City of Roswell, 
No. 12-375, 2013 WL 12330144, at *10 (D.N.M. May 21, 2013), objs. overruled, 2013 WL 
12330083, at *150 (D.N.M. June 26, 2013); Favors v. Cuomo, 285 F.R.D. 187, 198–99 
(E.D.N.Y. 2012); SEC v. Welliver, No. 11–cv–3076, 2012 WL 8015672, at *5 (D. Minn. Oct. 
26, 2012); Shinnecock Indian Nation v. Kempthorne, 652 F.Supp.2d 345, 365–66 (E.D.N.Y. 
2009). 
623 See RLIS, Inc. v. Cerner Corp., No. 3:12-CV-209, 2014 WL 12599509, at *1 (S.D. Tex. 
Dec. 24, 2014) (citing cases generally in agreement but using language of “tactical advantage” 
or “adversarial gain”); see, e.g., cases cited supra note 622; see also Cross & Nagendra, supra 
note 14, at 4 (noting most courts follow this approach). 
624 See supra cases cited notes 106–113. 
625 See De Los Santos v. City of Roswell, No. 12-375, 2013 WL 12330083, at *5 (D.N.M. 
June 26, 2013) (“The plain language of Rule 502(a) is insufficient to determine how a court 
should gauge ‘fairness’ in the discovery context.”) (quoted infra note 639); Mills v. Iowa, 285 
F.R.D. 411, 416 (S.D. Iowa 2012). 
626 Bear Republic Brewing Co. v. Cent. City Brewing Co., 275 F.R.D. 43 (D. Mass. 2011). 
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issue at length, taking note of both the Advisory Committee note and the Statement of 
Congressional Intent accompanying FRE 502, which it thought “can best be described 
as a piece of legislative history.”627 It disdained deriving guidance from either, 
however, because “the situation with this ‘legislative history’ is the same as with the 
Advisory Committee Notes, i.e., the plain unambiguous wording of the Rule is what 
the law [is] despite what is stated in either the Advisory Committee Notes or the 
legislative history.”628 With the Advisory Committee’s and Congress’s advice duly 
discounted, the court charted its own course: 
There will always be a “misrepresentation” by a partial disclosure in the sense 
that less than a complete picture has been disclosed, and that will be true 
whether the disclosure was made in a “selective, misleading and unfair 
manner” or not. If “misrepresentation” means more than that, how is a Court 
going to make a finding as to the issue since neither the Court nor the party 
asserting that there has been a waiver (who has the burden of proving 
waiver[629]) will know what has not been disclosed? It is best to leave the “in 
fairness” analysis to the scope of the subject-matter waiver, not to whether 
there has been one in the first place as a result of an “intentional” disclosure 
and “waiver” of privileged or protected material.630 
No small number of courts have followed suit.631 As Bear Republic set forth, such 
an approach deems it presumptively unfair for a party to produce materials only 
partially, satisfying FRE 502(a)(3) even absent a showing of particularized 
 
627 Id. at 48–49 & n.6 (“There is some evidence that the Advisory Committee Notes, in 
stating that the Rule 502(a) applies only when the disclosure be made in a “selective, misleading 
and unfair manner” is referring to subdivision (3) rather than subdivision (1) i.e., that the 
disclosed and undisclosed information ‘. . . ought in fairness to be considered together’. Thus, 
the Advisory Committee in a Report to the Standing Committee dated May 15, 2007 wrote that 
‘. . . [a] subject matter waiver should be found only when privilege or work product has already 
been disclosed, and a further disclosure “ought in fairness” to be required in order to protect 
against a misrepresentation that might arise from the previous disclosure.’”) (citations omitted). 
628 Id. at 49. 
629 The issue at hand concerned work product privilege, where the burden lies with the 
challenger in most courts. See supra notes 522–527. 
630 Bear Republic, 275 F.R.D. at 48 n.6. 
631 Id.; e.g., Colley v. Dickenson City Sch. Bd., No. 2:17CV00003, 2018 WL 5318259, at *3 
(W.D. Va. Oct. 29, 2018); Trireme Med., LLC v. Angioscore, Inc., No. 14-cv-02946, 2016 WL 
4191828, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2016); Luminara Worldwide, LLC v. Liown Elecs. Co., No. 
14-3103, 2015 WL 9861106, at *5 (D. Minn. Oct. 5, 2015); Cormack v. United States, 118 Fed. 
Cl. 33, 43 (Fed. Cl. 2014); Mills v. Iowa, 285 F.R.D. 411, 416 (S.D. Iowa 2012); Shukh v. 
Seagate Tech., LLC, 848 F. Supp. 2d 987, 991–92 (D. Minn. 2011); see also New Phoenix 
Sunrise Corp v. C.I.R., 408 F. App’x 908, 919–20 (6th Cir. 2010) (appearing to infer subject-
matter waiver without a fairness analysis in a “put in issue” context). But see Cross & Nagendra, 
supra note 14, at 4 (“Fortunately, this case looks to be an outlier, with many other courts instead 
adhering to the guidance provided by the Advisory Committee’s Note.”). 
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unfairness.632 Fairness then only mitigates the extent of the further subject matter that 
must be divulged633—although one could envisage even a strict court finding it unfair 
that any further material be produced in an appropriate case.634 “Generally,” however, 
the strict rule means that “a waiver extends to all communications on the same subject 
matter” when intentional.635 
There is no ready resolution in sight to this divergence of methodology.636 Some 
courts, indeed, have already muddled the two approaches, for example declaring that 
the default rule is of subject matter waiver but in the same breath finding it applies 
only where disclosure is made in a “selective, misleading, and unfair” manner.637 The 
District of New Mexico confronted the clash in 2013, admitting the rule’s text could 
not answer the question, but crediting the persuasiveness of school of thought 
following the Advisory Committee note: 
De Los Santos next challenges Judge Wormuth’s conclusion that subject 
matter waiver only applies if the lease was intentionally disclosed in a 
selective, misleading, or unfair manner. According to De Los Santos, the 
Court need only decide if the disclosure was intentional in order to allow 
subject matter waiver. 
The plain language of Rule 502(a) is insufficient to determine how a court 
should gauge “fairness” in the discovery context. Luckily, the Rules 
Committee included a note to Rule 502 advising district courts on how to 
evaluate fairness, and, as Judge Wormuth discussed in the discovery order, 
 
632 Bear Republic, 275 F.R.D. at 48 n.6; accord Luminara, 2015 WL 9861106, at *5 (“The 
widely applied standard for determining the scope of a waiver of attorney-client privilege is that 
the waiver applies to all other communications relating to the same subject matter. The waiver 
extends beyond the document initially produced out of concerns for fairness, so that a party is 
prevented from disclosing communications that support its position while simultaneously 
concealing communications that do not.”) (quoting Shukh,  848 F. Supp. 2d at 991–92); see also 
Emery, supra note 14, at 293–94 (analyzing outcomes “[a]ssum[ing] that a court holds that all 
selective disclosures are misleading and unfair as a matter of law”). 
633 Bear Republic, 275 F.R.D. at 48 n.6. 
634 See Rice, Continuing Confusion, supra note 39, at 1004 (“Once a client or his attorney 
waives the privilege, the scope of that waiver is defined roughly by the subject matter of the 
communication disclosed. This, however, is only the first step. Thereafter, it is refined by the 
standard of fairness. In many instances, as in von Bulow, the concern for fairness has resulted 
in the subject matter of waiver being narrowly limited to four comers of the instrument 
disclosed, or to the literal words repeated.”). 
635 Trireme Med., 2016 WL 4191828, at *1 (citing Cormack, 118 Fed. Cl. at 43); accord 
Colley, 2018 WL 5318259, at *3 (“Once a waiver has been determined, it is generally held that 
it applies to all other communications on the same subject matter.”). 
636 See McLoughlin, Bloomfield, Miller & Mercer, supra note 14, at 697 (writing that “Rule 
502’s inability to fully resolve the tension between the Classic and Modern Views is 
increasingly important”); id. at 744 (finding application of the standard for waiver “almost 
necessarily imprecise”); Meyers, supra note 9, at 1455. 
637 Simpson v. City of Indianapolis, No. 1:13-cv-791, 2014 WL 2557226, at *2 (S.D. Ind. 
June 6, 2014). 
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there is case law from other circuits that rely on this committee note. I see 
nothing clearly erroneous about the Judge Wormuth’s reliance on these legal 
sources in lieu of cases from the Southern District of Iowa and the District of 
Massachusetts[638] . . . Judge Wormuth was required to consider only that 
which he found to be the most persuasive in order to resolve this matter. 
Surely an explanation of Rule 502 by its very drafters is highly persuasive.639 
Cases have also trotted out hornbooks that recognized that subject matter waiver 
was intended to be narrowly applied, and only in cases of unfair advantage.640 Authors 
analyzing FRE 502 have thought so as well.641 One explained that a “majority of 
judicial opinions establish a clear principle: if privileged documents are produced 
intentionally but would not be used in the case to the receiving party’s disadvantage, 
courts generally will limit waiver to the disclosed documents themselves.”642 
Nonetheless, the school proponing subject matter waiver as a default rule has 
persevered, counting amongst its numbers many of the stricter courts of the D.C., First, 
and Federal Circuits.643 
2. Assessing the Scope of Subject Matter Waiver 
On some things all would agree. No court would allow parties to conjure their own 
arbitrary lines in the sand to circumscribe an intentional waiver, for FRE 502(a) 
supplies the correct delineation: like subject matter that ought in fairness be considered 
together with that disclosed.644 In San Francisco Residences Club, Inc. v. Baswell-
 
638 The court refers to Mills v. Iowa and Bear Republic, cited supra notes 626–627. 
639 De Los Santos v. City of Roswell, No. 12-375, 2013 WL 12330083, at *5 (D.N.M. June 
26, 2013) (citations omitted). 
640 E.g., Hawk Mountain LLC v. Mirra, No. 12-2083, 2016 WL 690883, at *2 (D. Del. Feb. 
19, 2016) (quoting 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2016.2 
(3d ed.1995, suppl. 2010)). 
641 See, e.g., Cross & Nagendra, supra note 14, at 2–3; McLoughlin, Bloomfield, Miller & 
Mercer, supra note 14, at 746; Murphy, supra note 14, at 208; Morse, supra note 14, at 65; 
Redgrave & Kehoe, supra note 14, at 36; Meyers, supra note 9, at 1457 (“[T]he rule creates a 
presumption that disclosure should result in subject-matter waiver only in rare circumstances, 
and that even waiver as to the disclosed information is by no means automatic.”); see also 
Emery, supra note 14, at 293 (“Impliedly, subsection (a) allows for selective disclosures, as 
long as those disclosures are not misleading and unfair. FRE 502 mitigates this confusion by 
providing a test, which might be extrapolated as: 1) was the disclosure made during a federal 
proceeding or to a federal office or agency; 2) did the disclosure include privileged materials; 
3) if so, was the disclosure selective; 4) if so, was the disclosure misleading; and 5) if so, was 
the disclosure unfair? If the answer to all of those inquiries is ‘yes,’ then there may be a total 
waiver of privilege, but if any of the answers are ‘no,’ then the waiver is limited to the disclosure 
itself.”). 
642 Cross & Nagendra, supra note 14, at 2. 
643 See generally cases cited supra note 631. 
644 FED. R. EVID. 502(a)(2)–(3). 
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Guthrie,645 a party had expressly waived privilege as to communications regarding a 
transaction and attendant post-closing matters, but attempted to defend a temporal 
Maginot Line646 on New Year’s Eve 2007 under the fiction that it represented some 
approximation of when those matters had come to an end.647 The court would have 
none of this, finding the “only distinction is one tick of the clock at midnight” and 
“devoid of substantive relevance.”648 Given deposition testimony that relevant events 
did continue past that date in some degree, “it would be palpably unfair to permit the 
plaintiffs to selectively waive some communications on the same subject matter while 
closely guarding others. Plaintiffs cannot be allowed to abuse the attorney-client 
privilege simply by hiding behind the coincidences of the Gregorian calendar.”649 Nor 
was there any defensible reason in another case justifying a selective waiver as to the 
opinions of a company’s outside counsel on a transaction but not local counsel’s 
opinions; waiver of the first thus extended to the same subject matter with the other.650 
Likewise, all concur that subject matter waiver is called for where the disclosing 
party deliberately divulges only favorable portions of its legal work whilst concealing 
the unfavorable, the central concern of the sword-and-shield doctrine.651 Thus, where 
 
645 S.F. Res. Club, Inc. v. Baswell-Guthrie, 897 F. Supp. 2d 1122 (N.D. Ala. 2012). 
646 Cf. United States v. Cortina, 630 F.2d 1207, 1217 (7th Cir. 1980) (“Unless we deter 
behavior such as Brown’s, that bulwark will become a Maginot Line, laughingly circumvented 
by those sworn to respect it.”). The non-metaphorical Maginot Line, of course, did not protect 
France any better than it did plaintiff’s privilege. See Tamenut v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 1000, 1005 
(8th Cir. 2008) (Beam, J., dissenting) (“‘Fifty Million Frenchmen Can’t Be Wrong,’ [is] an 
observation proven grossly inaccurate when France constructed the Maginot Line to defend 
itself from invasion by Germany at the outset of World War II. This defensive line was generally 
considered one of the great failures of military history.”) (citations omitted). 
647 S.F. Res. Club, 897 F. Supp. 2d at 1221–22. 
648 Id. (“The implication of Mr. Burnick’s comment is essentially correct: there is no good 
reason why “post closing clean-up matters” in 2007 relating to the Quality Circle and Tech Point 
(a/k/a Old Madison Pike) transactions should be distinguished from exactly the same 
undertakings in 2008. The only distinction is one tick of the clock at midnight on New Year's 
Eve. Despite plaintiffs’ attempts to maintain the 2007/2008 distinction, Mr. Bulso made it 
unambiguously clear that plaintiffs waived attorney-client privilege for (a) any communications 
regarding the Old Madison Pike and Quality Circle transactions up to the closing thereof, and 
(b) “post closing clean-up matters” that occurred in 2007. Yet because the December 31, 2007 
cutoff date is devoid of substantive relevance, the latter waiver amounts to a waiver of all post 
closing clean-up matters as to those transactions.”). 
649 Id. (“The court has no difficulty finding that the fairness element of waiver is satisfied. 
For one, plaintiffs’ efforts to maintain a 2007/2008 distinction in the face of Mr. Bulso’s 
statements can be charitably described as dubious.”). 
650 Fagen, Inc. v. Exergy Devel. Grp. of Idaho, L.L.C., No. 12-2703, 2015 WL 12977507, at 
*5–6 (D. Minn. June 1, 2015). This accorded, of course, with long-standing precedent. See 
Technitrol, Inc. v. Dig. Equip. Corp., 181 U.S.P.Q. 731, 1974 WL 20497, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 1974). 
651Levy v. Young Adult Inst., No. 13-CV-02861, 2015 WL 10891654, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. 
Dec. 14, 2015) (“Subject matter waiver is only appropriate in ‘unusual situations in which 
fairness requires a further disclosure of related, protected information, in order to prevent a 
selective and misleading presentation of evidence to the disadvantage of the adversary.’ 
Fed.R.Evid. 502, Committee Notes; see also In re General Motors LLC Ignition Switch 
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the government conceded it had disclosed overtly legal opinions regarding the law at 
issue, offering no explanation other than that the reviewing attorney was “no longer 
employed by the government,” the court ordered subject matter waiver of the 
remaining legal work to complement the “selectively ‘sanitized’ version . . . that 
cherry-picks legal interpretations favorable to Federal Defendants while excluding 
those that are unfavorable.”652 So too was subject matter waiver necessary where a 
litigant deliberately disclosed five interview memoranda in order to cross-examine 
confidential informants whilst holding back the remaining nine it had generated.653 
Likewise where defendants disclosed only the surveillance footage they sought to use 
at trial, they were not permitted to withhold the residuum on work product grounds: 
“Defendants should not be allowed to selectively disclose only the surveillance that 
they think helps them, and hide the rest.”654 
The converse, as proposed by the lenient school of decisions, is that no subject 
matter waiver should be needed in a spirit of fairness where there is no discernible 
scheme or possibility of gaining unfair advantage.655 A South Florida district court 
observed, in response to an overweening demand for subject matter waiver, that 
discovery was in its early stages and no evidence had even been presented, mooting 
any issues of unfairness.656 Likewise, no broader waiver followed after privileged 
documents were designated as exhibits to a deposition because no showing was made 
that any advantage had been sought or obtained.657 A non-tactical motivation may be 
obvious from the circumstances: another court rejecting subject matter waiver 
observed the plaintiff “only produced the emails she asserts are not subject to the 
 
Litigation, 80 F. Supp. 3d 521, 533–34 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). This rule prevents a party from 
tactically disclosing some beneficial privileged information while concealing harmful reports 
and opinions. See In re von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94, 101 (2d Cir. 1987).”).  
652 Audubon Soc’y of Portland v. Zinke, No. 1:17-cv-00069, 2018 WL 1522691, at *7–8 (D. 
Or. Mar. 27, 2018) (“In fact, the only difference between the comment Federal Defendants 
voluntarily disclosed and the one they now seek protected—comment TM25—is that the legal 
interpretation discussed in comment TM25 could potentially be interpreted as being more 
deferential to waterfowl management at the expense of farming/agricultural leasing.”). 
653 In re Symbol Techs., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. CV 05-3923, 2017 WL 1233842, at *15–16 
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2017). 
654 Hairston v. ED Nelson Transp., No. 3:13-cv-1457, 2015 WL 12843869, at *3 (M.D. Fla. 
Sept. 25, 2015). 
655 See generally cases cited supra notes 622–623. 
656 See Adinolfe v. United Tech. Corp., 2015 WL 11254706, at *4 n.4 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 17, 
2015) (“This case is still in the early stages of discovery and there has been no ‘presentation of 
evidence’ by Plaintiffs that will give them an unfair advantage in the ultimate resolution of the 
case.”). 
657 SEC v. Welliver, No. 11–cv–3076, 2012 WL 8015672, at *5–6 (D. Minn. Oct. 26, 2012) 
(“Obviously, Defendants' disclosure and waiver were intentional, but the current record does 
not support a conclusion that a subject-matter waiver is appropriate. Neither party described the 
context in which the deposition exhibits were used. Further, it is not clear if and how the parties 
relied on or intend to rely on those documents. Simply put, nothing in the present record 
suggests that Defendants deliberately disclosed this information to gain a tactical advantage.”) 
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attorney-client privilege because Defendant LANS was already in possession of 
them,” whilst continuing to assert privilege on subsequent materials, and LANS has 
simply shown no discernible prejudice from being unable to rifle through the complete 
attorney-client file, as it desired.658  (Presumably, any prejudice from such a result 
would accrue to the plaintiff, not LANS.) 
Belying the Bear Republic court’s protest as to how a court could possibly evaluate 
fairness with reference to as-yet undisclosed documents,659 courts are often to be 
found parsing just such materials.660 One judge reviewed the remaining privileged 
documents at issue in camera and emerged with no finding of a broader waiver; 
indeed, the plaintiff had commendably made “no effort to demonstrate that the 
withholding of otherwise privileged documents by this defendant would result in any 
unfairness” where no such effort could evidently succeed.661 A special master, after 
extensive reviews in camera and briefing, concluded that the production of six exhibits 
after a deliberative re-review by counsel seeking to correct errors in privilege could 
be called nothing but intentional, but that the complexity of the production called for 
a narrow subject matter waiver only.662 Another court conducted an email-by-email 
review and granted subject matter waiver only as to the portions of a handful whose 
pattern of redactions painted a “misleading picture” of the full content, as the rest 
caused no unfair disadvantage.663 In so holding, the court summed up the lenient view 
that “[w]here the disclosed information does not afford the disclosing party a tactical 
advantage that would lead to a selective and deceptive presentation of evidence at trial, 
however, selective waiver may be permissible.”664 
Such a construction of the fairness prong implies that a litigant may be able to 
defang subject matter waiver by representing it will not use the disclosed but 
privileged material.665 This may be straightforward when the documents are irrelevant 
 
658 Coyne v. Los Alamos Nat’l Sec., LLC, No. 15-0054, 2016 WL 10587986, at *6 (D.N.M. 
Mar. 10, 2016). 
659 Bear Republic Brewing Co. v. Cent. City Brewing Co., 275 F.R.D. 43 (D. Mass. 2011) 
(quoted supra note 630). 
660 E.g., Obeid v. La Mack, No. 14 cv 6498, 2015 WL 5581577, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 
2015); Noval Williams Films LLC v. Branca, No. 14 Civ. 4711, 2016 WL 7238960, at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2016); see Correll, supra note 6, at 1056 (“To that end, the early approach 
employed by most courts has been to conduct in camera reviews of the disclosed and 
undisclosed documents to assess this requirement.”). 
661 Obeid, 2015 WL 5581577, at *10 (“Indeed, although plaintiff appends to his counsel’s 
letter some examples of documents produced by the individual defendants, a review of them 
reflects that none is seemingly favorable (or unfavorable) to Gemini’s position.”). 
662 See N.M. Oncology & Hematology Consultants, Ltd. v. Presbyterian Healthcare Servs., 
No. 12-526, 2017 WL 10606787, at *9–12 (D.N.M. Feb. 17, 2017). 
663 Noval Williams, 2016 WL 7238960, at *4. 
664 Id. 
665 See Cross & Nagendra, supra note 14, at 6–7 (“To avoid subject matter waiver associated 
with a voluntary disclosure of privileged information, make clear that the disclosure is not 
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or cumulative to the case at hand.666 For documents that are germane, however, the 
court may reserve judgment, threatening reconsideration should a document be used 
“unfairly or to gain a tactical advantage.”667 A yet more guarded judge may require 
parties to preemptively disallow themselves any use of the privileged documents.668 
When they are willing to do so, however, courts may be equally willing to take them 
at (and hold them to) their word: 
Here, Defendants assert that they will not present evidence of their counsel’s 
advice because they are not pursuing an advice-of-counsel defense. The court 
will hold Defendants to this commitment and, accordingly, Defendants will 
not be using the attorney-client privilege as both a shield and a sword. 
Considerations of fairness do not justify a subject matter waiver.669  
The minority of courts viewing subject matter waiver as the default result of an 
intentional disclosure are of course less indulgent: once intentionality was established, 
subject matter waiver followed, as sure as night follows day.670 So where a single 
draft settlement document and presentation regarding license negotiations had been 
intentionally produced, the court found waived all privilege pertaining to the 
negotiations without any analysis of whether the selective disclosure was 
advantageous or misleading.671 Likewise in Colley v. Dickenson Country School 
Board,672 after the superintendent disclosed certain correspondence with their 
counsel, the waiver was extended at the plaintiff’s insistence to all attorney-client 
communications prior to the litigation’s commencement, without so much as a 
mention of selectiveness or tactical motivation.673 (The court had a hunch as to the 
plaintiff’s motivation: “I suspect that the plaintiff has gone to such lengths to obtain 
 
misleading or otherwise unfair. For example, the producing party can disavow any intention to 
use the disclosed information to prosecute or defend the claims in the litigation.”). 
666See Patrick v. City of Chi., 154 F. Supp. 3d 705, 715–16 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (“Mr. Patrick 
has not attempted to rely on any aspect of any conversation he ever had with Mr. Theis. Quite 
the contrary. He is quite adamant that none of those conversations should be admissible in this 
case. Mr. Patrick is therefore not seeking to use the privilege simultaneously ‘as a shield and a 
sword.’ Hence, the traditional subject matter waiver ought not apply here.”) (quoting United 
States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1292 (2nd Cir. 1991)). 
667 RLIS, Inc. v. Cerner Corp., No. 3:12-CV-209, 2014 WL 12599509, at *1–2 (S.D. Tex. 
Dec. 24, 2014). 
668 Gateway Deliveries, LLC v. Mattress Liquidators, Inc., No. 2:14-cv-02033, 2016 WL 
232427, at *2–3 (D. Ariz. Jan. 20, 2016). 
669 Id. 
670 See cases cited supra note 635. 
671 Luminara Worldwide, LLC v. Liown Elecs. Co. Ltd., No. 14-3103, 2015 WL 9861106, 
at *5 (D. Minn. Oct. 5, 2015). 
672 Colley v. Dickenson City Sch. Bd., No. 2:17CV00003, 2018 WL 5318259 (W.D. Va. 
Oct. 29, 2018). 
673 Id. at *3.  
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privileged material because she hopes she can find a document from the lawyers 
advising the Board that they were at fault, which the Board ignored, thus showing 
willfulness and providing a basis for enhanced damages.”)674 
C. Post-Production Concerns: Clawbacks and Professional Comity 
Shifting the sword to the other hand, one recurring theme in determining the 
inadvertence of a production both before and after FRE 502(b) was the expedition 
with which disclosing counsel demanded return of the supposedly inadvertent 
production675—a “clawback,” in the jargon of privilege.676 Tardiness in clawing back 
some documents compared with haste as to others may implicate serious sword-and-
shield concerns, or even imply a disclosure was truly intentional.677 Meanwhile, once 
opposing counsel is put on notice that privileged material has been produced, burdens 
shift and obligations of comity and candor in shielding the privilege arise.678 Even 
before such notice, parties receiving documents may be held to task for seeking to 
weaponize privileged documents that were obviously mistakenly provided.679 
1. Reasonable Remediation by the Producing Party 
Before the advent of FRE 502, there was some debate in courts as to how to 
measure the promptness of remediation under the Hydraflow factors or similar tests, 
 
674 Id. at n.2. If so, the plaintiff was likely to be disappointed, for the court continued: 
“Perhaps such a document exists, but I doubt it. It certainly did not appear in the documents that 
I earlier reviewed in camera.” Id. 
675 See infra notes 700–714 and accompanying text. 
676 E.g., Talismanic Props., LLC v. Tipp City, Ohio, 309 F. Supp. 3d 488, 494 (S.D. Ohio 
2017) (“The City argues that the documents were ‘inadvertently disclosed’ and that the Court 
should permit the ‘clawback’ of these documents by application of Fed. R. Evid. 502.”); FED. 
R. EVID. 502(d) advisory committee’s note to 2008 amendment (noting “the rule contemplates 
enforcement of ‘claw-back’ and ‘quick peek’ arrangements as a way to avoid the excessive costs 
of pre-production review for privilege and work product”). One may find the term spelled as a 
single word, two words, or hyphenated; this Article opts for the first for consistency. See 
Clawback, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (employing the single-word orthography 
for the noun and spacing for the verb); cf. Jared S. Sunshine, The Purloined Greek Letters: 
Twenty-First Century Developments in the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in 
Fraternity and Sorority Marks, 37 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 679, 682 & n.11 (2019) (discussing the 
same orthographical variations in the terms “markholder,” “trademark,” and “servicemark”). 
677 See infra notes 715–731 and accompanying text. 
678 See, e.g., Bona Fide Conglom., Inc. v. SourceAmerica, No. 3:14-cv-00751, 2016 WL 
4361808 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2016) (discussed infra notes 756–768). 
679 See, e.g., Harleysville Ins. Co. v. Holding Funeral Home, Inc., No. 1:15CV00057, 2017 
WL 4368617 (W.D. Va. Feb. 9, 2017), objs. overruled, 2017 WL 4368617 (W.D. Va. Oct. 2, 
2017) (discussed infra notes 750–755). 
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but most had settled on the date the producing party realized the error.680 The 
Advisory Committee nonetheless sought to provide clearer guidance to FRE 502(b): 
it does “not require the producing party to engage in a post-production review to 
determine whether any protected communication or information has been produced 
by mistake. But the rule does require the producing party to follow up on any obvious 
indications that a protected communication or information has been produced 
inadvertently.”681 Courts quite naturally read this as confirming that precautionary 
measures under 502(b)(2) need not extend past production.682 But most have also 
considered this direction to reaffirm that the promptness in remediation under FRE 
502(b)(3) is judged from when the producing party becomes aware of a mistake, not 
the date of production.683 Given that view was broadly held before the new rule,684 
and is only reinforced by the rule’s passage, there is now little dissent that cognizance 
or notice of the error is necessary to trigger an obligation to remediate.685 
 
680 See, e.g., Judson Atkinson Candies, Inc. v. Latini–Hohberger Dhimantec, 529 F.3d 371, 
389 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Nat’l Ass’n. of Realtors, 242 F.R.D. 491, 495 (N.D. Ill. 
2007); U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Braspetro Oil Servs. Co., No. 97 Civ. 6124, 2000 WL 744369, 
at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2000); Aramony v. United Way of Am., 969 F. Supp. 226, 237 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997); see also Outlaw, supra note 14, at 4 (citing cases following minority counting 
from the time-of-production and those following the majority rule). 
681 FED. R. EVID. 502(b) advisory committee’s note to 2008 amendment. 
682 E.g., SEC v. Blackburn, No. 15-2451, 2015 WL 10911438, at *4 (E.D. La. Oct. 26, 2015); 
D’Onofrio v. Borough of Seaside Park, No. 09-6220, 2012 WL 1949854, at *11 (D.N.J. May 
30, 2012); Datel Holdings Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp., No. C-09-05535, 2011 WL 866993, at *4 
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2011); Heriot v. Byrne, 257 F.R.D. 645, 660–61 (N.D. Ill. 2009). 
683 E.g., Phipps v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 3:12-cv-0109, 2018 WL 1183746, at *8 (M.D. 
Tenn. Mar. 7, 2018); Blackburn, 2015 WL 10911438, at *5 (“The fact that the SEC did not raise 
the issue for nearly four months is not material. It is not required to engage in post-production 
review. Once it determined that the wrong emails were produced, it acted immediately to claw 
them back.”); AAMP of Fla. v. Auto. Data Sol., Inc., No. 8:13–CV–2019, 2015 WL 12844396, 
at *4 (M.D. Fla. May 21, 2015); Burnett v. Ford Motor Co., No. 3:13-cv-14207, 2015 WL 
1650439, at *11 (S.D. W. Va. Apr. 14, 2015); Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Owlett & Lewis, P.C., 
297 F.R.D. 232, 242 (M.D. Pa. 2013); Prowess, Inc. v. RaySearch Labs. AB, No. 11-1357, 2013 
WL 1976077, at *4 (D. Md. May 9, 2013); West Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 
No. 2:12-cv-0692, 2013 WL 12141531, at *5–7 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 2013); D’Onofrio, 2012 WL 
1949854, at *12; Valentin v. Bank of New York Mellon Corp., No. 09 Civ. 9448, 2011 WL 
1466122, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2011); Kmart Corp. v. Footstar, Inc., No. 09 C 3607, 2010 
WL 4512337, at *5, n.54 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 2, 2010); Liles v. Stuart Weitzman, LLC, No. 09-
61448, 2010 WL 11505149, at *5 (S.D. Fla. June 15, 2010); Luna Gaming-S.D., LLC v. Dorsey 
& Whitney, LLP, No. 06cv2804, 2010 WL 275083, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2010); Coburn 
Grp., LLC v. Whitecap Advisors LLC, 640 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1041 (N.D. Ill. 2009); see also 
Heriot v. Byrne, 257 F.R.D. 645, 661–62 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (applying the advisory committee 
note to FRE 502(b)(2) but also concluding promptness of remediation is measured from notice 
of the error); Grimm, Bergstrom & Kraueter, supra note 14, ¶ 56. 
684 See Outlaw, supra note 14, at 4 (noting majority rule). 
685 See Coburn Grp., LLC v. Whitecap Advisors LLC, 640 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1041 (N.D. Ill. 
2009) (“Prior to Rule 502, courts in this circuit looked to the time between a party’s learning of 
the disclosure and that party's taking action to remedy it, rather than the time that elapsed since 
the document was placed in the hands of the other party. The Committee’s comment that Rule 
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Although a party need not mechanically perform a post-production review of every 
disk it releases,686 it cannot ignore signs that something is amiss and satisfy the 
remediation prong through willful ignorance.687 D’Onofrio v. Borough of Seaside 
Park surveyed just such a case, where the defendants suffered “seemingly unending 
problems” with their productions.688 First, they were aware they had inadvertently 
produced counsel’s notes on certain documents, but inexplicably did no further 
investigation.689 Second, their privilege log was missing 872 of the 1238 pages it 
ought logically to have contained; the court was “perplexed how counsel missed the 
fact that approximately 70% of the information that should have been included was 
not.”690 Finally, the defendants were given express notice that one section of the disk 
contained 728 inadvertently produced documents due to a computer glitch, yet still no 
re-review of the remainder of the disk was undertaken.691 The court rejected the 
argument that the producing party had not known of the problem: “whether a party is 
informed by its adversary that privileged information has been inadvertently produced 
. . . or whether the circumstances surrounding a party’s production indicates that 
something has gone awry, as is the case here, is of little import.”692 Once constructive 
notice accrued, so did an obligation to remediate.693 
Courts thus generally agree that when an error in privilege rears its ugly head, a 
broader reexamination must reasonably follow.694 Nevertheless, counsel is not 
expected to achieve “perfection or anything close based on the clairvoyance of 
hindsight,” as where the fact that “deposition documents gave some indication that 
some content had been truncated was not a sufficiently obvious clue that any missing 
 
502 does not require a post-production review supports this view that the relevant time under 
subpart (b)(3) is how long it took the producing party to act after it learned that the privileged 
or protected document had been produced.”) (citations omitted). But see also Outlaw, supra 
note 14, at 8 (predicting the minority view would survive). 
686 See Grimm, Bergstrom & Kraueter, supra note 14, ¶ 55. 
687 See, e.g., Stewart, 297 F.R.D. at 242; D’Onofrio, 2012 WL 1949854, at *12–17; Kmart, 
2010 WL 4512337, at *5; Luna Gaming, 2010 WL 275083, at *6; United States v. Sensient 
Colors, Inc., No. 07-1275, 2009 WL 2905474, at *5 (D.N.J. Sept. 9, 2009). 
688 D’Onofrio, 2012 WL 1949854, at *12. 
689 Id. at *12–13. 
690 Id. at *13 (“In the first instance, the Court notes that the privilege log is not simply missing 
‘fewer’ entries than should have been included; instead, the bulk of the entries are missing.”). 
691 Id. at *14–15. 
692 Id. at *16. 
693 Id. (“Instead, the key is that once a party has notice that something is ‘amiss with its 
production and privilege review[,]’ that party has an obligation to ‘promptly re-assess its 
procedures and re-check its production.’”) (quoting United States v. Sensient Colors, Inc., No. 
07-1275, 2009 WL 2905474, at *5 (D.N.J. Sept. 9, 2009)). 
694 E.g., cases cited supra note 687. 
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material concerned privileged material.”695 Some judges may be quite indulgent in 
forgiving lack of clairvoyance.696 A South Florida court, for example, found no 
constructive notice because the law firm’s paralegal “did not alert [counsel] when the 
attempt to create a privilege log yielded no documents with ‘privileged’ tags,” and 
thus counsel themselves had no inkling of inadvertent production prior to the 
deposition where the documents were sprung on them.697 At that point, of course, 
counsel demanded their return and, evidencing their diligence, handed over a privilege 
log “within ninety minutes of discovering the error.”698 As these examples indicate, it 
is quite often only at depositions that an inadvertent disclosure is first unveiled—and 
urgency in response then demanded.699 
Urgency matters, for in some courts, once “a party realizes a document has been 
accidentally produced, ‘it must assert that privilege with virtual immediacy.’”700 
“Generally,” wrote a slightly more charitable magistrate, a clawback must be issued 
 
695 Datel Holdings Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp., No. C-09-05535, 2011 WL 866993, at *4 (N.D. 
Cal. Mar. 11, 2011). 
696 See, e.g., Phipps v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 3:12-cv-0109, 2018 WL 1183746, at *8–
9 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 7, 2018) (weighing size of production against minor “indications” being 
sufficient to raise doubts as to the production); AAMP of Fla. v. Auto. Data Sol., Inc., No. 8:13–
CV–2019, 2015 WL 12844396, at *4 (M.D. Fla. May 21, 2015); West Penn Allegheny Health 
Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, No. 2:12-cv-0692, 2013 WL 12141531, at *5–7 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 2013) 
(distinguishing the harshness of D’Onofrio and Sensient and finding 502(b)(3) satisfied); Datel, 
2011 WL 866993, at *4. 
697 AAMP, 2015 WL 12844396, at *4. 
698 Id. 
699 See, e.g., Bd. of Trs., Sheet Metal Workers’ Nat’l Pension Fund v. Palladium Equity 
Partners, LLC, 722 F. Supp. 2d 845, 850 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (citing the explanatory note and 
noting that objection must be made promptly following use at a deposition); Liles v. Stuart 
Weitzman, LLC, No. 09-61448, 2010 WL 11505149, at *5 (S.D. Fla. June 15, 2010) (collecting 
cases finding remediation prompt when undertaken directly following deposition); e.g., 
Carmody v. Bd. of Trs., 893 F.3d 397, 405 (7th Cir. 2018); Diamond Car Care, LLC v. 
Scottsdale Insurance Co., No. 16-Civ-20813, 2017 WL 1293249, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 10, 2017); 
Surfcast, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 2:12-cv-333-JAW, 2013 WL 4039413, at *4–5 (D. Me. 
Aug. 7, 2013); Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Owlett & Lewis, P.C., 297 F.R.D. 232, 241-242 (M.D. 
Pa. 2013); Coburn Grp., LLC v. Whitecap Advisors LLC, 640 F. Supp. 2d 1032 (N.D. Ill. 2009). 
700 Cormack v. United States, 117 Fed. Cl. 392, 400–01 (Fed. Cl. 2014) (quoting Sikorsky 
Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 106 Fed. Cl. 571, 585–85 (Fed. Cl. 2012)); accord Stewart, 297 
F.R.D. at 241–42 (finding failure to object at deposition worked waiver even though the 
clawback was sought at the end of the deposition); Mycone Dental Supply Co. v. Creative Nail 
Design Inc., No. C-12-00747, 2013 WL 4758053, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2013); Skansgaard 
v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. C11-0988, 2013 WL 828210, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 6, 2013); 
Sikorsky, 106 Fed. Cl. at 585086 (contrasting cases finding privileged waived after delays 
between six days and months with those finding privilege preserved when asserted the same 
day or “immediately”). Compare, e.g., Surfcast, 2013 WL 4039413, at *4–5 (finding waiver 
because of a day’s delay), with Diamond Car, 2017 WL 1293249, at *6 (finding such delay 
reasonable) (discussed supra note 496). 
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“within days after learning of the disclosure.”701 Other courts, however, have cloven 
closer to the normative regime of FRE 502 in finding that promptness of remediation 
need only be reasonable under the circumstances, not reflexively immediate (or even 
within a few days).702 Counsel may need time to research the relevant law before 
making a motion.703 If the document was produced in the first place based on a 
mistake arising from nonobvious privilege, it is understandable that counsel may need 
time to ascertain that it ought to be clawed back even after seeing it again.704 
Confusion likely derives from the fact that documents introduced at depositions may 
rightly require an immediate if not instantaneous response—but based on the distinct 
doctrine that failure to object to a document’s introduction in depositions (or at trial) 
 
701 Ceglia v. Zuckerberg, No. 10-CV-00569A(F), 2012 WL 1392965 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 
2012); see also Barkett, supra note 14, at 1599–01 (discussing case). 
702 E.g., Phipps v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 3:12-cv-0109, 2018 WL 1183746, at *8 (M.D. 
Tenn. Mar. 7, 2018) (finding that “Defendant acted reasonably in engaging in dialogue with 
Plaintiffs regarding the documents over the course of several months, before seeking to claw 
back the documents when they were attached to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel”); West Penn 
Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, No. 2:12-cv-0692, 2013 WL 12141531, at *7 (W.D. Pa. 
Apr. 9, 2013) (“Finally, the ten days that elapsed between the time that Jones Day discovered 
the additional inadvertent production in 2012 and its first request for the return of the materials, 
and the few months that elapsed between Jones Day’s discovery and its second request that DOJ 
return the materials were not inappropriate in these circumstances.”); Valentin v. Bank of New 
York Mellon Corp., No. 09 Civ. 9448, 2011 WL 1466122, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2011) (lapse 
of six days not undue); see Meyers, supra note 9, at 1485 (“[T]he rule does not automatically 
impose waiver unless the response is perfect. Rather, the essential question is whether, under 
the circumstances of the case, the party acted appropriately.”); Coburn Grp., LLC v. Whitecap 
Advisors LLC, 640 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1041 (N.D. Ill. 2009); see also Terrell v. Cent. Wash. 
Asphalt, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-142, 2015 WL 461823, at *9 (D. Nev. Feb. 4, 2015) (finding year-
long delay unreasonable); Luna Gaming-S.D., LLC v. Dorsey & Whitney, LLP, No. 06cv2804, 
2010 WL 275083, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2010) (finding complete lack of follow up 
unreasonable). 
703 E.g., Coburn, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 1041; see also Grimm, Bergstrom & Kraueter, supra 
note 14, ¶¶ 57–58 (discussing case). 
704See, e.g., Valentin, 2011 WL 1466122, at *3 (“Here, BNYM had cause to be concerned 
only when it learned on February 18, 2011 that the handwriting was that of the former in-house 
counsel. And, it only fully understood the privileged nature of the notes four days later when it 
verified when the plaintiff had first asserted his legal claims.”); Alcon Mfg., Ltd. v. Apotex, 
Inc., No. 1:06-cv-1642, 2008 WL 5070465, at *6 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 26, 2008) (finding delay in 
assertion on document with nearly illegible handwriting reasonable under standard of FRE 
502(d) order); cf. Noyes, supra note 14, at 759 (“What if the Receiving Party asks the deponent 
about privileged information without revealing that the subject matter of the question was 
derived from a document produced pursuant to a Rule 502(d) order?”). 
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waives any privilege.705 Thus even though the original disclosure was governed by 
FRE 502, the failure to object works waiver of its own right.706 
In any event, however, substance rather that form controls in such assertions;707 a 
clawback demand must be pursued persistently, not posed pro forma and left to 
languish, if privilege is to be preserved.708 In Terrell v. Central Washington Asphalt, 
Inc., defense counsel posted a letter to their adversaries on the eve of a deposition 
asserting inadvertent production of draft interrogatory responses, and asking for a 
response so that the court could be consulted if there was disagreement, following the 
proper forms of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(B), all as directed by FRE 
502(b)(3).709 At the deposition the next day, however, counsel made no objection 
when the draft was used, which the court found itself called for waiver.710 Plaintiff’s 
counsel had no reason not to use the exhibit, for they did not receive the clawback 
letter until well after the deposition!711 In any case, plaintiff’s counsel then promptly 
responded that they disagreed with the clawback.712 “Nonetheless,” narrated the court, 
“Central Washington waited two hundred and thirty two days until the eve of the close 
of discovery before filing a motion with the court. This delay is unreasonable.”713 
 
705 See Hologram USA, Inc. v. Pulse Evol. Corp., No. 2:14–v–00772, 2016 WL 3654285, at 
*3 (D. Nev. July 5, 2016); Luna Gaming-S.D., LLC v. Dorsey & Whitney, LLP, No. 06cv2804, 
2010 WL 275083, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2010) (“But under both state and federal law, if a 
privileged document is used at a deposition, and the privilege holder fails to object immediately, 
the privilege is waived.”); Bd. of Trs., Sheet Metal Workers’ Nat’l Pension Fund v. Palladium 
Equity Partners, LLC, 722 F. Supp. 2d 845, 850 (E.D. Mich. 2010). 
706 See FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note to 2008 amendment; Luna Gaming, 
2010 WL 275083, at *5; Noyes, supra note 14, at 759 (“Counsel’s inability to quickly raise and 
support the claims that Rule 502(d) preserved may mean that they are simply waived through 
different conduct.”); infra notes 847–848 and accompanying text. 
707 See Terrell v. Cent. Wash. Asphalt, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-142, 2015 WL 461823, at *8 (D. 
Nev. Feb. 4, 2015) (“The fundamental command of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is 
‘never to exalt form over substance.’”) (quoting Amron v. Morgan Stanley Inv. Advisors Inc., 
464 F.3d 338, 343 (2nd Cir. 2006)). 
708 See id.; Luna Gaming, 2010 WL 275083, at *6 (“[A]lthough Luna’s counsel belatedly 
objected to the use of the 2003 Memo at the depositions of Celani and Oegema and invoked the 
claw-back provision, Luna’s counsel never followed up with Dorsey’s counsel to obtain the 
return of the documents, nor did Luna’s counsel seek an order from the court. Under the 
circumstances, after Dorsey did not return the document soon after the request, Luna should 
have petitioned the court. Failing to take affirmative steps to retrieve the document, beyond 
merely asking for it at depositions, also waives the privilege.”) (citations omitted) (citing 
LaSalle Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Merrill Lynch Mortg. Lending, Inc., No. CV 04-5452, 2007 WL 
2324292, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2007)). 
709 Terrell, 2015 WL 461823, at *8–9. 
710 Id. at *8. 
711 Id. 
712 Id. 
713 Id. at *9. Given this deficient performance, counsel also argued that their client should 
not be penalized for their own inadvertent disclosure. With FRE 502(b) easily satisfied, the 
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Asserting privilege but delaying or abandoning the clawback inherently raises the 
suspicion that no privilege is in play, only the interdict of inconvenient documents.714 
This suspicion becomes near-certainty when privilege is only asserted after a 
document has been used against a party, whilst innocuous documents of equally 
privileged provenance are left undefended.715 Such conduct openly defies the sword-
and-shield doctrine and has been embarrassingly transparent at times. The court in In 
re Recombinant DNA Technology Patent & Contract Litigation found waiver for lack 
of diligence in a massive but supposedly inadvertent production, alighting upon “one 
inadvertently produced document in particular.”716 The University of California had 
disclosed to Eli Lilly two patent opinions, one by law firm Irons & Sears, and the other 
by one Lorance Greenlee, who had begun his work at the law firm.717 Suspiciously, 
however, UC pressed only for return of the Irons letter, whilst it “never attempted to 
rectify its error—if it was an error—in producing the Greenlee letter,” and indeed 
Greenlee was questioned about it without objection.718 There was a ready explanation 
for this peculiarity: “Lilly suggests that UC’s desire to regain only the Irons opinion 
is fueled by the fact that the Irons opinion offers an unfavorable report of UC’s patent 
position, while the Greenlee letter presents a more favorable position.”719 The court 
accordingly found privilege in the Irons letter waived as well, relying on what sounded 
suspiciously like subject-matter waiver reasoning, even though this cat was already 
out of the bag.720 
 
court had no sympathy from such Mendenhallian logic, even citing Sealed Case and its famous 
invocation that privilege be “jealously guarded.” Id. 
714 See, e.g., id.; cases cited supra note 708. 
715 See, e.g., Hologram USA, Inc. v. Pulse Evol. Corp., No. 2:14–v–00772, 2016 WL 
3654285, at *3 (D. Nev. July 5, 2016) (“Defendants’ counsel did not object to the introduction 
of Exhibits 22 or 34. Instead, he objected when Plaintiffs' counsel used the documents as a 
bridge to undercover other allegedly privileged information.”). 
716 In re Recombinant DNA Tech. Patent & Contract Litig., MDL No. 912, 1994 WL 
270712, at *39 (S.D. Ind. 1993). 
717 Id. at *39–40. 
718 Id. at *40. 
719 Id. at *41. 
720 Compare id. (“Lilly, whether inadvertently or not, had been given the Greenlee letter—
one portion of a study conducted by two attorneys on the same subject matter. Lilly had been 
permitted to read and analyze that portion. Subsequently, UC ‘inadvertently’ produced the other 
portion of this study—the Irons opinion. UC seeks to regain possession only of the later-
produced portion . . . . In any event, fairness dictates that if UC was willing to permit Lilly to 
rely on the Greenlee portion of this study without objection (or to use this portion of the study 
for its own purposes), the remainder or counterpart of the study, likewise should remain in the 
mix.”) with id. (“Moreover, we note that holdings in the cases UC cites to support its limited 
waiver argument are not contrary to our finding today. In those cases, the courts found that 
while there was no subject matter waiver of documents not yet produced, privilege had been 
lost in those documents actually produced—even though produced inadvertently. In the instant 
case, both the Greenlee letter and the Irons opinion actually have been produced. Such actual 
production weighs in favor of a waiver of privilege.”) (citations omitted).  
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Attempts at selective disclosure through the back door of selective clawbacks may 
have been less brazen in the wake of FRE 502, 721 but courts will not be bamboozled 
easily.722 In one case, the defendant belatedly sought to claw back a series of exhibits 
offered in open court.723 In the first instance, the judge thought privilege had been 
“irrevocably and permanently waived” by failure to object immediately in such a 
context.724 Turning to the details, the court noted defense counsel had properly 
objected to one exhibit’s introduction, but it was no longer dispute, having been 
clawed back already.725 Tellingly, however, “counsel did not object to the 
introduction of Exhibits 22 or 34. Instead, he objected when Plaintiffs’ counsel used 
the documents as a bridge to undercover other allegedly privileged information.”726 
This sort of brinksmanship in allowing certain exhibits to be entered unchallenged and 
only complaining when the line of questioning turned dangerous could not stand.727 
As another court explained straightforwardly of a related privilege: 
 
721 See, e.g., Med. & Chiropractic Clinic, Inc. v. Oppenheim, No. 8:16-cv-1477, 2018 WL 
4558441, at *2–3 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2018); Hologram USA, Inc. v. Pulse Evol. Corp., No. 
2:14–v–00772, 2016 WL 3654285, at *3 (D. Nev. July 5, 2016). Compare, e.g., Potomac Elec. 
Power Co. & Subsidiaries v. United States, 107 Fed. Cl. 725, 730 (Fed. Cl. 2012) (denying 
construction of clawback provision that would “put the Government at a strategic disadvantage 
for various potential tactical reasons” and “force it to guess whether a given disclosure was 
made intentionally or not”), with Shire LLC v. Amneal Pharm., LLC, 2014 WL 1509238, at *2–
6 (D.N.J. Jan. 10, 2014) (denying clawbacks as to inadvertently produced documents but finding 
their disclosure remained inadvertent rather than part of a selective scheme). 
722 This is especially so when opposing counsel is at hand to draw attention to any potential 
violations of the sword-and-shield doctrine: “Mr. Sugarman has serious concerns that Banc’s 
efforts to selectively claw back documents and hurt his defense will not stop here. There are 
numerous documents that are identical (or substantially similar) to those at issue here that have 
been produced, are available on public dockets, or both, but are not on Banc’s current clawback 
list.” Defendant’s Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Order that Individual Document from 
Defendant Banc’s Feb. 21, 2018 Document Production Are Not Privileged, at 2, In re Banc of 
Cal. Sec. Litig., No. SACV 17-00118, 2018 WL 6730235 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2018). Courts may 
not agree, of course. See In re Banc of Cal. Sec. Litig., No. SACV 17-00118, 2018 WL 6167907, 
at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2018) (“Sugarman also maintains that Banc’s treatment of several of 
these documents conflicts with how Banc has treated other versions of the document or similar 
documents. The Court does not view the possibility of inconsistent positions as a basis for 
destroying the privilege.”). 
723 Hologram USA, 2016 WL 3654285, at *3. 
724 Id. at *3. 
725 Id. at *3, n.1. 
726 Id. (“For instance, as to Exhibit 22, Defendants’ counsel permitted questions regarding 
Mr. Caddick’s opinion, but objected when Plaintiffs inquired into whether Defendants asked 
Mr. Caddick to revise his opinion . . . . Similarly, Defendants’ counsel never objected to the 
introduction of Exhibit 34 and instead only objected to questions surrounding the purpose and 
identity of an individual referenced in Exhibit 34.”). 
727 Id. 
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Defendants are correct that certain other documents produced by Plaintiff 
reflect similar communications, both with regard to participants and content, 
and Plaintiff has not requested the return of those documents. As urged by 
Defendants,  
It is fundamentally unfair and inequitable for M&C to use the 
mediation privilege as both a shield and a sword—withholding 
documents under the privilege and/or seeking to claw them back 
when it serves M&C’s purpose to do so, while at the same time 
intentionally producing other documents as to which the same 
privilege argument could be made, but not seeking to claw them 
back, because it presumably serves M&C’s purpose to have those 
documents in the evidentiary record. 
Under the circumstances, I agree that allowing Plaintiff to claw back these 
documents is fundamentally unfair in the circumstances presented.728 
Nor should language in a clawback agreement under FRE 504(d)729 be 
manipulated to allow for tactical waivers by permitting undesirable documents to be 
clawed back whilst leaving others behind.730 The sword-and-shield doctrine looks to 
result, not form.731 
2. The “Candor and Courtesy” Expected of the Receiving Party732 
Playing no favorites, courts contrariwise look askance at parties receiving clearly 
privileged material who opt to squirrel it away for strategic advantage rather than raise 
the likely error to permit for a clawback.733 The Seventh Circuit recently offered an 
upbraiding in Carmody v. Board of Trustees of University of Illinois,734 where the 
university had inadvertently produced a key memorandum bearing the bolded, all-caps 
heading “ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATION PRIVILEGED AND 
 
728 Med. & Chiropractic Clinic, Inc. v. Oppenheim, No. 8:16-cv-1477, 2018 WL 4558441, 
at *2–3 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2018) (citations omitted). 
729 See infra Section IV.D. 
730 See Smith v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., No. 4:16-cv-00296, 2017 WL 3484158, at *4 (D. 
Idaho Aug. 14, 2017); Potomac Elec. Power Co. & Subsidiaries v. United States, 107 Fed. Cl. 
725, 730 (Fed. Cl. 2012). 
731 Cf. Terrell v. Cent. Wash. Asphalt, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-142, 2015 WL 461823, at *8 (D. 
Nev. Feb. 4, 2015) (quoted supra note 707). 
732 Harleysville Ins. Co. v. Holding Funeral Home, Inc., No. 1:15CV00057, 2017 WL 
4368617, at *10 (W.D. Va. Oct. 2 2017) (quoted fully infra note 771). 
733 See, e.g., Cases cited infra note 740; see also EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 619–623 (“In the 
absence of a governing state rule, should an attorney who is the beneficiary of an inadvertent 
disclosure return it upon request? To do so certainly buys one a great deal of good will with 
opposing counsel, and courts seem to expect such behavior in cases where the document 
production is neither substantial nor important.”). 
734 Carmody v. Bd. of Trs., 893 F.3d 397 (7th Cir. 2018). 
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CONFIDENTIAL,” subsequently submitting a privilege log identifying the document 
as such.735 Carmody’s lawyer was evidently aware of the document’s explosive 
potential, waiting a year to unveil it triumphantly at a deposition with the comment 
that it “was one that we wanted you to copy.”736 University counsel straightaway 
demanded the document’s return as inadvertently produced, but Carmody’s lawyer 
refused, leading to motion practice.737 Weighing the Hydraflow factors under FRE 
502(b), the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s upholding privilege, laying 
particular emphasis on the ultimate question of fairness: 
An element of basic fairness here also weighs against Carmody because of 
his lawyer’s tactics. He or his lawyer surreptitiously photographed the 
document, stayed silent for a year, tried to surprise the university with the 
document at a deposition, and then made the document public by attaching it 
as an exhibit to a motion for summary judgment after defense counsel had 
demanded its return but before the court could resolve the issue.738 
The court of appeals added in a folksy aside: “The university lawyer’s oversight 
was surely a doozy, but the point of Rule 502(b) is to protect client’s confidences from 
their lawyers’ human errors like this one.”739 
Accidental recipients of information shielded by privilege who seek to wield it as 
a sword themselves are likely to be disappointed in the FRE 502 era, for such conduct 
may sway courts to forgive any lapses of the producing party.740 Higher expectations 
of professional comity are not merely hortatory; state canons of professional ethics 
impose affirmative obligations on parties receiving obviously privileged material that 
will be given effect both in state741 and federal courts.742 Rule 4.4(b) of the Model 
 
735 Id. at 405. 
736 Id. 
737 Id. 
738 Id. at 406. 
739 Id. 
740 Id. Compare e.g., AAMP of Fla. v. Auto. Data Sol., Inc., No. 8:13–CV–2019, 2015 WL 
12844396, at *4 (M.D. Fla. May 21, 2015) (finding the producing party did not exercise 
reasonable precautions but nonetheless not finding waiver because receiving counsel violated 
their ethical obligations), with D’Onofrio v. Borough of Seaside Park, No. 09-6220, 2012 WL 
1949854, at *11 (D.N.J. May 30, 2012) (finding receiving counsel’s ethical violations in failing 
to report obviously privileged files “obviously weighs against finding that a waiver occurred,” 
although it did not overcome the producing party’s lapses). See also EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 
622 (“But what is certain is that counsel should clearly . . . not try to put something over on his 
or her adversary. Such tactics are likely to backfire with the court.”). 
741 E.g., Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d 650, 655 (N.J. 2010); see Barkett, 
supra note 14, at 1591–92 (discussing case). 
742 E.g., Harleysville Ins. Co. v. Holding Funeral Home, Inc., No. 1:15CV00057, 2017 WL 
4368617, at *10 (W.D. Va. Feb. 9, 2017), objs. overruled, 2017 WL 4368617 (W.D. Va. Oct. 
2, 2017); Bona Fide Conglom., Inc. v. SourceAmerica, No. 3:14-cv-00751, 2016 WL 4361808 
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Rules of Professional Conduct requires a party accidentally receiving privileged 
material to notify the discloser,743 a principle that no fewer than thirty-two states have 
adopted—and another eight and the District of Columbia impose even more stringent 
requirements.744 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(b)(5)(B) imposes duties on 
recipients receiving notice that documents have been inadvertently produced.745 
Distinctively from many state rules, FRCP 25(b)(5)(B) offers no ambit for the 
receiving party to demur on the contention the disclosure was truly intentional.746 The 
Southern District of New York has found that the precise course of conduct in 
Carmody—ignoring assertions of privilege, refusing to destroy or sequester identified 
documents, and filing them publicly in open court instead—was a blatant violation of 
the federal rule,747 though it declined to issue sanctions in response.748 Needless to 
say, however, privilege was not waived under such distasteful circumstances.749 
Others have not been so shy as to sanctions: in Harleysville Insurance Co. v. 
Holding Funeral Home, Inc.,750 defense counsel had surreptitiously accessed 
plaintiff’s files electronically, disregarded indicia of privilege, and then disseminated 
the material to third parties, all without seeking any guidance from the court or 
opposing counsel.751 Indeed, the “only action defense counsel claim they took in 
response to discovering that they had access to Harleysville’s Claims File—calling the 
Virginia State Bar Ethics Hotline for advice—belies any claim that they believed that 
their receipt and use of the materials without Harleysville’s knowledge was 
 
(S.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2016); AAMP, 2015 WL 12844396, at *4; D’Onofrio, 2012 WL 1949854, 
at *11; see EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 620. 
743 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4; see Barkett, supra note 14, at 1590–92 
(discussing application of the rule); Schaefer, supra note 14, at 205-07 (discussing application 
and adoption of the rule). 
744 Schaefer, supra note 14, at 206–07, nn.56–57 (collecting state rules). 
745 See Ground Zero Ctr. for Non-Violent Action v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 860 F.3d 1244, 
1259 (9th Cir. 2017) (“When privileged information is turned over inadvertently to a party in 
the course of discovery, applicable privileges generally are not waived. Fed. R. Evid. 502(b). 
Far from obtaining the right to share the inadvertently produced documents, the party who 
mistakenly received the information must ‘promptly return, sequester, or destroy’ it once 
notified it is privileged. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(B).”); Galena Street Fund, L.P. v. Wells Fargo 
Bank, N.A., No. 12-cv-00587, 2014 WL 943115, at *9–11 (D. Colo. Mar. 10, 2014); Barkett, 
supra note 14, at 1592–93; Schaefer, supra note 14, at 216–17; Noyes, supra note 14, at 750. 
746 See Schaefer, supra note 14, at 225. 
747 Fuller v. Interview, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 5728, 2009 WL 3241542, at *2, n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 
30, 2009). 
748 See Kelly v. CSE Safeguard Ins. Co., No. 2:08-cv-88, 2011 WL 3494235, at *4 (D. Nev. 
Aug. 10, 2011) (discussing case). 
749 Fuller, 2009 WL 3241542, at *3–5. 
750 Harleysville Ins. Co. v. Holding Funeral Home, Inc., No. 1:15CV00057, 2017 WL 
4368617 (W.D. Va. Feb. 9, 2017), objs. overruled, 2017 WL 4368617 (W.D. Va. Oct. 2, 2017). 
751 Id. at *7–8. 
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proper.”752 The magistrate judge considered but rejected the severe remedy of 
disqualification,753 instead levying the costs of motion practice.754 On review, the 
district court—after convening a full-blown evidentiary hearing replete with 
competing experts on professional ethics—excoriated defense counsel’s behavior at 
great length, and strengthened the sanction to an evidentiary bar against any discovery 
whatsoever predicated on the purloined files.755 
Faring even worse was plaintiff’s counsel in Bona Fide Conglomerate, Inc. v. 
SourceAmerica,756 where the attorney had obtained from his client and transcribed 
some twenty-five recordings of the defendant’s counsel Robinson during the period at 
issue in the litigation.757 SourceAmerica only learned of this when three were cited in 
the complaint itself, sending a letter demanding their return two weeks later.758 
Plaintiff’s counsel refused on the basis of waiver, and motion practice ensued.759 It 
was not until a year later that SourceAmerica winkled out that there were twenty-two 
more such recordings, and renewed its demands for their return.760 Plaintiff’s counsel 
again demurred, and the tapes appeared (anonymously, obviously) on WikiLeaks 
within the month.761 SourceAmerica thereupon moved to exclude the tapes and to 
disqualify plaintiff’s counsel.762 Reviewing the sordid affair, the district court found 
the relevant excerpts of the tapes facially privileged, and that Robinson had no 
authority to waive that privilege, stymieing the plaintiff’s attempt to argue for subject 
matter waiver over all the tapes under FRE 502(a).763  
 
752 Id. at *8 (“If defense counsel believed that the circumstances which allowed its access to 
the information waived any claim of privilege or protection, they should have asked the court 
to decide the issue before making any use of or disseminating the information. Counsel chose 
not to do so, however, and, therefore, the court believes that such conduct requires some 
sanction.”); cf. Lifewise Master Funding v. Telebank, 206 F.R.D. 298 (D. Utah 2002) (arguing 
unsuccessfully that waiver should be granted in recompense for proper professional behavior in 
consulting ethical hotline). 
753 Cf. Schaefer, supra note 14, at 227 (noting courts hesitate to disqualify counsel absent 
violation of the law). 
754 Harleysville, 2017 WL 4368617, at *8. 
755 Id. at *11–17. 
756 Bona Fide Conglom., Inc. v. SourceAmerica, No. 3:14-cv-00751, 2016 WL 4361808 
(S.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2016). 
757 Id. at *2. 
758 Id. 
759 Id. at *3. 
760 Id. at *3–4. 
761 Id. at *4. 
762 Id. 
763 Id. at *7–9. 
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Turning to the question of disqualification, the court was manifestly not pleased 
with the lead attorney for Bona Fide—as it turned out, a singularly inapt name.764 
Applying California law of professional responsibility, the court found he had 
“violated his ethical duties” in continuing to review and transcribe the tapes after being 
notified of their privilege,765 and precedent established clearly that counsel could not 
“hide behind the fact that the privileged documents were provided by his client.”766 
Moreover, counsel had used the tapes to craft claims against SourceAmerica, might 
do so again in the future, and (not to put too fine a point on it) the tapes had somehow 
ended up on WikiLeaks.767 All this led to one inexorable conclusion: not only would 
the lead lawyer for plaintiffs be disqualified, but so to would his entire law firm, as 
the court found that several other attorneys there had disregarded their professional 
duties as well, tainting the entire organization vicariously.768 The attempted wielders 
of privileged materials as a sword against their owner had cut themselves quite deeply 
indeed. 
Yet the federal rules offer few inexorable commands,769 and parties who attempt 
in good faith to respond to the appearance or allegations of privilege, avoiding tactical 
usage of mistakenly disclosed material, will generally be formally absolved of 
peccadillos.770 Professional comity and ethics should provide their own guidance 
when it comes to privilege, as the Harleysville magistrate judge recited, but guidance 
is not a requirement: 
The lowest common denominator, binding lawyers and laymen alike, is 
the statute and common law. A higher standard is imposed on lawyers by the 
Code of Professional Responsibility . . . . [W]e emphasize that more is 
required of lawyers than mere compliance with the minimum requirements 
of that standard. The traditions of professionalism at the bar embody a level 
 
764 Id. at *9–12. 
765 Id. at *10–11. 
766 Id. at *11 (quoting United States ex rel. Hartpence v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 2013 WL 
2278122, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 20, 2013)). 
767 Id. at *11 (“Here, Bona Fide has already used some of the information in the Robinson 
Tapes, albeit information deemed not to have been privileged, to craft claims against 
SourceAmerica. Moreover, another NPA (NTI) has already attempted to use information from 
the Robinson Tapes against SourceAmerica in its own case and the Robinson Tapes are now 
publicly available on Wikileaks. Further, Cragg cannot unlearn the privileged information he 
has had in his possession over two years. Thus, there is the potential that Bona Fide may use 
privileged information from the Robinson Tapes directly or indirectly in the future.”).  
768 Id. at *11–12. 
769 Cf. Terrell v. Cent. Wash. Asphalt, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-142, 2015 WL 461823, at *8–9 (D. 
Nev. Feb. 4, 2015) (“The fundamental command of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is 
‘never to exalt form over substance.’”) (quoting Amron v. Morgan Stanley Inv. Advisors Inc., 
464 F.3d 338, 343 (2nd Cir. 2006)). 
770 E.g., Kelly v. CSE Safeguard Ins. Co., No. 2:08-cv-88, 2011 WL 3494235, at *4 (D. Nev. 
Aug. 10, 2011). 
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of fairness, candor, and courtesy higher than the minimum requirements of 
the Code of Professional Responsibility.771   
Few courts can or would enforce such highfalutin principles, however;772 absent 
egregious behavior, courts will favor the lawyer providing zealous representation 
(who may indeed be ethically obligated to consider the disclosure)773 over the one 
who failed to “zealously protect” the privilege.774 This accounts for the frequency of 
inadvertent productions only coming to light at depositions where, as in Carmody, the 
questioning counsel unveils with some fanfare a particularly compromising 
document.775 Notably, such circumstances do not generally seem to yield sanctions or 
even scolding of the party who orchestrated the surprise.776 Instead, opinions 
generally address themselves to whether the producing counsel thereupon objected 
with sufficient urgency to satisfy their remedial duties and effect a clawback.777 In the 
FRE 502 era, commentators have called for clearer protections for mistakenly 
 
771 Harleysville Ins. Co. v. Holding Funeral Home, Inc., No. 1:15CV00057, 2017 WL 
1041600, at *7 (W.D. Va. Feb. 9, 2017) (quoting the Virginia State Bar Standing Committee on 
Legal Ethics, in turn quoting Gunter v. Va. State Bar, 385 S.E.2d 597, 600 (Va. 1989)) 
(alterations original). 
772See Jackson v. Deen, No. CV 412-139, 2013 WL 1911445, at *4 (S.D. Ga. May 8, 2013) 
(“The Eleventh Circuit has interpreted Snyder as standing for the proposition that courts can’t 
sanction lawyers for violating some ‘transcendental code of conduct’ that exists only in the 
subjective opinion of the court and is divorced from the specific guidance provided by case law, 
rule, or ethics code.”) (citing In re Finklestein, 901 F.2d 1560, 1565 (11th Cir. 1990)). 
773 See, e.g., In re Polypropylene Carpet Antitrust Litig., 181 F.R.D. 680, 698 (N.D. Ga. 
1998) ("If the disclosure operates to end legal protection for the information, the lawyer may 
use it for the benefit of the lawyer’s own client and may be required to do so if that would 
advance the client’s lawful objectives . . . ." (citation omitted)) (cited in Schaefer, supra note 
14, at 224 n.145); EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 622 (“But what is to be done when the privileged 
documents are crucial? Does counsel, in the name of good sportsmanship, have the right to turn 
over items of great possible benefit to his or her own client? Probably not.”); Schaefer, supra 
note 14, at 246 (“Receiving attorneys as fiduciaries are necessarily—and rightly—influenced 
by the interests of their own clients.”); Noyes, supra note 14, at 749–50; Cavaneau, supra note 
14, at 11–12 (“[I]f counsel has seen work product that includes important information about 
opposition strategy and thinking, it would be impossible (and perhaps a failure to adequately 
represent the client) if that information is not taken into account in structuring presentation of 
the case.”). But see, e.g., AAMP of Fla. v. Auto. Data Sol., Inc., No. 8:13–CV–2019, 2015 WL 
12844396, at *4 (M.D. Fla. May 21, 2015); Schaefer, supra note 14, at 205–06 (noting attorneys 
may ethically return inadvertent disclosure unread). 
774 SEC v. Lavin, 111 F.3d 921, 929 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“In other words, the holder must 
zealously protect the privileged materials, taking all reasonable steps to prevent their 
disclosure.”). 
775 See cases cited supra notes 699. 
776 Id. 
777 Compare, e.g., Surfcast, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 2:12-cv-333-JAW, 2013 WL 
4039413, at *4–5 (D. Me. Aug. 7, 2013) (finding waiver because of a day’s delay) with Diamond 
Car Care, LLC v. Scottsdale Insurance Co., No. 16-Civ-20813, 2017 WL 1293249, at *6 (S.D. 
Fla. Jan. 10, 2017) (finding such delay reasonable) (discussed supra note 497). 
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produced documents prior to a clawback.778 Professional conduct rules are likely a 
necessary component of such a revolution.779 Even if such advances were to come to 
pass, however, it ultimately remains the responsibility of every man, woman, and 
corporation to protect its own privilege with diligence.780 
D. The New Normal of FRE 502(d) and (e): Contracting for Privilege 
Some particularly provident litigants, therefore, may seek to mutually agree with 
their opponents on more robust protections than the rule provides by default.781 FRE 
502 accommodates such arrangements in subparts (d) and (e),782 which permit the 
parties to come to an agreement on inadvertent waivers and clawbacks that will bind 
them,783 or to seek an order from the court should they wish the agreement to extend 
beyond the instant proceedings and parties to the world at large.784 The provisions in 
question are terse: one notes that “agreement on the effect of disclosure in a federal 
proceeding is binding only on the parties to the agreement, unless it is incorporated 
into a court order,” whilst the other allows that a “federal court may order that the 
privilege or protection is not waived by disclosure connected with the litigation 
pending before the court—in which event the disclosure is also not a waiver in any 
other federal or state proceeding.”785 The resultant order can be exceedingly brief as 
 
778 See, e.g., Schaefer, supra note 14, at 239–43. 
779 Id. at 249–53. 
780 Galena Street Fund, L.P. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 12-cv-00587, 2014 WL 943115, 
at *9 (D. Colo. Mar. 10, 2014) (“However, Rule 502(b) does not remove a party’s ‘responsibility 
to take reasonable precautions against disclosure of privileged documents and to take reasonable 
and immediate actions when a disclosure of an otherwise privileged document is discovered.’ 
In addition, ‘[t]he burden of showing that the privilege has not been waived remains with the 
party claiming the privilege.’”) (citations omitted) (quoting Silverstein v. Fed. Bureau of 
Prisons, No. 07-cv-02471, 2009 WL 4949959, at *10 (D. Colo. Dec. 14, 2009). 
781 See Irth Sols., LLC v. Windstream Commc’ns LLC, No. 2:16-cv-219, 2017 WL 3276021, 
at *7 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 2, 2017); Barkett, supra note 14, at 1593–94; Noyes, supra note 14, at 
687–88; see also Caveneau, supra note 14, at 11. 
782 Irth, 2017 WL 3276021, at *7 (“[T]his section ‘codifies the well-established proposition’ 
that parties may agree ‘to limit the effect of waiver by disclosure between or among them.’ 
These agreements limiting waiver, known as ‘clawback’ provisions, ‘essentially “undo” a 
document production and allow the return of documents that a party belatedly determines are 
protected by the attorney-client privilege or work product immunity.’ These types of 
agreements, according to the Fed. R. Evid. 502(d) advisory committee’s note, are ‘becoming 
increasingly important in limiting the costs of privilege review and retention, especially in cases 
involving electronic discovery.’”) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 502(d)-(e) advisory committee’s note 
to 2008 amendment). 
783 FED. R. EVID. 502(e). 
784 Id. at (d). 
785 FED. R. EVID. 502(d)–(e). That these may be cited without resort to block quotation, see 
supra text accompanying note 413, speaks for itself. 
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well.786 Various scholars have written more pointedly on the singular subject of these 
provisions, and this already overburdened Article alights upon them comparatively 
briefly.787 
This new policy has been used frequently by litigants, as it only codifies what had 
become standard practice already.788 Courts, meanwhile, rightly view a FRE 502(d) 
order as a route to minimize the extent of privilege disputes laded onto their 
dockets.789 Yet the brusqueness of the rule itself has contributed to an unexpected 
degree of extratextual embroidery by courts seeking to apply it to novel or unforeseen 
circumstances, or even ordinary ones.790 As one author has noted, there is 
“conspicuous absence in FRE 502(d) of any reference to inadvertent disclosure or 
reasonable steps. The committee notes and recent case law suggest this omission is 
meaningful.”791 Yet, Judge Grimm observed in his article published not long after the 
rule’s adoption that courts were nonetheless already importing the requirement of 
reasonableness from FRE 502(b) into orders under FRE 502(d) lacking any such 
language.792 The judge objected properly that such an approach contradicts the 
express guidance to the rule itself,793 effectively writes FRE 502(d) and (e) out of 
existence, and sharply compromises the rule’s goals.794 As for why courts could go 
so far astray, the judge thought the errancy might derive from judicial distaste with 
 
786 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C.A. RCFC Form 14 (amended eff. May 14, 2018) (“Pursuant to 
agreement of the parties and the authority granted this court under Fed. R. Evid. 502(d), it is 
hereby ordered that a party’s disclosure, in connection with this litigation, of any 
communication or information covered by the attorney-client privilege or entitled to work 
product protection shall not constitute a waiver of such privilege or protection either in this 
litigation or in any other federal or state proceeding.”). 
787 See, e.g., Correll, supra note 6; Grimm, Bergstrom & Kraueter, supra note 14; Noyes, 
supra note 14. 
788 See FED. R. EVID. 502(d)-(e) advisory committee’s note to 2008 amendment; Grimm, 
Bergstrom & Kraueter, supra note 14, ¶ 8. 
789 E.g., Baez-Eliza v. Instituto Psicoterapeutica de P.R., 275 F.R.D. 65, 67–68 (D.P.R. 2011) 
(repeatedly advising the parties to consider an FRE 502(d) order to solve their acrimonious 
discovery disputes and threatening to impose one if they could not proceed amicably); see 
Correll, supra note 6, at 1032–33; id. at 1067 (noting FRE 502(d) “encourages courts to advance 
their own interests—specifically their own dockets”); cf. Morris v. Scenera Research, LLC, No. 
09-CVS-19678, 2011 WL 3808544, at *8 (Super. Ct. N.C. Aug. 26, 2011) (discussing 
traditional use of agreements to streamline discovery). 
790 See Irth Sols., LLC v. Windstream Commc’s LLC, No. 2:16-cv-219, 2017 WL 3276021, 
at *7–8 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 2, 2017); East Coast Sheet Metal Fabric. Corp. v. Autodesk, Inc., No. 
12–cv–517, 2014 WL 4627262, at *2 (D.N.H. Sept. 16, 2014) (“Borrowing the reasonableness 
language that appears in Rule 502(b), many courts have read a reasonableness requirement into 
Rule 502(d).”). 
791 Close, supra note 14, at 23. 
792 Grimm, Bergstrom & Kraueter, supra note 14, ¶¶ 77–98. 
793 Id. at ¶ 77 (citing FED. R. EVID. 502(d) advisory committee’s note to 2008 amendment). 
794 Id. at ¶ 79. 
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departing from a normative standard: “some courts have displayed a misguided 
reluctance to accept that parties may agree to procedures that would not be deemed 
reasonable under Rule 502(b)(2) or (3).”795 
Not all, however; other courts have agreed with Judge Grimm’s cogent criticisms, 
looking as always to the note provided by the Advisory Committee. 
Borrowing the reasonableness language that appears in Rule 502(b), many 
courts have read a reasonableness requirement into Rule 502(d). However, 
this court declines to do so. Federal Rule of Evidence 502(d) was adopted for 
the express purpose of allowing parties to limit the costs associated with 
screening documents produced during discovery for privileged material. To 
accomplish this, Rule 502 “seeks to provide a predictable, uniform set of 
standards under which parties can determine the consequences of a disclosure 
of a communication or information covered by the attorney-client privilege 
or work-product protection. Parties to litigation need to know, for example, 
that if they exchange privileged information pursuant to a confidentiality 
order, the court’s order will be enforceable.” Inserting a reasonableness 
requirement into Rule 502(d) would thwart this purpose.796 
The problem has not abated; the court in Irth Solutions, LLC v. Windstream 
Communications LLC recognized in 2017 with a palpable sense of disappointment that 
despite Rule 502’s goal of creating uniformity, courts still dispute how to 
analyze inadvertent disclosures when a cursory clawback agreement exists 
and alleged carelessness caused an inadvertent production. The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has not yet addressed how clawback 
agreements and Rule 502(b) interlace—if at all—in a case like this. Without 
any such guidance, this Court looks outside the Circuit and reviews three 
approaches taken by courts across the country: (1) if a clawback is in place, 
it always trumps Rule 502(b); (2) a clawback agreement trumps Rule 502(b) 
unless the document production itself was completely reckless; and (3) a 
clawback agreement trumps Rule 502(b) only if the agreement provides 
concrete directives regarding each prong of Rule 502(b).797 
The first approach cleaves to Judge Grimm’s observations,798 and follows the 
actual rule as enacted.799 An agreement or order providing for plenary indulgence of 
 
795 Id. at ¶ 78. 
796 East Coast Sheet Metal Fabricating Corp. v. Autodesk, Inc., No. 12–cv–517, 2014 WL 
4627262, at *2 (D.N.H. Sept. 16, 2014) (lineation and citations omitted). 
797 Irth Sols., LLC v. Windstream Commc’ns LLC, No. 2:16-cv-219, 2017 WL 3276021, at 
*7–8 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 2, 2017). 
798 See Grimm, Bergstrom & Kraueter, supra note 14, ¶¶ 68–70 (discussing Rajala as an 
exemplar of proper interpretation). 
799 E.g., Crissen v. Gupta, No. 12–CV–355, 2014 WL 1431653, at *4–5 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 14, 
2014); BNP Paribas Mortg. Corp. v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 09 CIV. 9783, 2013 WL 2322678, 
at *9 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013); Rajala v. McGuire Woods, LLP, No. CIV.A. 08-2638, 2013 
WL 50200, at *5 (D. Kan. Jan. 3, 2013); Tadayon v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., No. CIV. 10-1326, 
2012 WL 2048257, at *1 (D.D.C. June 6, 2012); United States v. Sensient Colors, Inc., No. 
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all inadvertent waivers, without further requirements, “substitutes for any discovery 
or evidentiary rules which might otherwise apply,”800 and “defeat[s] the default 
operation of Rule 502(b).”801 It thus properly avoids effectively reading FRE 502(d) 
and (e) out of existence,802 “on the theory that the time saved by not doing what the 
rule contemplates, at least in paragraph (b)(2), is lost if a careful review is still 
required.”803 After all, if a clawback order did not relax or enhance the requirements 
imposed to avoid waiver by default under FRE 502(b), it would serve only to restate 
the obvious.804 The entire raison d’être of these provisions is to allow courts and 
litigants to depart from the strictures imposed by Congress in favor of procedures 
tailored to the particular controversy at hand.805 Based on fundaments of statutory 
construction and legislative purpose, Judge Grimm is not the only commentator to find 
this the best—if not the only defensible—methodology.806 
The second approach likely reflects the distaste in some courts of condoning 
sloppy legal work,807 denying protections to parties who are “completely reckless” in 
their protection of the privilege.808 To meet such a standard, “the producing party must 
have shown no regard for preserving the confidentiality of the privileged 
 
CIV. 07-1275, 2009 WL 2905474, at *2 n.6 (D.N.J. Sept. 9, 2009). See also Murphy, supra 
note 14, at 218–19 (predicting that rules of statutory construction will lead to consensus around 
this approach). 
800 Northrop Grumman Sys. Corp. v. United States, 120 Fed. Cl. 436, 437 (Fed. Cl. 2015). 
801 Rajala, 2013 WL 50200, at *5. 
802 See Grimm, Bergstrom & Kraueter, supra note 14, ¶ 79. 
803 Northrop Grumman, 120 Fed. Cl. at 437. 
804 Id.; Grimm, Bergstrom & Kraueter, supra note 14, ¶¶ 77, 79. 
805 BNP Paribas Mortg. Corp. v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 09 CIV. 9783, 2013 WL 2322678, 
at *9 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013) (“[T]he parties intended, as that Rule permits, to displace the 
waiver text of that Rule with the more liberal clawback provisions of the Protective Order.”); 
see FED. R. EVID. 502(d)-(e) advisory committee’s note to 2008 amendment; Grimm, Bergstrom 
& Kraueter, supra note 14, ¶¶ 77, 79. 
806 See, e.g., Close, supra note 14, at 23-24; Murphy, supra note 14, at 218–19; id. at 230 
(calling a contrary case “an aberration”). 
807 Irth Sols., LLC v. Windstream Commc’ns LLC, No. 2:16-cv-219, 2017 WL 3276021, at 
*10–11 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 2, 2017); cf. Dyson v. Amway Corp., No. G88-CV-60, 1990 WL 
290683, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 15, 1990) (quoted supra note 323). 
808 E.g., Royal Park Invs. SA/NV v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., No. 14-CV-04394, 2016 
WL 2977175, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2016); United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 
12–CV–7527, 2015 WL 5051679, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2015); U.S. Commodity Futures 
Trading Comm’n v. Parnon Energy Inc., No. 11 CV 3543, 2014 WL 2116147, at *4–5 
(S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2014); Dover v. British Airways, PLC (UK), No. CV 2012–5567, 2014 WL 
4065084, at *3–4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2014); HSH Nordbank AG N.Y. Branch v. Swerdlow, 
259 F.R.D. 64, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
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documents.”809 The primary problem is this standard is imported from pre-FRE-502 
case law concerning such agreements,810 whereas FRE 502 conspicuously omits any 
mention of recklessness amongst its choices.811 Courts following the first approach 
have thus rejoined that, given “no indication that the use of the word ‘inadvertent,’ 
which represents only the first of three requirements under Rule 502(b), transforms 
the clawback provision to one identical to the Rule 502(b) standard,” the “addition of 
another definition term, ‘recklessness’ in the view of this Court adds nothing to the 
determination of waiver.”812 Beset by such criticism, this approach appears largely 
limited to the Second Circuit,813 and even some courts there have pushed the standard 
closer to the textually-based first approach.814 
The third approach is the most perplexing, but enjoys popularity in courts of the 
Fourth Circuit (and some elsewhere).815 It acknowledges that the “requirements of 
Rule 502(b) may be superseded by an agreement between the parties, or by a clawback 
order,” but only if the pact specifies “concrete directives regarding each prong of Rule 
502(b)—i.e., (1) what constitutes inadvertence; (2) what precautionary measures are 
required; and (3) what the privilege holder’s post-production responsibilities are to 
escape waiver. In areas where the order or agreement lacks specifics, Rule 502(b) will 
control.”816 In cases where an order mirrors the language of FRE 502(b), applying 
 
809 HSH Nordbank, 259 F.R.D. at 75 (quoting Prescient Partners, L.P. v. Fieldcrest Cannon, 
Inc., No. 96 Civ. 7590, 1997 WL 736726, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 1997)). 
810 See id. (citing U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Braspetro Oil Servs. Co., No. 97 Civ. 6124, 2000 
WL 744369, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2000) and Prescient Partners, 1997 WL 736726, at *4. 
811 See supra notes 554–560 and accompanying text. 
812 BNP Paribas Mortg. Corp. v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 09 Civ. 9783, 2013 WL 2322678, 
at *9 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013). 
813 See United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 12–CV–7527, 2015 WL 5051679, at 
*2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2015) (noting the analysis undertaken is that used by courts within the 
Second Circuit). 
814 E.g., Royal Park Invests. SA/NV v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., No. 14-CV-04394, 
2016 WL 2977175, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2016) (assessing and failing to find recklessness 
but noting that “the advisory committee note to Rule 502(d) makes clear” that “the court order 
may provide for return of documents without waiver irrespective of the care taken by the 
disclosing party.”). 
815 See, e.g., Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., No. 3:13–cv–06529, 2015 WL 1650428, at *6 
(S.D.W.V. Apr. 14, 2015); Maxtena, Inc. v. Marks, 289 F.R.D. 427, 444 n.16 (D. Md. 2012); 
U.S. Home Corp. v. Settlers Crossing, LLC, No. 08–1863, 2012 WL 3025111, at *5 (D. Md. 
July 23, 2012); Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. Felman Prod., Inc., 271 F.R.D. 125, 133 (S.D. W. Va. 
2010) (analyzing compliance with clawback order by using FRE 502(b)); Luna Gaming-San 
Diego, LLC v. Dorsey & Whitney, LLP, No. 06cv2804, 2010 WL 275083, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 
13, 2010); United States v. Sensient Colors, Inc., No. 07–1275, 2009 WL 2905474  (D.N.J. 
Sept. 9, 2009). See also Northrop Grumman Sys. Corp. v. United States, 120 Fed. Cl. 436, 437 
(2015) (assuming the third approach applies since it did not control under the facts at hand to 
“save[] our having to resolve a dispute in the case law”).  
816 Johnson, 2015 WL 1650428, at *6. 
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relevant precedent as to that language makes sense.817 But this approach is frankly 
unintelligible as applied to orders entered under FRE 502(d) providing 
unconditionally that no waiver will result from inadvertent disclosures,818 for in such 
cases the court would have knowingly issued an order unenforceable on its face, 
accomplishing nothing but misleading litigants into thinking the order modified the 
FRE 502(b) standard.819 A court ordering a “general non-waiver provision for 
privileged or protected materials that are inadvertently disclosed,” as in U.S. Home 
Corp. v. Settlers Crossing, LLC,820 must mean something other than the default.821 If 
the parties or court wish for precautionary or remedial tests, they may include them, 
but such requirements ought not be conjured from the air, as did U.S. Home.822 
Bafflingly, the court actually quoted Judge Grimm’s article as supporting its 
approach.823  
 
817 E.g., id. at *6–9. 
818 See, e.g., Maxtena, 289 F.R.D. at 444 n.16 (“Importantly, the Confidentiality Order does 
not define ‘inadvertence’ and is silent as to either the parties’ precautionary or post-production 
responsibilities to avoid waiver. Hence, all three prongs of Rule 502(b) govern this dispute.”); 
U.S. Home, 2012 WL 3025111, at *6 (“Importantly, the Confidentiality Order is silent as to 
either the parties' precautionary or post-production responsibilities to avoid waiver. Thus, when 
Judge Connelly interpreted the Confidentiality Order as directing that disputes over privilege or 
protection claims should be resolved pursuant to Rule 502(b) (see ECF No. 244 ¶ 21), a finding 
that was not vacated by the Reconsideration Order, it was not clearly erroneous or contrary to 
law for him to do so. All three prongs of Rule 502(b) govern this dispute.”). 
819 See East Coast Sheet Metal Fabricating Corp. v. Autodesk, Inc., No. 12–cv–517, 2014 
WL 4627262, at *2 (D.N.H. Sept. 16, 2014) (quoted supra note 796); Correll, supra note 6, at 
1068–71; Grimm, Bergstrom & Kraueter, supra note 14, ¶ 93. 
820 U.S. Home, 2012 WL 3025111, at *6. 
821 See U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Com’n v. Parnon Energy Inc., No. 11–CV–3543, 
2014 WL 2116147, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2014) (“‘Inadvertent disclosure provisions in 
stipulated protective orders are generally construed to provide heightened protection to 
producing parties,’ as protective orders would serve little purpose if “the provisions applied 
only to documents deemed inadvertently produced under governing caselaw.”); see also 
Barkett, supra note 14, at 1614–17 (discussing U.S. Home); Grimm, Bergstrom & Kraueter, 
supra note 14, ¶¶ 84–85. 
822 U.S. Home, 2012 WL 3025111, at *6; accord Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. Felman Prod., Inc., 
271 F.R.D. 125, 133 (S.D. W. Va. 2010) (analyzing compliance with clawback order by using 
FRE 502(b)); Luna Gaming-San Diego, LLC v. Dorsey & Whitney, LLP, No. 06cv2804, 2010 
WL 275083, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2010); United States v. Sensient Colors, Inc., No. 07–
1275, 2009 WL 2905474, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 9, 2009); see also Correll, supra note 6, at 1068-
71 (criticizing uncertainty of 502(d) enforcement); Grimm, Bergstrom & Kraueter, supra note 
14, ¶¶ 80-92 (analyzing and criticizing Luna and Mt. Hawley). 
823 U.S. Home, 2012 WL 3025111, at *6 n.15 (“In other words, the Confidentiality Order’s 
inclusion of a claw-back provision only for inadvertently produced documents necessarily 
contemplated that some degree of precautionary measures be taken by the parties to avoid 
waiver.”) (quoting Grimm, Bergstrom & Kraueter, supra note 14). Judge Grimm states just the 
opposite: “under Rule 502(d) orders and 502(e) agreements that provide otherwise, the parties 
need not take reasonable precautions to avoid disclosure of privileged or protected information, 
because the reasonableness requirements of Rule 502(b)(2) and (3) do not apply to disclosures 
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As for the relative merits of these approaches, the Irth court weighed them at 
length.824 Looking to Judge Grimm’s article, the court found it an “an abdication of 
the Court’s role to interpret the parties’ agreement” to do so in a fashion that would 
excuse any disclosure whatsoever.825 It thus rejected the first approach, finding it 
would encourage sloppy or cursory draftsmanship, compromising the benefits to the 
parties of a clear and predictable regime.826 If parties truly wish to eliminate the need 
for any degree of care, review, or remediation, they must do so explicitly—and the 
parties to the agreement in question had not.827 As applying the second and third 
choice yielded the same result—waiver—there was no need to decide between 
them.828 In passing, however, the court expressed sympathy for the third approach, 
for it ensured that parties could not rely on generic language without attending to the 
details a court would actually need to apply it.829  
Ultimately, the Irth court was unwilling to permit parties to flout the sanctity of 
privilege by the expedient of reciprocal absolution, exhibiting some intimations of an 
unenumerated fourth approach.830 Even under FRE 502(d) and (e), courts should 
“grant no greater protection to those who assert the privilege than their own 
precautions warrant.”831 This philosophy would decline to enforce a clawback 
agreement under FRE 502(d) or (e) under a more amorphous sense of the overarching 
purpose of privilege, perhaps implicitly contemplating some version of the fifth 
 
made pursuant to a Rule 502(d) order or Rule 502(e) agreement.” Grimm, Bergstrom & 
Kraueter, supra note 14, ¶ 102. 
824 Irth Sols., LLC v. Windstream Commc’ns LLC, No. 2:16-cv-219, 2017 WL 3276021, at 
*9–13 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 2, 2017). 
825 Id.  
826 Id. 
827 Id. at *12–13; see also Grimm, Bergstrom & Kraueter, supra note 14, ¶¶ 100–05. 
828 Irth, 2017 WL 3276021, at *13–15. 
829 Id. at *14 (“Instead, the Court views the third approach as appreciating the power of 
clawback agreements but providing an analytical mechanism for the court to revert back to Rule 
502(b)’s requirements if an agreement is so perfunctory that its intentions are not clear. In other 
words, the third approach gives guidance to courts in reviewing cursory clawback agreements—
like the one at issue in this case.”). 
830 See id. at *12 (rejecting the first approach because to “find otherwise would undermine 
the lawyer’s responsibility to protect the sanctity of the attorney-client privilege”); id. at *14 
(“[A]s the ‘guardian’ of the attorney-client privilege, it is a lawyer’s responsibility to minimize 
the cracks through which privileged material might slip. The Court believes the second approach 
adequately recognizes an attorney’s responsibility to guard that privilege, and holds an attorney 
accountable when normal cracks become chasms—as was the case here.”); see also infra note 
832. 
831 Irth, 2017 WL 3276021, at *12 (quoting United States ex rel. Fry v. Health All. of Greater 
Cincinnati, No. 1:03-CV-167, 2009 WL 2004350, at *2 (S.D. Ohio July 7, 2009)). 
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Hydraflow factor.832 Irth is not alone in seeking a fourth way: notwithstanding its own 
order that inadvertent production in the instant litigation “is not a waiver,” a District 
of Massachusetts court disregarded its words and found work product had been waived 
because it had been “used in a manner contrary to the doctrine’s purpose”—namely, 
inadvertently producing but then failing to claw back or move to seal the documents 
at issue.833 Yet such a nebulous test—or indeed anything not anchored to the order or 
agreement itself—would seem to seriously undermine the certainty interests embodied 
in FRE 502(d)-(e) and affirmed by Irth.834 
All of the above concerned inadvertent disclosures; what of the effect on 
intentional disclosures? A handful of courts have found that clawback agreements or 
orders “govern only waivers by inadvertent disclosure. They are intended to override 
the common law as to inadvertent disclosure, not displace the entire common law 
concerning privilege.”835 That, however, is not what the rule says:836 by its terms, it 
permits agreements and orders determining the effect of any disclosure, not a 
subset.837 The text is consistent with the Advisory Committee’s guidance, which 
contemplated the rule would permit for “quick peek” agreements whereunder 
documents are intentionally provided to the opponent without screening on condition 
that any privileged materials are not waived.838 Reluctance to permit for the clawback 
 
832 See id. at *11–12 (considering first and foremost “the rationale and purpose of the 
attorney-client privilege” and an “attorney’s responsibility to protect the sanctity of that 
privilege”). 
833 Thomas & Betts Corp. v. New Albertson’s, Inc., No. 10-11947, 2014 WL 11462825, at 
*4–5 (D. Mass. July 21, 2014). Perhaps Thomas & Betts gets it right after all, however, as the 
discloser had actually used the document in its case, which probably represents a new and 
intentional waiver of privilege notwithstanding its earlier inadvertence—if it was inadvertence 
at all. See infra Section VI-C. 
834 Irth, 2017 WL 3276021, at *11–12; see Grimm, Bergstrom & Kraueter, supra note 14, ¶ 
99; Murphy, supra note 14, at 218–19. 
835 Hologram USA, Inc. v. Pulse Evol. Corp., No. 2:14–v–00772, 2016 WL 3654285, at *2 
(D. Nev. July 5, 2016) (citing Great-W. Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Am. Econ. Ins. Co., 2013 
WL 5332410, *10 (D. Nev. Sept. 23, 2013)); accord Hostetler v. Dillard, No. 3:13–cv–351–
DCB–MTP, 2014 WL 6871262, at *4 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 3, 2014); see also Certain Underwriters 
at Lloyd’s, London v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 218 F. Supp. 3d 197, 201 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. 
2016) (“Some courts have expressly concluded that non-waiver provisions entered under Rules 
502(d) and (e) apply only to inadvertent disclosures.”); Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. United 
States, 107 Fed. Cl. 725, 731–32 (Fed. Cl. 2012). 
836 See Whitaker Chalk Swindle & Sawyer, LLP v. Dart Oil & Gas Corp., 2009 WL 464989, 
at *4 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2009); cf. In re Cellular Telephone P’Ship Litig., No. 6885–VCL, 
2017 WL 3769202, at *1 n.4 (Del. Ch. Aug. 29, 2017) (citing same); Grimm, Bergstrom & 
Kraueter, supra note 14, ¶ 71 (“The defendant [in Whitaker] incorrectly argued that the court 
only could issue such an order with regard to inadvertent disclosures.”); contra Potomac, 107 
Fed. Cl. at 731–32 (attempting to distinguish Whitaker). 
837 FED. R. EVID. 502(d)–(e). 
838 Id. advisory committee’s note to 2008 amendment; see Irth Sols., LLC v. Windstream 
Commc’ns LLC, No. 2:16-cv-219, 2017 WL 3276021, at *12 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 2, 2017); see 
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of intentionally produced documents appears to stem from concerns it will encourage 
counsel to engage in sharp practice and tactical deployment of the privilege,839 and 
courts have declined to issue such orders (as is their prerogative) under FRE 502(d).840 
There seems no basis to deny parties the right to agree to such tactics via FRE 502(e), 
however: such agreement can only bind the parties, and thus any disclosures will risk 
subject matter waiver under FRE 502(a) in any other context.841   
Other courts have similarly rejected limiting agreements to inadvertent 
disclosures.842 On a motion for reconsideration, the plaintiff Tri-State argued that “it 
is well-settled that ‘claw-back provisions . . . govern only waivers by inadvertent 
disclosure.’”843 The court was not impressed, as the “the authority Tri-State cites for 
this ‘well-settled’ proposition consists of three unpublished district court opinions 
from other districts, one of them not even in this circuit. This Court is not bound by 
those authorities.”844 The court accordingly confirmed that the clawback agreement 
in place prevented waiver even after the privilege’s owner failed to object to the 
inadvertently produced document being offered as an exhibit,845 a classic 
circumstance that would ordinarily cause waiver.846 Notwithstanding that particular 
court’s clemency, it seems many courts would find conduct other than an act of 
“disclosure” under FRE 502(d) and (e) may yet waive privilege,847 most notably 
 
also Close, supra note 14, at 23; Correll, supra note 6, at 1064–65 (noting nothing about a 
quick-peek disclosure can be called “inadvertent”). 
839 See Correll, supra note 6, at 1067 (“This case presents an extreme example: parties were 
permitted to use Rule 502(d) to agree, some might even say collude, to engage in private 
discovery proceedings shielded from public view.”). 
840 See, e.g., Smith v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., No. 4:16-cv-00296, 2017 WL 3484158, at *4 
(D. Idaho Aug. 14, 2017); Potomac , 107 Fed. Cl. at 730. 
841 FED. R. EVID. 502(e); see Meyers, supra note 9, at 1461. 
842 See Whitaker Chalk Swindle & Sawyer, LLP v. Dart Oil & Gas Corp., 2009 WL 464989, 
at *4 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2009); see, e.g. Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass’n Inc. v. 
Mitsubishi Int’l Corp., No. CV-14-08115, 2016 WL 7373360, at *1 (D. Ariz. Dec. 20, 2016); 
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 218 F. Supp. 3d 197, 
201 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. 2016); see Close, supra note 14, at 25 (finding that “parties can choose to 
waive any requirement for inadvertence, and permit claw-back of even intentionally produced 
documents under most circumstances”). 
843 Tri-State, 2016 WL 7373360, at *1 (alterations adopted). 
844 Id. 
845 Id. at *4. 
846 See cases cited supra note 699. 
847 See FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note to 2008 amendment (“The rule governs 
only certain waivers by disclosure. Other common-law waiver doctrines may result in a finding 
of waiver even where there is no disclosure of privileged information or work product.”). 
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putting a matter at issue, or failing to object to a document’s use at deposition or 
trial.848 What that means is explored in the final sections. 
The World of Waiver That Could Be 
V.THE LOST BOYS OF FRE 502: WHERE THE RULE FEARS TO TREAD 
It is unsurprising FRE 502 did not address such conduct implicating waiver,849 for 
it was intended to address ballooning costs in conducting reviews when disclosing 
documents,850 and  not to rewrite the entirety of privilege precedent,851 an undertaking 
that had been decisively rejected in the 1970’s.852 It is more notable, however, that 
the rule left unaltered two expansive contexts where disclosure regularly occurs, by 
the limitation of FRE 502(a) and (b) to disclosures “in a federal proceeding”: so-called 
extrajudicial disclosures made outside such a proceeding,853 and even judicially 
overseen disclosures made in state proceedings.854 How courts have responded in 
these free-for-all zones sheds valuable light on the influence of FRE 502 beyond its 
terms alone. 
A. The Von Bulow Enigma: The Peculiar Posture of Extrajudicial 
Disclosures 
The Second Circuit in Von Bulow proposed that extrajudicial disclosures usually 
enjoyed a different status than those in litigation.855 And FRE 502 (taken together 
with FRCP 26(b)(5)(B)), whether fully wittingly or not, wrote such a distinction into 
 
848 Id.; Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 218 F. Supp. 
3d 197, 201 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (“By their terms, Rules 502(d) and (e) apply only to waiver in 
connection with disclosures, and say nothing of waiver by other means. Accordingly, while an 
appropriately worded protective order may prevent waiver due to a producing party’s disclosure 
of privileged information, that party’s subsequent failure to timely and specifically object to the 
use of that information—during a deposition, for example—can waive any applicable 
privilege.”); see, e.g., Hologram USA, Inc. v. Pulse Evol. Corp., No. 2:14–v–00772, 2016 WL 
3654285, at *2 (D. Nev. July 5, 2016); Luna Gaming-San Diego, LLC v. Dorsey & Whitney, 
LLP, No. 06cv2804, 2010 WL 275083, at *4–5 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2010). 
849 Lloyd’s, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 201; see McLoughlin, Bloomfield, Miller & Mercer, supra 
note 14, at 726. 
850 See generally supra Part III. 
851 See FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note to 2008 amendment; Hologram USA, 
2016 WL 3654285, at *2; McLoughlin, Bloomfield, Miller & Mercer, supra note 14, at 726. 
852 See supra notes 388–396 and accompanying text. 
853 See infra Section V-A. 
854 See infra Section V-B. 
855 In re Von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94, 101 (2d Cir. 1987).  
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federal law—but in a potentially contrary manner.856 Von Bulow, it may be recalled, 
found that disclosures outside of litigation generally do not implicate the sort of 
tactical, misleading, or selective decision-making that would give rise to subject-
matter waiver, at least so long as they are not resuscitated in the course of the 
lawsuit.857 Yet, because FRE 502’s revisions to the law of waiver are textually limited 
to disclosures made in a federal proceeding, it is the protections of FRE 502(a) and 
(b) that may not apply to such extrajudicial disclosures, potentially leaving them more 
exposed to waiver, both subject matter and simpliciter, than the same divulgence 
during discovery.858 
Predictably, this peculiarity has puzzled courts. The Federal Circuit Court of 
Appeals took up the applicability of FRE 502(a) in Wi-LAN, Inc. v. Kilpatrick 
Townsend & Stockton LLP,859 where a crucial legal opinion by Townsend had been 
provided to its competitor LG in an effort to persuade it to tender royalties long before 
the instant litigation commenced.860 There was no debate that privilege had thus been 
waived; the vital question was the scope of waiver, which LG contended “should be 
broad, exposing to discovery a wide swath of attorney-client communications, both 
pre- and post-dating the Townsend letter.”861 On appeal, Townsend abandoned its 
position that FRE 502(a) dictated the answer, recognizing the disclosure occurred 
outside a federal proceeding, and instead arguing the district court had not properly 
balanced issues of fairness under the common law, which should always apply 
extrajudicially.862 LG, staking out the opposite position, contended that “an 
extrajudicial waiver of the attorney-client privilege must always extend beyond the 
precise matter disclosed, regardless of the circumstances in which the waiver occurs 
and even when the waiver inures in no benefit whatsoever to the party waiving the 
privilege.”863 
Recognizing it had no occasion to evaluate FRE 502(a) per se, the court of appeals 
nonetheless felt the “rule illuminates the policy question presented by this appeal.”864 
To that the court added the analysis of Von Bulow, which it observed had been cited 
favorably and with regularity in the Ninth Circuit, whose law of privilege 
 
856 See McLoughlin, Bloomfield, Miller & Mercer, supra note 14, at 736–38; Schaefer, supra 
note 14, at 228. But see FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note to 2008 amendment 
(indicating awareness that the rule was targeted solely at federal proceeding disclosures). 
857 Von Bulow, 828 F.2d at 103 (quoted supra note 149); accord XYZ Corp. v. United States 
(In re Keeper of the Records), 348 F.3d 16, 24 (1st Cir. 2003); see McLoughlin, Bloomfield, 
Miller & Mercer, supra note 14, at 730–32 (discussing extrajudicial discloses and Von Bulow). 
858 See McLoughlin, Bloomfield, Miller & Mercer, supra note 14, at 736–38; Schaefer, supra 
note 14, at 228–30. 
859 Wi-LAN, Inc. v. Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP, 684 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
860 Id. at 1366–67. 
861 Id. at 1368–69. 
862 Id. at 1369. 
863 Id. 
864 Id. 
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controlled.865 After reviewing such cases at length, the court of appeals could 
conclude only that “between the two directions put forward by the parties—one 
requiring fairness balancing for extrajudicial disclosures, the other barring it—we 
conclude that the Ninth Circuit’s cases support the former far better than the latter.”866 
Importing the fairness inquiry from FRE 502(a) also avoided the purportedly poor 
public policy of differentially applying principles of overarching fairness to 
disclosures made before and during litigation, a distinction for which LG offered no 
intelligible rationale.867 Nor is any apparent, as opting against assessment of fairness 
would almost by definition be unfair.868 Declining to apply the required fairness 
assessment in the first instance, the court of appeals vacated and remanded.869 Wi-
LAN’s disposition has proven popular: in 2014, a court observed that “federal courts 
have held that, in addition to these generally accepted principles, ‘fairness’ must also 
be considered in determining whether the waiver should extend to nondisclosed 
material of the same subject matter, comparable to what Rule 502(a) now explicitly 
provides for waivers during judicial proceedings and to federal agencies.”870 
Wi-LAN only determined whether to export the fairness balancing test to 
extrajudicial disclosures under the common law.871 It left “unresolved whether ‘Rule 
502(a) governs the scope of waiver resulting from . . . prelitigation disclosure” in the 
first place—that is, whether its intentionality test controlled.872 It was left to the Court 
of Federal Claims to answer that question on its own.873 First doing so in 2013, the 
court looked to pre-FRE-502 precedent to conclude that “it appears that subject matter 
waiver may continue to apply to inadvertent disclosures that occur prior to litigation, 
albeit in unusual circumstances”—namely, where the disclosure was later wielded 
 
865 Id. at 1369–72. 
866 Id. at 1373. 
867 Id. (“Nor do the Ninth Circuit’s cases suggest any policy reason why the fairness 
protections available for express disclosures in litigation should be unavailable to those who 
waive privilege pre-litigation. Such a rule, which LG promotes in this appeal, seems to us bad 
policy, and we decline to adopt it on the Ninth Circuit's behalf.”). 
868 Id. 
869 Id. 
870 North Dakota v. United States, 64 F. Supp. 3d 1314, 1345 (D.N.D. 2014); accord Wi-
LAN, 684 F.3d. at 1373; STM Atl. N.V. v. Dong Yin Develop. (Holdings) Ltd., No. 2:18-cv-
01269, 2018 WL 6265089, at *10 (C.D. Cal. June 8, 2018) (agreeing); Kan. City Power & Light 
Co. v. United States, 139 Fed. Cl. 546, 562 (Fed. Cl. 2018). 
871 Wi-LAN, 684 F.3d. at 1369. 
872 Kan. City Power & Light Co. v. United States, 139 Fed. Cl. 546, 562 (Fed. Cl. 2018) 
(quoting Oasis Int’l Waters, Inc. v. United States, 110 Fed. Cl. 87, 109 (Fed. Cl. 2013)) 
(alterations reverted). 
873 See Kan. City Power, 139 Fed. Cl. at 562; Oasis, 110 Fed. Cl. at 109-110. 
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unfairly in litigation to gain an advantage.874 That inadvertent disclosures prior to 
litigation might later become susceptible to subject-matter waiver ordinarily 
foreclosed by FRE 502(a)(1) comported with the purpose of the rule, which was to 
minimize the costs of electronic discovery in litigation by providing a blanket 
immunity from such a severe penalty.875 Even so, such waiver would only be available 
so far as fairness demanded.876 Returning to the question in 2018, the court reaffirmed 
that in extrajudicial contexts “not explicitly contemplated by FRE 502(a), the weight 
of authority suggests that the scope of subject matter waivers are premised on fairness 
considerations akin to those required by the evidentiary rule.”877 
The Seventh Circuit weighed in as well in Appleton Papers, Inc. v EPA,878 arising 
in the context of a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request.879 The district court 
had permitted the EPA to withhold as work product the information underlying certain 
reports that had already been made public, applying FRE 502(a) to deny subject matter 
waiver because fairness did not demand the withheld materials be considered together 
with the reports.880 Looking to common law, the court of appeals found nothing 
untoward with the government promulgating a final report whilst reserving inchoate 
drafts and analyses.881 Appleton’s contention the disclosure was misleading, selective, 
and unfair under FRE 502(a) was unavailing in a FOIA inquiry.882 Appleton “cannot 
 
874 Oasis, 110 Fed. Cl. at 109–10 (discussing Parkway Gallery Furniture, Inc. v. Kittinger/Pa. 
House Grp., Inc., 116 F.R.D. 46, 52 (M.D.N.C. 1987) and Yankee Atomic Elec. Co. v. United 
States, 54 Fed. Cl. 306, 309 (Fed. Cl. 2002)). 
875 Id.; see Sullivan v. Warminster Twp., 274 F.R.D. 147, 154 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (“Courts 
generally hold that disclosures that occur outside the context of a judicial proceeding do not 
implicitly waive the privilege as to all communications on the same subject matter.”); see also 
Technetics Grp. Daytona, Inc. v. N2 Biomedical, LLC, No. 17 CVS 22738, 2018 WL 5892737, 
at *7 (N.C. Super. Nov. 8, 2018) (describing federal law). 
876 Oasis, 110 Fed. Cl. at 110. 
877 Kan. City Power, 139 Fed. Cl. at 562. 
878 Appleton Paper, Inc. v. EPA, 702 F.3d 1018, 1026 (7th Cir. 2012). 
879 Id. at 1020–22. 
880 Id. at 1022 (“The district court next rejected API’s argument that ‘because some of the 
results of the consultant experts’ were released in the consent decrees, work product immunity 
no longer applied to ‘all of the underlying technical data and other materials underlying those 
results.’ The district court cited Federal Rule of Evidence 502(a)(2). Under this rule, subject 
matter waiver occurs only if the undisclosed material ‘ought in fairness be considered together’ 
with the disclosed material. The district court applied the rule and found that the government's 
submissions in the consent decrees were passive and did not result in waiver.”). 
881 Id. at 1025–26 (discussing In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 817 (D.C.Cir. 1982); Duplan 
Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 540 F.2d 1215, 1222 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v. Nobles, 
422 U.S. 225, 238 n. 11 (1974)). 
882 Appleton, 702 F.3d at 1026 (“API argues the district court erred by ‘allowing the 
[g]overnment to use the portions of the consultant's opinions that it believes are helpful, while 
hiding the analysis and the complete opinions from the public view.’ But these sorts of fairness 
concerns are not relevant to a FOIA inquiry.”). 
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make this argument in a FOIA case; it must make it in an actual litigation,” 
admonished the court, because FRE 502(a) only applies in active suits and “whether 
the undisclosed material ought to be considered with the disclosed material requires a 
case-specific analysis of the subject matter and adversaries,” which is a question quite 
“beyond the purview of FOIA requests.”883 Thus all extrajudicial disclosures, 
advertent and inadvertent, may yield subject-matter waiver in any ensuing litigation 
should fairness so demand, functionally applying the FRE 502(a)(3) standard.884 
There remained the reverse question of whether the FRE 502(b) standard might 
too be exported to excuse waiver entirely for inadvertent disclosures outside litigation 
where due care was demonstrated, arising most frequently in the context considered 
by the Seventh Circuit: public records laws such as FOIA.885 As one court noted, 
“because the plain language of Evidence Rule 502(b) governs disclosures made ‘in a 
federal proceeding,’ and the disclosures at issue here were made initially in response 
to public records requests pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code § 149.43, the ‘clawback’ 
provision of Evidence Rule 502(b) arguably does not apply.”886 The court declined to 
decide, however, for the distinction made little difference: if FRE 502 did not apply, 
the court would simply look to the factors in place prior to FRE 502, which embodied 
the very test adopted by the rule itself.887 Finding no evidence the government had 
taken any precautions to screen for privilege, and that their diligence in responding to 
the appearance of privileged documents was questionable, the court found waiver.888 
In doing so, it followed Eden Isle Marina, Inc. v. United States, in which, prior to 
instituting suit against the government, plaintiff’s counsel had providently made 
multiple FOIA requests, yielding fifteen boxes worth of material.889 After a lawsuit 
was duly filed, however, it came to light that these productions had inadvertently 
contained privileged material.890 Finding no guidance on what standard to apply to 
the presuit disclosures, the court adopted “a common-sense approach,” concluding: 
that it should treat the documents disclosed by the Corps prior to suit as if 
they were disclosed while the suit was pending. This conclusion is reinforced 
by the fact that all of the documents disclosed by the Corps to plaintiff prior 
 
883 Id. 
884 See id.; Wi-LAN, Inc. v. Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP, 684 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 
2012); Kan. City Power & Light Co. v. United States, 139 Fed. Cl. 546, 562 (Fed. Cl. 2018). 
885 E.g., Talismanic Props., LLC v. Tipp City, 309 F. Supp. 3d 488, 494 (S.D. Ohio 2017); 
De Los Santos v. City of Roswell, No. 12-375, 2013 WL 12330144, at *6 & n.6 (D.N.M. May 
21, 2013), objs. overruled, 2013 WL 12330083 (D.N.M. June 26, 2013); Eden Isle Marina, Inc. 
v. United States, 89 Fed. Cl. 480, 500–02 n.20 (Fed. Cl. 2009). 
886 Talismanic, 309 F. Supp. 3d at 494. 
887 Id. at 494–95. 
888 Id. 
889 Eden Isle, 89 Fed. Cl. at 489–90 (“Prior to instituting suit against the Corps, plaintiff's 
counsel performed due diligence by making ‘multiple’ Freedom of Information Act (‘FOIA’) 
requests to the Corps.”). 
890 Id. at 500. 
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to plaintiff’s institution of suit relate to the subject matter of the instant suit, 
as well as the fact that the parties involved in the prelitigation disclosure are 
identical to the parties in this suit.891 
Thusly fortified with a rule of law, the court recited the tests of precautions and 
remediation taken under the newly-passed FRE 502(b),892 and found the diligence 
evinced with respect nearly all of the inadvertently produced documents severely 
lacking, calling for waiver.893 Indeed, construing (rather dubiously)894 the 
government’s conduct as “sufficiently careless and reckless to be intentional,” the 
court also considered subject-matter waiver under FRE 502(a)(3), but ultimately 
demurred, finding the disclosures formed no “scheme to bolster its defense,” “lacked 
any strategic value,” and “have not adversely impacted plaintiff’s ability to prosecute 
its case.”895 
Some are unpersuaded by Eden Isle’s “common-sense approach.” The District 
Court of New Mexico in De Los Santos v. City of Roswell confronted privilege in a 
police report that had been disclosed to the plaintiff prior to the suit under a state public 
records statute, the Institutional Public Records Act (IPRA).896 The court thought the 
question simple: it was not disclosed in a federal proceeding, and thus common law 
rather than FRE 502 applied.897 Acknowledging its difference of opinion with Eden 
Isle, the court nonetheless maintained that “[b]ecause Rule 502 was not intended to 
replace the common law of waiver, I see no reason to treat the documents here as 
disclosed during the litigation. Under the common law, the disclosure of documents 
both before and during litigation can operate as waiver.”898 Discussing the three 
 
891 Id. at 500–01. 
892 Id. at 501–02. 
893 Id. at 520 (“Defendant failed to provide the court with sufficient information to evaluate 
its screening procedures for preventing disclosure. Indeed, the multiple disclosures of some of 
the documents suggest that defendant’s screening procedures were inadequate. In addition, 
defendant permitted witnesses to continue to testify at deposition about the privileged 
documents, even after lodging objections to such testimony. And, defendant made inadequate 
efforts to rectify its disclosures upon discovery.”); see e.g., id. at 506–20 (discussing each 
document in depth). 
894 See supra notes 554–566 and accompanying text (discussing how assessment of intent is 
binary). 
895 Eden Isle, 89 Fed. Cl. at 520–21. 
896 De Los Santos v. City of Roswell, No. 12-375, 2013 WL 12330144, at *6–7 (D.N.M. 
May 21, 2013), objs. overruled, 2013 WL 12330083 (D.N.M. June 26, 2013). 
897 De Los Santos, 2013 WL 12330144, at *6–7 (“Because the police report was not disclosed 
in a federal proceeding or to a federal office or agency, Rule 502 does not apply to it. Instead, 
the common law governs.”). 
898 Id. at n.6. Ironically, it turned out that the police report had actually been produced in 
discovery as well, and to that disclosure FRE 502 unquestionably applied. The district court 
nonetheless overruled the objections to the magistrate’s report, finding that De Los Santos had 
done such a deficient job of raising that point over numerous arguments that he had waived the 
argument. See De Los Santos, 2013 WL 12330083, at *3–4 (D.N.M. June 26, 2013). 
125Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2020
762 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [68:637 
 
twentieth-century schools of waiver, the court opted for the middle fork and found no 
waiver under the facts at hand.899 Still, although the De Los Santos court’s chosen test 
was tantamount to FRE 502(b)’s factors, its reasoning raises the possibility a strict or 
lenient court could deny the protections of FRE 502 to public records disclosures 
antecedent to litigation and revert to old habits.900 
In the context of public records requests, it would encourage gamesmanship to 
permit a private litigant to file such a request prior to commencing a case in lieu of 
discovery during the case to gain advantage over a government opponent.901 
Asymmetrically, documents produced at the behest of the federal government fall 
expressly within FRE 502’s protection even outside litigation or another federal 
proceeding.902 Moreover, the burden and costs of complying with FOIA and its like 
are hardly different in kind or scope than any discovery request in litigation,903 the 
central concern animating the adoption of FRE 502.904  And It has long been settled 
law that “FOIA was not intended to supplement or displace the rule of discovery,”905 
yet that is exactly what the De Los Santos approach might incentivize if applied in 
courts quick to find waiver. Given all this, the Eden Isle approach importing the FRE 
502(b) factors seems better and comports with the general trend towards harmonizing 
analyses of fairness under FRE 502 with those for disclosures occurring outside of 
federal proceedings.906 
 
899 De Los Santos, 2013 WL 12330144, at *8. 
900 Cf. id. (“Courts have taken three different approaches to the issue. Some—most notably 
the D.C. Circuit—have held that any disclosure of privileged information, regardless of whether 
it was inadvertent, waives the privilege. Others have held that inadvertent disclosures never 
waive privilege. The majority of courts, however, have applied a fact-specific balancing 
approach.”) (internal citations omitted). 
901 Cf. Eden Isle Marina, Inc. v. United States, 89 Fed. Cl. 480, 500–02 & n.20 (Fed. Cl. 
2009). 
902 FED. R. EVID. 502(a)-(b) (limiting rule to disclosures “made in a federal proceeding or to 
a federal office or agency . . .”) (emphasis added). 
903 See, e.g., Williams & Connolly, 662 F.3d 1240, 1245 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (discussing 
applicability of work product waiver in the context of the burden imposed by the 600,000 FOIA 
requests received in 2010); Meeropol v. Meese, 790 F.2d 942, 945–56 (D.C. Cir. 1986) 
(discussing what was then “perhaps the most extensive FOIA request ever made” ultimately 
leading to review of half a million pages and production of 200,000 over ten years); Vaughn v. 
Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1973); cf. Dep’t of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 
156 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“The result of its now-successful effort in this litigation 
is to impose the cost of obtaining the court orders and opinions upon the Government and thus 
upon taxpayers generally. There is no question that this material is available elsewhere. But it 
is quicker and more convenient, and less ‘frustrat[ing],’ for respondent to have the Department 
do the work and search its files and produce the items.”) (citation omitted). 
904 See, e.g., Oasis Int’l Waters, Inc. v. United States, 110 Fed. Cl. 87, 109–10 (Fed. Cl. 
2013). 
905 John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 153 (1989). 
906 Cf., e.g., Kan. City Power & Light Co. v. United States, 139 Fed. Cl. 546, 562 (Fed. Cl. 
2018) (finding importation of fairness standard comports with common law); North Dakota v. 
126https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol68/iss4/5
2020] FAILING TO KEEP THE CAT IN THE BAG 763 
B. State Responses to Federal Developments 
Notwithstanding the glaring issue posed by FOIA and equivalent laws, the greater 
lacuna in FRE 502’s attempt at regularization of discovery is its lack of application to 
privilege in state proceedings. This presumably derives from Congress’s impotence to 
dictate rules of law regarding privilege to states as sovereigns of their own 
judiciaries.907 The Rule’s drafters strove quite perceptibly to exercise all the power 
Congress had on the subject,908 providing that disclosures qualifying under FRE 502 
in state proceedings would not be treated as waived in subsequent federal venues 
absent a contrary state law or order, and that a federal court order under FRE 502(d) 
would bind a state court.909 In doing so, the rule exempted itself from the universal 
limitation of the Federal Rules of Evidence to federal proceedings, and the ordinary 
deference to state rules of decision that would control elsewhere.910 Indeed, Professor 
Henry S. Noyes of Chapman University, amongst others,911 has argued cogently that 
FRE 502 exceeds Congress’s power in attempting to regulate the definition of 
privilege and waiver thereof under state law, noting that states had historically 
possessed plenary and pervasive authority on the subject that Congress was now 
displacing.912  
Belying any discomfort, quite a number of states and other jurisdictions have 
enacted cognate rules mirroring to a greater or lesser extent FRE 502.913 State courts 
too have eagerly adopted federal common law appurtenances as well, particularly in 
the Hydraflow balancing factors to ascertain waiver following inadvertent 
 
United States, 64 F. Supp. 3d 1314, 1345 (D.N.D. 2014) (finding fairness consideration required 
under common law). 
907 See Noyes, supra note 14, at 700–02; Meyers, supra note 9, at 1464–66; Broun & Capra, 
supra note 9, at 249. 
908 See Broun & Capra, supra note 9, at 263 (“Ultimately, the Advisory Committee 
determined that it would be overreaching to try to control disclosures made at the state level, 
and that it should focus on the consequences of disclosures initially made in federal 
proceedings.”). 
909 FED. R. EVID. 502(c)-(d); see Noyes, supra note 14, at 695–97; Meyers, supra note 9, at 
1463–65; Broun & Capra, supra note 9, at 218–19; id. at 240–46. 
910 FED. R. EVID. 502(f); cf. id. at 101, 1101, 501. 
911 See, e.g., Emery, supra note 14, at 283–84; Meyers, supra note 9, at 1465–67. 
912 See Noyes, supra note 14, at 700–42; see also Emery, supra note 14, at 285 (noting state 
plenary power over attorney regulations). 
913 The Sedona Conference, The Sedona Principles of Protection of Privileged ESI, 17 
SEDONA CONF. J. 99, 199–04 (2016) (“Since Federal Rule 502 was enacted in September 2008, 
a number of states have adopted versions of Federal Rule 502.”); see In re Adoption of V.I. 
Rules of Evid., Prom. No. 2017-002, 2017 WL 1293843, at *8–9 (V.I. Apr. 3, 2017) 
(“SOURCE: FRE Rule 502. This provision has been adopted in the federal courts and many 
other jurisdictions because of the concerns over document production errors in ‘heavy 
discovery’ cases and the possibility of inadvertent disclosure of paper and electronic records.”). 
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disclosure.914 Although state rules often track their federal cognates,915 some states 
have maintained divergences or provided interpretive notes addressing questions that 
have plagued their federal counterparts.916 Massachusetts courts, for example, have 
made clear that a parties’ own agreement overrides the default definition of 
inadvertence and requirements for clawbacks, short-circuiting the lengthy debates of 
Section IV-D.917 The Supreme Court of Illinois, whilst acknowledging ambivalence 
in federal courts on subject-matter waiver in extrajudicial disclosures,918 adopted the 
Von Bulow rule declining to order broad waiver as more persuasive.919 The same 
questions remain open in other states; both state and federal courts have acknowledged 
that Texas’s analogue rules do “not appear to govern the effect of disclosures that do 
not occur in discovery,” leaving subject-matter waiver uncertain.920 So too in 
Delaware chancery, where the court surveyed federal law on FRE 504(d) in finding 
its breadth virtually unlimited and designed to be tailored to “difficult discovery 
problems,” and applied the same reasoning to its own counterpart.921 
To take one example, Robert A. Brown has chronicled how Oklahoma acted 
directly after the passage of FRE 502 to amend its own law in response.922 Its version 
of subparts (a) and (b) was virtually identical,923 albeit reversing their order.924 Brown 
 
914 See, e.g., Tucker v. CompuDyne Corp., 18 N.E.3d 836, 842 & n.1 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014); 
Morris v. Scenera Research, LLC, No. 09 CVS 19678, 2011 WL 3808544, at *10 (N.C. Super. 
Ct. Aug. 26, 2011); see Walton v. Mid-Atlantic Spine Specialists, P.C., 694 S.E.2d 545, 550–
51 & n.3 (Va. 2010); Sitterson v. Evergreen Sch. Dist. No. 114, 196 P.3d 735, 741–42 & n.8 
(Wash. Ct. App. 2008). 
915 See Sedona Conference, supra note 913, at 199–01; e.g., Crespo v. Cooperativa de 
Ahorro, No. ISCI201500211, 2016 WL 5357410, at *5 n.29 (P.R. Trib. Apel. June 30, 2016) 
(“Esta regla proviene de la Regla 502 de Evidencia Federal...”); McAfee v. State, 467 S.W.3d 
622, 643 n.4 (Tex. Ct. App. 2015) (“Effective April 1, 2015, Rule 511 was revised to conform 
with Federal Rule of Evidence 502.”). 
916 See Sedona Conference, supra note 913, at 202–04. 
917 918 See Vigor Works, LLC v. White Skanska, JV, No. 16-02146, 2019 WL 1027891, at 
*2 (Mass. Super. Feb. 12, 2019) (“Consistent with the suggestion in the Reporter’s Notes to the 
2014 amendments the court will use the parties’ own quite lengthy Clawback Agreement to 
measure inadvertence.”). 
918 See Ctr. Partners, Ltd. v. Growth Head GP, LLC, 981 N.E.2d 345, 363 n.5 (Ill. 2012). 
919 See id. at 362–63. 
920 See In re FEDD Wireless LLC, No. 14-18-00892-CV, 2019 WL 190704, at *4 n.5 (Tex. 
Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2019) (quoting Alpert v. Riley, 267 F.R.D. 202, 209 n.2 (S.D. Tex. 2010)). 
921 In re Cellular Tel. P’Ship Litig., No. 6885-VCL, 2017 WL 3769202, at *1–2 (Del. Ch. 
Aug. 29, 2017). 
922 Robert A. Brown, The Amended Attorney-Client Privilege in Oklahoma: A Misstep in the 
Wrong Direction, 63 OKLA. L. REV. 279 (2011). 
923 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2502(E)-(F) (Supp. 2009). 
924 See Brown, supra note 922, at 300–01. 
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predicted that the standards governing subject matter waiver would thus “result in 
application of the same test” as the federal rule.925 Similarly, the mirrored text on 
inadvertent waiver “should mimic the Federal Rule of Evidence 502 approach and 
take the middle ground between never treating inadvertent disclosure as a waiver and 
always treating inadvertent disclosure as a waiver.”926 This was seemingly purposeful 
and felicitous: “the closer the new rule is to the Federal Rule, the more case law for 
persuasive precedent will be at the Oklahoma court’s disposal.”927 On the other hand, 
the Oklahoma statute expressly embraced the selective waiver principle that had been 
rejected in FRE 502, limiting the scope of subject-matter waiver even further than the 
federal rule.928 And it wholly omitted any analogue to FRE(d) and (e) approving of 
agreements and orders modifying the default standard.929 Brown ultimately criticizes 
the legislative choices made,930 but the empowering effect of FRE 502 seems clear in 
providing a national standard replete with ample interpretive law from which states 
can pick and choose the elements they find expedient: a jurisprudential buffet.931 
States courts have generally been mindful of the interplay between state and 
federal privilege law. In Robert R. McCormick Foundation v. Arthur J. Gallagher Risk 
Management Services, Inc.,932 an Illinois appellate court assuaged the plaintiffs’ 
concerns that the state protective order under consideration might be interpreted 
differently in related federal litigation, and any disclosure made pursuant thereto 
waived.933 Such fears were “entirely baseless”: the relevant law of privilege was well-
established and similar in both fora; principles of comity would incline any federal 
court to defer to a state court order; and most importantly, FRE 502(c) expressly 
provided disclosures pursuant to state law would not implicate waiver in a federal 
proceeding.934 Tilting even further towards consistency, a Massachusetts court simply 
adopted FRE 502(a) and (b) wholesale, finding the tests faithfully reflected state law 
and “basic fairness,” echoing a distinctly Mendenhall view of waiver:935 “It bears 
 
925 Id. at 303. 
926 Id. at 306. 
927 Id. 
928 Id. at 304–06. 
929 Id. at 310. 
930 Id. at 310–14. 
931 Id. at 280–81. 
932 Robert R. McCormick Found. v. Arthur J. Gallagher Risk Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 110 N.E.3d 
1081 (Ill. App. 2018). 
933 Id. at 1087. 
934 Id. 
935 Greenleaf Arms Realty Trust I, LLC v. New Bos. Fund, Inc., 2012 WL 5316014, at *4–
5 (Mass. Super. Aug. 8, 2012) (“Massachusetts has departed from ‘traditional view . . . that, 
once the contents of a document had become public regardless of the means by which this came 
about, the document’s confidentiality and privilege had been destroyed,’ favoring instead the 
more ‘[m]odern’ rule that ‘the inadvertent loss, interception, or disclosure of privileged 
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remembering that the attorney-client privilege belongs to the client. That the client’s 
representative has let the cat out of the bag, inadvertently and without authorization, 
should not entitle the adverse party to take the horse, the dog, the hamsters, and the 
goldfish too.”936 
The trend in state courts after FRE 502 has thus been away from Wigmore and 
generally towards the balanced approach endorsed by the rule.937 In late 2018, a North 
Carolina superior court provided a thoughtful summary of the subject-matter waiver 
landscape with reference to the federal rule.938 The plaintiff had argued for the 
“bright-line rule” that intentional disclosure mechanically yields subject matter 
waiver, a proposition that admittedly may “find support in some federal cases,” and 
of course Wigmore, if the selective disclosure is patently misleading.939 “Few courts 
would question this rationale” in the sword-and-shield context, but such a rule “loses 
its force” as applied to inadvertent disclosures or even intentional ones lacking 
prejudice, for then the broader waiver “would cure no harm” and could only be viewed 
as punitive.940 Discerning that the “modern trend decidedly favors a balanced 
approach” after looking to the Federal Circuit in Wi-LAN, the court found the cabining 
of subject matter waiver in FRE 502(a) and the Advisory Committee note 
persuasive.941 As no unfair advantage or prejudice was even intimated, the court held 
against subject matter waiver.942 
The subject of waiver for inadvertent disclosure has received more august 
attention, from the Supreme Court of Virginia,943 which took notice at the outset of 
the newly promulgated FRE 502(b) endorsing the Lois Sportswear and Hartford Fire 
 
communications does not destroy the privilege, so long as reasonable precautions against such 
disclosure are taken.’”) (quoting In re Reorg. of Elec. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. Ltd. (Bermuda), 681 
N.E.2d 838, 841 (Mass. 1997)). 
936 Id. at *4–5. 
937 See Walton v. Mid-Atlantic Spine Specialists, P.C., 694 S.E.2d 545, 550–52 (Va. 2010) 
(“This approach avoids the extremes of an across-the-board rule of waiver when a 
communication has been produced, an approach often attributed to Dean Wigmore, or a blanket 
‘no waiver’ rule which would hold that negligence by counsel or a producing party can never 
constitute waiver for lack of clear and intentional decision to waive protections.”); accord 
Technetics Grp. Daytona, Inc. v. N2 Biomedical, LLC, No. 17 CVS 22738, 2018 WL 5892737, 
at *7 (N.C. Super. Nov. 8, 2018); Greenleaf Arms Realty Trust I, LLC v. New Bos. Fund, Inc., 
2012 WL 5316014, at *4–5 (Mass. Super. Aug. 8, 2012). 
938 Technetics Grp. Daytona, Inc. v. N2 Biomedical, LLC, No. 17 CVS 22738, 2018 WL 
5892737, at *6–8. 
939 Id. at *6. 
940 Id. at *7. 
941 Id. 
942 Id. at *8 (“Here, too, the Court perceives no risk of unfair prejudice. N2 disclosed Schor’s 
communication to Technetics outside of litigation and in the context of the parties' contract 
negotiations. Technetics does not argue that N2 has used the disclosure to gain an unfair 
advantage in this litigation, and the Court is not aware of any such advantage.”). 
943 Walton v. Mid-Atlantic Spine Specialists, P.C., 694 S.E.2d 545, 550–52 (Va. 2010). 
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factors.944 Also recognizing that “inadvertent production of a privileged document is 
a specter that haunts every document intensive case,” the court made clear that both 
knowingly (but mistakenly) and unknowingly producing a documents may qualify as 
inadvertent.945 As for whether waiver ensues, the court embraced the language of FRE 
502(b) nearly word for word, finding “waiver may occur if the disclosing party failed 
to take reasonable measures to ensure and maintain the document’s confidentiality, or 
to take prompt and reasonable steps to rectify the error,” along with the five factor test 
from Lois Sportswear for use in interpreting those tests.946 Finding precautions 
deficient, a delay of eighteen months in remediating, and that the document’s 
exclusion had allowed counsel to “engage in questioning that had significant potential 
to mislead the jury” without fear of impeachment, the high court held the failure to 
find waiver to be reversible error, sending the case back for retrial.947 
VI. WHITHER WAIVER: THE PILGRIM’S PROGRESS TO A MORE PERFECT 
PRIVILEGE  
As the Virginia disposition illustrates, all of these academic-seeming arguments 
about principles of privilege can have very real consequences: the outcome of a jury 
trial was overthrown and the suit sent back for a presumably expensive and time-
consuming redo.948 Yet the case did offer at least one salutary efficiency; thenceforth, 
Virginia courts confronting similar privilege scenarios would enjoy controlling 
guidance from the highest court in the state, ensuring a more predictable regime of 
privilege going forward.949 That, at least, is how the American judicial system is 
supposed to work.950 
 
944 Id. at 550 n.3 (“We note that the recently promulgated Federal Rule of Evidence 502(b) 
adopts general standards concerning whether the party holding the privilege or protection took 
reasonable steps to prevent disclosure, and promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the error 
after inadvertent disclosure. The drafters state that they intend to make available for 
consideration the factors articulated in Lois Sportswear and Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Garvey.”). 
945 Id. at 551–52 (quoting New Bank of New England v. Marine Midland Realty Corp., 138 
F.R.D. 479, 479–80 (E.D. Va. 1991)). 
946 Id. at 552; cf. Fed. R. Evid. 502(a)(2)-(3) (“the holder of the privilege or protection took 
reasonable steps to prevent disclosure” and “the holder promptly took reasonable steps to rectify 
the error”). 
947 Id. at 555. 
948 Id. at 554. 
949 See, e.g., Bergano v. City of Va. Beach, 821 S.E.2d 319, 322 (Va. 2018) (quoting Walton); 
N. Va. Real Estate, Inc. v. Martins, 720 S.E.2d 121, 136 (Va. 2012) (same). 
950 See Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Am. Soc. of Composers, 620 F.2d 930, 934–35 (2d 
Cir. 1980) (“[C]ourts, especially appellate courts, have an entirely legitimate function of 
elucidating principles of law, fairly raised by litigation, even if the resulting pronouncements 
are not absolutely required for the precise decision reached.”); Arizona ex rel. Pennartz v. 
Olcavage, 30 P.3d 649, 652 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001); Steven L. Chanenson, Guidance from Above 
and Beyond, 58 STAN. L. REV. 175, 177 (2005) (“Appellate courts should be key players in the 
consultative and interactive process of sentencing guidance and communication. Appellate 
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A. The Dogs That Didn’t Bark:951 Addressing the Absence of Appellate 
Guidance 
In the federal law of privilege, however, a myriad misunderstandings and 
disagreements arise from a surprising lacuna: that the courts of appeals have virtually 
never taken up the minutiæ of privilege at issue under FRE 502.952 District courts in 
every circuit are thus to be found prefacing analyses with the mantra that their 
respective court of appeals has not yet decided the issue, and thus they can look only 
to the precedent of their peers.953 This inevitably leads to the promulgation of yet 
more precedents (of greater or lesser persuasiveness), which in turn multiplies divides 
as lower courts align with each gradation of school and subschool, uncorralled by a 
singular shepherd.954 As the De Los Santos district court observed pointedly, absent 
 
review ought to be the fulcrum around which guided sentencing systems revolve.”); David G. 
Post & Steven C. Salop, Issues and Outcomes, Guidance, and Indeterminacy: A Reply to 
Professor John Rogers and Others, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1069, 1084 (1996) (“After all, appellate 
courts have expertise in formulating issues, and, we believe, providing guidance and usable 
precedent is their primary responsibility.”); see generally Adam N. Steinman, Reinventing 
Appellate Jurisdiction, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1237 (2007). 
951 “In Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s story, Inspector Gregory posited that a stranger had stolen 
a race horse from Colonel Ross’s barn in the night. But Sherlock Holmes asked how he could 
explain the ‘curious incident’ of the guard dog’s silence. Holmes later revealed that the dog was 
silent because the thief was the horse’s trainer, a person familiar to the dog.” United States v. 
Lopez, 518 F.3d 790, 798 n.2 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing SIR ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, The Silver 
Blaze, in THE MEMOIRS OF SHERLOCK HOLMES 7 (1894)). 
952 E.g., United States v. Broombraugh, No. 14-40005-10, 2017 WL 2734636, at *4 (D. Kan. 
June 26, 2017) (“Federal Rule of Evidence 502, still relatively new, resulted from a series of 
events dating back to 1975. Still, much remains unsettled about the rule. Indeed, the court could 
not locate a single case from our Circuit that has reviewed a district court’s application of this 
rule.”) (citations omitted); see also infra notes 996–1005 and accompanying text (reviewing the 
sparse precedent). 
953 See, e.g., In re Testosterone Replacement Therapy Prod. Litig., 301 F. Supp. 3d 917, 924–
25 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (“The Seventh Circuit has not addressed this issue. Nor have courts in the 
Northern District of Illinois taken a uniform approach.”); STM Atl. N.V. v. Dong Yin Develop. 
(Holdings) Ltd., No. 2:18-cv-01269, 2018 WL 6265089, at *10 (C.D. Cal. June 8, 2018); 
Harleysville Ins. Co. v. Holding Funeral Home, Inc., No. 1:15CV00057, 2017 WL 4368617, at 
*9 (W.D. Va. Oct. 2, 2017); Irth Sols., LLC v. Windstream Commc’ns LLC, No. 2:16-cv-219, 
2017 WL 3276021, at *9 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 2, 2017) (“The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit has not yet addressed how clawback agreements and Rule 502(b) interlace—
if at all—in a case like this. Without any such guidance, this Court looks outside the Circuit and 
reviews three approaches taken by courts across the country.”); Broombraugh, 2017 WL 
2734636, at *4; De Los Santos v. City of Roswell, No. 12-375, 2013 WL 12330083, at *5 
(D.N.M. June 26, 2013); Bd. of Trs., Sheet Metal Workers’ Nat’l Pension Fund v. Palladium 
Equity Partners, LLC, 722 F. Supp. 2d 845, 850 (E.D. Mich. 2010); Grain v. Trinity Health, 
Mercy Healthy Servs., Inc., No. 03-72486, 2009 WL 1868543, at *6 (E.D. Mich. June 26, 2009). 
954 E.g., Testosterone, 301 F. Supp. 3d at 924–25; Irth, 2017 WL 3276021, at *9; De Los 
Santos, 2013 WL 12330083, at *5; see Correll, supra note 6, at 1076 (discussing how lack of 
appellate guidance on FRE 502 is problematic because “if more discretion is afforded to 
individual trial judges, then rulings could vary more significantly from judge to judge and from 
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controlling precedent, there is nothing beyond persuasiveness to guide a judge in 
following a sister court in Massachusetts, Iowa, or elsewhere.955 Such a vicious cycle 
is not the way the law is supposed to develop or arguments are meant to proceed,956 
as one court explained with a tale about the problems attendant to privilege: 
The parties in this case have flung case law from all over the country at 
each other. I am reminded of the anecdote about an appellate court judge 
who, when counsel relied on a single, lonely district court case from another 
Circuit for his entire argument, interrupted the lawyer to say: “Counsel, you 
can find a district court in this country that will say anything.” The point for 
counsel is that it should focus on what guidance the court of appeals for this 
Circuit has provided.957 
What is one to make of the courts of appeals that haven’t barked? The silence can 
be explained in part by the fact that an adverse decision on privilege is not entitled to 
interlocutory appeal.958 Under the collateral order doctrine first enunciated in 1949,959 
to qualify for immediate appeal an order “must ‘conclusively determine the disputed 
question,’ ‘resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the 
action,’ and ‘be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.’”960 This 
is an exacting and narrow exception;961 the Supreme Court has found denial of class 
certification,962 disqualification of counsel,963 and disregard of a forum selection 
 
court to court”); see also Grimm, Bergstrom & Kraueter, supra note 14, ¶ 99 (noting disarray 
in interpretation amongst courts). 
955 De Los Santos, 2013 WL 12330083, at *5 (“[T]here is case law from other circuits that 
rely on this committee note. I see nothing clearly erroneous about the Judge Wormuth’s reliance 
on these legal sources in lieu of cases from the Southern District of Iowa and the District of 
Massachusetts . . . . Since there is no published Tenth Circuit case discussing the elements of 
‘fairness,’ Judge Wormuth was required to consider only that which he found to be the most 
persuasive in order to resolve this matter.”); accord Irth, 2017 WL 3276021, at *9–13 
(reviewing approaches by numerous courts around the country and choosing amongst them). 
956 Cf. sources cited supra note 950. 
957 D’Onofrio v. SFX Sports Grp., Inc., No. 06-687, 2010 WL 3324964, at *4 (D.D.C. Aug. 
24, 2010). 
958 Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 109–10 (2007); see Correll, supra note 
6, at 1075–76; Murphy, supra note 14, at 232. 
959 See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). 
960 Lauro Lines v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 498 (1989) (quoting Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. 
Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 431 (1985) (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 
(1978)). 
961 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981). 
962 See Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468–69. 
963 See Richardson-Merrell, 472 U.S. at 439–41.  
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clause964 all fall short—even if the order would sound the “death knell” of the 
litigation.965 It appears only to have been consistently applied where the order works 
a deprivation of the right “not to be tried,” as under double jeopardy, or absolute 
immunity from suit in a civil context, because the very continuance of proceedings 
works the harm.966 Orders denying privilege never readily fit within that ambit,967 
especially as the Court progressively tightened the screws on the standard.968 Finally, 
in 2009, the Court ruled squarely in Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter that adverse 
privilege rulings cannot be entertained by interlocutory appeal.969 
In doing so, it rejected the rationales of the minority of circuits that had theretofore 
allowed such appeals.970 The Third Circuit had reasoned that an ordinary appeal 
“cannot remedy the breach in confidentiality occasioned by erroneous disclosure of 
protected materials. At best, on appeal after final judgment, an appellate court could 
send the case back for re-trial without use of the protected materials. At that point, 
however, the cat is already out of the bag.”971 The Ninth Circuit agreed that “once 
privileged materials are ordered disclosed, the practical effect of the order is often 
‘irreparable by any subsequent appeal.’ This case is one of those in which ‘[o]nce 
“[t]he cat is already out of the bag,” it may not be possible to get back in.’”972  And 
the D.C. Circuit observed that in the event of reversal and retrial, the privileged 
material “will have been disclosed to third parties, making the issue of privilege 
effectively moot,” quoting its previous precedent holding that compelled divulgence 
“followed by appeal after final judgment is obviously not adequate in [privilege] 
cases—the cat is out of the bag.”973 
 
964 See Lauro, 490 U.S. at 498. 
965 See Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 473–77. 
966 See Lauro, 490 U.S. at 499 (collecting cases). 
967 Cf. Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794, 801–02 (1989) (declining to 
allow appeal denying dismissal based on violation of Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 6(e) forbidding 
disclosure of secret grand jury information). 
968 See Dig. Equip. Corp v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 873–84 (1994) (discussing 
Midland Asphalt at length and emphasizing narrowness of the doctrine). 
969 Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 109–10 (2009). 
970 See id. at 105 n.1 (“Three Circuits have permitted collateral order appeals of attorney-
client privilege rulings. The remaining Circuits to consider the question have found such orders 
nonappealable.”) (citations omitted). 
971 In re Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954, 963–64 (3d Cir. 1997), abrogated by Mohawk, 558 
U.S. at 105–09. 
972 In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 479 F.3d 1078, 1088 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations 
omitted), abrogated by Mohawk, 558 U.S. at 105–09. 
973United States v. Phillip Morris Inc., 314 F.3d 612, 619–20 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting In re 
Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 251 (D.C. Cir. 1998)), abrogated by Mohawk, 558 U.S. at 105–09. 
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Absent interlocutory appeal, no appellate guidance would now be forthcoming 
until after the privilege has been forfeited and the case completed.974 The Supreme 
Court offered a number of responses to this predicament.975 First, the Court found no 
“discernible chill” on attorney-client communications given the remote chance a 
district court will wrongly deny privilege, as compared to the far greater “possibility 
that they will later be required by law to disclose their communications for a variety 
of reasons” not involving judicial error.976 Second, there remained safety valves for 
worthy causes: courts of appeals retained the discretionary authority to authorize an 
interlocutory appeal on novel legal questions, as well as to correct manifest injustices 
via writ of mandamus.977 Third, a party may “defy a disclosure order and incur court-
imposed sanctions,” permitting final judgment to be reached without the privileged 
material, albeit at potentially great cost.978 And the sanction of criminal contempt can 
itself be appealed from directly.979 But given the structural burden of allowing appeal 
as of right from every discovery order implicating privilege, the collateral order 
doctrine must bar it as a matter of course.980 
The Seventh Circuit had its own explanation for the fact that “even orders to 
produce information over strong objections based on privilege are not appealable, 
despite the claim that once the cat is out of the bag the privilege is gone.”981 (Indeed, 
in that circuit not even a fine for civil contempt occasioned by refusing court-ordered 
production is subject to interlocutory appeal,982 although jurisdiction still lies should 
the conscientious objector be jailed for the contempt.)983 
It is too late in the day to waste words explaining why interlocutory 
orders, and discovery orders in particular, are not appealable despite their 
irreversible costs. Because almost all interlocutory appeals from discovery 
 
974 See Correll, supra note 6, at 1075–76. 
975 Mohawk, 558 U.S. at 109–13. 
976 Id. at 110 (“The breadth of the privilege and the narrowness of its exceptions will thus 
tend to exert a much greater influence on the conduct of clients and counsel than the small risk 
that the law will be misapplied.”). 
977 Id. at 110–11. 
978 Id. at 111 (“District courts have a range of sanctions from which to choose, including 
‘directing that the matters embraced in the order or other designated facts be taken as established 
for purposes of the action,’ ‘prohibiting the disobedient party from supporting or opposing 
designated claims or defenses,’ or ‘striking pleadings in whole or in part.’”) (citations omitted). 
979 Id. at 111–12. 
980 Id. at 112–13 (“Were this Court to approve collateral order appeals in the attorney-client 
privilege context, many more litigants would likely choose that route. They would also likely 
seek to extend such a ruling to disclosure orders implicating many other categories of sensitive 
information, raising an array of line-drawing difficulties.”). 
981 Reise v. Bd. of Regents, 957 F.2d 293, 295 (7th Cir. 1992). 
982 Id. (citing Powers v. Chicago Transit Authority, 846 F.2d 1139 (7th Cir. 1988)). 
983 Id. (citing Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941)). 
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orders would end in affirmance (the district court possesses discretion, and 
review is deferential), the costs of delay via appeal, and the costs to the 
judicial system of entertaining these appeals, exceed in the aggregate the 
costs of the few erroneous discovery orders that might be corrected were 
appeals available.984 
The Supreme Court’s fearful foreclosure of innumerable interlocutory appeals is 
perhaps understandable,985 especially given the efflorescence of debate amongst the 
district courts on every aspect of FRE 502.986 But the Seventh Circuit’s sanguine view 
of predictable affirmances presupposes that the law of privilege is already well-settled 
and thus district courts know the standards to which they must adhere.987 That is 
assuredly not the case with FRE 502, for the Mohawk opinion arrived just in time to 
cut off all interlocutory appeals of issues arising under the new rule.988 Even after 
Mohawk, the D.C. Circuit has persevered in the belief that discovery orders of 
privileged information are “effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final 
judgment,” for when “the information is disclosed, the ‘cat is out of the bag’ and 
appellate review is futile”989—though Mohawk now foreclosed more timely 
review.990 rue, courts had taken up review of privilege decisions in mandamus,991 a 
route left intact by the Supreme Court.992 But mandamus is not available as of right, 
demands truly extraordinary circumstances, and thus affords only the most meager of 
chances of prompt appellate attention.993 
 
984 Id. 
985 Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 109–13 (2009). It did, however, run 
athwart a strikingly similar assumption of interlocutory jurisdiction in a case of privilege some 
two decades earlier. See infra note 1067. 
986 See generally supra Section IV. 
987 See Reise v. Bd. of Regents, 957 F.2d 293, 295 (7th Cir. 1992). 
988 FRE 502 entered into effect on September 19, 2008. See supra note 417, whilst Mohawk 
was decided just over a year later, on December 8, 2009. Mohawk, 558 U.S. at 100. Although 
in theory this might have afforded a small window through which an interlocutory appeal might 
slip, no cases did so before the bar was lowered. 
989 Al Odah v. United States, 559 F.3d 539, 544 (D.C. Cir. 2009); see also In re Papandreou, 
139 F.3d 247, 251 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
990 Mohawk, 558 U.S. at 109–10. 
991 See, e.g., Rhone–Poulenc Rorer, Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851, 861 (3d Cir.1994) 
(reviewing order forfeiting privilege in mandamus and collecting cases doing same). 
992 Mohawk, 558 U.S. at 110–11; see, e.g., In re OptumInsight, Inc., No. 2017-11, 2017 WL 
3096300, at *3 (Fed. Cir. July 20, 2017); In re Pac. Pictures Corp., 679 F.3d 1121, 1128–29 
(9th Cir. 2012). 
993 See Mohawk, 558 U.S. at 111 & n.3 (“Mohawk itself petitioned the Eleventh Circuit for 
a writ of mandamus. It has not asked us to review the Court of Appeals’ denial of that relief.”); 
Correll, supra note 6, at 1075–76 (“Given the extraordinary difficulty attendant to securing 
mandamus relief and Rule 502(d)’s ability to ameliorate the worst superficial consequences of 
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The paucity of decisions addressing FRE 502 after final judgment confirms it is 
not serving as an effective avenue of review. It might have been explicable if odd that 
no court of appeals had formally opined on the FRE 502 factors a year or two after its 
promulgation,994 but the fact that none has done so over ten years except the Seventh 
Circuit—and that only briefly995—is telling.996 In 2017, a district court lamented “a 
dearth of authority in the Fourth Circuit, and in federal law generally, as to the 
definition of an ‘inadvertent disclosure’ under the meaning of Rule 502.”997 Of the 
grand total of sixteen appellate decisions in any posture even mentioning the rule over 
the decade from September 2008 to 2018, three noted the applicability of covenants 
on privilege in one sentence,998 one simply confirmed a disclosure was never 
privileged at all,999 one addressed successor corporation authority in privilege,1000 
two found FRE 502 did not apply given the extrajudicial context,1001 and six offered 
no analysis of the rule whatsoever,1002 leaving only three discussing the standards of 
FRE 502(a) or (b) that have animated battalions of lower court opinions.1003 Of these 
last three, two were unreported, making the Seventh Circuit opinion in Carmody the 
 
compelled disclosure, district courts would ap pear to have virtually unreviewable authority to 
compel disclosures as they see fit.”). 
994 See Murphy, supra note 14, at 232 (“Accordingly, as of June 11, 2011, there is no reported 
federal appellate court opinion on FRE 502.”). 
995 Carmody v. Bd. of Trs., 893 F.3d 397, 405–06 & n.2 (7th Cir. 2018). 
996 See supra notes 537–539 and accompanying text. 
997 Harleysville Ins. Co. v. Holding Funeral Home, Inc., No. 1:15CV00057, 2017 WL 
4368617, at *9 (W.D. Va. Oct. 2, 2017). 
998 See In re Grand Jury, 740 F. App’x 243, 248 (4th Cir. 2018); Auto. Sols. Corp. v. Paragon 
Data Sys., Inc., 756 F.3d 504, 518 n.6 (6th Cir. 2014); In re Pac. Pictures Corp., 679 F.3d 1121, 
1129 (9th Cir. 2012). 
999 See Sky Angel U.S., LLC v. Discovery Commc’ns, LLC, 885 F.3d 271, 276 (4th Cir. 
2018). 
1000 See In re OptumInsight, Inc., No. 2017-11, 2017 WL 3096300, at *3 (Fed. Cir. July 20, 
2017). 
1001 See Appleton Papers, Inc. v. EPA, 702 F.3d 1018, 1026 (7th Cir. 2012); Wi-LAN, Inc. 
v. Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP, 684 F.3d 1364, 1368–70 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
1002 See Ground Zero Ctr. For Non-Violent Action v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 860 F.3d 1244, 
1259 (9th Cir. 2017); In re Queen’s Univ. at Kingston, 820 F.3d 1287, 1314 n.12 (Fed. Cir. 
2016) (Reyna, J., dissenting); Greene v. Philadelphia Housing Auth., 484 F. App’x 681, 686 
(3d Cir. 2012); Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 674 F.3d 158, 160 n.1 (3d 
Cir. 2012); Avgoutis v. Shinseki, 639 F.3d 1340, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Hernandez v. Tanninen, 
604 F.3d 1095, 1100 n.1 (9th Cir. 2010). 
1003 See Carmody v. Bd. of Trs., 893 F.3d 397, 405–06 & n.2 (7th Cir. 2018); Bayliss v. N.J. 
State Police, 622 F. App’x 182, 186 (3d Cir. 2015); New Phoenix Sunrise Corp. v. C.I.R., 408 
F. App’x 908, 918–19 (6th Cir. 2010). 
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only precedential opinion in play.1004 A majority of the courts of appeals never so 
much as cited FRE 502 in the ensuing decade, whether in dicta, footnote, dissent, or 
otherwise.1005 
Moreover, of the sixteen cases, a third sounded in mandamus,1006 whilst the other 
two-thirds arose on direct appeal,1007 a peculiar proportion on the presumption that 
claims of privilege were to ordinarily be raised by the latter route.1008 Are litigants 
simply failing to raise the many discrepancies in privilege approach amongst the 
district courts on appeal of final judgments?1009 The result in one of the unreported 
decisions, New Phoenix Sunrise Corp. v. C.I.R., may explain why.1010 There, the 
district court had found disclosure of a tax opinion yielded subject-matter waiver on 
all related material as construed rather amply, admitting a number of such documents 
into evidence.1011 On appeal, New Phoenix argued the waiver had been overly broad 
in compelling release of documents unrelated to the opinion, but the Sixth Circuit 
found it unnecessary to decide, for any overbreadth was “clearly harmless.”1012 The 
ordinary standard is decisive: there is little way for appellants to prove a trial court 
abused its discretion via a contrafactual hypothetical of how a case might have 
eventuated absent a wrongly imposed subject-matter waiver, for with the cat out of 
the bag, there is no way anyone will ever really know.1013 Small wonder few have 
sought to meet such an imponderable burden even in cases of relatively clear error.1014 
 
1004 See cases cited supra note 1003. 
1005 Those would be the First, Second, Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits. See 
cases cited supra notes 998–1003. 
1006 Grand Jury, 740 F. App’x 243; OptumInsight, 2017 WL 3096300; Queen’s Univ., 820 
F.3d 1287; Pac. Pictures, 679 F.3d 1121; Hernandez, 604 F.3d 1095. 
1007 Sky Angel, 885 F.3d 271; Carmody, 893 F.3d 397; Ground Zero, 860 F.3d 1244; Bayliss, 
622 F. App’x 182; Auto. Sols., 756 F.3d 504; Appleton, 702 F.3d 1018; Wi-LAN, 684 F.3d 1364; 
Greene, 484 Fed. App’x 681; Race Tires, 674 F.3d 158; Avgoutis, 639 F.3d 1340; New Phoenix, 
408 F. App’x 908. 
1008 See Reise v. Bd. of Regents, 957 F.2d 293, 295 (7th Cir. 1992). 
1009 Apparently, the answer is yes. See McLoughlin, Bloomfield, Miller & Mercer, supra 
note 14, at 705. 
1010 New Phoenix, 408 F. App’x at 908. 
1011 Id. at 918. 
1012 Id. at 919–20. 
1013 See In re Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954, 963–64 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[T]he party will be 
similarly irremediably disadvantaged by erroneous disclosure. ‘[A]ttorneys cannot unlearn what 
has been disclosed to them in discovery’; they are likely to use such material for evidentiary 
leads, strategy decisions, or the like.”) (quoting Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Turner & 
Newall, PLC, 964 F.2d 159, 165 (2d Cir. 1992)), abrogated by Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. 
Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 105–09 (2007). 
1014 See McLoughlin, Bloomfield, Miller & Mercer, supra note 14, at 705 (“Rulings over 
attorney-client privilege are rarely appealed, and the standards of appellate review are typically 
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Courts of appeals seem to intuitively understand that waiting to resolve privilege 
disputes on appeal until after a case concludes means they may never be resolved.1015 
(According to the Seventh Circuit, of course, there is scarce to resolve.)1016 Even 
before Mohawk,1017 panels in circuits dubious of appeal under the collateral order 
doctrine had been struggling to somehow justify jurisdiction to address privilege 
claims contemporaneously, without first “letting the ‘cat out of the bag’ and 
precluding effective appellate review at a later stage.”1018 Thus in Stolt-Nielsen SA v. 
Celanese AG,1019 the Second Circuit was first able to rationalize jurisdiction over an 
interlocutory appeal to an order directing a non-party attorney to testify on the better-
accepted theory that a non-party “cannot be expected to risk a contempt citation rather 
than comply with the subpoena” simply because a party objects to the testimony.1020 
With that authority established, the court then assumed pendent jurisdiction over the 
ordinary inter partes privilege dispute that would be barred by the collateral order 
doctrine.1021 Such machinations are clever indeed, but few cases will have a 
convenient third-party by which to bootstrap claims so long as Mohawk stands athwart 
review of run-of-the-mill privilege quarrels; indeed, it is not pellucid that the Stolt-
Neilsen maneuver even survives Mohawk.1022 
This state of affairs seems unlikely to abate soon, though one might optimistically 
presume the courts of appeals will eventually confront and decide amongst the many 
competing philosophies, however long that may take.1023 But even that ostensible 
 
deferential. For example, in the Second Circuit, determinations about the scope of waiver are 
reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard.”). 
1015 See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 971–973, 989. 
1016 See Reise v. Bd. of Regents, 957 F.2d 293, 295 (7th Cir. 1992) (quoted supra note 984). 
1017 Cf. cases cited supra note 970. 
1018 In re Katz, 623 F.2d 122, 124 (2d Cir. 1980).  
1019 Stolt-Nielsen SA v. Celanese AG, 430 F.3d 567, 575–76 (2d Cir. 2005). 
1020 Id. at 575 (citing In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 219 F.3d 175, 182 n.3 (2d Cir. 2000)). 
1021 Id. at 575–76 (“Appellate jurisdiction over the order enforcing the Stolt subpoenas is 
less clear under traditional finality principles, for the reasons discussed above. However, 
because we have clear jurisdiction over Stolt's appeal involving the O’Brien subpoena, we may 
exercise pendent jurisdiction over the appeal involving the related Stolt subpoena.”). 
1022 See Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 110–12 (2007) (providing several 
reasons beyond the ability to risk contempt by disobedience why interlocutory appeal is 
inappropriate in the case of privilege disputes); cf. In re Air Crash at Belle Harbor, N.Y., 490 
F.3d 99, 104–08 (2d Cir. 2007) (distinguishing Stolt-Neilsen and finding an attorney to a party 
enjoys no exception to ordinary collateral order doctrine). 
1023 See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 14, at 232 (“As the substantive issues in these cases are 
tried and some of the cases are appealed, we will begin to have an indication about how U.S. 
appellate courts will interpret FRE 502.”); see also McLoughlin, Bloomfield, Miller & Mercer, 
supra note 14, at 705 (“The scope of Rule 502, and the ways in which the rule impacts the 
Classic and Modern Views (and vice versa), may not be addressed by the appellate courts for 
some time.”). 
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inevitability is dubious: FRE 501 was enacted in the 1970s,1024 and Wigmore penned 
his magnum opus establishing much of modern privilege law in 1904.1025 
Nevertheless, district courts still lament regularly in contexts outside FRE 502 that 
their courts of appeals had not yet provided direction on numerous crucial nuances of 
privilege—after the passage of over a century!1026 As surveyed above, most courts of 
appeals did not formally hold which of three great schools should be broadly followed, 
let alone the innumerable subschools and other gradations of privilege.1027 District 
courts bickered amongst themselves in reading the tea leaves of cryptic appellate dicta 
and footnotes in vain attempts to prise out guidance from obscurity.1028 It was 
precisely to such a state of confusion that FRE 502 addressed itself.1029 If the future 
of privilege precedent from the courts of appeals is to look anything like the past, the 
new rule will suffer from the same dearth of clear appellate direction—and the omens 
so far are not auspicious.1030 
 
1024 FED. R. EVID. 501; see Noyes, supra note 14, at 682–83. 
1025 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW (Little, Brown & Co. 
1904); see Edward J. Imwinkelried, Introduction to the Treatise: The New Wigmore in 
Perspective, in THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE (3d ed. 2019). 
1026 See, e.g., Gates Corp. v. CRP Indus., Inc., No. 1:16-cv-01145, 2018 WL 4697326, at *7 
n.20 (D. Colo. Aug. 10, 2018) (“The federal case law in this circuit is more ambiguous on this 
point, implying perhaps that the burden remains always on the privilege holder to prove that 
waiver does not apply.”); Logsdon v. BNSF Ry. Co., No. 8:15 CV 232, 2017 WL 1411500, at 
*2 (D. Neb. Apr. 19, 2017); Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 306 F.R.D. 234, 240 n.28 (N.D. 
Cal. 2015); Baylon v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 12-0052, 2012 WL 12819981, at *4 (D.N.M. 
Dec. 21, 2012); TransWeb, LLC v. 3M Innovative Props. Co., No. 10-cv-4413, 2012 
WL2878076, at *7 (D.N.J. Apr. 12, 2012); Clena Invs., Inc. v. XL Specialty Ins. Co., No. 0:10-
CV-62028, 2011 WL 13217140, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 2, 2011); Terrell v. OTS, Inc., No. 1:09–
CV–626, 2011 WL 864501, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 9, 2011); Traficante v. Homeq Servicing 
Corp., No. 9-746, 2010 WL 3167435, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 10, 2010); City of New York v. 
Coastal Oil N.Y., No. 96 Civ. 8667, 2000 WL 145748, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2000); Chick-
fil-A v. ExxonMobil Corp., 2009 WL 3763032, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 10, 2009) (“There is very 
little primary authority from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals on what constitutes waiver 
of the work product privilege, but the overwhelming majority of persuasive authority from other 
circuits holds that voluntary disclosure of work product information to an adversary waives 
work product protection as to that information”) (quoting Wood v. Archbold Med. Ctr., Inc., 
No. 7:07-CV-109, 2009 WL 3063392, at *2 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 17, 2009)); McCook Metals L.L.C., 
v. Alcoa Inc., 192 F.R.D. 242, 251 (N.D. Ill. 2000); see also Walker v. GEICO Indem. Co., No. 
6:15-cv-1002, 2016 WL 11578803, at *10 (M.D. Fla. July 11, 2016) (“Counsel have not cited 
a case from the Eleventh Circuit stating which view it will follow.”). 
1027 See supra notes 284–295 and accompanying text. 
1028 See, e.g., supra note 292 (detailing differences of opinion on approach to privilege in 
the Tenth Circuit); id. at 293 (same in the Seventh Circuit); id. at 294–295 (same in the First 
Circuit). 
1029 See FED. R. EVID. 502(b) advisory committee’s note to 2008 amendment. 
1030 See Correll, supra note 6, at 1076 (“The lack of interlocutory review occasioned by these 
orders presents two important problems. First, it again undermines the ability of clients to rely 
upon the privilege at the time they decide to share confidential information with their counsel. 
Second, it could destroy the uniformity and predictability Rule 502(d) was supposed to create. 
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B. The Cats That Lack a Sack: Balancing Privilege with the Search for 
Truth 
The absence of appellate review is therefore particularly problematic where 
subject matter waiver is under consideration, for a court may wrongly compel the 
divulgence of strictly confidential material.1031 Such orders advance the search for the 
truth, but only by running roughshod over privilege.1032 Truth, however, can be a wily 
object, as in United States v. Pinho, where the defendant had testified that she had 
never spoken with her counsel regarding a pending subpoena after being directed to 
fabricate invoices that were later submitted to a grand jury.1033 Later, the defendant 
resisted the peculiar notion that she had thereby waived privilege over her nonexistent 
conversation with counsel.1034 Citing a parallel case from the Fourth Circuit, the court 
ordered waiver,1035 for “if Defendant was telling the truth and no conversations 
occurred, she would have nothing to claim privilege over.”1036 On the other hand, if 
the “attorney would testify that he told Defendant about the subpoena or that the 
documents were going to be submitted to the grand jury, those statements would 
directly contradict the factual assertions that Defendant made in her direct examination 
about the contents of her communications with her attorney.”1037 With potential 
perjury in the air, the court found that the attorney could be compelled to testify to the 
truth.1038 
 
After all, if more discretion is afforded to individual trial judges, then rulings could vary more 
significantly from judge to judge and from court to court.”); Murphy, supra note 14, at 232; see 
also McLoughlin, Bloomfield, Miller & Mercer, supra note 14, at 705. It need hardly be added 
that the Supreme Court itself has even more rarely addressed itself to privilege, whether before 
or under FRE 502, though such an intervention providing clear interpretation of FRE 502 would 
be most welcome. 
1031 E.g., cases cited supra notes 970–972. 
1032 See In re Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954, 963–64 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoted supra note 
1013); Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Turner & Newall, PLC, 964 F.2d 159, 165 (2d Cir. 
1992) (“If opposing counsel is allowed access to information arguably protected by privilege 
before an adjudication as to whether privilege applies, a pertinent aspect of confidentiality will 
be lost, even though communications later deemed to be privileged will be inadmissible at trial,” 
and that “attorneys cannot unlearn what has been disclosed to them in discovery.”); see also 
D’Onofrio v. SFX Sports Grp., Inc. 256 F.R.D. 277, 280 (D.D.C. 2009). 
1033 See United States v. Pinho, 2003 WL 2577243, at *1–2 (E.D. Pa. July 2, 2003). 
1034 Id. at *3. 
1035 Hawkins v. Stables, 148 F.3d 379 (4th Cir. 1998). 
1036 Pinho, 2003 WL 2577243, at *4. 
1037 Id.  
1038 Id. (“In addition, we find Defendant’s waiver in this case to be even more compelling 
than the waiver in Hawkins. Defendant affirmatively raised this issue at trial during her own 
direct examination. Repeatedly throughout her testimony, Defendant indicated that her counsel 
did not contact her about the subpoena. It was Defendant who purposefully injected this lack of 
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1. Privilege as an Exception to Truth-Seeking 
By contrast, with inadvertent disclosures the cat is already out of the bag.1039 In 
such cases, FRE 502’s rejection of Sealed Case and Wigmore, and adoption of a 
standard that permits such mistakes to be clawed back, runs more vividly athwart the 
eternal search for truth.1040 Once a document has been disclosed, it cannot be unread 
or unconsidered by opposing counsel;1041 such was the straightforward lesson of 
Wigmore.1042 A clawback, however, is meant precisely to “essentially ‘undo’ a 
document production.”1043 FRE 502 contemplates that clawbacks will be repossessed 
from the receiving party and their usage or entry into evidence foreclosed in the 
judicial proceeding at hand.1044 An order under FRE 502(d) can ensure the inadvertent 
 
communication with counsel into the first trial. It would make little sense to now permit her to 
assert attorney-client privilege with regard to this subject.”). 
1039 See Stinson v. City of New York, No. 10 Civ. 4228, 2014 WL 5090031, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 10, 2014) (“The Second Circuit in Chase was primarily concerned that attorneys could not 
‘unlearn what ha[d] been disclosed to them’ and that in disclosing the documents, before an 
adjudication as to whether privilege applied, ‘a pertinent aspect of confidentiality w[ould] be 
lost, even though communications later deemed to be privileged w[ould] be inadmissible at 
trial.’ Id. Here, the ‘bell has already been rung’ as the Documents have already been produced 
to and seen by the Plaintiffs prior to Defendants’ September 16 Letter seeking to claw back the 
Documents.”) (discussing Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Turner & Newall, PLC, 964 F.2d 
159, 165–66 (2d Cir. 1992)); Emery, supra note 14, at 244. 
1040 See generally Laura Catherine Daniel, The Dubious Origins and Dangers of Clawback 
and Quick-Peek Agreements: An Argument Against Their Codification in the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 663 (2005); cf. Dru Stevenson, Against 
Confidentiality, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 337 (2014) (critiquing broader right to confidentiality 
given burden on truth-seeking and other externalities); Yasmin Naqvi, The Right to the Truth in 
International Law: Fact or Fiction, 88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 245 (2006) (examining in 
international context). 
1041 See Stinson, 2014 WL 5090031, at *4; Chase, 964 F.2d at 165; FDIC v. Singh, 140 
F.R.D. 252, 253 (D. Me. 1992). 
1042 See United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461, 464–65 (E.D. Mich. 1954) 
(quoted supra notes 61–62). 
1043 Rajala v. McGuire Woods, LLP, No. 08-2638-CM-DJW, 2010 WL 2949582, at *3 (D. 
Kan. July 22, 2010); accord Thomas & Betts Corp. v. New Albertson’s, No. 10-11947, 2014 
WL 11462825 (D. Mass. July 21, 2014) (quoting same); Great-West Life & Annuity Co. v. Am. 
Econ. Ins. Co., No. 2:11-cv-02082, 2013 WL 5332410, at *10 (D. Nev. Sept. 23, 2013) (same); 
see also Noyes, supra note 14, at 757–58. 
1044 FED. R. EVID. 502(b); see, e.g., Cormack v. United States, 117 Fed. Cl. 392, 401 (Fed. 
Cl. 2014) (“Because the e-mail in question is protected under the work-product doctrine and 
Systems has not waived that protection, a claw-back order is appropriate. Pursuant to Fed. R. 
Evid. 502 (b) and RCFC 26(b)(5)(B), Mr. Cormack’s counsel must destroy or return the 
sequestered copy of the e-mail. The filing containing Exhibit 3 will be stricken from the record, 
and Mr. Cormack is directed to resubmit that filing without reference to the e-mail.”); Great-
West, 2013 WL 5332410, at *10; Rajala, 2010 WL 2949582, at *3. 
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disclosure does not constitute waiver elsewhere.1045 Protective orders may detail yet 
more byzantine structures if the situation warrants it by, for example, imposing 
something like a “fruit of the poisonous tree” bar,1046 under which no discovery 
predicated on the privileged material may be sought.1047 
Of course, courts exclude evidence from consideration all the time;1048 weighty 
tracts of the Federal Rules of Evidence are devoted to detailing such procedures.1049 
The various categories of inadmissible hearsay, together with ramified exceptions and 
exemptions, have bedeviled many a law student and practitioner alike1050—in such 
cases, the concern is generally that the evidence is not suitably reliable for 
consideration.1051 Other times, inadmissibility is due to impropriety or error in 
obtaining the evidence, as with the exclusionary rule barring documents or testimony 
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.1052 The impetus there is not 
reliability, but rather deterrence of state overreach and refusal to rely on tainted 
evidence.1053 That species of inadmissibility seems closer philosophically to that 
contemplated by inadvertently disclosed privilege,1054 where the client would 
 
1045 FED. R. EVID. 502(d); see, e.g., Great-West, 2013 WL 5332410, at *10; Potomac Elec. 
Power Co. v. United States, 107 Fed. Cl. 725, 731–32 (Fed. Cl. 2012); Rajala, 2010 WL 
2949582, at *4–5. 
1046 The term “fruit of the poisonous tree,” refers to the exclusion of evidence acquired 
because of an earlier constitutional violation, and has enjoyed a long history in Supreme Court 
cases after its coining in 1939. See Nardone v. United States, 303 U.S. 338, 340 (1939); accord, 
e.g., Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 441 (1986); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 
487–88 (1963). 
1047 E.g., Harleysville Ins. Co. v. Holding Funeral Home, Inc., No. 1:15CV00057, 2017 WL 
4368617, at *15–17 (W.D. Va. Oct. 2, 2017). 
1048 See, e.g., Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 153–54 (1945); see also Meyers, supra note 
9, at 1442–43. 
1049 See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, 4 FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 1:2 
(4th ed. suppl. 2018). 
1050 See FED. R. EVID. 801–807. 
1051 See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 1049 § 8:1; MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, 6 
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 801:0 (8th ed. suppl. 2018); see also Meyers, supra note 
9, at 1443. 
1052Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655–58 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 
391–93 (1912). 
1053 See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656–60. 
1054 Compare, e.g., cases cited supra note 1046, with Harleysville Ins. Co. v. Holding 
Funeral Home, Inc., No. 1:15CV00057, 2017 WL 4368617, at *15–17 (W.D. Va. Oct. 2, 2017) 
(applying similar exclusions of fruit of the poisonous tree), and Trammel v. United States, 445 
U.S. 40, 50 (1980) (holding privilege applies only where it trumps the need for truth), with 
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 659 (applying similar principle in excluding evidence obtained illegally). 
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otherwise be unfairly deprived of its protections due to a mistake made by another.1055 
Privilege recognizes that sometimes a great principle must trump the search for 
truth.1056 Nonetheless, as with other constructs of evidentiary exclusion,1057 
clawbacks for privilege would take a certain facility with Orwellian doublethink to 
“unknow” something that is, in fact, known to court and counsel.1058 
This contrafactual construct that the privileged document’s disclosure is somehow 
undone1059 would be particularly offensive to truth-seeking in the context of 
impeaching false statements, as adumbrated in Pinho.1060 Consider a recent 
hypothetical posed by Justice Samuel Alito in Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado 
underscoring the sacrosanctity of privilege: 
Suppose that a prosecution witness gives devastating but false testimony 
against a defendant, and suppose that the witness’s motivation is racial bias. 
Suppose that the witness admits this to his attorney, his spouse, and a member 
of the clergy. Suppose that the defendant, threatened with conviction for a 
serious crime and a lengthy term of imprisonment, seeks to compel the 
attorney, the spouse, or the member of the clergy to testify about the witness’s 
admissions. Even though the constitutional rights of the defendant hang in 
the balance, the defendant’s efforts to obtain the testimony would fail.1061 
 
1055 See Helman v. Murry’s Steaks, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 1099, 1104 (D. Del. 1990); 
Mendenhall v. Barber-Green Co., 531 F. Supp. 951, 955 n.8 (N.D. Ill. 1982). 
1056 See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 50 (holding privilege is to recognized “only to the very limited 
extent that . . . excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally 
predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth”); Fisher v. United 
States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976); cf. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 428 (1956) (“No 
doubt the constitutional privilege may, on occasion, save a guilty man from his just deserts. It 
was aimed at a more far-reaching evil—a recurrence of the Inquisition and the Star Chamber, 
even if not in their stark brutality.”). 
1057 See, e.g., Mapp, 367 U.S. at 659 (“There are those who say, as did Justice (then Judge) 
Cardozo, that under our constitutional exclusionary doctrine ‘(t)he criminal is to go free because 
the constable has blundered.’ In some cases this will undoubtedly be the result.”) (quoting New 
York v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926), abrogation recognized by Linkletter v. Walker, 
381 U.S. 618, 633–34 (1965)).  
1058 See Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Turner & Newall, PLC, 964 F.2d 159, 165 (2d Cir. 
1992); FDIC v. Singh, 140 F.R.D. 252, 253 (D. Me. 1992) (Once “persons not within the ambit 
of the confidential relationship have knowledge of the communication, that knowledge cannot 
be undone. One cannot ‘unring’ a bell.”); cf. Microsoft Corp. v. Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. 
Res. Org., No. 6:06 CV 549, 2009 WL 440608, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2009) (“[O]nce Cisco’s 
confidential information is known by Healy and Redfern through this discovery, it will be 
impossible for them to ‘unknow’ it during the negotiations.”). 
1059 Rajala v. McGuire Woods, LLP, No. 08-2638-CM-DJW, 2010 WL 2949582, at *3 (D. 
Kan. July 22, 2010). 
1060 Cf. United States v. Pinho, 2003 WL 2577243, at *3–4 (E.D. Pa. July 2, 2003). 
1061 Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 875 (2017) (Alito, J., dissenting); cf. 
Sunshine, Uncertain Junction, supra note 36, at 562–63 (discussing the implications of the 
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That result, although perhaps shocking to the conscience, is what privilege means; 
sometimes the search for truth will bow to secrecy, however, disquieting that may be 
in a given case.1062 The Supreme Court itself has wrestled with these questions of 
privilege’s burden, notably in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie.1063 The defendant, charged 
with the rape of his daughter, had subpoenaed state records from the youth protective 
service agency statutorily protected by privilege allegedly containing statements by 
his daughter, but the trial court declined to order the subpoena honored, 
notwithstanding a statutory allowance that the privilege would yield to court order.1064 
On appeal, Ritchie contended that this denial was unconstitutional under the 
Confrontation Clause insofar as it foreclosed his ability to impeach the testimony of 
his primary accuser by showing her courtroom testimony was false (or at least 
inconsistent); the Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed and vacated the conviction to 
permit for retrial.1065 Bespeaking the importance of the principle, the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari without noting any division of authority, observing the “substantial 
and conflicting interests” of the parties.1066 
After assuring itself of jurisdiction,1067 the Supreme Court affirmed in part and 
reversed in part, splitting the baby.1068 It rejected Ritchie’s proposal that “statutory 
privilege cannot be maintained when a defendant asserts a need, prior to trial, for the 
protected information that might be used at trial to impeach or otherwise undermine a 
witness’ testimony.”1069 The right to confront adverse witnesses was to be measured 
by the latitude permitted in their questioning, not the documentary evidence available 
to do so; to hold otherwise would constitutionalize the entire practice of discovery, 
 
hypothetical). N.b., although the petitioner’s surname was Peña-Rodriguez, the case caption 
replaced the eñe with an en. 
1062 See Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 875; Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 
407–09 (2002); Emery, supra note 14, at 244; Correll, supra note 6, at 1033–34 & n.13.  
1063 Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987). 
1064 Id. at 43–44. 
1065 Id. at 45–46. 
1066 Id. at 46; see 476 U.S. 1139 (1986). 
1067 Id. at 47–50. For what it is worth, the Court’s reasoning in accepting an interlocutory 
appeal is at odds with its later ruling in Mohawk discussed above: “We thus cannot agree with 
the suggestion in Justice STEVENS’ dissent that if we were to dismiss this case and it was 
resolved on other grounds after disclosure of the file, ‘the Commonwealth would not have been 
harmed.’ This hardly could be true, because of the acknowledged public interest in ensuring the 
confidentiality of CYS records. Although this consideration is not dispositive, we have noted 
that ‘statutorily created finality requirements should, if possible, be construed so as not to cause 
crucial collateral claims to be lost and potentially irreparable injuries to be suffered.’” Id. at 49–
50 (citations omitted). 
1068 Id. at 61. 
1069 Id. at 52. 
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privilege and all.1070 Nonetheless, the Court found Ritchie’s Compulsory Process 
Clause claims more (ahem) compelling, and ordered the trial judge to review the file 
in camera and determine whether any material was relevant to give the lie to the 
daughter’s testimony.1071 In doing so, however, it relied heavily on the fact the 
privilege in question was qualified rather than absolute, contemplating disclosure in 
numerous circumstances.1072 This comported with Clark v. United States in 1933, 
where the Court approved penetration of the juror deliberative privilege in order to 
confront perjury by the venirewoman, for there the Court found the jury deliberation 
privilege was only conditional1073—just like the majority opinion in Pena-Rodriguez 
from which Justice Alito was dissenting.1074 Were the privilege in question absolute, 
however, the Ritchie Court intimated (though judiciously did not hold)1075 that no 
compelled disclosure would be proper, notwithstanding the gravest of interests at 
stake.1076 
 
1070 Id. at 52–53 (“If we were to accept this broad interpretation of Davis, the effect would 
be to transform the Confrontation Clause into a constitutionally compelled rule of pretrial 
discovery. Nothing in the case law supports such a view. The opinions of this Court show that 
the right to confrontation is a trial right, designed to prevent improper restrictions on the types 
of questions that defense counsel may ask during cross-examination. The ability to question 
adverse witnesses, however, does not include the power to require the pretrial disclosure of any 
and all information that might be useful in contradicting unfavorable testimony.”) (citations 
omitted). 
1071 Id. at 57–61. 
1072 Id. at 57–58. 
1073 Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 10–14 (1933) (“But the recognition of a privilege 
does not mean that it is without conditions or exceptions. The social policy that will prevail in 
many situations may run foul in others of a different social policy, competing for supremacy. It 
is then the function of a court to mediate between them, assigning, so far as possible, a proper 
value to each, and summoning to its aid all the distinctions and analogies that are the tools of 
the judicial process. The function is the more essential where a privilege has its origin in 
inveterate but vague tradition and where no attempt has been made either in treatise or in 
decisions to chart its limits with precision. Assuming that there is a privilege which protects 
from impertinent exposure the arguments and ballots of a juror while considering his verdict, 
we think the privilege does not apply where the relation giving birth to it has been fraudulently 
begun or fraudulently continued.”) (lineation omitted). 
1074 Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 873–74 (2017). 
1075 Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 57 n.14. 
1076 Id. 57–58 (“Although we recognize that the public interest in protecting this type of 
sensitive information is strong, we do not agree that this interest necessarily prevents disclosure 
in all circumstances. This is not a case where a state statute grants CYS the absolute authority 
to shield its files from all eyes. Rather, the Pennsylvania law provides that the information shall 
be disclosed in certain circumstances, including when CYS is directed to do so by court order. 
Given that the Pennsylvania Legislature contemplated some use of CYS records in judicial 
proceedings, we cannot conclude that the statute prevents all disclosure in criminal 
prosecutions. In the absence of any apparent state policy to the contrary, we therefore have no 
reason to believe that relevant information would not be disclosed when a court of competent 
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To close the circle, that is exactly what the lower courts have found attorney-client 
privilege to mean, being an absolute bar to discovery even in the face of mistruths—
so long as it remains unwaived and intact: 
[I]t is perfectly legitimate for a party to disclose a non-privileged 
communication but to decline to disclose a privileged communication, even 
though the privileged communication would prove that the party is lying 
through his teeth. While that may be unfair, it is how any privilege works. 
The search for the truth yields to a privilege when the common law 
determines that the effectuation of the purpose of the privilege must do so. 
Only if the disclosure is of privileged information can it justify the forced 
disclosure of additional privileged information.1077 
Oddly enough, attorneys learning that a client intends to perjure herself before the 
testimony must not abet the client’s scheme, may threaten to report the intended 
falsehood if committed,1078 and may even break privilege to inform the court if the 
client cannot be dissuaded.1079 Yet attorneys hearing a confession of such behavior 
after the fact must seal their lips, just as Justice Alito described.1080 The latter, at least, 
arises from the Supreme Court’s recognition that “if the client knows that damaging 
information could more readily be obtained from the attorney following disclosure 
than from himself in the absence of disclosure, the client would be reluctant to confide 
 
jurisdiction determines that the information is ‘material’ to the defense of the accused.”) 
(citations omitted). 
1077 Trs. of Elec. Workers Local No. 26 Pension Tr. Fund v. Tr. Fund Advisors, Inc., 266 
F.R.D. 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2010); see Finjan, Inc. v. Sonicwall, Inc., No. 17-cv-04467, 2018 WL 
4998149, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2018) (“A party may not obtain an adversary’s privileged 
communications simply because it believes those communications would bear on—or even 
contradict—its adversary’s allegations.”); N. River Ins. Co. v. Phila. Reinsurance Corp., 797 F. 
Supp. 363, 370–71 (D.N.J. 1992) (rejecting claim of waiver where the challenger’s “primary 
goal in seeking production of privileged documents is so that it can test the veracity and 
completeness of North River’s disclosure to it as to the facts of the underlying claim dispute”). 
See also Murphy, supra note 14, at 225 (quoting Electrical Workers). 
1078 See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 170–75 (1986). 
1079 See New York v. DePallo, 754 N.E.2d 751, 753–54 (N.Y. 2001). 
1080 See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 407–08 (2002) (“The Independent 
Counsel assumes, incorrectly we believe, that the privilege is analogous to the Fifth 
Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination. But as suggested above, the privilege 
serves much broader purposes. Clients consult attorneys for a wide variety of reasons, only one 
of which involves possible criminal liability. Many attorneys act as counselors on personal and 
family matters, where, in the course of obtaining the desired advice, confidences about family 
members or financial problems must be revealed in order to assure sound legal advice. The same 
is true of owners of small businesses who may regularly consult their attorneys about a variety 
of problems arising in the course of the business. These confidences may not come close to any 
sort of admission of criminal wrongdoing, but nonetheless be matters which the client would 
not wish divulged.”); cf. Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 875 (2017) (Alito, J., 
dissenting). 
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in his lawyer and it would be difficult to obtain fully informed legal advice.”1081 This 
had been recognized as early as 1888 when the Court wrote that the privilege is 
founded upon necessity to the very administration of justice.1082 And the Court has 
affirmed and reaffirmed that an absolute privilege, not one subject to fiddly balancing 
tests, is the only way to ensure its vitality.1083 Plainly, few would confess their past 
sins to their attorney (or priest,1084 or spouse,1085 to take Justice Alito’s point1086) if 
the state could force the tongue of the confessor and thereby expose their secrets or 
sidestep the right against self-incrimination.1087 So understood, privilege is not 
eliminating evidence that would otherwise have been available, for absent the 
privilege, the confession would never had occurred at all.1088 
2. The Impossibility of Putting the Cat Back in the Bag 
But now tweak Justice Alito’s hypothetical to contemplate an FRE 502(b) 
situation: what if the attorney, despite irreproachable precautions, inadvertently 
disclosed during trial a single page from his confidential case notes recording his 
conversation with his client and laying bare the latter’s invidiously motivated perjury, 
discovering the error shortly after its transmission and immediately demanding its 
return? Is defense counsel to take no notice of exculpatory evidence that could free 
the defendant in a trice? Is the judge to close her eyes to bigotry, perjury, and fraud 
upon the court in steadfast deference to the privilege? Both would have unwittingly 
done so absent the mistaken divulgence, and one might think FRE 502(b) inexorably 
demands that an excusably accidental disclosure is juridically a nonevent, and 
certainly can be no waiver. Somehow, however, the adjusted hypothetical seems 
worse: to stoically endure the exclusion of some modicum of evidence to permit for 
 
1081 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976); accord Upjohn Co. v. United States, 
449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980). 
1082 Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888). 
1083 See Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 409 (“Balancing ex post the importance of the 
information against client interests, even limited to criminal cases, introduces substantial 
uncertainty into the privilege’s application. For just that reason, we have rejected use of a 
balancing test in defining the contours of the privilege.”) (citing Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393 and 
Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1996)). 
1084 See In re Verplank, 329 F. Supp. 433, 435 (C.D. Cal. 1971). 
1085 See Sexton v. Sexton 105 N.W. 314, 315–16 (Iowa 1905) (cited in Wolfle v. United 
States, 291 U.S. 7, 14 (1934)). 
1086 See Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 875 (2017). 
1087 See cases cited supra notes 1080–1086; see generally Monroe H. Freedman, Client 
Confidences and Client Perjury: Some Unanswered Questions, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1939 (1988). 
1088 Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 408 (“In related cases, we have said that the loss of 
evidence admittedly caused by the privilege is justified in part by the fact that without the 
privilege, the client may not have made such communications in the first place.”) (citing Jaffee, 
518 U.S. at 12 and Fisher, 425 U.S. at 403); see Correll, supra note 6, at 1035–36 n.26 (“Absent 
the privilege, however, the communications very likely would not exist.”). 
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privilege is one thing; to wittingly whistle past the graveyard of truth is quite another. 
It is indeed for this reason that privileges “are not lightly created nor expansively 
construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth.”1089 
Such situations had been contemplated prior to Pena-Rodriguez. In Starway v. 
Independent School District No. 625,1090 a crucial memorandum had been 
inadvertently disclosed, and thus the court proceeded to review under the Hydraflow 
factors in use at the time.1091 The crux of the argument rested on the fifth factor, 
overarching fairness: the defendant laid great emphasis on the importance of the 
attorney-client privilege, whilst the plaintiff stressed the document was necessary to 
prove its case and impeach a defense witness.1092 But the court found scarce evidence 
that the document was actually necessary to demonstrate perjury: “While the 
document may be favorable to the plaintiff, the court does not find that the document 
contains evidence of fraud or crime and finds no implicit support for the unexplained 
assertion that it may prove helpful in establishing that someone lied under oath.”1093 
This sufficed to decide the case, for justice does not otherwise militate against the 
denial of “something to which he was never entitled.”1094 Lest anyone misunderstand, 
however, the court observed that the impossibility of unringing the bell sufficed to 
protect against perjury: 
While the court may be granting defendant school district the relief it seeks 
in this motion, no one should be under the delusion that the cat has been put 
back into the bag. Plaintiff is not entitled to keep a copy of the privileged 
memorandum, but knowledge cannot be so easily erased. This court has no 
doubt that any significant and meaningful discrepancies between the 
memorandum and testimony under oath will be brought to the trial court’s 
attention.1095 
(The cat: now making cameos as guardian of the truth.) 
 
After the passage of FRE 502, an ordinary inadvertent disclosure where there is no 
sword-and-shield gamesmanship—or worse yet, the specter of perjury—does not 
compel the penalty of waiver simply because the disclosed document may have some 
value for impeachment.1096 With the cat out of the bag, the ordinary crucible of 
 
1089 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974). 
1090 Starway v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 625, 187 F.R.D. 595 (D. Minn. 1999). 
1091 Id. at 597–98. 
1092 Id. at 598. 
1093 Id. 
1094 Id.  
1095 Id. n.6. 
1096 Finjan, Inc. v. Sonicwall, Inc., No. 17-cv-04467, 2018 WL 4998149, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 
Oct. 15, 2018) (“SonicWall argues that it should at least be permitted to use the emails for 
impeachment purposes. However, the cases on which SonicWall relies for this remedy concern 
circumstances where the attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine is used as a sword 
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litigation suffices to uproot any untruths, or indeed “may reveal that there is nothing 
to impeach.”1097 Courts continuing to apply the Hydraflow factors have thus found 
the inadmissibility of an inadvertently produced document for impeachment purposes 
to be in the interests of justice where there is no “unfair prejudice,” even if “some 
hardship” does result.1098 One would expect, however, that a court would not find the 
interests of justice served by excusing an inadvertent disclosure showing plainly that 
a client engaged in perjury or committed fraud upon the court.1099 To mangle the 
Seventh Circuit, such an oversight would be surely be a doozy, but the point of Rule 
502(b) is not to protect clients from such a fortunate accident.1100 The state has forced 
no tongues when the disclosure is an unforced error,1101 preserving the core value of 
privilege.1102 
The nuance and flexibility of the FRE 502(b) factors thus provide an answer to the 
embellishment on Justice Alito’s hypothetical.1103 Such nuance in balancing truth and 
privilege was on evidence in far less flagrant circumstances in Community Bank v. 
 
and shield . . . . These cases do not address the inadvertent disclosure of privileged 
communications during discovery.”). 
1097 Id. at *5. 
1098 Pick v. City of Remsen, No. 13-4041, 2014 WL 4585732, at *5 (N.D. Iowa Sept. 15, 
2014) (“The attorney-client privilege promotes the just resolution of disputes by facilitating 
forthright communication between counsel and client. This interest of justice would be harmed 
here by permitting Pick to use the email at trial. Remedying defense counsel’s mistake 
undoubtedly results in some hardship for Pick at trial, since the email will be unavailable for 
him to use for possible impeachment purposes. This hardship, however, does not negate the 
injustice that will occur if the email is stripped of its privileged status as a result of its inadvertent 
disclosure under the circumstances.”). 
1099 Cf. Atronic Int’l, GMBH v. SAI Semispecialists of Am., Inc., 232 F.R.D. 160, 166 
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) (“The two e-mails contain admissions regarding the number of graphic 
processors ordered from SAI that differ markedly from the factual position plaintiff has taken 
in this action . . . . Given the claim and defenses asserted in this action, defendant may be 
prejudiced by restoring immunity to the inadvertently disclosed e-mails.”); Noyes, supra note 
14, at 754 (“Also, the privileged document may provide reasonable grounds to impeach a 
witness- -directly or indirectly.”). 
1100 See Carmody v. Bd. of Trs., 893 F.3d 397, 406 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoted supra note 739). 
1101 “An unforced error occurs when the opponent has time to set up mentally and physically 
for the shot and the opponent makes an error.” NICK BOLLETTIERI, BOLLETTIERI’S TENNIS 
HANDBOOK 166 (2001); cf. supra text accompanying note 1087.  
1102 See Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470–71 (1888); supra notes 1080–1087 and 
accompanying text. 
1103 But see Grimm, Bergstrom & Kraeuter, supra note 14, at 43–45 (questioning whether 
fairness could override clear adherence to the text of the rule notwithstanding its status as a 
Hydraflow factor); Meyers, supra note 9, at 1484 (“The Advisory Committee Notes to 
subsection (b) specifically name this consideration and state that ‘[t]he rule is flexible enough 
to consider any of these factors.’ Yet the issue of fairness tells us little about whether precautions 
or responses were reasonable.”). 
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Progressive Casualty Insurance Co.,1104 where Community’s counsel had allowed 
Progressive unmitigated access to its files, privileged or not, and permitted their 
copying without review.1105 Despite an immediate objection when privileged 
documents appeared at a deposition, the magistrate judge thus found precautions 
lacking under FRE 502(b)(2).1106 But because Progressive went on to use the 
documents in a motion for summary judgment whilst the question of privilege was 
pending, in violation of Rule 26(b)(5)(B), the magistrate excluded the documents as 
substantive evidence after all as a sanction1107—yet, in a final flourish, “still 
permit[ted] Progressive to use these items for impeachment purposes to promote the 
truth-seeking function of litigation.”1108 On review, the district court cautioned that 
should Community offer testimony by counsel, justice “may well require credibility 
determinations best made without procedural limits on the fact finder’s truth-seeking 
function.”1109 
Properly deployed, therefore, both main subparts of FRE 502 should therefore 
work to balance robust protection of privilege with fortifications against the “sly 
attempt to gain advantage using truth garbling tactics.”1110 A court in 1990 explained 
of this evocative term: 
The term “truth garbling” comes to us from academia to describe two types 
of impermissible uses of privileged material. In one situation, a party 
furnishes the other side with false evidence while depriving it of the means 
of detecting the imposition. In the second, a party engages in selective 
disclosure, disclosing the favorable while withholding the unfavorable.1111 
As if by design, each subpart provides the balancing test for one of these species 
of abuse. FRE 502(a) combats selective, misleading, and unfair disclosures by 
directing judges to compel the production of those documents needed (and only those 
needed) to level the playing field and deny any advantage to such sharp tactics.1112 
 
1104 Cmty. Bank v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., No. 1:08-cv-01443, 2010 WL 1435368 (S.D. 
Ind. Apr. 8, 2010), objs. overruled in part and aff’d in part, 2010 WL 2484306 (S.D. Ind. June 
14, 2010). 
1105 Id. at *1. 
1106 Id. at *4. 
1107 Id. (“Progressive offers no defense for its misconduct, and the Court sees none. Because 
Progressive impermissibly resorted to self-help to try and avoid the risk that Progressive 
couldn’t use the disputed materials as evidence in this matter, the Court will impose an 
appropriate and proportional sanction.”). 
1108 Id. at *5 n.6. 
1109 Cmty. Bank, 2010 WL 2484306, at *2. 
1110 Golden Valley Microwave Foods, Inc. v. Weaver Popcorn Co., 132 F.R.D. 204, 207 
(N.D. Ind. 1990). 
1111 Id. n.8 (citing Richard L. Marcus, The Perils of Privilege: Waiver and Litigation, 84 
MICH. L. REV. 1605, 1636 (1986)). 
1112 See cases cited supra notes 622–623. 
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Meanwhile, FRE 502(a) recognizes that reasonable but mistaken disclosures should 
not compromise the adversarial process protected by privilege;1113 but at the same 
time the rule is malleable enough to enforce a waiver if the clawback would work 
grave injustice on that selfsame system.1114 Perhaps most importantly, in the event of 
inadvertent disclosure, the cat is already out of the bag, and courts and counsel are 
under no Orwellian compulsion to expunge its very memory from their minds.1115 
The earlier courts wrote often of the need to strictly circumscribe the privilege because 
it stood athwart the search for truth, resulting in the stunted safeguards of the world of 
waiver that was.1116 To its credit, FRE 502 seems set to cut with a far finer scalpel 
and strike a happier balance between the eternally warring imperatives of secrecy and 
disclosure.1117 
C. The Pilgrim’s Progress and the Hodós1118 
Accordingly, let it never be said that no progress has been made since Wigmore 
reigned supreme.1119 Recall that in the 1981 case Suburban Sew ‘N Sweep, the district 
 
1113 See Pick v. City of Remsen, No. 13-4041, 2014 WL 4585732, at *5 (N.D. Iowa Sept. 
15, 2014); see also cases cited supra note 537 (recognizing use of tests of reasonableness). 
1114 Pick, 2014 WL 4585732, at *5. 
1115 See Stinson v. City of New York, No. 10 Civ. 4228, 2014 WL 5090031, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 10, 2014); Starway v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 625, 187 F.R.D. 595, 598 n.6 (D. Minn. 1999); 
see also D’Onofrio v. SFX Sports Grp, Inc. 256 F.R.D. 277, 280 (D.D.C. 2009) (declining to 
allow review of privileged materials because “while I believe that plaintiff, were she given 
access to these documents, would take all appropriate steps to put anything she learns out of her 
mind, it is a simple fact that it is difficult to unlearn something once it is learned”); see also 
Noyes, supra note 14, at 753–54; Cavaneau, supra note 14, at 11–12. 
1116 See, e.g., Weil v. Inv./Indicators, Research & Mgmt., Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 24 (9th Cir. 
1981); Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 862–63 (D.C. Cir. 1980) 
(quoting Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976)); Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 
572 F.2d 596, 602 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 
358 (D. Mass. 1950) (citing People’s Bank v. Brown, 112 F. 652 (3d Cir. 1902)). 
1117 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974); Imwinkelried, supra note 14, at 
188–89; Cavaneau, supra note 14, at 12. 
1118 Hodós is a Greek term literally meaning “road” that is used frequently in the New 
Testament to describe the path taken by a traveler, or metaphorically, a continuing course of 
conduct or manner of thinking or deciding. See POPE EMERITUS BENEDICT XVI, THE CHURCH 
AND THE SCANDAL OF SEXUAL ABUSE (Catholic News Agency trans., Apr. 10, 2019) (“Greek 
for a road, in the New Testament often used in the sense of a path of progress.”), 
https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/full-text-of-benedict-xvi-the-church-and-the-
scandal-of-sexual-abuse-59639; CARL LUDWIG WILBALD GRIMM, A GREEK-ENGLISH LEXICON 
OF THE NEW TESTAMENT 437–38 (Harper 1887). 
1119 See Imwinkelried, supra note 14, at 172–76; Correll, supra note 6, at 1033–34 (narrating 
the shift away from Wigmore to modern practice and concluding that the “addition of Rule 
502(d) orders to this pantheon may signal the final step in the slow demise of the requirement 
for maintained confidentiality as it adds an element of predictability as well as legislative and 
judicial approval to abandoning Wigmore’s theory”). 
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court enforced waiver despite the fact that the relevant legal memoranda had been 
pilfered from a dumpster, admitting that the invasion was incredibly unlikely and 
risked criminal punishments, and moreover that the onus that the adopted rule of 
waiver placed on the holders of privilege could be seen as “extreme.”1120 Not so two 
decades later at the turn of the millennium, when the district court in McCafferty’s, 
Inc. v. Bank of Glen Burnie found the opposite: 
I must determine whether it was reasonable for Joyner to have concluded that 
by tearing up the confidential memo and throwing it away in a private 
location—from which it would be further mingled with other trash from 
BGB, before being thrown into a dumpster posted with a warning that it was 
for the exclusive use of BGB, located on BGB’s private parking lot—she was 
continuing to preserve the confidentiality of the memo against disclosure to 
third persons. I find that it was. 
To be sure, there were additional precautions which Joyner could have 
taken. As suggested by the court in Suburban, BGB could have used a paper 
shredder. Joyner could have burned the pieces of the memo before throwing 
the ashes away. She could have torn it into smaller pieces, or distributed the 
pieces into several trash cans in different locations. However, the issue is not 
whether every conceivable precaution which could have been taken was 
taken, but whether reasonable precautions were taken. Under the facts of this 
case, Joyner would have had to anticipate that someone would trespass onto 
BGB’s private property, look through an entire dumpster of trash, remove 
sealed bags of garbage, sift through them looking for torn up documents, and 
then piece them together. Even in an age where commercial espionage is 
increasingly common, the likelihood that someone will go to the unseemly 
lengths which Mariner did to obtain the Serotte memo is not sufficiently great 
that I can conclude that the precautions Joyner took were not reasonable. 
Although the precautions taken in this case were not perfect, they were 
sufficient to preserve the attorney-client privilege against the clandestine 
assault by Mariner’s “dumpster diver.”1121 
As the emphasis highlights, the difference in result derived from a welcome 
difference in standard: Sealed Case and its ilk had demanded that “all possible 
precautions” be deployed.1122 That standard placed those seeking to protect privilege 
between Scylla and Charybdis—and they were sailing without a steersman given the 
fact that the question of whether every precaution had been taken was unknown until 
a court said so.1123 But that was true of whether reasonable precautions had been 
taken as well, as the middle-of-the-road court in McCafferty’s asked (and 
 
1120 See Suburban Sew ‘N Sweep, Inc. v. Swiss-Bernia, Inc. 91 F.R.D. 254, 261 (N.D. Ill. 
1981) (discussed supra notes 67–69). 
1121 McCafferty’s, Inc. v. Bank of Glen Burnie, 179 F.R.D. 163, 169–70 (D. Md. 1998) 
(emphasis added). 
1122 In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
1123 See supra Section I-C. 
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answered).1124 To be sure, asking the question of what a normal person would do will 
yield better and more predictable answers than questioning whether a court could 
imagine some outré or exorbitant safeguard that had gone unimplemented.1125 One 
judge tried to liken the modern balancing test to other areas of law, reasoning that 
“‘reasonable’ precautions are not necessarily foolproof. Just as a tort defendant who 
acts in a reasonably prudent manner avoids liability despite the occurrence of an 
accident, so an attorney who takes reasonable precautions in discovery may avoid 
waiver even though he inadvertently discloses a privileged document.”1126 The 
Hydraflow factors and their analogues might even direct such analyses into familiar 
channels.1127 
Nevertheless, the answer to what a reasonable person would have done remained 
irreducibly indeterminate until a judge decided,1128 as a 1995 case observed in 
confessing that the “balancing approach results in an uncertain privilege. That is, the 
protection of the privilege will depend on courts reviewing and making judgments on 
a broad array of facts.”1129 That was the situation that no less a tribunal than the 
Supreme Court had declared would “eviscerate” the privilege entirely.1130 Questions 
could be picayune and yet dispositive: “were five hundred pages of documents copied 
or five thousand, and is two days, three days, or ten days too long a delay in taking 
steps to rectify the error?”1131 Different courts reached different results based on the 
same material facts.1132 Given such uncertainty, the balancing test inherently invited 
motion practice over every jot and tittle of privilege, as either party might prevail in 
all but the most obvious cases.1133 Judges of the time lamented that litigants were 
 
1124 McCafferty’s, 179 F.R.D. at 169. 
1125 See cases cited supra notes 319–325 and accompanying text. 
1126 Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais (Suisse) S.A., 160 F.R.D. 437, 442 (S.D.N.Y. 
1995) (“Courts following this inadvertent disclosure doctrine engage in a multifactor analysis 
to judge whether counsel acted reasonably to safeguard the privilege or so recklessly that waiver 
should be implied.”).  
1127 E.g., id. (“The elements considered include (1) the reasonableness of the precautions 
taken to prevent inadvertent disclosure, (2) the time taken to rectify any error, (3) the scope of 
discovery, (4) the extent of the disclosure, and (5) overriding issues of fairness. See, e.g., 
Hydraflow, Inc. v. Enidine, Inc., 145 F.R.D. 626, 637 (W.D.N.Y. 1993); Federal Deposit Ins. 
Corp. v. Marine Midland Realty Credit Corp., 138 F.R.D. 479, 482 (E.D. Va. 1991); Lois 
Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 104 F.R.D. 103, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). This 
analysis may now be applied to the facts presented here.”). 
1128 See Meyers, supra note 9, at 1449. 
1129 Berg Elecs., Inc. v. Molex, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 261, 262 (D. Del. 1995); see also Rice, 
Continuing Confusion, supra note 39, at 998–99. 
1130 See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 17 (1996) (quoted supra note 191). 
1131 Berg, 875 F. Supp. at 263. 
1132 See Meyers, supra note 9, at 1449. 
1133 Berg, 875 F. Supp. at 263 (“This approach also has the disadvantage of inviting parties 
to litigate almost every dispute where there is a claim of an inadvertent waiver, as it suggests 
154https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol68/iss4/5
2020] FAILING TO KEEP THE CAT IN THE BAG 791 
indeed turning to the court too readily to balance the relevant factors in hopes of an 
advantageous ruling, instead of being “resolved amicably by counsel returning 
documents which are obviously privileged and inadvertently produced.”1134   
FRE 502(b) did nothing to displace this regime, instead installing the existing 
middle-of-the-road balancing test as federal law.1135 In the 2016 revised edition of her 
standard hornbook, Epstein noted that the case-by-case analysis involves “a 
tremendous amount of judicial discretion,” is “far less predictable,” and “ensures that 
virtually each inadvertent disclosure will be litigated and must be ruled on by a court. 
What one court would deem excusable mistake, another will call ‘gross 
negligence.’”1136 Before setting forth on their analyses, various courts have noted that 
Advisory Committee “consciously chose not to codify any factors in the rule because 
the analysis should be flexible and applied on a case by case basis,”1137 even whilst 
endorsing the Hartford Fire and Lois Sportswear factors as guideposts.1138 
Unsurprisingly, this lack of change has done little to curb uncertainty,1139 or prodigal 
motion practice on privilege.1140 One recent court addressing privilege logs noted a 
 
the decision on whether the protection of the privilege has been lost will be made on a case by 
case basis and will depend on a particular court’s judgment on whether it would be reasonable 
to find a waiver in the context of the facts and circumstances of that case.”); see also Rice, 
Continuing Confusion, supra note 39, at 996. 
1134 United States v. Pepper’s Steel & Alloys, Inc., 742 F. Supp. 641, 645 (S.D. Fla. 1990) 
(“Mistakes of this type are likely to occur in cases with voluminous discovery. At best, these 
situations are resolved amicably, by counsel returning documents which are obviously 
privileged and inadvertently produced. It is unfortunate that such could not be the case here and 
that the Court was forced to expend a great deal of time on this relatively minor matter. 
However, such has been the case throughout the course of this litigation.”); see also Rice, 
Continuing Confusion, supra note 39, at 996; Richard L. Marcus, The Perils of Privilege: 
Waiver and the Litigator, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1605, 1606–07 (1986). 
1135 Schaefer, supra note 14, at 219–20 (“Thus the new FRE 502(b) approach incorporates 
the same uncertainty and possibility of waiver that exists in balancing jurisdictions.”); see FED. 
R. EVID. 502(b) advisory committee’s note to 2008 amendment; see Liles v. Stuart Weitzman, 
LLC, No. 09-61448, 2010 WL 11505149, at *2 n.1 (S.D. Fla. June 15, 2010); Amobi v. D.C. 
Dep’t of Corr., 262 F.R.D. 45, 53 (D.D.C. 2009); see also supra note 535 (citing secondary 
sources confirming or arguing against FRE 502’s adoption of the previous balancing standard). 
1136 EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 574. 
1137 Liles, 2010 WL 11505149, at *2 n.9; accord Amobi, 262 F.R.D. at 54. 
1138 See Amobi, 262 F.R.D. at 54; see FED. R. EVID. 502(b) advisory committee’s note to 
2008 amendment. 
1139 See Barkett, supra note 14, at 1595–96 (noting case-by-case approach); Murphy, supra 
note 14, at 217 (“This illustrates the fact that each case is decided based upon each judge’s 
particular analysis. The sought after uniformity may not be achieved under their approach.”); 
Meyers, supra note 9, at 1458–59 (observing idiosyncratic application); Outlaw, supra note 14, 
at 7 (predicting rule would yield greater uncertainty and costs). 
1140 See, e.g., Baez-Eliza v. Instituto Psicoterapeutica de P.R., 275 F.R.D. 65, 67–70 (D.P.R. 
2011); see also Star Ins. Co. v. Cont’l Res., Inc., 2013 WL 1702653, at *3 & n.1 (D.N.D. Apr. 
19, 2013) (observing in trying to head off “intractable” privilege disputes that in its last case of 
the sort, “the parties spent tens of thousands of dollars in attorney’s fees arguing over what 
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lack of guidance as to the timeliness of privilege assertions, remarking mildly that the 
“cases are not harmonious.”1141 After surveying divisions of opinion on essentially 
identical facts, the court could conclude only: “It is ultimately a discretionary decision, 
and thus, as we have shown, cases holding one way or the other are not conclusive, 
for ‘[t]he very exercise of discretion means that persons exercising discretion may 
reach different results from exact duplicates.’”1142 
Such a state of affairs represents a missed opportunity in the promulgation of FRE 
502(b).1143 The Supreme Court had written only six years prior that a balancing test 
“introduces substantial uncertainty into the privilege’s application” and that “[f]or just 
that reason, we have rejected use of a balancing test in defining the contours of the 
privilege.”1144 Had FRE 502(b) simply provided that an inadvertent disclosure does 
not work waiver—full stop—much uncertainty might have been curtailed.1145 The 
logic of Mendenhall is compelling: waiver should only attach when a client knowingly 
and intentionally opts to waive privilege by revealing a document, acquiescing that 
such use will make the document (and perhaps others too) fair game.1146 That is, after 
all, exactly what waiver means.1147 Such a construction would at last remove the 
jurisprudential irritant that waiver in matters of privilege is for some reason different 
from waiver in other spheres of the law.1148 This stilted misuse of the word apparently 
arose to align itself with the stringencies demanded by Wigmore in protecting the 
privilege against all interlopers—even thieves!—by whatever means necessary.1149 
 
documents were subject to attorney-client privilege and work product. After several weeks of 
work, the court was making the final edits on its order ruling on the eighty-eight documents 
requiring in camera inspection when the parties called and advised the case had been settled”); 
Murphy, supra note 14, at 225 (“This type of reasoning certainly provides a disincentive for 
parties to work together, as they would never be able to predict how a judge would rule on their 
agreement. This is not advisable in our current environment of high-cost litigation.”). 
1141 Surgery Ctr. at 900 N. Mich. Ave., LLC v. Am. Physicians Assurance Corp., Inc., 317 
F.R.D. 620, 632 (N.D. Ill. 2016). 
1142 Id. (quoting McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 891 (11th Cir. 1985), aff’d, 481 U.S. 
279, 289–90 (1987)); see also Murphy, supra note 14, at 235 (“It is a test of reasonableness, so 
of course reasonable minds may differ.”). 
1143 See Barkett, supra note 14, at 1595 (noting FRE 502(b) involves “a fact-specific inquiry 
to be made on a case-by- case basis”); Murphy, supra note 14, at 217; Meyers, supra note 9, at 
1457–58; Outlaw, supra note 14, at 7–8. 
1144 Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 409 (2002) (citing Upjohn, 449 U.S. 
at 393 and Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1996)). 
1145 But see supra Section IV-A-3 (discussing varying interpretations of how to assess the 
meaning of inadvertence itself). 
1146 Mendenhall v. Barber-Green Co., 531 F. Supp. 951, 954–55 (N.D. Ill. 1982). 
1147 Id. at 955; accord sources cited supra notes 79 & 84. 
1148 Cf. EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 508–09; John Doe Co. v. United States (In re Grand Jury), 
350 F.3d 299, 302 (2d Cir. 2003). 
1149 See Gergacz, supra note 14, at 16 (“Under privilege law, waiver uses the term, 
‘intentional,’ in a limited way. It is not a question of whether the disclosure itself was intended. 
156https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol68/iss4/5
2020] FAILING TO KEEP THE CAT IN THE BAG 793 
With that atavism rejected,1150 there is little principled reason why waiver should not 
revert to its ordinary meaning, bringing greater consistency to jurisprudence as a 
whole.1151 
Moreover, the observation from Wigmore that few would freely profess to such 
intent does not shake that logic:1152 intent to waive is easily discernible should a party 
cite, introduce, or otherwise rely on a privileged document in litigation (regardless of 
how it came to be disclosed), as numerous courts have noted.1153 FRE 502(b) aimed 
to avoid ceaseless litigation over whether privileged documents adverse to the 
discloser—clearly inadvertently released—must nonetheless be treated as waived 
based on some a posteriori judgment of counsel’s diligence;1154 the Mendenhall rule 
actually achieves that aim, however, unlike FRE 502.1155 True, clawback of such 
documents retards the search for truth, but that is what privilege means:1156 once the 
principle of privilege is accepted, the interests of justice are not generally served by 
denying the clawback from an opponent of “something to which he was never 
 
After all, a waiver may arise if a thief absconds with a document.”); e.g., Berg Elecs., Inc. v. 
Molex, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 261, 263 (D. Del. 1995) (quoted supra note 274); Smith v. Armour 
Pharmaceutical Co., 838 F. Supp. 1573, 1577 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (quoted supra note 275).  
1150 See Explanatory Note on Evidence Rule 502, FED. R. EVID. 502(b) (revised Nov. 28, 
2007). 
1151 See Gergacz, supra note 14, at 16 (“Instead, what is intended is the relinquishment of 
the privilege. This is assessed by evaluating whether the loss of confidentiality has compromised 
the goals of the privilege. Thus, a ‘waiver intent’ is linked to the privilege policies. It does not 
arise merely because the act of disclosure itself was voluntary.”). 
1152 WIGMORE, supra note 38, at 638 (quoted supra note 104). 
1153 See, e.g., Silverstein v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 07-cv-02471, 2009 WL 4949959, at 
*13–14 (D. Colo. Dec. 14, 2009); see also Cross & Nagendra, supra note 14, at 3 (discussing 
Silverstein and noting that “failure to remedy disclosure of privileged information, even if 
inadvertent, supported an inference of intentional waiver”) (emphases added). 
1154 See Diamond Car Care, LLC v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., No. 16-Civ-20813, 2017 WL 
1293249, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 10, 2017) (“The purpose of this rule is to resolve ‘longstanding 
disputes in the courts about inadvertent disclosure issues” and “provide a predictable, uniform 
set of standards under which parties can determine the consequences of a disclosure of a 
communication or information covered by the attorney-client privilege or work-product 
protection.’”) (quoting United States v. Sigman, No. 11–80155–CR, 2013 WL 5890714, at *4 
(S.D. Fla. Nov. 4, 2013)); Explanatory Note on Evidence Rule 502, FED. R. EVID. 502(b) 
(revised Nov. 28, 2007); Broun & Capra, supra note 9, at 252. 
1155 Cf. Outlaw, supra note 14, at 7–8 (criticizing such a posteriori analysis as 
counterproductive). 
1156 See sources cited supra notes 1061 & 1077. 
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entitled.”1157 Why should an adversarial system turn on such random windfalls?1158 
A future revision to FRE 502(b) tracking Mendenhall would advance greater 
predictability in privilege and avoid taxing judicial resources.1159 As it stands now, 
parties must inefficiently seek an order via FRE 502(d) in every case if they wish the 
benefit of the better rule.1160 
Nor would adoption of the Mendenhall rule permit unfairly selective disclosures 
through the back door of selective clawbacks.1161 In the first place, FRE 502(b) as 
written and the balancing tests that preceded it already must be defended against such 
behavior.1162 The foxy firm that sought to claw back only the opinion letter adverse 
to its position whilst allowing the letter’s helpful counterpart to languish was thus 
readily rejected.1163 Even addressing such situations under the balancing test for 
inadvertent disclosures is probably not as philosophically rigorous as could be. 
 
1157 Rhoads Indus., Inc. v. Bldg. Materials Corp. of Am., 254 F.R.D. 216, 227 (E.D. Pa. 
2008) (holding that “denying these documents to Defendants is not prejudicial to Defendants 
because, in the first place, they have no right or expectation to any of Rhoads’s privileged 
communications”); Starway v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 625, 187 F.R.D. 595, 598 (D. Minn. 1999); 
see also Correll, supra note 6, at 1079 (“Quite simply, the disclosed material has been privileged 
since its creation and that privilege has never been interrupted.”). 
1158 See Richard L. Marcus, The Perils of Privilege: Waiver and the Litigator, 84 MICH. L. 
REV. 1605, 1614–15 & n.50 (1986) (“Beyond that, broad waiver doctrines will tempt parties to 
press claims of waiver even where chances of success are small, owing to the potential windfall 
that success would bring.”) (citing Special Project, The Work Product Doctrine, 68 CORNELL L. 
REV. 760, 891 (1983)); EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 835 (“If genuinely inadvertent rather than 
strategic, what policy purpose is served by being unduly punitive?”). But see Amobi v. D.C. 
Dep’t of Corr., 262 F.R.D. 45, 55 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing holding that “given the extent of the 
disclosure, fairness dictates that the non-disclosing party be allowed to utilize its windfall”) 
(citing Golden Valley Microwave Foods, Inc. v. Weaver Popcorn Co., 132 F.R.D. 204, 209 
(N.D. Ind. 1990)). 
1159 Perhaps the best rejoinder is that the flexibility of FRE 502(b) as it stands permits some 
allowance for courts to treat an inadvertently produced document as waived in extraordinary 
circumstances such as the perjury and fraud upon the court imagined by Justice Alito. Facing a 
rule that denied waiver in every case of inadvertence, the critical evidence that the witness had 
lied would be inadmissible, and a witness already having lied once will hardly be dissuaded in 
being confronted by defense counsel with the lie upon recall to the stand, absent documentation. 
But precedent again rides to the rescue, for now that the witness’s potentially repeated perjury 
is in the future rather than a confession of the past, counsel may have some ambit—and perhaps 
obligation—to breach privilege to prevent such a miscarriage of justice. See Nix v. Whiteside, 
475 U.S. 157, 171–75 (1986); New York v. DePallo, 754 N.E.2d 751, 753–54 (N.Y. 2001). 
1160 See Barkett, supra note 14, at 1619–20 (recommending parties do exactly that); Correll, 
supra note 6, at 1068-75 (discussing such a regime); Murphy, supra note 14, at 235 
(recommending parties do exactly that). 
1161 But see Broun & Capra, supra note 9, at 249 (citing sloppiness or gamesmanship as 
reasons Committee opted against the Mendenhall rule). 
1162 See supra notes 715–730 and accompanying text. 
1163 In re Recombinant DNA Tech. Patent & Contract Litig., MDL No. 912, 1994 WL 
270712, at *39 (S.D. Ind. 1993) (discussed supra notes 716–720). 
158https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol68/iss4/5
2020] FAILING TO KEEP THE CAT IN THE BAG 795 
Regardless of why a document was disclosed, once the disclosing party decides to use 
the document in the litigation to its own advantage, rather than clawing it back, it has 
knowingly and intentionally waived its privilege.1164 That conclusion means that 
subject matter waiver precedent came into effect, allowing the court to deny the 
clawback of related documents that ought to in fairness be considered alongside.1165 
That was, indeed, the very reasoning of the court confronting the foxy firm, although 
it did not quite say that the adversarial use of the purportedly inadvertent disclosure 
rendered it intentional per se.1166 
Finally, to the objection that allowing the liberal use of clawbacks as to any 
unintentional disclosure would encourage sloppy work by counsel and document 
dumps,1167 that old cat has an answer. Privileged documents disclosed inadvertently 
may be clawed back, but they cannot be unremembered.1168 It is difficult to imagine 
that responsible counsel would opt against at least elementary and economical 
measures to withhold the most vital privileged materials, for fear of compromising 
their case1169—and if they do, then opposing counsel are free to formulate whatever 
 
1164 Statement of Congressional Intent Regarding Rule 502 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
154 CONG. REC. H7818–H7819 (Sept. 8, 2008) (“[T]he party using an attorney-client 
communication to its advantage in the litigation has, in so doing, intentionally waived the 
privilege as to other communications concerning the same subject matter, regardless of the 
circumstances in which the communication being so used was initially disclosed.”); Murphy, 
supra note 14, at 208 (“Therefore, a party may not advertently disclose a protected document 
and later claim an inadvertent disclosure when the document is used by the opposing party.”); 
see, e.g., Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Alcon Labs., Inc., No. 15-525, 2017 WL 3013249, at *2–3 (D. 
Del. July 14, 2017); Silverstein v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 07-cv-02471, 2009 WL 4949959, 
at *13–14 (D. Colo. Dec. 14, 2009); F.C. Cycles Int’l, Inc. v. Fila Sport, S.p.A., 184 F.R.D. 64, 
71–74 (D. Md. 1998). 
1165 Statement of Congressional Intent Regarding Rule 502 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
154 CONG. REC. H7818–H7819 (Sept. 8, 2008); see Johns Hopkins, 2017 WL 3013249, at *2–
3; Silverstein, 2009 WL 4949959, at *13–15; F.C. Cycles, 184 F.R.D. at 74–80. 
1166 See supra note 720 and accompanying text (quoting the relevant language). 
1167 See, e.g., Gray v. Bicknell, 86 F.3d 1472, 1482–84 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. 
Gangi, 1 F. Supp. 2d 256, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Marine Midland 
Realty Credit Corp., 138 F.R.D. 479, 482 (E.D. Va. 1991); Dyson v. Amway Corp., No. G88-
CV-60, 1990 WL 290683, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 15, 1990); see also Correll, supra note 6, at 
1068–70 (addressing concerns regarding cost shifting); Noyes, supra note 14, at 752–53 
(criticizing the rule shifting of costs of review onto the receiving party); Broun & Capra, supra 
note 9, at 249 (citing sloppiness or gamesmanship as reasons Committee opted against the 
Mendenhall rule). 
1168 See In re Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954, 963–64 (3d Cir. 1997); Chase Manhattan Bank, 
N.A. v. Turner & Newall, PLC, 964 F.2d 159, 165 (2d Cir. 1992); Stinson v. City of N.Y.C., 
No. 10 Civ. 4228, 2014 WL 5090031, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2014); D’Onofrio v. SFX Sports 
Grp, Inc. 256 F.R.D. 277, 280 (D.D.C. 2009); Starway v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 625, 187 F.R.D. 
595, 598 n.6 (D. Minn. 1999); Correll, supra note 6, at 1073–75; Noyes, supra note 14, at 753–
54; Cavaneau, supra note 14, at 11–12. 
1169 See Correll, supra note 6, at 1071 (“Either disclosing parties must be permitted to safely 
abandon all privilege review (not that they actually will do so) without fear of later 
consequences, or, alternatively, courts must specifically identify in a given order what steps a 
disclosing party must take.”) (emphasis added); Cavaneau, supra note 14, at 11 (“Third, and 
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strategies they may from the privileged material before it is clawed back.1170 To the 
extent that the Mendenhall rule encourages counsel to perform only such measures as 
needed to identify the most obvious and compromising privileged materials—
understanding that less relevant or damaging privileged documents may be released 
inadvertently—that is exactly what FRE 502 was supposed to encourage.1171 Fear of 
waiver previously encouraged the expense of inordinate sums of money to identify 
punctiliously each and every word that might be subject to privilege, however 
meaningless that privilege may be to the case at hand.1172 Such expenditures 
continue,1173 albeit perhaps with some minor efficiencies.1174 By demurring from the 
 
perhaps most significantly, in most cases, mere disclosure of protected information could be 
quite prejudicial to the disclosing party even if there was no waiver and even if the information 
could not be used directly. Opposing counsel would have seen the material. It would be 
impossible to erase that knowledge and perhaps impossible for counsel to avoid capitalizing on 
it, if only subconsciously . . . . These considerations will lead counsel, in many cases, to advise 
a painstaking and expensive pre-production review of relevant materials”). 
1170See Ford Motor, 110 F.3d at 963–64; Chase, 964 F.2d at 165; Starway, 187 F.R.D. at 
598 n.6; Correll, supra note 6, at 1073–75; Schaefer, supra note 14, at 226; Noyes, supra note 
14, at 753–54 (“Once privileged or work product protected information is reviewed by the 
Receiving Party, it will provide a virtual roadmap to follow up discovery to learn the underlying 
facts or data that are not protected by the privilege.”); Cavaneau, supra note 14, at 11–12 (“For 
example, if counsel has seen work product that includes important information about opposition 
strategy and thinking, it would be impossible (and perhaps a failure to adequately represent the 
client) if that information is not taken into account in structuring presentation of the case. 
Another example would be that the information could be used in formulating discovery 
requests.”). But cf. D’Onofrio, 256 F.R.D. at 280 (suggesting the recipient of clawbacks should 
attempt to put such information out of mind, although recognizing that task is impossible). 
1171 Cross & Nagendra, supra note 14, at 7 (“Litigants can perhaps save manual review and 
logging for those relatively few documents that really need it, such as those belonging to 
custodians who regularly communicate with counsel about sensitive matters. For other 
custodians, litigants generally can feel comfortable that any disclosed privilege information 
should not lead to subject matter waiver, and thus the privileged information that really matters 
should remain protected.”); Cavaneau, supra note 14, at 11–12; see also Rhoads Indus., Inc. v. 
Bldg. Materials Corp. of Am., 254 F.R.D. 216, 227 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (holding that even after 
FRE 502, “[a]n understandable desire to minimize costs of litigation and to be frugal in spending 
a client’s money cannot be an after-the-fact excuse for a failed screening of privileged 
documents.”). 
1172 See Stamps.com, Inc. v. Endicia, Inc., No. CV 06–7499–ODW, 2008 WL 11338241, at 
*2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2008) (quoting S. Rep. 110–264, at 2 (2008)) (first case applying FRE 502 
explaining Congressional purpose); Cross & Nagendra, supra note 14, at 1 (“Capturing the 
specific details about each document to prepare a defensible log is akin to writing a phone book, 
in terms of its structure, detail, and the joy the task brings to the authors.”); id. at 7; see also 
sources cited supra note 15 (elaborating on the disproportionate efforts and costs occasioned by 
former waiver doctrine). 
1173 See Correll, supra note 6, at 1068–71; Murphy, supra note 14, at 238 (“Rule 502 is not 
a ‘get-out-of- jail-free’ provision for attorneys. Thus far, there has not been any evidence of cost 
savings.”); Cavaneau, supra note 14, at 12 (“These considerations will lead counsel, in many 
cases, to advise a painstaking and expensive pre-production review of relevant materials”). 
1174 See Cross & Nagendra, supra note 14, at 7. 
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philosophically sound rule of Mendenhall, FRE 502(b) has failed to achieve the 
economies it sought.1175 
On the other hand, FRE 502(a) has mitigated the grossly disproportionate regime 
of subject matter waiver applied at times before its advent.1176 Even the harsh district 
court of the D.C. Circuit has admitted as much: “an inadvertent disclosure no longer 
carries with it the cruel cost of subject-matter waiver.”1177 So too in the severe Federal 
Circuit: the rule “is limited to situations in which a party intentionally puts protect 
information into the litigation in a selective, misleading, and unfair manner. It follows 
that an inadvertent disclosure of protected information can never result in a subject 
matter waiver.”1178  Commentators on the rule have thus predicted hopefully that the 
rule “may finally knockout the much-dreaded subject matter waiver bugaboo.”1179 
Yet the manifest ambiguity of FRE 501(a) has allowed a vestigial school of harsh 
waiver to persist with intentional disclosures as though the rule’s guarantee of fairness 
had not come along at all, reflexively imposing broad waivers absent some saving 
grace.1180 And without direction from the courts of appeals, parties cannot know 
whether their court will adhere to the majority view or chart a more dangerous 
course.1181 
Moreover, serious challenges remain even as to subject matter waiver based on a 
legacy of entangled waiver doctrines. By applying itself only to disclosures, FRE 502 
purportedly left untouched such philosophically discrete doctrines as waiver by failure 
to object and by placing subject matter at issue in litigation.1182 Yet both of those 
 
1175 See generally Correll, supra note 6 (discussing economies of installing a Mendenhall-
like regime under FRE 502(d)). 
1176 See Explanatory Note on Evidence Rule 502, FED. R. EVID. 502(b) (revised Nov. 28, 
2007) (“The rule rejects the result in In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1989), which 
held that inadvertent disclosure of documents during discovery automatically constituted a 
subject matter waiver.”). 
1177 Amobi v. D.C. Dep’t of Corr., 262 F.R.D. 45, 52 (D.D.C. 2009); accord Trs. Of Elec. 
Workers Local No. 26 Pension Tr. Fund v. Tr. Fund Advisors, Inc., 266 F.R.D. 1, 10–16 (D.D.C. 
2010) (quoted supra note 446). 
1178 Oasis Int’l Waters, Inc. v. United States, 110 Fed. Cl. 87, 109 (Ct. Cl. 2013). 
1179 Correll, supra note 6, at 1081. 
1180 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 631. 
1181 See supra Section VI-A, e.g., De Los Santos v. City of Roswell, No. 12-375, 2013 WL 
12330083, at *5 (D.N.M. June 26, 2013) (describing how a judge considered both subject-
matter-waiver approaches before, absent appellate direction, making his own decision as to 
which he wanted to follow). 
1182 See Explanatory Note on Evidence Rule 502, FED. R. EVID. 502(b) (revised Nov. 28, 
2007) (noting the rule “does not purport to supplant applicable waiver doctrine generally”); 
Statement of Congressional Intent Regarding Rule 502 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 154 
CONG. REC. H7818–H7819 (Sept. 8, 2008); e.g., Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. 
Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 218 F. Supp. 3d 197, 201 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (explaining the rule does 
not displace waiver by failure to object); McLoughlin, Bloomfield, Miller & Mercer, supra note 
14, at 726. 
161Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2020
798 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [68:637 
 
doctrines usually arise from disclosures, where FRE 502 does govern and displace 
prior law.1183 For example, any disclosed document may later become an exhibit at 
deposition or at trial: even if no waiver arises from disclosure, inordinate expenditures 
may remain necessary to avoid privileged documents being introduced and thus 
waiving the privilege notwithstanding inadvertence.1184 Even under FRE 502 itself, 
an overly demanding test for depositions is unsound.1185 One court ordering waiver 
admitted that the producing party demanded return of the privileged memorandum at 
the end of the deposition.1186 Indeed, counsel objected during the deposition, but the 
objection was held inadequate because it cited mediation rather than attorney-client 
privilege.1187 Moreover, scolded the court, counsel had not peppered the record with 
objections to every subsequent question, or “attempt[ed] to get the court on the phone 
to resolve the issue.”1188 Although there was no question of inadvertence, remediation 
under FRE 502(b)(3) was found lacking.1189 
Similarly, disclosures of information in negotiations, filings, and open court 
inherently put some topic into play; how is FRE 502 to have any operation if the party 
challenging privilege can claim privilege waived on all related matters not by the 
disclosure per se but because the “subject matter” was put at issue?1190 Pinho, it may 
be recalled, invoked a fear of perjury to allow counsel to testify whether his client had 
 
1183 See FED. R. EVID. 502(b) advisory committee’s note to 2008 amendment (“The rule is 
not intended to displace or modify federal common law concerning waiver of privilege or work 
product where no disclosure has been made.”) (emphasis added). 
1184 See cases cited supra notes 699–700, 705; cf. Noyes, supra note 14, at 759 (“For 
example, assume that the document containing privileged information is used at a deposition 
and the Producing Party fails to object to the use of privileged information. Has the privilege 
been waived, even if the court previously entered a 502(d) order?”). 
1185 See Noyes, supra note 14, at 758–59. 
1186 Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Owlett & Lewis, P.C., 297 F.R.D. 232, 241 (M.D. Pa. 2013). 
1187 Id. at 241–42. 
1188 Id. Most courts, needless to say, are not eager to be haled onto the phone for every 
objection lodged at a deposition. 
1189 Id. 
1190 See McLoughlin, Bloomfield, Miller & Mercer, supra note 14, at 726–29; cf. N. River 
Ins. Co. v. Phila. Reins. Corp., 797 F. Supp. 363, 371 (D.N.J. 1992) (“The Remington Arms 
court convincingly rejected this ground for abrogating the attorney-client privilege by 
explaining that such a construction of the ‘in issue’ doctrine would seemingly apply to any 
litigant offering evidence in a case on any issue that he has discussed with his attorney, and 
would drastically alter the traditional boundaries of the privilege.”) (citing Remington Arms Co. 
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 142 F.R.D. 408, 415–416 (D. Del. 1992)). This author does not mean 
to challenge cases where the content of the privileged relationship is dispositive, as in a claim 
of inadequate advice of counsel or malpractice, e.g., Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. v. Tri-Links Inv. 
Tr., 837 N.Y.S.2d 15, 23 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (legal malpractice); see McLoughlin, 
Bloomfield, Miller & Mercer, supra note 14, at 724–25, but where some particular conversation 
with counsel is collaterally implicated, as in the ensuing example. 
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in fact discussed a certain matter she had squarely denied discussing under oath.1191 
But an FRE-502-era court transmuted such logic into freewheeling subject-matter 
waiver in holding all conversations with counsel during the relevant period waived 
because the client had entered a declaration to the court that he had not discussed a 
particularized topic with counsel.1192 Another thought that waiver from a disclosed 
opinion in a patent case evaded FRE 502(a) entirely because “the rules state that in 
this specific area of patent law, there is a broad subject-matter waiver that is not subject 
to fairness balancing as applied elsewhere in the rules.”1193 But what the court quoted 
was the Statement of Congressional Intent,1194 not the rule,1195 and in any event, the 
Statement seemingly suggests that FRE 502(a)(3) does provide the proper schema of 
analysis, albeit not in so many words.1196 As intimated in discussing selective 
clawbacks, the interplay between disclosure under FRE 502 and the use of that 
disclosure is less than pellucid.1197 
Modesty has long been rightly held a virtue in those charged with administering 
the law,1198 but in declining to promulgate a more comprehensive regime addressing 
waiver of privilege in all its circumstances,1199 FRE 502 left dangerously uncertain 
exemptions from its protections that undermine its efficacy in reducing the burdens of 
discovery.1200 So too is prudence a virtue,1201 but the incrementalism and reflexive 
 
1191 United States v. Pinho, 2003 WL 2577243, at *3–4 (E.D. Pa. July 2, 2003) (discussed 
supra notes 1033–1040 and accompanying text). 
1192 See Hughes v. Abell, No. 09-0220, 2012 WL 13054819, at *3–5 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2012) 
(discussed supra note 451–452 and accompanying text). 
1193 Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Alcon Labs., Inc., No. 15-525, 2017 WL 3013249, at *2–3 (D. 
Del. July 14, 2017). 
1194 Id. 
1195 See Bear Republic Brewing Co. v. Cent. City Brewing Co., 275 F.R.D. 43, 48–49 (D. 
Mass. 2011). 
1196 Statement of Congressional Intent Regarding Rule 502 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
154 CONG. REC. H7818–H7819 (Sept. 8, 2008) (“One situation in which this issue arises, the 
assertion as a defense in patent-infringement litigation that a party was relying on advice of 
counsel, is discussed elsewhere in this Note. In this and similar situations, under subdivision 
(a)(1) the party using an attorney-client communication to its advantage in the litigation has, in 
so doing, intentionally waived the privilege as to other communications concerning the same 
subject matter . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
1197 See supra notes 1161–1166 and accompanying text. 
1198 See SIR PHILIP WARWICK, RULES OF GOVERNMENT: A TRUE BALANCE BETWEEN 
SOVEREIGNTY AND LIBERTY 45–47 (Bernard Lintott 1710). 
1199 See Broun & Capra, supra note 9, at 258–60. 
1200 See Correll, supra note 6, at 1070–71; Noyes, supra note 14, at 760; Outlaw, supra note 
14, at 8. 
1201 See WARWICK, supra note 1198, at 52–53; e.g., United States v. Harris, 154 F.3d 1082, 
1085 (9th Cir. 1998) (Noonan, J., concurring). 
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adherence to past practice recommended by the precautionary principle can be a 
stumbling block as well.1202 Ralph Waldo Emerson, that great philosopher of the 
natural virtues, denounced a “foolish consistency” maintained by statesmen,1203 yet 
his renowned bon mot cuts both ways: in order to craft a more consistently sound 
privilege, a good measure of (thoughtful) inconsistency is required to break from the 
past.1204 Although much progress has been made, especially in diluting the venom of 
subject-matter waiver,1205 a yet longer road beckons on the perhaps quixotic quest for 
the perfect realization of age-old privilege.1206 
VII. A RECOMMENDATION FOR THE FUTURE APPLICATION OF FRE 502 
Nevertheless, the preceding Part is more philosophical and thus aspirational; what 
remains is the law as it exists today. Imagining another revolution in privilege law in 
the offing would disregard the history of desultory advancements over the meandering 
path of progress to date.1207 To distill into a concise set of principles the various 
 
1202 See Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 653 (1980); 
CTIA v. San Francisco, 827 F. Supp. 1054, 1060–61 (N.D. Cal. 2011); In re Kukui (Molokai), 
Inc., 174 P.3d 320, 338–39 (Haw. 2007). 
1203 RALPH WALDO EMERSON, THE ESSAY ON SELF-RELIANCE 23 (Roycrofters 1908) (“A 
foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers 
and divines. With consistency a great soul has simply nothing to do. He may as well concern 
himself with his shadow on the wall. Out upon your guarded lips! Sew them up with packthread, 
do. Else, if you would be a man, speak what you think to-day in words as hard as cannon-balls, 
and to-morrow speak what to-morrow thinks in hard words again, though it contradict 
everything you said to-day.”). It should go without saying that this author wishes merely to 
accord Emerson his due voice, rather than to cast aspersion on any statesman, philosopher, 
divine, or any other, holding in the highest esteem all those statesmen and jurists who have spent 
such time offering their best judgments on matters of privilege. 
1204 See, e.g., Gergacz, supra note 14, at 2 (“Case law has created three conflicting tests and 
even the one used by the majority of courts has predictability problems. Federal Rules of 
Evidence 502 was enacted to clear up the confusion. Unfortunately, some courts’ constructions 
of Rule 502 have sown the seeds, that if allowed to sprout, will entangle Rule 502 in its own 
variety of unpredictability and confusion. This article will replant the garden.”). 
1205 See supra notes 1176–1179 and accompanying text. 
1206 See Murphy, supra note 14, at 238 (“More work needs to be done, to ensure that clients, 
lawyers, and courts have reasonable ways to resolve conflicts in the digital age. Certainly Rule 
502 is an improvement over past law on the waiver of privileges and protections, but much work 
needs to be done to protect attorneys and their clients.”). 
1207 See Rice, Continuing Confusion, supra note 39, at 1005 (“Fortunately, the legal 
community is not dependent upon the glacial revision processes of either Congress or the 
Judicial Conference’s Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence. Privilege is the 
only subject within the Federal Rules of Evidence that was left to develop under the common 
law. Therefore, change, for better or for worse, will likely continue on a case-by-case basis.”). 
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suggestions and recommendations interlarded throughout the Article,1208 adoption of 
the best interpretations of the new regime under FRE 502, in light of reason and 
experience,1209 would entail the following— 
• The prongs testing intent in FRE 502(a)(1) and (b)(1) should be applied 
first, as the gateway to determining FRE 502’s treatment of a 
disclosure,1210 and each prong should 
o depend on subjective mental state and not be judged based on 
objective factors of reasonable precautions or remediation;1211 
and 
o be binary and exclusive, such that a discloser’s mental state is 
either intentional or inadvertent—i.e., not intentional—with no 
standard of negligence or recklessness;1212 and 
o assess the intent to waive a known privilege, not the intent to 
disclose, crucially rendering genuine mistakes of law as to 
privileged status inadvertent.1213 
• The latter prongs in FRE 502(b)(2)-(3) should be analyzed by an objective 
standard under the expansive precedent deriving from Hartford Fire, Lois 
Sportswear, and Hydraflow.1214 
o The reasonableness of precautions under FRE 502(b)(2) should 
not demand all possible reasonable precautions but rather take 
 
1208 One scholar attempted a similar undertaking in 2009 just after FRE 502 was passed, and 
this author has taken due note of many of the fine suggestions made there. See Meyers, supra 
note 9, at 1481–85. 
1209 See FED. R. EVID. 501; Rice, Continuing Confusion, supra note 39, at 1005 & n.133. 
1210 See Correll, supra note 6, at 1057 (“Again, though an obvious conclusion, it reflects a 
budding belief that each of these provisions can be seen as a discrete unit subject to their own 
case law and interpretive guidance. Therefore, the various provisions of the rule, or at least the 
operative provisions, may be seen as truly discrete rules notwithstanding their nominal 
combination under a single rule.”); see also Gergacz, supra note 14, at 10 (“One approach, 
called the ‘prerequisite approach,’ requires that the disclosure be deemed ‘inadvertent’ before 
the confidentiality safeguards that were in place or the steps taken after the disclosure are 
evaluated.”). 
1211 E.g., cases cited supra notes 493 & 548; see Grimm, Bergstrom & Kraueter, supra note 
14, ¶¶ 36–38. Contra, e.g., cases cited supra note 544. 
1212 E.g., cases cited supra notes 554, 566 & 568. But see, e.g., cases cited supra note 544. 
1213 E.g., cases cited supra note 577; see also Cross & Nagendra, supra note 14, at 2; Grimm, 
Bergstrom & Kraueter, supra note 14, ¶¶ 26–27; Gergacz, supra note 14, at 16. Contra, e.g., 
cases cited supra note 573. 
1214 E.g., cases cited supra note 537; see also sources cited supra note 535. But see, e.g., 
Roe v. St. Louis Univ., No. 4:08CV1474, 2010 WL 199948, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 14, 2010); see 
also sources cited supra note 536. 
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into account the size and speed of the production schedule to 
accurately assess the burdens on the producing party.1215 
o The reasonableness of remediation under FRE 502(b)(3) should 
evaluate promptness from both actual notice of and constructive 
knowledge of likely errors,1216 but should not be judged by 
hindsight,1217 and should require only practical punctuality 
under the circumstances, not virtual immediacy.1218 
o Clawbacks should be denied where the initial production was 
inadvertent when pattern or practice indicates the producing 
party’s attempt to gain tactical advantage or effect unfairly 
selective disclosure, rendering the party’s remediation 
unreasonable.1219 
o Sharp and unfair tactics by the receiving party in abetting or 
concealing inadvertent disclosures should weigh 
commensurately against finding inadvertent waiver, as such 
behavior mitigates any unreasonableness of the producing 
party’s conduct.1220 
• The latter prongs in FRE 502(a)(2)–(3) should be satisfied with 
particularity to support a subject matter waiver; only where a disclosure 
is selective, misleading, and unfair in light of related undisclosed material 
should any subject matter waiver arise.1221 
• The language of an order or agreement under FRE 502(d) or (e) should 
be applied as entered or executed, without embroidery by the court to 
reflect best practices or notions of fairness, because such writings are 
 
1215 FED. R. EVID. 502(b) advisory committee’s note to 2008 amendment (specifying factors 
regarding size and time); e.g., Coburn Grp., LLC v. Whitecap Advisors LLC, 640 F. Supp. 2d 
1032, 1040 (N.D. Ill. 2009); cases cited supra note 537. Contra Relion, Inc. v. Hydra Fuel Cell 
Corp., No. CV06-607-HU, 2008 WL 5122828, at *2–3 (D. Or. Dec. 4, 2008). See generally 
Correll, supra note 6, at 1052-53 (comparing and contrasting Coburn and Relion). 
1216 E.g., cases cited supra notes 683 & 687. 
1217 E.g., cases cited supra note 696. 
1218 E.g., cases cited supra note 702. Contra, e.g., cases cited supra note 700–701. 
1219 E.g., In re Recombinant DNA Tech. Patent & Contract Litig., MDL No. 912, 1994 WL 
270712, at *40–41 (S.D. Ind. 1993); cases cited supra notes 721 & 1164. 
1220 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 740, 742 & 745. But see also sources cited supra note 
1103. 
1221 E.g., cases cited supra notes 622–623; see also sources cited supra note 641. Contra, 
e.g., cases cited supra note 631; see also Correll, supra note 6, at 1056 (“This methodology 
fatally undermines the twin goals of cost reduction and uniformity that underpin the rule.”). 
166https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol68/iss4/5
2020] FAILING TO KEEP THE CAT IN THE BAG 803 
relied upon—and bargained for at least in the case of 502(e)— by the 
parties, superseding the normative operation of waiver by disclosure.1222 
• Courts should continue to seek to apply standards of fairness analogous 
to FRE 502(a)(3) to extrajudicial disclosures to achieve parity,1223 and 
should consider subjecting interparty disclosures prior to litigation that 
are later used in litigation to standards analogous to FRE 502(b) in order 
to avoid gamesmanship.1224 
Although particular emphasis is laid on the guidance provided by the Advisory 
Committee,1225 these interpretive guidelines are proposed based on ease and 
straightforwardness of application, faithfulness to the rule’s stated purposes, 
assessment of trends and reasoning in the district courts, scholarly commentary, and, 
in the end, this author’s humble opinions on equity and fair play. The opinions that 
ultimately matter in creating consistency, of course, are those of the courts of appeals 
and Supreme Court.1226 Regardless of whether these or other rules of decision are 
adopted, the future force of privilege rests in the hands of the appellate judges 
oathbound for life to provide the fidelity, uniformity, and predictability that the law of 
privilege has for so long been held to demand.1227 
CONCLUSION 
One might be forgiven, after the profusion of allusions to swords, shields, jewels, 
and mythical monsters, to imagine the subject of privilege to be some sort of 
swashbuckling adventure undertaken by lawyers voyaging the heady seas of 
jurisprudence. Swashbuckling it may be—on account of the dangerously enigmatic 
 
1222 E.g., cases cited supra note 799; see also Correll, supra note 6, at 1060; Grimm, 
Bergstrom & Kraueter, supra note 14, ¶¶ 77–79. Contra, e.g., Irth Sols., LLC v. Windstream 
Commc’ns LLC, No. 2:16-cv-219, 2017 WL 3276021, at *9–13 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 2, 2017); cases 
cited supra notes 808 & 815. 
1223 E.g., cases cited supra note 870. 
1224 See Eden Isle Marina, Inc. v. United States, 89 Fed. Cl. 480, 500–02 & n.20 (Fed. Cl. 
2009). Contra De Los Santos v. City of Roswell, No. 12-375, 2013 WL 12330144, at *6–7 
(D.N.M. May 21, 2013), objs. overruled, 2013 WL 12330083 (D.N.M. June 26, 2013). 
1225 See, e.g., De Los Santos v. City of Roswell, No. 12-375, 2013 WL 12330083, at *5 
(D.N.M. June 26, 2013) (quoted supra note 639); Cross & Nagendra, supra note 14, at 2 (“Many 
courts have looked to the Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 502 for guidance”); Correll, supra 
note 6, at 1050, 1055 (observing courts interpreting FRE 502(a) and (b) have exhibited 
“extraordinary” reliance on and afforded “unusual and disproportionate” weight to the Advisory 
Committee note); Grimm, Bergstrom & Kraueter, supra note 14, ¶ 21. But see Bear Republic 
Brewing Co. v. Cent. City Brewing Co., 275 F.R.D. 43, 49 (D. Mass. 2011) (discounting 
guidance of the Advisory Committee). 
1226 See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 14, at 232 (“Hopefully appellate courts will 
enthusiastically endorse agreements amongst the parties; this will lead to cost savings and 
predictability—the very reasons for the creation and addition of Rule 502 to the Federal Rules 
of Evidence.”). 
1227 See cases cited supra note 191. 
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precedential territory in which it occurs.1228 But privilege is fundamental to the rights 
of citizens, long predating the Constitution itself,1229 and ought not be the uncharted 
expanse at the periphery of jurisprudence whereon is scrawled “here be dragons” and 
aught more, an ocean only sailed by courageous explorers.1230 Scylla and Charybdis 
may have been partly tamed, but a new generation of monsters hungrily awaits unwary 
seafarers.1231 The promise of FRE 502 was to commission cartographers to map those 
distant tides and install the comfortable and predictable machinery of the law.1232 That 
potential has not yet been realized, in roughly equal measures because of unchecked 
judicial momentum, a dearth of guidance from controlling authorities, and ambiguities 
in the text of the rule itself.1233 As one article grimly predicted in 2012, exploring the 
inherent tensions and contradictions in FRE 502’s application “is therefore necessary 
because navigating these waters may be an uncertain enterprise for a long time.”1234 
Beyond the swords, shields, and other allegorical folderol, there is the eternal cat. 
Odd it is that the preferred—indeed, nigh ubiquitous—metaphor for privilege itself is 
the cat.1235 Courts might as well have chosen a mythological creature akin to Scylla 
 
1228 See McLoughlin, Bloomfield, Miller & Mercer, supra note 14, at 705–06; id. at 751–
52; Meyers, supra note 9, at 1446–47. 
1229 See Imwinkelried, supra note 14, at 168–69 (quoting Rules of Evidence: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Reform of Fed. Criminal Laws of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93th Cong. 
142, 143-44 (1973) (testimony of Hon. Arthur H. Goldberg)); RICE, ACPITUS, supra note 39, 
§§ 1:1-4; see also Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr., An Historical Perspective on the Lawyer-Client 
Privilege, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 1061, 1071–72 (1978) (discussing history of the attorney-client 
privilege); Max Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communication Between Lawyer and 
Client, 16 CALIF. L. REV. 487, 487–89 (1928) (same); cf. Sunshine, Uncertain Junction, supra 
note 36, at 547-48 (discussing Hazard and Radin). 
1230 Meeri Kim, Oldest Globe to Depict the New World May Have Been Discovered, WASH. 
POST, Aug. 19, 2013 (“The globe’s lone sentence, above the coast of Southeast Asia, is ‘Hic 
Sunt Dracones.’ ‘“Here be dragons,” a very interesting sentence,’ said Thomas Sander, editor 
of the Portolan, the journal of the Washington Map Society . . . . ‘In early maps, you would see 
images of sea monsters; it was a way to say there’s bad stuff out there.’”). 
1231 Compare supra Section I-C with Section VI-C. 
1232 See Broun & Capra, supra note 9, at 271–73. 
1233 See McLoughlin, Bloomfield, Miller & Mercer, supra note 14, at 751–52 (concluding 
that the strict and lenient schools essentially persevered in their preexisting philosophies); 
Grimm, Bergstrom & Kraueter, supra note 14, at ¶ 99 (“The framework exists for Rule 502 to 
function as intended, but thus far it has not fulfilled its purpose, mainly because parties have 
overlooked it and courts have not construed it consistently with its purpose—or consistently 
with each other—such that counsel and litigants are left without the protections and uniform set 
of standards that the rule should provide.”). 
1234 McLoughlin, Bloomfield, Miller & Mercer, supra note 14, at 706. 
1235 See, e.g., Al Odah v. United States, 559 F.3d 539, 544 (D.C. Cir. 2009); In re Napster, 
Inc. Copyright Litig., 479 F.3d 1078, 1088 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted), abrogated by 
Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 105–09 (2009); United States v. Philip Morris, 
Inc., 314 F.3d 612, 619–620 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 251 
(D.C. Cir. 1998)), abrogated by Mohawk, 558 U.S. at 105–09; In re Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 
954, 963 (3d Cir. 1997), abrogated by Mohawk, 558 U.S. at 105–09; Reise v. Bd. of Regents, 
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and Charybdis: “letting the proverbial genie out of the bottle.”1236 Or they might have 
looked to another farmyard animal in likening waived privilege to the legendary 
equine escapee, after which locking the barn or stable door accomplishes nothing.1237 
Those of a more meditative bent might see once-confidential material in the hands of 
the adversary as “water over the dam” or “water under the bridge”—in either case, 
insusceptible of return.1238 Also available to courts preferring inanimate subjects as 
metaphors is the temporally impossible unringing of the bell.1239 One court of appeals, 
after citing the cat, professed there were more vivid alternatives to its favored allusion: 
“[m]ore colorfully, there is no way to unscramble the egg scrambled by the disclosure; 
the baby has been thrown out with the bath water.”1240 Nevertheless, it is to the cat 
that courts perennially return in describing that most elusive of entities, the privilege 
itself.1241 
“But”—at the risk of rousing a zombified corpse of Sealed Case, which uttered the 
phrase—“that is as it should be.”1242 The cat is a superlative symbol of treacherous 
uncertainty.1243 Look, for instance, to Schrödinger’s cat, existing in an indeterminate 
 
957 F.2d 293, 295 (7th Cir. 1992); Carter v. Gibbs, 909 F.2d 1450, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1990); In re 
Von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94, 103 (2d Cir. 1987); In re Katz, 623 F.2d 122, 124 (2d Cir. 1980). The 
list could go on at great length—not least by the inclusion of district courts—but at 1235 
overstuffed footnotes and counting, this Article will practice a rare parsimony. 
1236 Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377 F.3d 133, 144 (2d Cir. 2004) (“The genie is out of 
the bottle, albeit because of what we consider to be the district court’s error. We have not the 
means to put the genie back.”); In re Subpoena No. 22, 709 A.2d 385, 392 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) 
(addressing context of waiver of psychiatrist-patient privilege with the metaphor); Noyes, supra 
note 14, at 679 (“May a federal court enter an order with retroactive effect—to put the waiver 
genie back in the privilege bottle?”). 
1237 Cf. United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 137 (2d Cir. 1979) (“Cases need not be cited 
to prove the adage of the futility of locking the barn door after the horse has escaped.”); Sykes 
v. Jenny Wren Co., 78 F.2d 729, 735 (D.C. Cir. 1935) (“It is the equivalent of locking the stable 
door after the horse is gone.”). 
1238 Cf. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 545 (1991) (White, J., 
concurring) (“Third, even if—as JUSTICE O’CONNOR now argues—the Court was quite wrong 
in doing so, post, at 553–559, that is water over the dam, irretrievably it seems to me.”); Minn. 
Assoc. of Nurse Anesthetists v. Allina Health Sys. Corp., 276 F.3d 1032, 1053 (8th Cir. 2002) 
(“water under the bridge”). 
1239 FDIC v. Singh, 140 F.R.D. 252, 253 (D. Me. 1992). 
1240 In re Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954, 963 (3d Cir. 1997). 
1241 See cases cited supra note 1235. 
1242 In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
1243 Cf. M.A. Pershina, English and Spanish Phraseological Units with Zoonimal 
Component «cat»/«gato», 3 ВОПРОСЫ ТРАНСФОРМАЦИИ ОБРАЗОВАНИЯ [LINGUISTICS AND 
INTERCULT. COMMC’N] 226, 229 (2016) (noting “the cat symbolizes deception, fraud and 
cheating”); id. at 230 (also noting “a cat represents two opposite concepts of trouble and luck”); 
Gertrude M. Yeager & Lisa Zimmerman, Introduction, in CONFRONTING CHANGE, 
CHALLENGING TRADITION: WOMEN IN LATIN AMERICAN HISTORY xi, xiii (“In traditional 
folktales the cat symbolizes evil, treachery, and cunning.”) (Gertrude Yeager ed. SR Books 
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state of simultaneous life and unlife, death and undeath, awaiting the observation of a 
decisive observer to determine its fate.1244 This is an animal well known to the 
judiciary, as narrated by the Seventh Circuit: “In a famous gedanken experiment of 
quantum mechanics, Schrodinger’s [sic] cat remains suspended between life and death 
in a box, neither alive nor dead until the box is opened and uncertainty about the decay 
of a radioactive particle is resolved.”1245 What better metaphor could there be for 
privilege—perhaps waived, perhaps preserved—awaiting opening of that black box 
and a judgment as to its validity?1246 Under the current regime, decisions are to be 
made on a case-by-case basis, and thus it is the contemporaneous predilection of 
whichever judge happens to inherit the motion that will determine the crucial decision 
as to whether the privilege (or cat) lives or dies.1247 
Spare also a thought for the Cheshire Cat of Lewis Carroll’s Wonderland, by 
whose words Alice’s hopes to avoid consorting with madmen were shattered, because 
“you can’t help that . . . we’re all mad here. I’m mad. You’re mad.”1248 Such hopes 
are oft similarly forlorn for those seeking predictability or even lucidity in the often 
freewheeling application of privilege law.1249 One might consider too the Cat’s 
sagacious advice to Alice that “it doesn’t matter” which road she takes if she didn’t 
 
1994); see also Kamran Pashaei Fakhri, Rogayeh Mahmudivand Bakhtiari & Parvaneh 
Adelzadeh, Sanctity and Malevolence of Cat in World Mythology and Persian Prose and Verse, 
ARABIAN J. BUS. MGMT. REV., vol.1, no. 7 (2013); SANDRA CHORON, HARRY CHORON & ARDEN 
MOORE, PLANET CAT: A CAT-ALOG 15, (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt 2007) (listing eighteen 
concepts that the cat symbolizes). 
1244 Erwin Schrödinger, Die Gegenwärtige Situation in der Quantenmechanik, 23 DIE 
NATURWISSENSCHAFTEN 807–12, 823–28, 844–49 (1935); see also TKO Equip. v. C&G Coal 
Co., 863 F.2d 541, 545 (7th Cir. 1988) (discussing same); Denke v. Shoemaker, 198 P.3d 284, 
302 n.2 (Mont. 2008) (same); Hardin Cty. Schs. v. Foster, 40 S.W.3d 865, 872 & n.6 (Ky. 2001) 
(same). 
1245 E.g., TKO, 863 F.2d at 545; accord, e.g., Mont. Cannabis Ind. Ass’n v. Montana, 286 
P.3d 1161, 1170 n.3 (Mont. 2012); Denke, 198 P.3d at 302 n.2; Hardin, 40 S.W.3d at 872 & 
n.6. 
1246 See Surgery Ctr. at 900 N. Mich. Ave., LLC v. Am. Physicians Assurance Corp., 317 
F.R.D. 620, 632 (N.D. Ill. 2016); Berg Elecs., Inc. v. Molex, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 261, 263 (D. 
Del. 1995). 
1247 See supra notes 1135–1142 and accompanying text. 
1248 LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 90 (Lee & Shephard 1869). 
1249 See, e.g., In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 
294–95 (6th Cir. 2002) (“The prevailing view is that once a client waives the privilege to one 
party, the privilege is waived en toto. However, as evidenced by the instant case, some courts 
have recognized that a client may ‘selectively’ waive the privilege. And, unfortunately, ‘the 
case law addressing the issue of limited waiver [is] in a state of “hopeless confusion.”’ Indeed, 
as will be discussed infra, some courts have even taken internally inconsistent opinions.”) 
(citations and lineation omitted); see also BankDirect Capital Fin., LLC v. Capital Premium 
Fin., Inc., 326 F.R.D. 176, 182–83 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (noting that “courts have reached varied 
results in assessing whether and when communications with a third-party consultant assisting 
the client results in a waiver of the attorney-client privilege” and that such judgments are based 
on a “complex inquiry based on intractable factual variables”). 
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much care where she ended up so long as it was somewhere: “you’re sure to do that . 
. . if you only walk long enough.”1250 Such counsel might be equally apt to the many 
district courts selecting amongst clashing interpretations of FRE 502’s various 
subparts without appellate guidance.1251 At least one, attempting to unpack ramified 
layers of inconsistent arguments regarding privilege, has found itself empathizing with 
Alice: “It then gets, as Alice in Wonderland put it, ‘curioser and curioser.’”1252 Like 
privilege at times,1253 just when one thinks one has a firm grasp on it, the Cat vanishes, 
 
1250 CARROLL, supra note 1248, at 89–90; cf. Sowsonicut v. Roosevelt City, No. 2:03-cv-
676, at *17 (D. Utah Mar. 29, 2005), https://casetext.com/case/sowsonicut-v-roosevelt-city-2 
(“It is as if Plaintiffs have come to a fork in the road and do not know which way to go. Perhaps 
then, as the wise Cheshire cat eloquently stated in Lewis Carroll’s timeless classic Alice in 
Wonderland, ‘it doesn't matter.’”). 
1251 See, e.g., In re Testosterone Replacement Therapy Prod. Litig., 301 F. Supp. 3d 917, 
924–25 (N.D. Ill. 2018); United States v. Broombraugh, No. 14-40005-10, 2017 WL 2734636, 
at *4 (D. Kan. June 26, 2017); De Los Santos v. City of Roswell, No. 12-375, 2013 WL 
12330083, at *5 (D.N.M. June 26, 2013). 
1252 Intervet, Inc. v. Merial Ltd., 252 F.R.D. 47, 52 (D.D.C. 2008) (“Thus, in the perfect 
converse of the ordinary situation, the titular holder of the privilege, Intervet, is insisting that 
the documents are not privileged while Merial is insisting they are. It then gets, as Alice in 
Wonderland put it, ‘curioser and curioser;’ Intervet, claiming that Exhibits 64 and 67 are not 
privileged, nevertheless ‘clawed them back’ under a provision of a Protective Order, pertaining 
to the production of privileged material. It then produced them in a redacted form, even though 
Merial had already seen them in an unredacted form, and used them during the deposition.”). 
Alice in Wonderland did not in fact put it quite that way, for the court misspelt “curiouser,” 
perhaps understandably, as Carroll had invented the word, as he had so many others. See 
CARROLL, supra note 1248, at 15 (“‘Curiouser and curiouser!’ cried Alice (she was so much 
surprised, that for the moment she quite forgot how to speak good English).”). 
1253 See Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 16 (1933) (“A privilege surviving until the 
relation is abused and vanishing when abuse is shown to the satisfaction of the judge has been 
found to be a workable technique for the protection of the confidences of client and attorney.”); 
Ingo v. Koch, 127 F.2d 667, 672 (2d Cir. 1942) (“Many a privilege, however, is conditional: 
the privilege vanishes, being abused, if the purpose or intent of the conduct is not to further the 
interest which is the basis of the privilege.”); Alexander v. FBI, 193 F.R.D. 1, 9–10 (D.D.C. 
2000) (holding that “once a sufficient showing of a crime has been made, as it has here, ‘the 
privilege vanishes as to all material related to the ongoing violation.’”) (quoting In re Sealed 
Case, 676 F.2d 793, 811 n.67 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). 
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leaving only a mischievous grin behind.1254 And also like privilege,1255 this Cat has 
“very long claws and a great many teeth,” demanding a healthy respect.1256 
So, in the end, has FRE 502 actually advanced the voyage over the seas of 
privilege, or simply created more churn in the water? Ten years after its passage, a 
verdict remains elusive; indeed, it is improbable there will ever be a final verdict, for 
time will undoubtedly see future amendments and additions in this peculiar nexus 
where principles of privacy, rules of evidence, and standards of ethics intersect.1257 
Challenges to the underpinnings of privilege continue to mount. The Third Circuit 
observed that, in 2011 alone, some 1.8 zettabytes of data had been created1258—for 
those unfamiliar with that metric prefix, a zettabyte is one sextillion bytes, equating to 
383 quintillion (383,000,000,000,000,000,000) words,1259 or 2,788 trillion copies of 
the New Testament:1260 roughly four hundred thousand scriptures for every man, 
woman, and child then quick on Earth.1261 
FRE 502 represents just one of many modern forays to address such an 
incomprehensible order of magnitude.1262 Future technological advancements 
 
1254 CARROLL, supra note 1248, at 89 (“It looked good-natured, she thought: still it had very 
long claws and a great many teeth, so she felt that it ought to be treated with respect.”). 
1255 See Alexis N. Simpson, The Monster in the Closet: Declawing the Inequitable Conduct 
Beast in the Attorney-Client Privilege Arena, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 735, 743 n.56 (2009) (stating 
that FRE 502 “limit[s] waiver of attorney-client privilege for inadvertent disclosures and 
disclosures made in state proceedings, while giving teeth to court orders and party agreements 
governing the scope of the waiver”); id. at 735–36 (setting forth how present law has not yet 
declawed a principle of privilege waiver forced upon patent attorneys); cf. Nancy Leong, Note, 
Attorney Client Privilege in the Public Sector: A Survey of Government Attorneys, 20 GEO. J. 
L. & ETHICS 163, 186 (2007) (discussing how, although many localities have rules that moot 
privilege, it still has teeth in those that do not). 
1256 CARROLL, supra note 1248, at 89 (“It looked good-natured, she thought: still it had very 
long claws and a great many teeth, so she felt that it ought to be treated with respect.”). 
1257 See, e.g., Schaefer, supra note 14, at 232–60 (noting the intersection and proposing new 
standards). 
1258 Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 674 F.3d 158, 160 n.1 (3d Cir. 2012). 
1259 This assumes one character per byte and an average of 4.7 characters per word. See Joel 
Pynte & Alan Kennedy, An Influence over Eye Movements in Reading Exerted from Beyond the 
Level of the Word: Evidence from Reading English and French, 46 VISION RESEARCH 3786, 
3788 (2006). 
1260 A ready-made textual corpus, the NT Corpus, has conveniently counted the length of 
each book in the original Greek. See Helmut Pruscha, Statistical Models for Vocabulary and 
Text Length with an Application to the NT Corpus, 13 LITERARY & LINGUISTIC COMPUTING 195, 
196 (1998). 
1261 This figure takes the estimated human population of 2011 to be seven billion. WORLD 
POPULATION BUREAU, 2011 WORLD POPULATION DATA SHEET, https://www.prb.org/2011-
world-population-data-sheet-2/. 
1262 Race Tires, 674 F.3d at 160 n.1; Murphy, supra note 14, at 196–200; see Henry S. 
Noyes, Is E-Discovery So Different that It Requires New Discovery Rules? An Analysis of 
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unfathomable at present will surely revolutionize evidentiary discovery as much (if 
not more) as has the exponential bourgeoning of electronically stored information over 
the last three decades.1263 To the question of whether FRE 502 did the right thing, and 
whether everything will work out in the end, one can therefore only echo the answer 
of Alan Moore’s magnum opus Watchmen to such an enquiry: “Nothing ever 
ends.”1264 What remains certain is that the protection of privilege, an isomorphism of 
civil society’s protection of the individual, is worth the effort.1265 For all his inequable 
talents, Wigmore was only a waypoint, albeit a monumental one, towards the goal in 
view.1266 The quest for a more perfect privilege balancing the supreme goals of 
privacy and truth will go ever on, as it has for centuries.1267 The future, in short, 
promises many more decennial—and indeed centennial—assessments.1268 
 
* * * 
  
 
Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 71 TENN. L. REV. 585, 617–54 
(2004). 
1263 Some advances are already on the horizon, notably in artificial intelligence. See, e.g., 
Julie Sobowale, Beyond Imagination: How Artificial Intelligence Is Transforming the Legal 
Profession, 102 A.B.A. J. 47 (2016); Jason R. Baron, Law in the Age of Exabytes: Some Further 
Thoughts on “Information Inflation” and Current Issues In E-Discovery Search, XVII RICH. J. 
L. & TECH. 17 (2011); Jack G. Conrad, E-Discovery Revisited: The Need for Artificial 
Intelligence Beyond Information Retrieval, 18 ARTIFICIAL INTELL. & L. 321 (2010); Kevin D. 
Ashley & Will Bridewell, Emerging AI & Law Approaches to Automating Analysis and 
Retrieval of Electronically Stored Information in Discovery Proceedings, 18 ARTIFICIAL 
INTELL. & L. 311 (2010). 
1264 ALAN MOORE, DAVID GIBBONS & JOHN HIGGINS, WATCHMEN ch. 12, p.27 (DC Comics 
1987). 
1265 See Imwinkelried, supra note 14, at 168–69. 
1266 See id. at 172–76; Correll, supra note 6, at 1033–34. 
1267 See sources cited supra note 1229. 
1268 Cf., e.g., Felix J. Frankfurter, John Henry Wigmore: A Centennial Tribute, 58 NW. U. L. 
REV. 443, 443 (1964) (“I am grateful for the long, happy friendship that I had with John Henry 
Wigmore throughout my professional life, and am honored to pay tribute to that great man’s 
contribution to the law on the centennial of his birth.”). 
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